Volatility spillovers among the U.S. and Asian stock markets: A comparison between the periods of Asian currency crisis and subprime credit crisis

This paper examines the changing nature of volatility spillovers among the U.S. and eight East Asian stock markets between two financial crises: the Asian currency crisis and the U.S. subprime credit crisis. Our empirical results suggest that volatility is not always spilled over from the directly affected markets to surrounding markets in crisis periods. The East Asian markets who directly suffered from the Asian currency crisis are the ones to which volatility is spilled over from other markets during the Asian currency crisis period, whereas uni-directional volatility spillovers from the U.S. market to other markets are observed during both crisis periods. This difference can be explained by a pre-determined hierarchy in which volatility spillovers tend to start from the U.S. market regardless of the geographical origin of the crisis. Furthermore, our results reveal that the markets in three major Asian financial hubs, i.e., Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, are the markets to which volatility is spilled over uni-directionally from several other countries during the subprime credit crisis period, but not during the Asian currency crisis period. We attribute this difference to crisis-specific (currency or credit crisis), market-specific (credit derivatives market participation and foreign currency reserves), and time-specific (more integrated global market) factors.     

Does income inequality lead to banking crises in developing countries? Empirical evidence from cross-country panel data

This study empirically examines whether increasing income inequality results in banking crises using panel data for 68 countries covering the years 1973 to 2010. The results show that developing countries with high inequality tend to have higher levels of domestic credit and that domestic credit booms increase the probability of banking crises. We also find that developing economies display direct channels from inequality to banking crises without an association with credit booms. We find no consistent evidence that income inequality contributes to banking crises in advanced economies. In developing countries, the probability of banking crises increases dramatically as income inequality levels increase: The probability of a systemic banking crisis within three years is 9.5% when the Gini is as low as 0.2 in developing countries and increases to 57.4% when the Gini is 0.4. These results are robust to several specifications.     

The study of contagious paces of financial crises

This study deals with the emergence of different regional crises and the comparison of early warning indicators to check for the accuracy of pace of exits. It was found that trade factors and monetary conditions clearly play a pivotal role in affecting the probability of existing time to currency crisis episodes and on the recurrence of crises. More specifically, using the index of market pressure methods, it is likely that the Asian Financial Crisis and the Mexico Tequila Crisis, when compared with the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Crisis, were preceded by different spreads accelerating across those countries. The evidence suggests that efficient early warning indicators may exist and may be identified depending on the methods applied to the pace of exit involved.     

Crises, portfolio flows, and foreign direct investment: An application to Turkey

We analyze how financial and economic crises affect the relation between the components of capital flows and their determinants in an emerging economy. Our results suggest that the composition of capital flows matters, crises can explain the volatility of portfolio flows and foreign direct investment, and modeling them as endogenous breakpoints improves the results considerably. By using data from the Turkish economy, we estimate these breakpoints together with the parameters of the model and find that they correspond to international and domestic crises that hit the country. Although both components are affected by similar crises, direct investment reacts strongly to the domestic crisis, while portfolios flows are more sensitive to global financial conditions. Breaks also have an effect on the significance and sign of determinants of each type of international investment. Evidence indicates changes in all coefficients in both investment types and suggests that analyses assuming parameter constancy lead to misleading results if they ignore the influence of endogenous breaks.     

Quantity of finance and financial crisis: A non-monotonic investigation☆

Whether finance is beneficial to economic development remains ambiguous. There are studies arguing that finance can facilitate growth and increase stability. However, the recent global financial crisis has led some to argue that finance can decrease stability and lead to more crises. This paper constructs a non-monotonic framework of quantity of finance (measured by leverage) and financial crisis and decomposes leverage into fundamental and excess components. Using cross-country level data, the empirical results confirms that it is excess leverage, rather than fundamental leverage, that results in the increase of probability of financial crisis. Further empirical results show that excess leverage leads to a higher probability of currency crisis, asset price collapse, and banking crisis, while fundamental leverage helps alleviates the crises. This paper reconciles the two contrasting views of the relationship between finance and economic development and provides strong policy implication to pay special attention to the sudden increase of leverage, which is probably excessive, rather than fundamental leverage.     

Structural vulnerability and resilience to currency crisis: Foreign currency debt versus export

Is there any factor that is not analyzed in the literature but is important for preventing currency crises? I argue that exports are an important factor to prevent currency crises that has not been frequently analyzed in the existing theoretical literature. Using the third generation model of currency crises, I derive a simple and intuitive formula that captures an economy’s structural vulnerability characterized by the elasticity of exports and repayments for foreign currency denominated debt. I graphically show that the possibility of currency crisis equilibrium depends on this structural vulnerability and also analyze how this vulnerability impacts the effectiveness of monetary policy response.     

