Macro‐Fiscal Volatility and the Composition of Public Spending*

Earlier empirical literature has examined some long‐ and medium‐term aspects of macro‐fiscal volatility while leaving its short‐term fiscal impact unexplored. To help fill that gap, we examine the impact of macro‐fiscal volatility on the composition of public spending. To that end, we analyse a panel of 10 EU countries during 1991–2007. Our results suggest that increases in the volatility of regularly‐collected and cyclical revenues such as the VAT and income taxes tend to tilt the expenditure composition in favour of public investment. In contrast, increases in the volatility of ad hoc taxes such as capital taxes tend to favour public consumption spending, albeit only a little. We interpret such volatility innovations as conveying news to the fiscal policymaker about the underlying economic conditions, with especially regularly‐collected and cyclical taxes prompting short‐term cyclical fine‐tuning.     

Making the Stability Pact More Flexible: Does It Lead to Pro‐Cyclical Fiscal Policies?*

One of the often‐discussed negative aspects of the Stability and Growth Pact is the rigidity of its deficit rule. Several reform proposals aim currently to alleviate the rule in order to allow the automatic stabilisers to operate freely. However, such a reform is likely to cause even further deterioration of fiscal balances in the EMU member countries. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that, in the past, increasing the structural deficit had a strong negative impact on the degree of anti‐cyclical fiscal stabilisation. This suggests that the reform of the Pact, through higher structural deficits, could decrease rather than increase the scope of anti‐cyclical fiscal actions in the EMU member countries.     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages*

We survey the recent empirical literature concerning the cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area, finding large differences in results. We show that these differences are heavily influenced by the choices made in modelling fiscal behaviour. We make a case for the use, in assessing policies and in the EMU context, of the standard modelling choice where the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy is directly estimated. Models where the overall reaction to the cycle – which includes the effects of both discretionary actions and automatic stabilisers – is directly estimated tend to suggest either strong pro‐cyclical or strong counter‐cyclical discretionary reactions, depending on how this component is identified. Within the standard model and for the years 1994 to 2008, we show that results are significantly affected by the data vintage (ex post or real‐time). With ex post data, we find an unambiguous indication of a‐cyclicality. Using real‐time data, we find that the output gap matters. However, depending on whether we assess policy intentions or actual policies, euro‐area governments' behaviour radically changes. A plausible interpretation is that in the implementation phase, governments loosen their fiscal stance, giving in to political pressures that are proportional to the scale of the economic difficulties in bad times and the size of the ‘growth dividend’ in good times.     

Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The ‘Golden Rule of Public Finance’ Reconsidered in an Endogenous Growth Setting*

In this paper, we look for long‐run and short‐run effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth and welfare in a standard endogenous growth model. We show that, under very general hypotheses, the ‘golden rule of public finance’, which allows a government to run public‐investment‐oriented fiscal deficits, leads to a lower balanced‐growth path in the long run, and eventually in the short run, compared with balanced‐budget rules. Welfare effects are more difficult to assess, and depend on the form of the utility function. Our model shows that debt rules such as the golden rule may improve (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘low’) or weaken (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘high’) intertemporal welfare. Consequently, a balanced‐budget rule does not necessarily dominate debt rules from the point of view of welfare, while it does from the point of view of long‐run economic growth.     

Growth and Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model with Public Investment

In this paper we analyze growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model along the balanced growth path. As to the model we assume that sustained per capita growth results from public investment. The government uses its tax revenue for investment in public capital, for investment subsidy and for transfer payments. We then analyze how the balanced growth rate reacts to variations in those policy variables. Further, we study welfare effects of varying the fiscal parameters and demonstrate that, in general, maximizing economic growth is not equivalent to maximizing welfare on the balanced growth path.     

Cyclically‐Neutral Generational Accounting

This paper introduces a key methodological innovation into generational accounting. By incorporating cyclically‐adjusted balances into the forward‐looking budget projections underlying the concept, we isolate pure policy effects, which render comparisons of the fiscal sustainability indicators obtained across time and countries truly meaningful. We also show that a demographic effect and a debt effect may drive fiscal sustainability measures over time, and establish a routine to control for these effects in the generational accounting framework. An empirical application for Spain illustrates that our proposed decomposition of indicators is empirically relevant. Standard generational accounting suggests that fiscal sustainability in Spain improved substantially in preparing for EMU. However, calculation of the pure policy effects reveals that this has not been the case.     

