The performance of emerging hedge funds and managers

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.     

The performance of hedge funds and mutual funds in emerging markets

Use of short selling and derivatives is limited in most emerging markets because such instruments are not as readily available as they are in developed capital markets. These limitations raise questions about the value added provided by hedge funds, especially compared to traditional mutual funds active in these markets. We use five existing performance measurement models plus a new asset-style factor model to identify the return sources and the alpha generated by both types of funds. We analyze subperiods, different market environments, and structural breaks. Our results indicate that some hedge funds generate significant positive alpha, whereas most mutual funds do not outperform traditional benchmarks. We find that hedge funds are more active in shifting their asset allocation. The higher degree of freedom that hedge funds enjoy in their investment style might thus be one explanation for the differences in performance.     

Information spillovers and performance persistence for hedge funds

We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004), the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition if informed investors were to partner with non-incumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.     

The leverage of hedge funds

Long–short hedge funds are often very highly levered, despite the costs of leverage that became apparent during the LTCM crisis in 1998 and the more recent episode in 2008. This note explores potential market imperfections that may explain the use of leverage.     

The economics of hedge funds

Hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation. Money flows, managerial restart options, and management ownership increase the importance of high-water-mark-based incentive fees but management fees remain the majority. Investors' valuation of fees are highly sensitive to their assessments of the manager's skill.     

Regulatory induced performance persistence: Evidence from hedge funds

This paper tests the idea that financial regulation can impact performance persistence in the context of the hedge fund industry in 48 countries over the years 1994–2008. The data show evidence of three types of regulation influencing performance persistence: (1) minimum capital restrictions, which restrict lower quality funds and hence increase the likelihood of performance persistence, (2) restrictions on location of key service providers, which restrict human capital choices and hence tend to mitigate performance persistence, and (3) distribution channels, which make fund performance more opaque, decrease the likelihood of performance persistence. We do not find evidence that distribution channels, that promote fund presence to institutional investors, enhance performance persistence. Finally, we show differences in the effect of regulation on persistence by fund quartile ranking.     

CAPM option pricing

This paper extends the option pricing equations of [Black and Scholes, 1973] , [Jarrow and Madan, 1997] and [Husmann and Stephan, 2007] . In particular, we show that the length of the individual planning horizon is a determinant of an option’s value. The derived pricing equations can be presented in terms of the Black and Scholes [1973. Journal of Political Economy 81, 637–654] option values which ensures an easy application in practice.     

The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

Mutual fund performance when parent firms simultaneously manage hedge funds

This study examines the performance of mutual funds managed by firms that simultaneously manage hedge funds. We find that the reported returns of mutual funds in these “side-by-side” associations with hedge funds significantly underperformed those of mutual funds that shared similar fund and family characteristics but differed in that they were not affiliated with hedge funds. Digging deeper into performance, we find that the underperformance was confined to return gaps, a return measure that captures the impact of unobservable managerial actions. Interestingly, mutual funds with investment styles that were most closely aligned to affiliated hedge funds generated reported-return alphas and return gaps that underperformed by the greatest amount. Finally, we find that side-by-side mutual funds received less of a contribution to performance from IPO underpricing than similar unaffiliated mutual funds or affiliated hedge funds. Evidence does not support the hypothesis that affiliations with hedge funds allow side-by-side mutual funds to attract superior stock-picking talent. Our evidence does not allow us to rule out the possibility that management firms maximized fee income by strategically transferring performance from mutual funds to hedge funds.     

Does the choice of performance measure influence the evaluation of hedge funds?

The Sharpe ratio is adequate for evaluating investment funds when the returns of those funds are normally distributed and the investor intends to place all his risky assets into just one investment fund. Hedge fund returns differ significantly from a normal distribution. For this reason, other performance measures for hedge fund returns have been proposed in both the academic and practice-oriented literature. In conducting an empirical study based on return data of 2763 hedge funds, we compare the Sharpe ratio with 12 other performance measures. Despite significant deviations of hedge fund returns from a normal distribution, our comparison of the Sharpe ratio to the other performance measures results in virtually identical rank ordering across hedge funds.     