Currency crisis early warning systems: Why they should be dynamic

Traditionally, financial crisis Early Warning Systems (EWSs) have relied on macroeconomic leading indicators when forecasting the occurrence of such events. This paper extends such discrete-choice EWSs by taking the persistence of the crisis phenomenon into account. The dynamic logit EWS is estimated using an exact maximum likelihood estimation method in both a country-by-country and a panel framework. The forecasting abilities of this model are then scrutinized using an evaluation methodology which was designed recently, specifically for EWSs. When used for predicting currency crises for 16 countries, this new EWS turns out to exhibit significantly better predictive abilities than the existing static one, both in- and out-of-sample, thus supporting the use of dynamic specifications for EWSs for financial crises.     

On the relation between currency and banking crises in developing countries, 1980–2010

This paper investigates the relationship between the occurrence of currency and banking crises using high-frequency data for a sample of 94 countries during 1980–2010. The two types of crises are proxied by continuous, multi-categorical and dummy variables based on market pressure indexes, and a dummy variable from the Laeven–Valencia banking crises database. Results suggest that a bidirectional leading relationship exists between the two types of crises. However, banking crises do not lead currency crises robustly when banking crises are proxied by dummies based on market pressure indexes. Finally, currency crises have robust state dependence, but this is not the case for banking crises.     

Exchange rate regime choice and currency crises

Exchange rate regime choice is not exogenous, but it depends on the structural, political and financial features of countries. However, it is often the case that the regime actually pursued and the one that is imposed by country features do not match one to one. The existing empirical crisis models do not take fully into account the regime in which the crisis unfolded. The aim of this paper is to incorporate the appropriateness of the regime choice into the standard currency crisis model. The results show that the odds of crisis increase significantly in countries which have chosen regimes inconsistently.     

Second Generation Models of Currency Crises

Until the beginning of the 1990s, currency crises were typically analyzed within the framework of a generation of models that assumed that the foreign exchange reserves of a country that was running a fixed exchange rate policy were falling (because the government was running a deficit on its budget that was financed by printing money). When the foreign exchange reserves reached a lower bound, a speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate was launched. Today, this theory is no longer the benchmark when explaining the occurrence of a currency crisis. Actually, a new generation of models that seeks to take explicitly into account the costs and benefits associated with the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate has emerged. This paper surveys these 'second generation models of currency crises'. This generation of models emphasizes that it is an endogenous decision if a government chooses to abandon a policy of fixed exchange rates. The survey pays special attention to the fact that the second generation of currency crises models often generates multiple equilibria for the rate of devaluation given one state of the economic fundamentals. A currency crisis can thus occur even if no secular trend in economic fundamentals can be identified, as in recent currency crises.     

Early warning systems for currency crises: The Turkish case

Different severe financial crises episodes occurred in the Turkish economy in the last two decades. These crises led to severe economic and social consequences for Turkey in terms of increasing interest rates, large reserves losses, considerable currency depreciations, high output losses and high unemployment rates. This paper aims to illustrate the essential determinants of these crises by developing a multivariate logit model which estimates the predictive ability of sixteen economic and financial indicators in a sample that covers the period from January 1990 to December 2008. The empirical findings show that the Turkish crises are mainly due to excessive fiscal deficits, high money supply growths, sharp rises in short-term external debt, growing riskiness of the banking system (in particular currency and liquidity mismatches), and external adverse shocks.     

Relative risk aversion and the transmission of financial crises

We study how investor behavior affects the transmission of financial crises. If investors exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion, then negative wealth shocks increase the risk premium required to hold risky assets. We integrate this into a second generation model of currency crises which allows for contagion through changes in fundamentals. Investor behavior can be a transmission channel of financial crises, as changes in risk premia increase the coverage ratio and makes the defense of a peg less attractive for the policy maker. The feedback effect of the risk premia on the probability of devaluation also makes multiple equilibria more likely. The possible stabilization effects of capital controls and a Tobin tax on the international transmission of financial crises are also studied.     

Unravelling financial market linkages during crises

An empirical model of multiple asset classes across countries is formulated in a latent factor framework. A special feature of the model is that financial market linkages during periods of financial crises, including spillover and contagion effects, are formally specified. The model also captures a range of common factors including global shocks, country and market shocks, and idiosyncratic shocks. The framework is applied to modelling linkages between currency and equity markets during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The results provide strong evidence that cross‐market links are important. Spillovers have a relatively larger effect on volatility than contagion, but both are statistically significant. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An update on EMU sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis

We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries. Besides, without exception, the marginal effects of sovereign spread drivers (specifically, the variables that measure global market sentiment) increased during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period, especially in peripheral countries. Moreover, the increase in the significance of the banking level of indebtedness and foreign bank's claims in the public sector (mainly in peripheral countries) along with the crisis unfolding seems to highlight the interconnection between private and public debt and thus, between banking and sovereign crises.     

