TESTING THE NET BUYING PRESSURE HYPOTHESIS DURING THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM HANG SENG INDEX OPTIONS

We investigate net buying pressure in the Hong Kong Hang Seng Index options market during the Asian financial crisis from July 1997 to August 1998. Our findings suggest that during this period, the dramatic changes in volatility overwhelmed the dynamics of supply and demand in the options market. The extremely high realized volatility drove market participants' expectations about future market volatility in the early months of the crisis. Findings during the late‐crisis, pre‐crisis, and post‐crisis periods are consistent with the net buying pressure hypothesis.     

DIVERGENT EXPECTATIONS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997

An important question concerning integration of global financial markets is whether local investors in an equity market react differently from international investors, particularly during periods of financial crisis. Considering local investors are closer to information, they might turn pessimistic before foreign investors before a crisis. We examine whether local investors in each of the six Asian stock markets—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand—reacted differently from international investors during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Our empirical results indicate that, in general, closed‐end country fund share prices (mainly driven by foreign investors) Granger‐cause the respective net asset values (NAVs, mainly driven by local investors). Moreover, this one‐way Granger‐causality effect from share prices to NAVs becomes much stronger during the crisis period after controlling for U.S. stock returns. Our results suggest international investors turned pessimistic before local investors. JEL classification: G15     

INFORMATION AND NOISE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE E‐MINI INDEX FUTURES

I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.     

THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADING VOLUME REACTION TO FINANCIAL INFORMATION: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

Prior empirical research indicates that trading volume reaction to new information increases with the heterogeneity of investors’ prior beliefs. We examine three potential factors that theoretical models of financial economists show determine trading volume reaction to new information: heterogeneous prior beliefs, differential interpretation, and the consensus effect—the extent to which the information causes their beliefs to converge or diverge. We find that these three factors have a distinct and significant incremental effect on trading volume, thereby suggesting that empirical trading volume models that exclude or fail to control for any of these determinants are misspecified with biased estimated coefficients.     

SENSITIVITY OF INVESTOR REACTION TO MARKET DIRECTION AND VOLATILITY: DIVIDEND CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENTS

We examine whether investor reactions are sensitive to the recent direction or volatility of underlying market movements. We find that dividend change announcements elicit a greater change in stock price when the nature of the news (good or bad) goes against the grain of the recent market direction during volatile times. For example, announcements to lower dividends elicit a significantly greater decrease in stock price when market returns have been up and more volatile. Similarly, announcements to raise dividends tends to elicit a greater increase in stock price when market returns have been normal or down and more volatile, although this latter tendency lacks statistical significance. We suggest an explanation for these results that combines the implications of a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with behavioral considerations that link the responsiveness of investors to market direction and volatility.     

THE BROKERAGE FIRM EFFECT IN HERDING: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

We examine herding behavior of domestic and foreign investors in the Indonesian stock market. We document that both domestic and foreign investors from a particular brokerage firm tend to herd. The foreign investors exhibit a greater propensity to herd than domestic investors. However, when examining investor trading across brokerage firms, we find only weak evidence of herding by domestic investors and no herding by foreign investors. Our overall findings suggest a strong brokerage firm effect on herding but a weak marketwide effect. Moreover, we find evidence that the strong brokerage effect on herding is likely driven by acting on common information.     

INSTITUTIONAL TRADING AND OPENING PRICE BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A FAST‐EMERGING MARKET

Using daily and intraday data, we investigate the cross‐sectional relation between stock prices and institutional trading in the Taiwan stock market. Consistent with the investigative herding hypothesis, we find that institutional herding exists because of institutional positive feedback trading behavior rather than following trades made by other institutions, as suggested by the information cascade hypothesis. Moreover, the positive correlation between institutional trade imbalance and stock returns mainly comes from institutional positive feedback trading. The institutional trading decisions rely on returns measured not only over the lagged trading day but also over the opening session during the same day.     

TRADER EXPLOITATION OF ORDER FLOW INFORMATION DURING THE LTCM CRISIS

By using a unique data set of audit trail transactions, I examine the trading behavior of market makers in the Treasury-bond futures market during the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in 1998. I find strong evidence that during the crisis market makers in the aggregate engaged in anticipatory trading against customer orders from a particular clearing firm (coded PI7) that closely match various features of LTCM's trades through Bear Stearns. I also show that a significant percentage of market makers made abnormal profits during the crisis. Their aggregate abnormal profits, however, were more than offset by abnormal losses following the recapitalization of LTCM.     

DAYLIGHT AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT TWO STOCK MARKET BEHAVIORAL ANOMALIES

Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000, 2003) describe two stock market behavioral anomalies associated with changes in investor sentiment caused by daylight saving time (DST) changes and seasonal affective disorder (SAD). According to the hypothesized effects, DST changes and SAD affect asset prices by changing investors’ risk aversion. Although changes in the timing or amount of daylight are correlated with unusual stock market returns, I present evidence they do not cause those unusual returns. Instead, seasonal patterns in market‐related information during the sample period are the likely cause of the correlation between stock market returns and DST changes or SAD.     

INVESTOR REACTION TO MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM UK DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS

Existing work on the flow–performance relation in mutual funds focuses on the average U.S. investor, obscuring the contributions of different clienteles. We analyze UK data on monthly fund sales and purchases made via seven distinct distribution channels. We show that there exist marked differences in the reaction to fund performance between different types of retail and institutional investors. These differences can be understood by considering the incentives of parties involved in each channel. Our analysis indicates that the well‐documented aggregate net flow–performance convexity in mutual funds is driven by the extreme reaction of retail inflows to favorable performance, particularly from independently advised investors.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF SHORT‐SALES CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE

Using a database of stock lending fees for Japanese centralized margin transactions, I show that short‐sales constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks with high short‐sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre‐announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the CARs of the stocks with low short‐sales costs when the announcements reveal negative information to the public.     

