Formal and informal contract farming in Mozambique: Socially embedded relations of agricultural intensification

This paper explores the role of contract farming arrangements in agricultural intensification in sub-Saharan Africa, combining secondary literature and original case material from Mozambique. The paper extends the scope of “contract farming” beyond the formal contracts between large companies and small-scale producers to include less formal credit agreements between farmers and traders. It argues that such informal contract arrangements are evidence of farmers' agency in “real markets.” In the studied cases, farmers use contract farming opportunities to intensify agricultural production by investing in irrigation and inputs. While informal contracts typically concern locally consumed crops, thus with more possibilities for side selling than formal contracts for export crops with company-controlled markets, informal contract compliance reflects closely knit social ties between the contracting parties. In both formal and informal contracts, purchasers tend to seek out producers who are already irrigating, thus obtaining gains from farmers' earlier investments. This also implies contract farming as a mechanism for accelerating social differentiation arising from unequal access to irrigation. The paper argues that the significance of informal contracts in the studied cases raises the possibility that informal contract farming by local traders plays a more important role in agrarian transformation in Africa than formal contract farming by large companies.     

Bilateral Information Asymmetry in the Design of an Agri‐Environmental Policy: An Application to Peatland Retirement in Norway

Agriculture is a significant source of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. GHG mitigation through agri‐environmental programmes could be important in achieving emission reduction targets under the 2015 UN climate agreement. This study uses the principal‐agent model to examine a peatland retirement programme to reduce agricultural emissions in Norway. The focus is on the role of the government's private information in programme design. Two cases are examined. First, optimal contracts are derived when farmers have private information about the costs of implementing peat land retirement, but the government reveals its information on the resulting public benefits through differentiated contracts. This corresponds to the standard targeting strategy with one‐sided information asymmetry. In the second case, an informed principal model developed by Maskin and Tirole in a 1990 study is employed to address bilateral information asymmetry. Using the informed principal model, the government offers the same menu of contracts to farmers in order not to disclose information on the public benefits from land retirement. Empirical results show that the government can achieve a higher payoff by using a pooling offer.     

Distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net: contract choice evidence from Tigray,Ethiopia

Rural households in the semiarid Northern Ethiopian highlands are net buyers of food. Crop failure due to erratic and unpredictable rainfall occurs frequently and leads to food shortages and income shocks. The renting out of land may be one of the coping responses of households exposed to shocks. We developed a theoretical household model for poor landlord households capturing their contract choice response to downside production shocks. We tested econometrically whether contract choice may depend on poverty, capital constraints, production risk and random shocks. The multinomial logit model estimates show that poor households experiencing random shocks are more likely to choose fixed‐rent contracts as a distress response to shocks, suggesting that fixed‐rent contracts may be used to meet immediate needs, but at the expense of future incomes. We also found that fixed‐rent contracts are preferred when ex ante production risk is low, while sharecropping is more likely where production risk is high. Finally, we found an indication that the choice of a fixed‐rent contract as a coping response to shocks comes as a last resort after all other means of coping are exhausted.     

Contracting for Canola in the Great Plains States

Canola has become an important crop in the last decade in the United States. Production of canola is risky and competes with other crops that have varying risk reduction mechanisms. Processors develop and offer contracts with varying specifications that allow growers to reduce risk and attract canola production. In this study, preplant contracting strategies were evaluated in terms of risk and return for growers and processors. Alternative contracts include fixed‐price‐variety‐specific with and without act‐of‐God provisions, and an oil‐premium contract. Grower returns and processor gross margins were simulated and resulting distributions were evaluated using stochastic efficiency with respect to a function. In the dominant growing region, growers would prefer fixed‐price‐variety‐specific contracts versus contracts with oil premiums. The latter would only be preferred by crushers that are highly risk averse. The results vary regionally suggesting that contract types should vary by region to be acceptable to a broader range of growers and processors.     

