Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

Common Ground Between Free‐Traders and Environmentalists

We use a North–South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto‐dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to “drag down” its richer trading partner, when they degrade their stocks which would be preserved under autarky. It may enable the environmentally richer country to “pull up” its partner, when they preserve their stocks which would be degraded under autarky.     

Stable Tariffs and Retaliations*

A two‐country, two‐commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash‐equilibrium, a non‐free‐trade outcome. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the “contingent threat situation” to reformulate tariff retaliations. In this context, we show that the free trade is a stable outcome. More surprisingly, this interesting result is also valid for the “Johnson case,” where one country is better off under the tariff‐ridden Nash equilibrium compared to free trade.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

Footloose Capital and Comparative Advantage

We investigate the effect of country size differentials and Ricardian technology differences on firms’ location decisions using a two‐country, two‐good (homogeneous agricultural good and differentiated manufacturing products), two‐factor (labour and footloose capital) simple new economic geography model. We found that manufacturing firms may agglomerate in a country where the manufacturing sector has a comparative disadvantage. In addition, when country size differentials and Ricardian technology differences exist between two countries, the key factor influencing firms’ location decisions changes according to the level of trade liberalization, from being market size‐dependent to becoming technology‐dependent.     

Making Sense of the Comparative Advantage Gains from Trade: Comment on Batra

This paper addresses Ravi Batra’s (2002 ) criticism of the basic comparative advantage gains‐from‐trade model. While Batra’s criticism is based on the selection view interpretation of real income, the gains from trade can only be properly understood from the options view interpretation of real income. I also show how a recent empirical implementation of the gains‐from‐trade model defies Batra’s claim that “the consumption gain . . . is not subject to measurement” (2002, p. 642).     

Over the ROC methodology: Productivity,economic size and firms’ export thresholds

We identify the minimum combinations of productivity and “economic size” that Italian manufacturing firms need to achieve in order to access international markets. These “export thresholds” are estimated by applying, for the first time in economics, the ROC (receiver operating characteristics) methodology. In this way, we detect a model‐based (rather than a subjectively determined) cut‐off that allows to identify exporters and nonexporters and provides a measure of each firm’s distance from the export threshold. This methodology also paves the way to investigate other determinants of thresholds, thus helping to design more effective policy interventions to reduce barriers to trade.     

International Trade and the Value of Time

I discuss a generalized Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek (HOV) model in which consumption requires time as well as money (as in Becker's theory of the allocation of time) and the amount of work that a worker can do per unit of time—her “ability”—varies from country to country. High ability implies high income per hour, which implies a high value of time and, therefore, high consumption of the good that is more “time‐saving.” Therefore, if domestic production of this good is not commensurately high, it would have to be imported. In this way, I demonstrate that international differences in worker ability constitute an independent source of gains from trade. The model is able to explain several observed features of North–South trade that are not explained by the HOV model. The theoretical possibility of a Leontief paradox‐type trade pattern is also demonstrated.     

“Out of Sync”: The Breakdown of Economic Sentiment Cycles in the EU

Empirical evidence is presented about the properties of economic sentiment cycle synchronization for Germany, France and the UK and they are compared with the “crisis” countries Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Instead of using output data it is preferred to focus on the economic sentiment indicator (ESI), a forward‐looking, survey‐based variable consistently available from 1985. The cyclical nature of the ESI allowed the analyis of the presence or not of synchronicity among country pairs before and after the onset of the financial crisis. The results show that ESI movements were mostly synchronous before 2008 but they exhibit a breakdown after 2008, with this feature being more prominent in Greece. It is also found that, after the political maneuvering of the past two years, a cycle re‐integration or re‐synchronization is on the way. An analysis of the evolution of the synchronicity measures indicates that they can potentially be used to identify sudden phase breaks in ESI co‐movement and they can offer a signal as to when the EU economies are getting “in” or “out of sync”.     

International Trade and Volume Patterns under Quasilinear Preferences

We formally analyze the pattern and volume of trade by embedding quasilinear preferences in the standard perfectly competitive, two‐factor, two‐good, two‐country trade model. Quasilinear preferences deliver a natural partition of the two goods into a luxury and a necessity, and preserve the validity of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theorems. In addition, the predicted factor content of trade under quasilinear preferences is smaller (larger) than the predicted factor content of trade under homothetic preferences if and only if the luxury good is capital (labor) intensive. This result offers a novel explanation for the “missing‐trade” mystery.     

International Trade,Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms

Recent trade models determine the equilibrium distribution of firm‐level efficiency endogenously and show that freer trade shifts the distribution towards higher average productivity because of entry and exit of firms. These models ignore the possibility that freer trade also alters the firm‐size distribution via international firm migration (offshoring); firms must, by assumption, produce in their “birth nation.” We show that when firms are allowed to switch locations, new productivity effects arise. Freer trade induces the most efficient small‐nation firms to move to the large nation. The large country gets an “extra helping” of the most efficient firms while the small nation's firm‐size distribution is truncated on both ends. This reinforces the large‐nation productivity gain while reducing or even reversing the small‐nation productivity gain. The small nation is nevertheless better off allowing firm migration.     

