论国家权限与政府腐败

马克思主义者认为,国家是超出其他一切以维持和维护阶级统治和剥削为职能的一种机构。国家征税是权力当做资本的结果。国家通过征税参与剩余价值的分配,但国家权力资本分配财富不是无限的。在市场经济中,政府对于维护国家经济安全负有重要的责任。制度的腐败导致官员生活的腐化,对官员权力寻租的批判不应当脱离人的本性。     

Stochastic dominance and thick-tailed wealth distributions

Right-skewed and thick-tailed wealth distributions have been documented as an empirical regularity across space and time. A key mechanism for explaining these distributional features is proportional random growth. We investigate the comparative statics of a well-defined class of random growth models when allowing for stochastically ordered shifts in the wealth return process. An order-contingent monotone comparative statics property is identified, according to which pure increases in risk (e.g. higher volatility of capital returns) foster top wealth concentration whereas first-order stochastically dominated shifts in the return process (induced by e.g. proportional capital income taxation) rather lower inequality at the upper end of the distribution. Our analysis points to the potentially ambiguous effects on top wealth inequality of introducing or modifying capital income tax treatments in the presence of stochastic returns.     

Top Wealth Shares in Australia 1915–2012

Combining data from surveys, inheritance tax records, and rich lists, we estimate top wealth shares for Australia from World War I until the present day. We find that the top 1 percent share declined by two‐thirds from 1915 until the late 1960s, and rose from the late 1970s to 2010. The recent increase is sharpest at the top of the distribution, with the top 0.001 percent wealth share tripling from 1984 to 2012. The trend in top wealth shares is similar to that in Australian top income shares (though the drop in the first half of the twentieth century is larger for wealth than income shares). Since the early twentieth century, top wealth shares in Australia have been lower than in the U.K. and U.S.     

Parental Wealth and the Black–White Mobility Gap in the U.S.

Utilizing longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this paper examines the relationship between parental wealth and intergenerational income mobility for black and white families. I find that total parental wealth is positively associated with upward mobility for low‐income white families, but is not associated with reduced likelihood of downward mobility for white families from the top half of the income distribution. Conversely, I find that total parental wealth does not have the same positive association for low‐income black families, while home ownership may have negative associations with the likelihood of upward mobility for these families. However, for black families from the top half of the income distribution, home equity is associated with a decreased likelihood of downward mobility, suggesting a heterogeneous relationship between home ownership and mobility for black families.     

Estimating the marginal propensity to consume using the distributions of income,consumption, and wealth

Studies of economic inequality almost always separately examine income, consumption, and wealth inequality, and hence, miss the important synergy amongst the three measures explicit in the life-cycle budget constraint. These joint distributions, however, are important in evaluating macroeconomic impacts of changes in income because the response may differ across the wealth distribution. This heterogeneity in the response to income changes can have significant impact on the effectiveness of government fiscal policy. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1999–2013, we examine how the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) differs across the wealth distribution. We find that the MPC is lower at higher wealth quintiles, indicating that low wealth households cannot smooth consumption as much as other households. This implies that increasing wealth inequality likely reduces aggregate consumption, which, in turn, could limit economic growth.     

The Gender Wealth Gap in Europe: Application of Machine Learning to Predict Individual-level Wealth

This article provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 22 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The data on wealth are collected at the household level, while individual-level data are needed for the estimates of gender wealth gaps. We propose a novel approach using machine learning and model averaging methods to predict individual-level wealth data for multi-person households. Our results suggest that random forest performs best as the predicting tool for this exercise, outperforming elastic net and Bayesian model averaging. The estimated gender wealth gaps tend to be in favor of men, especially at the top of the wealth distribution. Men have 24 percent more wealth than women on average. We also find that a high home ownership rate is associated with a smaller country-level gender wealth gap. Our estimates suggest that the individual-level wealth inequality is on average 3 pp higher than the household-level wealth inequality in multi-member households.     

Effects of monetary and government spending policy on economic inequality

Using detailed micro-level income and expenditure data, we study the effects of monetary and government spending policy shocks on income and expenditure inequality in the US from 1990 to 2018. We find that expansionary monetary and government spending policy shocks systematically decrease income, disposable income and expenditure inequality. There is evidence of time variation on the effects and monetary policy and transfer payment shocks. Various impulse responses suggest that the impacts of the policy shocks increase during and after the Great Recession. The responses of income and expenditures of households at different percentiles suggest that expansionary monetary and government spending policy have a larger positive impact on households with low income and expenditures relative to those at the top of the distribution. We do not find evidence of the significant impact of Quantitative Easing policies on income inequality, however, expenditure inequality appear to increase due to the policies.     

WEALTH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY EFFECTS

This paper examines the permanent and transitory effects of changes in wealth, the top federal marginal income tax rate, and capital gains tax rate on the distribution of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). This paper establishes the importance of wealth in determining the distribution of AGI, and results here suggest that its effects can negate the permanent effect of a change in both tax rates. Of the two tax rates, the capital gains tax rate is the most important for AGI distribution. The marginal income tax rate is notably less important for long run behavior, but does have short run impacts.     