The role of input vouchers in modernizing the fresh fruit and vegetable market in Turkey

Contractual arrangements between farmers and traders aiming at providing input/credit in return for output selling have been widely studied in the literature on agricultural economics. Nonetheless, there is one issue, which is barely mentioned in the literature: how to enforce the contract terms when traders offer credit in cash rather than input advances? This article aims to describe an innovation in farming contracts, used by fresh fruit and vegetable wholesalers in Turkey, which involves a kind of private voucher system. Drawing on original data collected from wholesalers—a segment in the supply chain hardly covered in the literature—we investigate the factors determining contract adoption using a two‐limit Tobit model. Our results suggest that this private voucher system contributes to supply chain coordination and facilitates smallholder farmer participation in export and supermarket channels, which are growing rapidly in this developing country.     

Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture

This article examines a self-enforcing contract between a risk-neutralprincipal and a risk-averse agent who is able to hold up valuesex post. It shows that risk aversion and variance can only partlyexplain the contract's incentive intensity. Ex post bargainingpower and outside options will also determine contract choice.If the agent's ex post bargaining position is weak, the principalcannot commit to high-powered incentives, whereas if the agent'sex post bargaining position is good, the agent cannot committo low-powered incentives. The model may thus explain some puzzlesin agricultural contracts, in particular why risk-averse agentssometimes accept to be governed by high-powered incentive contractsthat are quite similar to fixed rental contracts, and why risk-neutralagents are sometimes offered share contracts with lower-poweredincentives.     

University licensing of patents for varietal innovations in agriculture

There has been a sharp increase in the number of patented agricultural varieties from public universities in the United States. We develop an experiment to examine the revenue stream to universities from licensing plant‐based innovations. In the experiment we asked subjects to bid for access for a patented input that would be used to produce a differentiated product; treatments were employed to solicit bids that were financed by fees, royalties, and a combination of the two mechanisms under exclusive and nonexclusive contracts. The literature studying the economics of downstream duopoly competition in quantity suggests that revenues for the innovator would be greatest under a nonexclusive contract that uses fees and royalties. In our experiment we allow more than two firms to obtain access to the patent in the nonexclusive treatments, and our empirical results suggest that innovator revenues are greatest when royalties are used alone in a nonexclusive contract.     

农地规模化流转背景下的农业雇佣生产合约:理论模型及实证分析

在中国农地规模化流转的背景下,农业雇佣生产成为客观事实。本文基于多任务委托—代理思想,通过建立农业雇佣生产合约模型,从合约激励角度推演出三种典型的合约形式,即固定工资+过程监督、计件工资+事后客观评估、固定工资+收益分成+事后主(客)观评估。进一步地,本文借助经验素材证实了上述合约形式的存在及其合理性。研究结果表明:在雇佣采茶情景下,采用固定工资+过程监督合约会导致采茶工、茶农和社会三方出现效率损失和福利损失,计件工资+事后客观评估合约优于固定工资+过程监督合约。     

我国政府购买公共法律服务行为法律属性研究--以行政协议理论为切入点

近年来,购买公共法律服务成为许多地方政府及其组成部门实现职能转变的重要选择。然而,复杂的实践表明不应将我国政府购买公共法律服务简单地定性为合同行为或"行政协议"行为,而应当根据不同行为所体现的权力(利)运行机理,将政府购买公共法律服务行为分为两种类型:私权行为性质的购买行为和行政行为性质的购买行为。厘清这一点,是推动行政协议理论发展和正确适用法律对我国政府购买公共法律服务行为进行审查的基本前提。     

Revisiting the determinants of futures contracts success: the role of market participants

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange introduced a futures contract for distillers’ dried grains (DDGs) in early 2010, but the market became inactive only four months after its inception. While many new futures contracts do not develop into high‐volume traders, interest from DDG cash market participants indicated that this contract could be successful. Prompted by the unexpected lack of trading activity in this new futures market, we empirically revisit the question of what factors contribute to a futures contract's success and extend the literature by investigating the roles of market participants and the significance of supporting futures markets. Estimation results indicate that the market participant type—hedger or speculator—affects futures contract trade volume. More importantly, we find that the viability of new futures contracts for commodities that are jointly produced with other commodities is impacted by hedgers’ trade volume of the related futures contract. These results provide important additions into the portfolio of indicators used by commodity exchanges to more cost‐effectively evaluate new futures contract products.     

