The performance and diversification benefits of funds of hedge funds

We examine the performance and diversification potential of 332 funds of hedge funds (FOHFs) for the period from January 1990 to May 2003. Consistent with prior studies, we find that FOHFs appear to underperform the hedge fund index on a risk-adjusted basis. However, FOHFs have characteristics that offset their apparent underperformance. Their returns do not suffer from negative skewness that is a feature of many hedge fund strategies. Relative to the hedge fund index, we find that FOHFs have lower correlations with stock indices in both bull and bear markets, making them a better diversification tool in equity portfolios. For bond portfolios, however, FOHFs have no diversification advantage over hedge fund indexing.     

The performance of hedge funds and mutual funds in emerging markets

Use of short selling and derivatives is limited in most emerging markets because such instruments are not as readily available as they are in developed capital markets. These limitations raise questions about the value added provided by hedge funds, especially compared to traditional mutual funds active in these markets. We use five existing performance measurement models plus a new asset-style factor model to identify the return sources and the alpha generated by both types of funds. We analyze subperiods, different market environments, and structural breaks. Our results indicate that some hedge funds generate significant positive alpha, whereas most mutual funds do not outperform traditional benchmarks. We find that hedge funds are more active in shifting their asset allocation. The higher degree of freedom that hedge funds enjoy in their investment style might thus be one explanation for the differences in performance.     

The performance of emerging hedge funds and managers

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.     

Information spillovers and performance persistence for hedge funds

We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004), the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition if informed investors were to partner with non-incumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.     

The leverage of hedge funds

Long–short hedge funds are often very highly levered, despite the costs of leverage that became apparent during the LTCM crisis in 1998 and the more recent episode in 2008. This note explores potential market imperfections that may explain the use of leverage.     

The economics of hedge funds

Hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation. Money flows, managerial restart options, and management ownership increase the importance of high-water-mark-based incentive fees but management fees remain the majority. Investors' valuation of fees are highly sensitive to their assessments of the manager's skill.     

Public hedge funds

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.     

Synthetic hedge funds

We provide evidence on the performance and the replication success of a broad sample of 72 synthetic hedge funds from January 2009 to December 2013. Thereby, we assign the term “synthetic hedge fund” to mutual funds and exchange-traded funds with hedge fund indices as their benchmarks. Replication success is measured through different perspectives from distributional characteristics to risk-adjusted performance. We find an overall significant underperformance of synthetic hedge funds compared to an appropriate benchmark index. Furthermore, mutual funds (associated with active portfolio management) can produce return characteristics closer to hedge fund benchmarks than exchange-traded funds (associated with passive management) can. From a single strategy perspective, we find a picture of heterogeneity. Regarding the market environment, we show larger return differences for unusual market conditions than for regular ones.     

Reviewing the hedge funds literature I: Hedge funds and hedge funds' managerial characteristics

This paper summarizes the literature on hedge funds (HFs) developed over the last two decades, particularly that which relates to managerial characteristics (a companion piece covers the return and risk management characteristics of HFs). It classifies, the current HF literature, suggesting which critical problems have been “solved” and which problems have not been yet adequately addressed. It also discusses the effects of past financial regulation and the prospects for the effect of new financial regulation on the HF industry and its performance and risk management practices, and suggests new avenues for research. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of managerial characteristics for HF performance, and the successes and the shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated HF-related risk management tools.     

CAPM option pricing

This paper extends the option pricing equations of [Black and Scholes, 1973] , [Jarrow and Madan, 1997] and [Husmann and Stephan, 2007] . In particular, we show that the length of the individual planning horizon is a determinant of an option’s value. The derived pricing equations can be presented in terms of the Black and Scholes [1973. Journal of Political Economy 81, 637–654] option values which ensures an easy application in practice.     

Regulatory induced performance persistence: Evidence from hedge funds

This paper tests the idea that financial regulation can impact performance persistence in the context of the hedge fund industry in 48 countries over the years 1994–2008. The data show evidence of three types of regulation influencing performance persistence: (1) minimum capital restrictions, which restrict lower quality funds and hence increase the likelihood of performance persistence, (2) restrictions on location of key service providers, which restrict human capital choices and hence tend to mitigate performance persistence, and (3) distribution channels, which make fund performance more opaque, decrease the likelihood of performance persistence. We do not find evidence that distribution channels, that promote fund presence to institutional investors, enhance performance persistence. Finally, we show differences in the effect of regulation on persistence by fund quartile ranking.     

The Italian hedge funds industry: An empirical analysis of performance and persistence

This study analyses Italian hedge funds performance and persistence. The peculiarity of the Italian hedge fund industry is that 95% of the hedge funds are funds of hedge funds (FoHF), whereas only 5% of them employ other investment styles. Using monthly data on FoHF provided by MondoHedge, we examine the impact of both market variables and funds’ own characteristics on funds performance using panel data. We find that the European, the Japanese and the emerging markets equity markets, and the commodity market have a positive impact on Italian FoHF performances, while the US Bond Market negatively affects them. Moreover, we find performance fees and notice days to have a negative impact on funds performances. Finally, we test the presence of performance persistence. Employing two different nonparametric methods, we find that funds performances are persistent on a monthly and quarterly basis, while the regression-based parametric method provides evidence of persistence only on a monthly basis.     