ARE PRICE LIMITS EFFECTIVE? EVIDENCE FROM THE ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE

There is considerable discussion about controlling volatility by imposing price limits on asset prices. We examine the effects of price limits on a stock market by testing the volatility spillover, delayed price discovery, and trading interference hypotheses in a leading emerging market, the Istanbul Stock Exchange, which has a unique market microstructure as related to price limits. Our results support the volatility spillover, delayed price discovery, and trading interference hypotheses. We also show price locks at limits provide significantly stronger evidence regarding the effects of price limits than limit moves only. Finally, price limits have a significant effect on the stock market, casting doubt on their effectiveness.     

GLOBALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

This article has three basic aims: (1) to analyze the impact of the opening of their capital markets on the economies of host countries; (2) to investigate the causes of the Asian financial crisis; and (3) to evaluate the likely effects of the South Korean government's recent attempts to restructure its corporate sector. Although the recent Asian financial crisis has led some to question the merits of open capital markets and to call for regulatory restraints on capital flows across international borders, the scientific evidence suggests that the opening of stock markets to foreign investors has been largely beneficial for emerging economies. On average, stock market liberalization has been accompanied by increases in stock prices and reductions in stock return volatility, reductions in inflation, and reductions in the rate of currency depreciation. Much of the blame for the Asian currency crises is assigned to Asian policymakers' futile attempts to defy market forces by trying to maintain their currencies at artificially high levels. But a more fundamental cause of Asia's economic problems has been the widespread value destruction by Asian corporations, which has led to a lower value for the overall economy and weakened the banking sector. The government-directed banking systems and weak corporate governance structures (including managerial incentives to increase size and market share at the expense of shareholders) that characterize most Asian economies have resulted in systematic overinvestment, bloated payrolls, and sharp declines in corporate profitability. While applauding most of the Korean government's recent measures to reform the economy, the article expresses skepticism about the government-mandated restructuring of the chaebol known as the “big deal.” Rather than trying to direct the process of restructuring, Korean policymakers should limit their efforts to improving the market mechanism by increasing competition in the markets for capital, corporate control, and goods and services. The Korean market for corporate control transactions could be greatly improved by increasing the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings and by allowing hostile takeovers by foreign as well as domestic investors. To increase the productivity of capital, Asian companies should seek to realign managerial with shareholder interests by tying compensation to measures of value creation like EVA.     

MATCHING FINANCIAL AND REAL INVESTMENT OPTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM WARRANT CALLS

We provide new evidence on the sequential financing explanation for the use of warrants. Consistent with sequential financing, capital spending starts increasing in the year of the call and peaks three years after the call. In addition, both equity and debt financing increase significantly in the year of the call and remain at high levels. Warrant contract features—the exercise price and the presence or absence of a price condition for callable warrants—are also consistent with the sequential financing hypothesis.     

THE EFFECT OF THE TRADING SYSTEM ON IPO UNDERPRICING: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1997 ORDER‐HANDLING RULES

We use a natural experiment resulting from the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission rule mandating a change in the order‐handling rules (OHR) for all NASDAQ stocks to test whether secondary market structure affects initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find that the increase in liquidity that the OHR represent led to a decrease in underpricing for cold NASDAQ IPOs, suggesting that when liquidity is lowest, changes in market liquidity display a negative relation to initial returns.     

SHORT SELLING AND PRICE DISCOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS

The underlying shares of some American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) can be short sold in their home markets, and others cannot. This institutional feature offers a unique opportunity to investigate the relation between short selling and price discovery. We hypothesize and confirm that ADR short selling on a U.S. exchange is more informative when the ADRs’ underlying shares cannot be short sold in the home market. These and related results suggest that short sellers make a significant contribution to price discovery. Short sellers’ trading activity, representing more than 20% of total ADR share volume, increases the benefits of cross‐listing on U.S. exchanges.     

THE EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS

We investigate whether insider trading restrictions had their intended effects during the 1960s and 1970s. We examine insider trading and stock market behavior before dividend initiations and omissions announced between 1935 and 1974. Contrary to existing research and commentary, we show that restrictions had meaningful effects. During the 1960s and 1970s, insiders sold less frequently before dividend omissions, and the average profitability of insider trades declined. In addition, the positive (negative) stock price runup before dividend initiations (omissions) decreased after 1961. The results provide some vindication for the Securities and Exchange Commission's adjudicative approach toward insider trading regulation.     

EVIDENCE ON THE MARKET FOR PROFESSIONAL DIRECTORS

Using the temporary increase in the supply of directors associated with successful tender offers, we examine characteristics of directors who are valuable in the market for board seats. We find that after a takeover, professional directors are three times more likely to receive new appointments than other types of directors released from their respective boards. We find that the proportion of professional directors in above‐average performing targets is significantly greater than that in underperforming targets. Our results indicate that professional directors generally have valuable general human capital that more than offsets the costs of multiple directorships.     

THE EFFECT OF CROSS‐LISTING ON TRADING VOLUME: REDUCING SEGMENTATION VERSUS SIGNALING INVESTOR PROTECTION

We examine the relation between cross‐listing on the U.S. and UK regulated and unregulated exchanges and trading volume for a sample of 500 foreign firms from 34 countries. We find that the increase in trading volume is a function of both reducing segmentation and signaling investor protection. In addition, we find that home market trading volume, firm size, firm returns, and analyst forecast accuracy are the major determinants of a firm's trading volume. We also show that U.S. and UK investors trade foreign securities that originate from low‐investor‐protection countries more than they trade those from high‐investor‐protection countries, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.