The role of hedge funds as primary lenders

We examine the role of hedge funds as primary lenders to corporate firms. We investigate both the reasons and the implications of hedge funds’ activities in the primary loan market. We examine the characteristics of firms that borrow from hedge funds and find that borrowers are primarily firms with lower profitability, lesser credit quality, and higher asymmetric information. Our results suggest that hedge funds serve as lenders of last resort to firms that may find it difficult to borrow from banks or issue public debt. We also examine the effect of hedge fund lending on the borrowing firms and find that borrowers’ profitability and creditworthiness improve subsequent to the loan. This beneficial effect of hedge fund lending is corroborated by our finding of positive abnormal returns for borrowers’ stocks around the loan announcement date. Overall, our findings are consistent with hedge funds adding value through their lending relationships and financial markets perceiving these activities as good news for the firms.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Style analysis and Value-at-Risk of Asia-focused hedge funds

In this paper we identify risk factors for Asia-focused hedge funds through a modified style analysis technique. Using an Asian hedge fund index, we find that Asian hedge funds show significant positive exposures to emerging equity markets. For both a static and rolling period style analysis, our model provides a high explanatory power for returns of the considered hedge fund index. We further conduct a Value-at-Risk analysis using the results of a rolling window style analysis as inputs. Our findings suggest that the considered parametric models outperform a simple historical simulation that is purely based on past return observations.     

Strategic behavior within families of hedge funds

The paper investigates the strategic behavior of hedge fund families. It focuses on decisions to start and liquidate family-member funds. Hedge fund families tend to liquidate funds that underperform compared to other member funds, and to replace them by new ones. By choosing a launch time after a short period of superior performance by their member funds, families extend the spillover to new funds. Hedge fund families seem to be more experienced in promoting their funds and attracting fund inflow than in generating superior performance. This results in higher dollar compensation earned by managers within multi-fund families than in stand-alone funds.     

Risk and performance estimation in hedge funds revisited: Evidence from errors in variables

This paper revisits the performance of hedge funds in the presence of errors in variables. To reduce the bias induced by measurement error, we introduce an estimator based on cross sample moments of orders three and four. This Higher Moment Estimation (HME) technique has significant consequences on the measure of factor loadings and the estimation of abnormal performance. Large changes in alphas can be attributed to measurement errors at the level of explanatory variables, while we emphasize some shifts in the economic contents of the equity risk premiums by switching from OLS to HME.     

The risk in hedge fund strategies: Theory and evidence from long/short equity hedge funds

Theory suggests that long/short equity hedge funds' returns come from directional as well as spread bets on the stock market. Empirical analysis finds persistent net exposures to the spread between small vs large cap stocks in addition to the overall market. Together, these factors account for more than 80% of return variation. Additional factors are price momentum and market activity. Combining two major branches of hedge fund research, our model is the first that explicitly incorporates the effect of funding (stock loan) on alpha. Using a comprehensive dataset compiled from three major database sources, we find that among the three thousand plus hedge funds with similar style classification, less than 20% of long/short equity hedge funds delivered significant, persistent, stable positive non-factor related returns. Consistent with the predictions of the Berk and Green (2004) model we find alpha producing funds decays to “beta-only” over time. However, we do not find evidence of a negative effect of fund size on managers' ability to deliver alpha. Finally, we show that non-factor related returns, or alpha, are positively correlated to market activity and negatively correlated to aggregate short interest. In contrast, equity mutual funds and long-bias equity hedge funds have no significant, persistent, non-factor related return. Expressed differently, L/S equity hedge funds, as the name suggests, do benefit from shorting. Besides differences in risk taking behavior, this is a key feature distinguishing L/S funds from long-bias funds.     

L-performance with an application to hedge funds

This paper introduces a new parametric fund performance measure, called the L-performance. The L-performance is an alternative to the Sharpe performance, which is commonly used in practice despite its inability to account for skewness and heavy tails of unconditional return distributions. The L-performance improves upon the Sharpe measure in this respect. Technically, it resembles the Sharpe measure in that it is defined as a ratio of the first- and second-order moments, which are the trimmed L-moments instead of the conventional (power) moments. The trimming parameters allow for focusing the L-performance on specific risk levels of interest, according to financial risk criteria. For illustration, a set of L-performances is computed for a variety of hedge funds. The empirical study shows the use of L-performance for fund ranking and return smoothing (manipulation) control.     

A tale of feedback trading by hedge funds

This paper studies the extent of feedback trading at the factor level by hedge fund managers. We show that fund managers continuously adjust their exposure to different risk factors conditional on the recent performance of these factors. The majority of managers apply a positive feedback strategy, whereas the remaining managers use a negative feedback strategy. In addition, we find some evidence for factor timing ability, although managers appear to be more backward looking than forward looking. We show that positive feedback trading can be beneficial to fund performance in our setup. If managers applied the positive feedback strategy more aggressively, however, they could benefit more from it. As such, the “smart switching benchmark” can be used to assess the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds.