Shiller's CAPE: Market Efficiency and Risk

Robert Shiller shows that Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) is strongly associated with future long‐term stock returns. This is often interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. We present two findings contrary to such an interpretation. First, if markets are efficient, stock returns should be higher than the risk‐free rate. We find that even when CAPE is in its ninth decile, future 10‐year stock returns, on average, are higher than future returns on 10‐year U.S. Treasurys. Thus, the results are largely consistent with market efficiency. Second, consistent with a risk–return tradeoff, we find that CAPE is negatively associated with future stock market volatility.     

Overreaction in the Brazilian stock market

The overreaction hypothesis on a new set of data for the Brazilian stock market over the period 1970–1989 is investigated. Both market adjusted returns and the standard Sharpe-Lintner CAPM adjusted returns are used. Price reversals in 2-year returns are detected and the results contrast with the U.S. evidence in that the magnitude of the effect is more pronounced than in the U.S. The results also suggest that differences in risk, as measured by CAPM-betas using the method suggested by Chan (Chan K.C., 1988, On the contrarian investment strategy, Journal of Business 61, 147–163), cannot account for the overreaction effect. I also examine the issue of asymmetry versus symmetry in the overreaction effect. Using the criterion proposed by Dissanaike (Dissanaike G., 1992, Are stock price reversals really symmetric? University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics Discussion Paper, AF series, No. 4) I find evidence that the price reversals are asymmetric.     

Return and Volatility Spillovers and Cojump Behavior Between the U.S. and Korean Stock Markets

ABSTRACT

In this study, we examine return spillover, volatility transmission, and cojump behavior between the U.S. and Korean stock markets. In particular, we focus on cojump behavior between the two markets in order to explain the transmission of unexpected shocks. We find that the U.S. stock market causes return spillover effects in the Korean stock market, and there is significant volatility transmission between the two markets. Importantly, we find a stronger association in size, as compared with intensity, of cojumps between the U.S. and Korean stock markets, particularly during the recent financial crisis.     

The Determinants of Conditional Autocorrelation in Stock Returns

We investigate whether return volatility, trading volume, return asymmetry, business cycles, and day‐of‐the‐week are potential determinants of conditional autocorrelation in stock returns. Our primary focus is on the role of feedback trading and the interplay of return volatility. We present empirical evidence using conditional autocorrelation estimates generated from multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (M‐GARCH) models for individual U.S. stock and index data. In addition to return volatility, we find that trading volume and market returns are important in explaining the time‐varying patterns of return autocorrelation.     

Do Low‐Priced Stocks Drive Long‐Term Contrarian Performance on the London Stock Exchange?

We investigate whether low‐priced stocks drive long‐term contrarian performance on the U.K. market. We find that contrarian performance at low, middle, and high price levels is positive. On the Fama‐French risk adjusted basis, we find both low‐priced and middle‐priced losers have significantly positive returns. When we adjust returns by market and liquidity risk, only middle‐priced losers maintain their positive returns. Our results reveal that low‐priced stocks are not fully responsible for contrarian performance. Our empirical evidence is generally consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and behavioral models of value investing.     

MARKET TIMING OF INTERNATIONAL STOCK MARKETS USING THE YIELD SPREAD

We use probit modeling to forecast bear stock markets in the United States and in eight major foreign stock markets. In general, we find that the U.S. yield spread contains more important market‐timing information than does the home‐country yield spread for profitable market timing. At a 35% probability screen, our simulations show that the U.S. dollar (representative local currency) investor could earn a median compound annual return across eight foreign (non‐U.S.) stock markets of 15.75% (17.67%) by following a market‐timing strategy versus a median buy‐and‐hold return of 13.56% (16.55%).     

Investor sentiment and stock returns: Some international evidence

We examine whether consumer confidence – as a proxy for individual investor sentiment – affects expected stock returns internationally in 18 industrialized countries. In line with recent evidence for the U.S., we find that sentiment negatively forecasts aggregate stock market returns on average across countries. When sentiment is high, future stock returns tend to be lower and vice versa. This relation also holds for returns of value stocks, growth stocks, small stocks, and for different forecasting horizons. Finally, we employ a cross-sectional perspective and provide evidence that the impact of sentiment on stock returns is higher for countries which have less market integrity and which are culturally more prone to herd-like behavior and overreaction.     

Credit Spread Changes and Equity Volatility: Evidence from Daily Data

We investigate the determinants of daily changes in credit spreads in the U.S. corporate bond market. Using a sample of liquid investment grade and high‐yield bonds, we show that both systematic bond and stock market factors as well as idiosyncratic equity market factors affect changes in the yield spread at the daily frequency. In particular, we find that increase in stock market volatility has a positive effect on changes in the spread of corporate bonds over the corresponding Treasuries beyond that captured by standard term structure variables. Our results show that there is an almost contemporaneous inverse relationship between changes in the bond yield spread and the stock return of the issuing firm.     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long‐Term Return Reversals

Prior studies have linked long‐term reversals to the magnitude of locked‐in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked‐in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns.     

