The Determinants of Stock Option Compensation: Evidence from Finland

A new, long, and rich panel data set consisting of all Finnish publicly traded firms is used to study how firm characteristics and stock market developments influence the adoption and targeting of stock option compensation. Stock option adoption is found to be a procyclical phenomenon. Findings from firm‐level econometric analysis often corroborate those based on U.S. data, but important differences also emerge. Findings include: (i) firms with higher market value per employee are more likely to use stock option compensation; (ii) share returns from the past year affect the adoption of targeted stock options, but not broad‐based plans; (iii) our results are consistent with the hypothesis that selective and broad‐based plans arise as solutions to differing monitoring difficulties. Broad‐based schemes are observed when production is human capital‐intensive and employee performance is hard to monitor, while selective schemes are adopted when ownership is dispersed and therefore owners may have weak incentives to monitor management.     

上市公司股权激励盈余管理及影响因素研究

自股权激励办法施行以来,股权激励作为一种降低代理成本的激励方式,被越来越多的上市公司所采用。然而实证发现,盈余管理会伴随股权激励发生,实行股权激励公司在业绩考核第一年存在显著的盈余管理现象,而业绩考核前一年并不存在。在影响盈余管理的因素上,公司选用考核范围更广的业绩指标能减少管理层进行盈余管理的动机,行权时长的增加会给管理层盈余管理造成一些困难,从而抑制管理层在后阶段盈余管理的行为。     

The Effects of Non‐Expensed Employee Stock Bonus on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese High‐Tech Firms

The choice of whether to expense broad‐based stock incentives has been a highly controversial debate in both academic research and practice circles. We provide insightful findings to reconcile certain debates regarding the effectiveness of non‐expensed, broad‐based stock incentives. Using a unique longitudinal dataset from Taiwanese high‐tech firms over the 1997–2008 period, our results indicate that non‐expensed employee stock bonus incentives exerted positive effects on short‐term organizational value added creation. The dilution effects of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan, however, exerted a negative influence on profitability and eroded share return. The negative effects were even more severe in the following year, and overexploitation of employee stock bonus also damaged the long‐term organizational performance of Taiwanese high‐tech firms. This negative aspect of non‐expensed employee stock incentives resulted in more evidence for changing the regulatory context of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan.     

Determinants of alliance partner choice: Network distance,managerial incentives,and board monitoring

Research Summary: We ask if managerial opportunism is a significant problem in alliance partner choice and examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining this choice. Using a sample of 313 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries from 1992 to 2010, we find that managerial incentives lead to managerial preference for relationally risky distant partners over existing and new close partners. Further, board monitoring encourages managers to pursue existing and distant partners over new close ones, choices aligned with shareholder interests. In addition, we find that board monitoring substitutes for managerial incentives in alliance partner choice. We contribute to the literature on alliance partner choice to identify an important, and hitherto, unexplored perspective. Managerial Summary: This article examines whether managers and shareholders view alliance‐related risks differently, and how the divergent interests between managers and shareholders affect alliance partner choice. We argue that managers’ concern about their loss of employment and compensation from alliance failure impedes the choice of relationally risky alliance partners that may increase shareholder value. We also argue that managerial stock ownership and board monitoring mitigate this managerial propensity. Our findings suggest that stock ownership owned by managers and strong board monitoring are effective governance mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Our study offers a novel perspective to understand alliance partner choice by viewing the firm as an entity comprised of fragmented interests.     

Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains

We characterize the degree of price discretion that two competing manufacturers grant their retailers in a framework where demand is uncertain and privately observed by the retailers, while manufacturers only learn it probabilistically. In contrast with the consolidated vertical contracting literature, we assume that manufacturers cannot use monetary incentives to align the retailers’ incentives to pass on their unverifiable distribution costs to consumers. Our objective is to study how, in this context, an information-sharing agreement according to which manufacturers share their demand information affects prices, profits and consumer surplus. While equilibria with full price delegation never exist, regardless of whether manufacturers share information, partial delegation equilibria may exist with and without the exchange of information. These equilibria feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent retailers from passing on their distribution costs to consumers, and are more likely to occur when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they do not share this information. Manufacturers profit from exchanging demand information when products are sufficiently differentiated, and retailers’ distribution costs are high enough. Yet, expected prices are unambiguously lower when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they don’t, making the information exchange beneficial to consumers.     

Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans

This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. On the basis of theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue‐ and white‐collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white‐collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement, and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white‐collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.     

Finance,Corporate Governance,and the Employment Relationship

This comparative paper examines the relationship between equity markets and corporate governance on one hand, and job tenure, training, and pay on the other. Two dimensions of equity markets and corporate governance are used: share trading activity and mergers and acquisitions. There is support for the posited links between these measures and job tenure, employee stock ownership plans, pay dispersion, and collective bargaining arrangements. Evidence on the relationship with training is more mixed.     