Contract farming,contract design and smallholder livelihoods*

Contract farming has gained in importance in many developing countries. Previous studies analysed effects of contracts on smallholder farmers’ welfare, yet mostly without considering that different types of contractual relationships exist. Here, we examine associations between contract farming and farm household income in the oil palm sector of Ghana, explicitly differentiating between two types of contracts, namely simple marketing contracts and more comprehensive resource-providing contracts. Moreover, we look at different income sources to better understand how both contracts are linked to farmers’ livelihood strategies. We use cross-sectional survey data and regression models. Issues of endogeneity are addressed through measuring farmers' willingness-to-participate in contracts and using this indicator as an additional covariate. Farmers with both types of contracts have significantly higher household incomes than farmers without a contract, yet with notable differences in terms of the income sources. Farmers with a marketing contract allocate more household labour to off-farm activities and thus have higher off-farm income. In contrast, farmers with a resource-providing contract have larger oil palm plantations and thus higher farm incomes. The findings suggest that the two contract types are associated with different livelihood strategies and that disaggregated analysis of different income sources is important to better understand possible underlying mechanisms.     

Contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality: experimental evidence from the Vietnamese dairy sector

In emerging markets for high‐value food products in developing countries, processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality. One widely embraced approach is contract farming. But relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context. We use the example of the Vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk. A framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments, a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk, on farmers’ investment in quality‐improving inputs. Statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use, resulting in better output quality. The bonus payment generates even higher quality milk. We also find that input choice levels depend on farmers’ socio‐economic characteristics such as wealth, while individual risk preferences seem to be less important. Implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed.     

Heterogeneous Risk Preferences,Discount Rates and Land Contract Choice in Ethiopia

This paper analyses the role of risk and rate of time preference in the choice of land contracts. The analysis builds on the risk‐sharing and imperfect market explanations of contract choice. Unique data from Ethiopia, which contain land contract information and experimental risk and rate of time preference measures on matched landlord–tenant partners, are employed in the empirical analysis. The results show that landlord and tenant time preferences are significant determinants of contract choice. For landlords (but not tenants), risk preference is also significant, indicating the importance of financial constraints and production risk in the determination of contract choice. The results are of particular relevance to land market policy in Ethiopia, where production is risk‐prone, financial markets are imperfect, and where there is a major need for the development of vibrant land rental markets.     

Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial

The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and government. The present paper describes the key elements of auction and contract design employed and the results obtained from a pilot auction of conservation contracts run in two regions of Victoria. The pilot demonstrated that it was possible to create at least the supply side of a market for nature conservation and in conjunction with a defined budget, prices were discovered and resources allocated through contracts with landholders. The present paper compares a discriminative price auction with a hypothetical fixed-price scheme showing that an auction could offer large cost savings to governments interested in nature conservation on private land. The paper identifies some important design problems that would need to be solved before auctions could be applied more broadly including: multiple complementary outcomes, reserve prices, sequential auction design and contract design. Nevertheless, the paper does show that auctioning conservation contracts for environmental outcomes is an important new policy mechanism that deserves closer examination.     

Cattle sharing and rental contracts in an Agrarian economy: evidence from Ethiopia

Empirical evidence on the role of cattle sharing and rental contracts in agrarian economies is limited. This article is an investigation of different types of cattle sharing and rental contracts producers in rural Ethiopia adopt. It also investigates why households in rural Ethiopia rely on these contracts that are vulnerable and therefore subject to potential moral hazard problems described in earlier literature. We apply random effect probit and control function econometric methods to household panel data collected in 2005 and 2007 from two agro‐ecological zones in Ethiopia. Controlling for the endogeneity of access to livestock credit, we find that contracts are spatially fragmented and better developed where population density is high and credit and insurance markets are poorly developed. We also find that contracts help cash poor and credit constrained households to improve their herd dynamics, to get access to nonlivestock resources (land, labor and cash) and share risks that could have been difficult without the contract. We show that contracts are rational responses of residents in rural communities characterized by imperfect credit and insurance services, since households with better access to credit are less likely to rely on contracts.     