ON THE “PRO‐POORNESS” OF GROWTH IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTEXT

This paper represents a first attempt to bring together the issues of multidimensional poverty and growth “pro‐poorness” assessments. More specifically, we suggest the use of sequential dominance procedures to test the “pro‐poorness” of observed growth spells when poverty is measured on the basis of income and another discrete well‐being attribute. Sequential procedures are also used to obtain graphical tools that are consistent with the spirit of Ravallion and Chen's growth incidence curve and Son's poverty growth curve. Contrary to traditional unidimensional tests, our method makes it possible to take into account the importance of deprivation correlations at the individual level and thus may reverse results observed with the traditional tools used to check the “pro‐poorness” of growth. An illustration of our approach is given using Turkish data for the period 2003–05.     

“Love of wealth” and economic growth

In a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth framework it is shown that for an optimum a benevolent social planner cannot have an excessive “love of wealth”. With a “right” “love of wealth” an optimum exists and implies higher long‐run per‐capita capital, income, and consumption relative to the standard model. This has important implications for comparative development trajectories. The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility of getting arbitrarily close to the golden rule where long‐run per‐capita consumption is maximal. It is shown that the optimal path attains its steady state more slowly. Thus, the beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model. Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private ownership economy. One can then identify “love of wealth” with the “spirit of capitalism.” The paper thus implies that one needs a “right” level of the “spirit of capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.     

Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World

During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The “Received Theory” of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms‐of‐trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom. But it is dramatically inconsistent with actual trade agreements. This paper offers an alternative explanation, based on intergovernmental political externalities, consistent with what we actually observe. With remarkably little necessary formal structure—in particular, no formal bargaining model—this framework (chosen to parallel actual experience) gives an immediate and transparent role to the basic characteristics of contemporary trade agreements: gradual liberalization, reciprocity, nondiscrimination, and multilateralism.     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

Information sharing for consumption tax purposes: An empirical analysis

The paper studies the determinants of information sharing between Swedish tax authorities and 14 EU tax authorities for value-added tax (VAT) purposes. It is shown that trade-related variables (such as the partner country’s net trade position and population size), reciprocity, and legal arrangements are significant determinants of Sweden’s trade in tax information. Countries that are net exporters of goods to Sweden appear to be net importers of information from Sweden, reflecting their need for information to combat export-related VAT fraud. Reciprocity plays a more important role in Sweden’s export of information upon official request than in its spontaneous export of information.     

China Bashing: Does Trade Drive the “Bad” News about China in the USA?

A monthly index of “bad” news about China as reported in the USA from January 1990 to December 2008 is developed in this paper. “Bad” is defined as news touching on the following issues: human rights, Tibet, child labor, democracy, and repression. Using this bad news index, this paper documents a peculiar finding: 3–4 months after a trade deficit shock to the US–China bilateral trade balance, the frequency of bad news published about China by US media outlets rises sharply, then dies off slowly. Statistical analysis reveals that the likelihood that this finding is just a coincidence is relatively small—about 1%. In addition, this paper finds a robust association between the annual number of Congressional hearings on China and the US–China bilateral trade deficit. These results suggest that “China bashing” may be endogenous to fluctuations in the US–China bilateral trade balance.     

A social contract approach to sustainability

This paper asks whether it is possible to derive a concern for future generations (“sustainability”) from an account of the firm as a social contract (SC) among its stakeholders. Two aspects of a leading SC model of the firm limit its usefulness for an analysis of sustainability. First, the stakeholders provide investments to the firm over time. Second, the relationship between contemporaries and future generations is marked by asymmetries of power and knowledge that need to be considered while reconstructing the SC today. I discuss three reformulations of the SC that are all, in principle, capable of introducing within the SC a concern for future generations. The first describes the contractors as heads of families. The second envisages a grand meeting of stakeholders of all generations. The third, which I find most defensible, views the SC as an ahistorical agreement reached behind a thick veil of ignorance. This agreement is based on John Rawls’s norm of reciprocity, whereby the stakeholders adopt today the decision they wish all previous (and future) generations had made regarding the rate of consumption of natural resources and emission of pollutants.     

Eco‐labelling by a for‐profit certifier: Countervailing power and its consequences

For‐profit certifier's eco‐labelling is common in industries where firms have some “countervailing power” on sharing gains from labelling. We show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong “power.” A certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain. This switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard. This is consequential for evaluating policies. The dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used, and ultimately upon firms’ countervailing power.     

Knowledge Diffusion and economic Growth based on Fourier’s law

Learning is the basic thing for a person’s growth, whenever in school or on the work. Also the economic growth of a country depends its technology and science. The knowledge diffusion in a firm dynamic system is important. Some former models have been given by Fernando E. Alvarez, Francisco J. Buera and Robert E. Lucas, Jr’s paper: “Models of Idea Flows” (Alvarez et al., 2008). Our model based on the earlier work but extend the definition of spread direction based on Fourier’s law, in which case can also explain the asymptotic equilibrium state. Solving the partial differential equation helps us to learn the solution well. A simulation is given using finite difference method to sketch the curve moving, also comparing with the realistic economic curves and they are fit. It can well explain the economic stable in the closed system of a single country and a “huge” change under some special outside “source” power.