Search Costs and Investment in Quality

In this paper we analyze how lower search costs affect firms' incentives to invest in quality. We identify two conflicting effects. On the one hand, lower search costs increase incentives to invest in quality by eroding the market share of low quality firms and increasing the market share of high quality firms. On the other hand, by intensifying price competition, lower search costs adversely affect high quality firms more than low quality firms. The net effect of a change in the search cost on quality is shown to depend on the initial quality distribution. There is a critical value such that, if the proportion of high quality firms is initially below this value, lower search costs increase this proportion, whereas if the initial quality is above this value, lower search cost decreases the proportion of high quality firms. We show that our results are consistent with a ‘superstar effect.’     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic orientations,incentive plan adoptions,and firm performance: evidence from electric utility firms

This study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics. Research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy, managerial motivation and control, managerial risk-bearing, and incentive plan characteristics. A pooled cross-sectional, time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms. Consistent with theory, results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with Defender strategic orientations. In contrast, firms with Prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock-based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pay dispersion and workforce performance: moderating effects of incentives and interdependence

The compensation literature is replete with arguments, but lacking in empirical tests, regarding the effects of pay dispersion on organizational outcomes. Pay dispersion may increase effort and provide incentives for high workforce performance levels, but may also inhibit cooperation and goal orientation among employees. Drawing on several theoretical perspectives (individual motivation, institutional theory, organizational justice, and neoclassical economics), this study predicts that pay dispersion will be associated with higher levels of workforce performance when accompanied by formal individual incentive systems and independent work, while pay compression is desirable in the absence of individual incentive systems and when work is interdependent. Survey research studies in two industrial sectors (the motor carrier and concrete pipe industries) were conducted to address these issues. Interactive regression results were generally supportive of the predictions across several measures of workforce performance (accident rates, safety violations, and productivity). Implications of these studies for strategy implementation in terms of compensation theory and practice are addressed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Evolution of Health Insurer Costs in Massachusetts, 2010–2012

We analyze the evolution of health insurer costs in Massachusetts between 2010 and 2012, paying particular attention to changes in the composition of enrollees. This was a period in which Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) increasingly used physician cost control incentives but Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) did not. We show that cost growth and its components cannot be understood without accounting for (1) consumers’ switching between plans, and (2) differences in cost characteristics between new entrants and those leaving the market. New entrants are markedly less costly than those leaving (and their costs fall after their entering year), so cost growth of continuing enrollees in a plan is significantly higher than average per-member cost growth. Relatively high-cost HMO members switch to PPOs while low-cost PPO members switch to HMOs, so the impact of cost control incentives on HMO costs is likely different from their impact on market-wide insurer costs.     

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.     

Cybersecurity: Stakeholder incentives,externalities, and policy options

Information security breaches are increasingly motivated by fraudulent and criminal motives. Reducing their considerable costs has become a pressing issue. Although cybersecurity has strong public good characteristics, most information security decisions are made by individual stakeholders. Due to the interconnectedness of cyberspace, these decentralized decisions are afflicted with externalities that can result in sub-optimal security levels. Devising effective solutions to this problem is complicated by the global nature of cyberspace, the interdependence of stakeholders, as well as the diversity and heterogeneity of players. The paper develops a framework for studying the co-evolution of the markets for cybercrime and cybersecurity. It examines the incentives of stakeholders to provide for security and their implications for the ICT ecosystem. The findings show that market and non-market relations in the information infrastructure generate many security-enhancing incentives. However, pervasive externalities remain that can only be corrected by voluntary or government-led collective measures.     

X-Inefficiency,Competition and Market Information

Whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question. We consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs. In contrast to recent literature, we point out that, to have a genuine effect on firm X-inefficiency, competition must change managerial incentives. By introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals' behaviour we show that, if costs are correlated, the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential. This result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work.     

A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Managed Care on Medical Referrals and the Quality of Specialty Care

This paper analyzes the role of referrals in the provision of surgical services. Primary physicians in managed care control patient access to specialists, while referrals in traditional insurance plans are less constrained. The traditional, fee–for–service insurance market is shown to achieve appropriate incentives for high quality care. In contrast, physicians with bad reputations may not lose HMO's referrals, owing to differences in incentives to cut costs. Empirically, we find that managed care may protect a physician whose reputation has been damaged by providing a source of referrals when shunning occurs in the FFS sector following a malpractice claim.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Control mechanisms,idea transfer,and performance in sales organizations

Drawing on the knowledge-based theory of the firm, the authors examine the differential effects of an individual orientation and a group orientation on idea transfer from the salesperson to the sales manager. The authors also consider the moderating effect of output and process control on the relationship between group and individual orientation and idea transfer. The results suggest that individual and group orientations have different effects on idea transfer, and these effects are moderated by output control. Salespeople who share ideas with the sales manager are rated as higher performers by the manager. At the group level, a climate of idea sharing among salespeople results in improved unit performance.