The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

Emerging market hedge funds: Do they perform like regular hedge funds?

In this study, we investigate whether the performance of emerging market hedge funds (EMHFs) follow a pattern similar to that reported for advanced market hedge funds. In contrast to the pre-2007 period, our results for the post-2006 period show that EMHFs exhibit performance patterns similar to those reported for hedge funds that focus on the developed markets. Unlike in the pre-2007 period, EMHFs in general do not exhibit significant exposure to specific asset classes in the post-2006 period. On a risk-adjusted basis, we find that EMHFs do not consistently outperform the benchmarks. The reported performance patterns may provide useful insights to both academics and portfolio managers.     

Mutual fund performance when parent firms simultaneously manage hedge funds

This study examines the performance of mutual funds managed by firms that simultaneously manage hedge funds. We find that the reported returns of mutual funds in these “side-by-side” associations with hedge funds significantly underperformed those of mutual funds that shared similar fund and family characteristics but differed in that they were not affiliated with hedge funds. Digging deeper into performance, we find that the underperformance was confined to return gaps, a return measure that captures the impact of unobservable managerial actions. Interestingly, mutual funds with investment styles that were most closely aligned to affiliated hedge funds generated reported-return alphas and return gaps that underperformed by the greatest amount. Finally, we find that side-by-side mutual funds received less of a contribution to performance from IPO underpricing than similar unaffiliated mutual funds or affiliated hedge funds. Evidence does not support the hypothesis that affiliations with hedge funds allow side-by-side mutual funds to attract superior stock-picking talent. Our evidence does not allow us to rule out the possibility that management firms maximized fee income by strategically transferring performance from mutual funds to hedge funds.     

Does the choice of performance measure influence the evaluation of hedge funds?

The Sharpe ratio is adequate for evaluating investment funds when the returns of those funds are normally distributed and the investor intends to place all his risky assets into just one investment fund. Hedge fund returns differ significantly from a normal distribution. For this reason, other performance measures for hedge fund returns have been proposed in both the academic and practice-oriented literature. In conducting an empirical study based on return data of 2763 hedge funds, we compare the Sharpe ratio with 12 other performance measures. Despite significant deviations of hedge fund returns from a normal distribution, our comparison of the Sharpe ratio to the other performance measures results in virtually identical rank ordering across hedge funds.     

Activist hedge funds and firm disclosure

This study examines whether firms' disclosure decisions are affected by the presence of activist hedge funds. Using a large sample of firms that experienced increases in ownership by activist hedge funds, we find that firms are more likely to cease providing financial guidance or reduce the information in the guidance in the quarter subsequent to new investment by activist hedge funds. These results hold even for firms that experienced good quarters and consistently provided guidance in previous quarters. Since guidance has been shown to be beneficial to capital market participants in many ways, reduced guidance has meaningful market implications. Our findings highlight a negative and possible unintended consequence of activist hedge funds' investment in firms, which provides some counterbalance to the numerous positive consequences documented in the prior literature on hedge fund activism.     

The role of hedge funds as primary lenders

We examine the role of hedge funds as primary lenders to corporate firms. We investigate both the reasons and the implications of hedge funds’ activities in the primary loan market. We examine the characteristics of firms that borrow from hedge funds and find that borrowers are primarily firms with lower profitability, lesser credit quality, and higher asymmetric information. Our results suggest that hedge funds serve as lenders of last resort to firms that may find it difficult to borrow from banks or issue public debt. We also examine the effect of hedge fund lending on the borrowing firms and find that borrowers’ profitability and creditworthiness improve subsequent to the loan. This beneficial effect of hedge fund lending is corroborated by our finding of positive abnormal returns for borrowers’ stocks around the loan announcement date. Overall, our findings are consistent with hedge funds adding value through their lending relationships and financial markets perceiving these activities as good news for the firms.     

Measuring the market impact of hedge funds

Hedge funds often employ opportunistic trading strategies on a leveraged basis. It is natural to find their footprints in most major market events. A “small bet” by large hedge funds can be a sizeable transaction that can impact a market. This study estimates hedge fund exposures during a number of major market events. In some episodes, hedge funds had significant exposures and were in a position to exert substantial market impact. In other episodes, hedge fund exposures were insignificant, either in absolute terms or relative to other market participants. In all cases, we found no evidence of hedge funds using positive feedback trading strategies. There was also little evidence that hedge funds systematically caused market prices to deviate from economic fundamentals.     

Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds

We study how incentive fees and manager’s own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund’s investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.