Multidimensional affluence: theory and applications to Germany and the US

This article suggests multidimensional affluence measures for the top of the distribution. In contrast to commonly used top income shares, they allow the analysis of the extent, intensity and breadth of affluence in several dimensions within a common framework. We illustrate this by analysing the role of income and wealth as dimensions of multidimensional well-being in Germany and the US in 2007 as well as for the US over the period 1989–2007. We find distinct country differences with the country ranking depending on the measure. While in Germany wealth predominantly contributes to the intensity of affluence, income is more important in the US.     

Politico-economic inequality and the comovement of government purchases

This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality for the comovement of government purchases with macroeconomic fluctuations. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model, where households value government purchases which are financed by income taxes. A key feature of the model is a wealth bias in the political aggregation process. When calibrated to U.S. wealth inequality and exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, such a model is able to generate weaker positive comovement of government purchases than models with no political wealth bias. The wealth bias that matches the cross-sectional campaign contribution distribution by income is consistent with the mild positive comovement of government purchases in the aggregate data. We thus provide an empirically relevant example where economic and political heterogeneity matter for aggregate dynamics.     

INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Drawing on the author's work, this lecture presents evidence on U.S. income and wealth inequality. It presents series for top income and wealth shares, and the distribution of economic growth by income groups. It discusses the mechanisms behind the evolution of U.S. income and wealth inequality from historical and comparative perspectives. It analyzes the role of public policy and in particular taxation in the evolution of inequality. (JEL D31, F66, J24)     

The Distribution of Wealth in Australia — A Survey*

This paper surveys and analyzes the available evidence on the distribution of wealth in Australia. On the basis of this evidence, it is argued that the cross-section distribution of personal wealth reveals considerable concentration in the top tail, with the top 1 per cent of adult individuals holding around 25 per cent of private wealth. The inequality of wealth revealed in the cross-section distribution among the top 10 per cent of wealth holders is not significantly reduced when adjustments are made to correct for life-cycle influences. Although the proportion of wealth held by the top 1 per cent of adult individuals has decreased sharply since World War I, the second to tenth percentiles have almost the same proportion in the 1960s and 1970s as in 1915.     

Behind rising inequality and falling growth

This paper investigates why the upsurge of top income shares has coincided with economic slowdowns in the US since the late 1970s. I argue that a fast-growing unearned income from ‘wealth residual’ – the unexplained increase in wealth that is not accompanied by any increase in real output – lies behind them. To support this hypothesis, I measure wealth residual from the national accounts and associated statistics, and then perform a set of panel regressions using a comprehensive panel dataset of the US at the state level. The estimation results demonstrate that the rapid growth of wealth residual during the last four decades has contributed to a co-evolution of fast-growing inequality and falling growth.     

TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1962–83 AND 1983–89

Using the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances, I find evidence of sharply increasing house-hold wealth inequality over this period. Whereas mean wealth increased by 23 percent in real terms, median wealth grew by only 8 percent. The share of the top one-half percentile rose by five percentage points, while the wealth of the bottom two quintiles showed an absolute decline. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.80 to 0.84. Almost all the growth in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealthholders. In contrast, the degree of wealth inequality was almost identical in 1983 as in 1962, and real wealth growth was more evenly distributed across the wealth distribution. There is also evidence that the sharp increase in wealth inequality from 1983 to 1989 was due to a correspondingly sharp rise in income inequality, the increase of stock prices relative to housing prices, and relatively slow inflation.     

Power laws in top wealth distributions: evidence from Canada

This article investigates Pareto power law (PPL) behavior at the top of the Canadian wealth distribution. To this end, Canadian Business data on the wealthiest 100 Canadians for the years 1999–2008 are used. The resulting estimates of the PPL exponent ranged from approximately 1.0 to 1.3 depending on the year of analysis and the estimation method used. These estimates are roughly comparable to those based on Forbes’ list of the wealthiest 400 Americans. Furthermore, whereas modified OLS and maximum likelihood estimates of the power law exponents conform to Zipf’s law, the OLS estimates do not. These results raise some concerns about deducing the magnitudes of and trends in the power law exponents based on a single estimation method and highlight the importance of extensive hypothesis testing for model adequacy. The battery of diagnostic tests pertaining to PPL behavior at the top of the Canadian wealth distribution yields some conflicting results.     

Mineral wealth and human capital accumulation: a nonparametric approach

This article uses a nonparametric approach to investigate the nexus between mineral wealth and human capital accumulation across countries. Higher mineral wealth is associated with elevated levels of human capital in a cross-section of countries. Matching the overall level of economic development and political instability and violence, weakens but does not reverse this conclusion. These results are economically significant. Moving up from the bottom to the top quartile for subsoil wealth per capita decreases illiteracy by ≈ 12% among young and adult females. Conversely, moving down from the top to the bottom quartile for subsoil wealth per capita decreases the average years of primary and total education by ≈ 1.5 years for females. Results are consistent with Hirschman's conjecture that enclave economies have weaker production linkages but stronger government revenue linkages than other activities. Most importantly, this article argues that caution should be exercised when discouraging countries from exploiting their mineral wealth, especially for countries where human capital is scarce.