Finding default? Understanding the drivers of default on contracts with farmers’ organizations under the World Food Programme Purchase for progress pilot

During the past two decades, food assistance policy has shifted toward local or regional food purchases and away from purchases from donor countries. Although most local and regional procurement occurs through hard tendering processes open to large‐scale firms and farms, there is growing interest in identifying how and whether to procure from smallholder farmer organizations (FOs). To date, little is known about the drivers of successful contracting with FOs. We utilize data from the United Nations World Food Programme Purchase for Progress pilot in three East African countries to predict defaults on contracts. We examine four possible explanations: country contexts, FO characteristics, prior experience with contracts, and contract modalities and their relationship to local spot market prices. The single most important predictor of default is the increase in market prices between contract approval and delivery. Yet, although increases in market prices are linked to increases in default, this relationship is decreasing in contract size, indicating search costs associated with breaking contracts. Our findings yield both generalizable and context‐specific insights about whether—and when—procuring from smallholder farmers can be successfully integrated into the food assistance toolkit.     

Optimisation of water procurement decisions in an irrigation district: the role of option contracts

Water supply instability is one of the main risks faced by irrigation districts and farmers. Water procurement decision optimisation is essential in order to increase supply reliability and reduce costs. Water markets, such as spot purchases or water supply option contracts, can make this decision process more flexible. We analyse the potential interest in an option contract for an irrigation district that has access to several water sources. We apply a stochastic recursive mathematical programming model to simulate the water procurement decisions of an irrigation district's board operating in a context of water supply uncertainty in south‐eastern Spain. We analyse what role different option contracts could play in securing its water supply. Results suggest that the irrigation district would be willing to accept the proposed option contract in most cases subject to realistic values of the option contract financial terms. Of nine different water sources, desalination and the option contract are the main substitutes, where the use of either depends on the contract parameters. The contract premium and optioned volume are the variables that have a greater impact on the irrigation district's decisions.     

New evidence regarding the effects of contract farming on agricultural labor use

Contractual agreements between smallholder farmers and agribusiness companies have gained in importance in many developing countries. While productivity and income effects of contracting in the small farm sector were analyzed in many previous studies, labor market and employment effects are not yet well understood. This is an important research gap, especially against the background of continued population growth and structural transformation. Here, we investigate the effects of two types of contractual agreements between large international processing companies and smallholder farmers on agricultural labor use, household labor allocation, and hired labor demand in Ghana's palm oil sector. We use cross‐sectional survey data and a willingness‐to‐pay approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity between farmers with and without contracts. We find that agricultural labor intensity is substantially reduced through the contracts, because contracting in Ghana is associated with the adoption of labor‐saving procedures and technologies. Simple marketing contracts lead to reallocation of the saved household labor to off‐farm employment, whereas resource‐providing contracts lead to a stronger reallocation of labor within the farming enterprise. Household labor is more affected by labor savings than hired labor.     

The political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture: an empirical study

The paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision‐making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture. We use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures (PARI). The empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses. The analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers, but also to invest in public agricultural research. Furthermore, the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision‐making on PARI is non‐linear and conditional on other factors. Regarding the impact of political institutions, the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers (agricultural protection), nor to lower investment in public goods (PARI). ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.     

Contract Enforcement, Social Efficiency, and Distribution: Some Experimental Evidence

We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration. We find that if a third party (e.g., government) perfectly enforces contracts, social efficiency is enhanced. We also find that when third-party enforcement is imperfect, social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts. However, opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers (growers) with ex post profits below reservation levels. Finally, partial or one-sided third-party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects' ability to use informal enforcement instruments.