Formulation of public debt management strategies: An empirical study of possible drivers

A well-designed public debt management strategy can help countries reduce their borrowing cost, contain financial risks and develop their domestic markets. Using survey data on debt management strategies, this paper studies whether the probability that a country has a formal debt management strategy, publishes the strategy document, and uses quantitative benchmarks to formulate its debt management strategy is affected by democratic accountability, institutional quality, past debt crises/defaults, official development assistance, and participation in debt management programs. We find that countries located in Latin America and the Caribbean are less likely to have developed a debt management strategy and, if they have, are less likely to publish it. In contrast, countries located in the Middle East and North Africa are less likely to use quantitative benchmarks in the formulation of their debt management strategies. A country is more likely to have developed a debt management strategy if it has the experience of a past debt crisis, but not of repeated debt crises. Institutional quality and democratic accountability could significantly contribute to the emergence of more transparent and accountable debt management strategies in developing countries. IFIs’ technical assistance on public debt management could be enhanced by IFIs conducting their own, prior diagnostic reviews.     

Government bailouts and monetary disequilibrium: common fundamentals in the Mexican and East Asian currency crises

Monetary disequilibrium seems to be a common thread that connects the Mexican and East Asian crises. Both crises have been characterized by governments attempting to minimize the adverse impacts of capital reversals on their domestic financial systems. This backstopping function of the monetary authority is modeled within an escape clause-based currency crisis framework which emphasizes the “nonmechanical” behavior of governments as they trade off various economic policy objectives.     

The effect of raising deposit insurance coverage in times of financial crisis – Evidence from Croatian microdata

Typically, depositors in transition countries react very sensitively to the safety of deposits. Faced with rising deposit outflows in October 2008, many transition countries were forced to extend the limits of deposit insurance coverage. Has this calmed private agents? Or has it caused more uncertainty? We analyze these questions by employing household survey data for Croatia from exactly the time deposit insurance was extended. First, we provide evidence how the financial crisis has affected trust in banks and trust in the local currency. Then, we show that the increase in deposit insurance coverage had an immediate and positive impact on how people perceived the safety of deposits and the credibility of the local currency. Therefore, our results suggest that this policy measure helped to prevent a more serious and dangerous meltdown of deposits and a further shift towards foreign currency denominated assets. However, despite this effect the perceived safety of deposits remained lower than it was before the financial crisis. We also consider this finding to be of relevance for other countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.     

Between two poles: A dual currency board for Mercosur

The paper explores exchange rate options for Mercosur countries. We start from the observation that most of the countries in the region have a long-standing tendency for fixed exchange rates, and ask how such a system could best be designed. The Argentine crisis has demonstrated that single currency pegs imply the risk of serious misalignments with other trading partners and could undermine regional integration initiatives. The standard basket peg is not a solution because of its limited transparency and credibility. We, therefore, discuss a proposal for dual currency boards that could be a workable solution for Mercosur countries.     

Dollar-denominated accounts in Latin America during the 1990s

In this paper we analyze the evolution of dollar-denominated accounts in Latin America, and how they impact the stability of the banking system and the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates. Our findings reveal that dollar deposits are strongly influenced by depreciation expectations of the local currency even in an environment of fairly low inflation. We also find that having more dollar accounts increases the probability of future crises if the economy is already in a crisis. Finally, our findings suggest that for some macroeconomic aggregates there exists a positive correlation, in the long and short run, between their volatility and the volume of dollar-denominated accounts in the banking system. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Sociedad Hipoetcaria Federal de Mexico. The authors would like to thank Bruce Smith, Scott Freeman, Alex Minicozzi, Li Gan, Subal Kumbhakar, Gil Mehrez, Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, Keisuke Hirano, the participants of the University of Mississippi, Barcelona, and Texas at Austin seminar series and an anonymous referee for useful comments. The authors would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Bruce Smith.     

希腊主权债务危机研究以及对中国的启示

由于处在全球金融危机的时代背景和独特的欧元区经济环境之下,希腊主权债务危机的发生有着自身的特点。对希腊主权债务危机的研究将有助于其他国家防范主权债务危机的发生,对于拥有巨大外汇储备和地方政府债务风险积聚的中国来说,也同样具有积极的意义。