I know, [there is] no safe depositary of the ultimate powers of society, but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.     

对增加居民财产性收入的探讨

创造条件让广大群众拥有财产性收入,是目前国内收入分配制度改革的一个重要方面,它的提出具有重要的理论和现实意义。我们既要看到财产性收入对提高居民收入的积极作用,也需防范其可能加剧贫富差距所产生的负面效应;既要充分发挥好政府“创造条件“的职能,也要认识到,财产性收入是一把双刃剑,只有采取相应政策加以适当调节,才能防止收入差距的进一步扩大,实现较为平均的财产性收入共享。     

THEORY OF THE STATE, GOVERNMENT TAX AND PURCHASING POLICY, AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Until recently, there has been virtually no discussion among professional economists of the impact of government expenditures on the distribution of income.¹ Neoclassical economics has traditionally shown little interest in distributional issues. Little is said beyond the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products. Micro economics is said to take a “neutral” stance with regard to distributional issues. Static efficiency of allocation is attainable for any income distribution, and consequently, so the parable goes, no income distribution is superior on purely economic grounds to any other. Macro economics also purports to be neutral with respect to distribution. Government expenditures in Keynes' model appear as an undifferentiated blob called “G”. The only interest macro economics takes in distribution issues is concerned with the marginal effect of redistribution on the marginal propensity to consume out of income. Keynesian economics, therefore, is unable to say whether one form of government expenditure is superior to another so long as both accomplish macro objectives. When orthodox economists have approached the issue of the government's distributional impact, they have until recently focused solely on its use of taxes and transfer payments. Public finance has traditionally ignored the expenditure side of state activity since, after all, government activity was a necessary evil, benefiting no one. Gillespie's path-breaking study in 1965 finally acknowledged the utility of government spending, but his analysis and those that have followed in the orthodox tradition have been hampered by a number of awkward premises. First, the orthodox studies of fiscal incidence implicitly accept the view of the government as a neutral arbiter rather than a protagonist of the dominant classes in society. Second, benefits of government services are assumed to be accurately measured by outlays. Thus, if we find that the government spends four times as much on highways as on police, it is assumed that the utility of highways is four times that of police even though one cannot even imagine the continuity of the status quo without the police while many responsible citizens argue that we should drastically curtail outlays on roads. Obviously, the utility of the police in terms of system maintenance exceeds that of the more expensive highway expenditures. Third, it is assumed that for each dollar spent by the government, only one person will benefit when, in fact, many disparate groups can benefit from the same expenditure. A dollar spent on education benefits the student as well as hislher employer. Fourth, Gillespie and his orthodox followers ignore any effect of the government on the pre-tax, pre-transfer distribution of income which they take as given. A hypothesis which we examine in this paper is that the government has an enormous influence over the shape of the pre-tax, pre-transfer income distribution. A more general criticism of previous studies of fiscal incidence is that they suffer from a poorly defined theory of the state. This assertion is most clzarly illustrated by the categorization in previous studies of a wide variety of public exp-enditures as “public goods” (such as national military expenditures). The benefits of these “public goods” are allocated among various income groups in several ways, for example on the basis of wealth ownership (both productive and consumptive) or on a per capita basis. The method of allocation chosen has enormous consequences for one's estimate of overall fiscal incidence. According to Herriot and Miller, those with incomes over $50,000 either receive a net benefit of 4.5 percent of their total income from the government or lose 42.1 percent, depending upon the allocation formula chosen for public goods. Previous studies have taken an agnostic position with respect to the appropriateness of the several allocative assumptions. But this is merely simple empiricism without theoreticai foundation, and thus the formulation of specific hypotheses which employ scientific procedures is impossible. What is needed to provide an interpretation of the data is a well-articulated theory of the state-an area to which we turn our attention in the next section of this paper.     

Technical Progress and Its Fruits: The Idea of Development in the Works of Raul Prebisch

The Seventeenth Communist Party National People's Congress in 2007 declared, for the first time, that the Chinese government would create conditions and opportunities to promote property income growth in order to enhance common prosperity. This new policy on the one hand helps to garner support for the further financial reform in China; but on the other hand, it entails potentially adverse impacts on economic equality in China, given the current configuration of income and wealth distribution, uneven process of financial development and other socio-economic structures. Employing the Institutionalist theory on property and distribution, this paper explores the impacts of institutions and institutional changes in the financial system on income and wealth inequality in China.     

Education for the masses? The interaction between wealth,educational and political inequalities

This paper presents a simple model of distribution dynamics, in which the distributions of wealth, education and political power are circularly endogenous. Different levels of education translate into different income and wealth levels. Political power may (or may not) vary with wealth, and in turn affects decisions on the level of public expenditure on education. Since the market for education credit is imperfect, some people might need to rely on public schooling, the quality of which depends on those expenditure levels. As a result, educational opportunities differ along the wealth distribution. The dynamic system displays multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by a vicious circle of interaction between educational, wealth and political inequalities. These particular equilibria, which are more unequal, are also shown to be inefficient in terms of aggregate output levels. Switching equilibria may be achieved through redistribution of political power.
JEL classification: D31, D63.