Reversal and momentum patterns in weekly stock returns: European evidence

We analyze short‐term reversal and medium‐term momentum patterns in weekly stock returns in Europe. Focusing on raw and stock‐specific returns, our empirical results show for both return specifications (a) a negative relation between weekly past returns and future returns in the short run and (b) a positive relation in the medium run. However, returns from reversal and momentum strategies based on stock‐specific returns are less volatile. In further analyses, we find short‐term reversal and medium‐term momentum patterns to be connected to stock characteristics. Looking at the potential causes of these effects, our results do not support the idea that short‐term reversal in weekly stock returns is due to an over‐ or underreaction to firm‐specific news nor that it is mainly driven by illiquidity. Medium‐term momentum in weekly stock returns, on the other hand, can be connected to behavioral biases. Our concluding tests confirm that our findings are robust among industries, in subperiods, for the January effect and in varying market states. Finally, while medium‐term momentum strategies remain profitable after accounting for transaction costs, short‐term reversal strategies can be mainly explained by transaction costs due to their high turnover.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.     

DO U.S. STOCK MARKET INDEXES OVER‐ OR UNDERREACT?

Our objective is to investigate the short‐term over‐ or underreaction of six U.S. stock market indexes. We find evidence of a one‐day underreaction for winners (days on which an index experiences abnormally high returns) and losers (days on which an index experiences abnormally poor performance). We also find strong evidence of a sixty‐day underreaction for winners. For losers, abnormal returns turn from negative to positive as the period is extended, resulting in significant reversals over the sixty‐day period. Results are generally consistent for each of the six indexes. Overall, these results provide strong support for the uncertain information hypothesis. JEL classification: G14     

Stock Market Efficiency and the Federal Budget Deficit: Another Anomaly?

This paper investigates the efficiency of the U.S. stock market as it pertains to a number of major macrofinance variables that theory and empirical evidence suggest are important in rational stock pricing decisions. A multivariate vector autoregressive analysis is used to draw efficiency inferences. The estimated factor pricings are consistent with theory and previous empirical research. In addition, these results indicate that the stock market may be inefficient with respect to the federal budget deficit variable. Similar apparent inefficiency evidence is obtained for the term structure and risk premium variables. The authors cannot reject the efficiency hypothesis for industrial production, inflation, and base money. Using indirect causality tests, the authors find plausible intermediate information linkages connecting variables in the system. The term structure and risk premia variables consistently appear important as intermediate conduits through which information about other factors impact stock returns.     

Did Regulation Fair Disclosure,SOX, and Other Analyst Regulations Reduce Security Mispricing?

Between 2000 and 2003 a series of disclosure and analyst regulations curbing abusive financial reporting and analyst behavior were enacted to strengthen the information environment of U.S. capital markets. We investigate whether these regulations reduced security mispricing and increased stock market efficiency. After the regulations, we find a significant reduction in short‐term stock price continuation following analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements. The effect was more pronounced among higher information uncertainty firms, where we expect security valuation to be most sensitive to regulation. Analyst forecast accuracy also improved in these firms, consistent with reduced mispricing being due to an improved corporate information environment following the regulations. Our findings are robust to controls for time trends, trading activity, the financial crisis, analyst coverage, delistings, and changes in information uncertainty proxies. We find no concurrent effect among European firms and a regression discontinuity design supports our identification of a regulatory effect.     

The Risk‐Return Relation in International Stock Markets

We investigate the risk‐return relation in international stock markets using realized variance constructed from MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) daily stock price indices. In contrast with the capital asset pricing model, realized variance by itself provides negligible information about future excess stock market returns; however, we uncover a positive and significant risk‐return tradeoff in many countries after controlling for the (U.S.) consumption‐wealth ratio. U.S. realized variance is also significantly related to future international stock market returns; more importantly, it always subsumes the information content of its local counterparts. Our results indicate that stock market variance is an important determinant of the equity premium.     

Contagion in financial markets after September 11: myth or reality?

Major global events can lead to a change in the cross‐country correlation of assets. Using stock prices from 25 economies, we test whether the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, resulted in a contagion—an increase in correlation across global financial markets. Unlike prior works on contagion, we model the intrinsic heteroskedasticity. Our results indicate that international stock markets, particularly in Europe, responded more closely to U.S. stock market shocks in the three to six months after the crisis than before. Our evidence suggests that the benefits of international diversification in times of crisis are substantially diminished.     

The Equity Premium: Consistent with GDP Growth and Portfolio Insurance

We find that the long‐term equity premium is consistent with both GDP growth and portfolio insurance. We use a supply‐side growth model and demonstrate that the arithmetic average stock market return and the returns on corporate assets and debt depend on GDP per capita growth. The implied equity premium matches the U.S. historical average over 1926–2001. Separately, we find that the equity premium tracks the value of a put option on the S&P 500. Our theory predicts a smaller equity premium in the future, assuming that the recent regime shifts in dividend policies, interest rates, and tax rates are permanent.     

What moves international stock and bond markets?

We study the relation between international mutual fund flows and the different return components of aggregate equity and bond markets. First, we decompose international equity and bond market returns into changes in expectations of future real cash payments, interest rates, exchange rates, and discount rates. News about future cash flows, rather than discount rates, is the main driver of international stock returns. This evidence is in contrast with the typical results reported only for the US. Inflation news instead is the main driver of international bond returns. Next, we turn to the interaction between these return components and international portfolio flows. We find evidence consistent with price pressure, short-term trend chasing, and short-run overreaction in the equity market. We also find that international bond flows to emerging markets are more sensitive to interest rate shocks than equity flows.     

How Does Investor Sentiment Affect Stock Market Crises? Evidence from Panel Data

We test the impact of investor sentiment on a panel of international stock markets. Specifically, we examine the influence of investor sentiment on the probability of stock market crises. We find that investor sentiment increases the probability of occurrence of stock market crises within a one‐year horizon. The impact of investor sentiment on stock markets is more pronounced in countries that are culturally more prone to herd‐like behavior, overreaction and low institutional involvement.