Fiscal spillovers in the Euro area

This paper analyses the dynamic effects of fiscal imbalances in a given EMU member state on the borrowing costs of other countries in the euro area. The estimation of a multivariate, multi-country time series model (specifically a Global VAR, or GVAR) using quarterly data for the EMU period suggests that euro-denominated government yields are strongly linked with each other. However, financial markets seem to be able to discriminate among different issuers. Consequently, fiscal imbalances in Italy and in other peripheral countries should be closely monitored by their EMU partners and the European institutions.     

Panel Data Evidence on the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks in the EU New Member States

We identify fiscal policy shocks in the EU new member states using four different methods. We use panel data techniques to estimate the output response to these shocks. We find that investment and export growth increase after fiscal consolidation and decelerate after fiscal stimulus when the shocks are expenditure‐based. In contrast, private consumption does not respond to fiscal policy shocks. Expenditure‐based fiscal consolidations reduce wages, supporting the view that fiscal consolidation of such composition enhances the competitiveness and profitability of domestic enterprises. In contrast, we do not find evidence of fiscal shocks affecting households' confidence.     

Government investment and fiscal stimulus

Effects of government investment are studied in an estimated neoclassical growth model. The analysis focuses on two dimensions that are critical for understanding government investment as a fiscal stimulus: implementation delays for building public capital and expected fiscal adjustments to deficit-financed spending. Implementation delays can produce small or even negative labor and output responses to increases in government investment in the short run. Anticipated fiscal adjustments matter both quantitatively and qualitatively for long-run growth effects. When public capital is insufficiently productive, distorting financing can make government investment contractionary at longer horizons.     

Federal fiscal transfers in monetary unions: A NOEM approach

In the debate over EMU, a widely accepted view is that a federal fiscal mechanism is needed for the participating states to cope with asymmetric shocks. In this paper, we explore the properties of federal fiscal transfer schemes with regard to their capability to stabilize national consumption, production and employment. We consider direct transfers among private sectors and indirect transfers among national fiscal authorities. We show that federal fiscal arrangements can provide perfect insurance. Our analysis builds on the New Open Economy Macroeconomics framework which allows us to portray the transmission of shocks and the properties of transfers in detail. JEL Code E42 · E63 · F33 · F42     

Public Investment,the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’

The fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact have sometimes been criticised as an excessively binding constraint for appropriate counter‐cyclical action. The risk that the rules may permanently reduce the public sector's contribution to capital accumulation has also been pointed out. In this framework, the adoption of a ‘golden rule’ has been suggested. Starting from the recent debate, this paper tackles two questions: (a) the implications of the Pact for public investment and (b) the pros and cons of introducing a golden rule in EMU's fiscal framework, given the objectives of low public debts and adequate margins for a stabilising budgetary policy. The analysis suggests that the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact may negatively influence public investment spending. However, the golden rule, although intuitively appealing, does not seem to be an appropriate solution to the problem.     

Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model

We develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the “Engine of Growth” is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use the taxes gathered to fund public capital accumulation or consume the resourses itself; that is engage in corruption. There is an irreducable level of endogenously determined corruption which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. This competition takes the form of choosing a time path for public capital invesment, which implies time paths for output and household consumption. We study both the model’s steady state, and dynamical behavior along the saddle path. The predictions of our theory accord well with the existent empirical evidence on the relationships between the level and growth rate of output, corruption, public investment and fiscal transparency. Our analysis also provides a perspective on the transition experiences of several Eastern European economies. JEL Code: O41, H41     

Long‐Term Effects of Fiscal Policy on the Size and Distribution of the Pie in the UK*

This paper provides a joint analysis of the output and distributional long‐term effects of various fiscal policies in the UK, using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach. Our findings suggest that the long‐term impact on GDP of increasing public spending and taxes is negative, and especially strong in the case of current expenditure. We also find significant distributional effects associated with fiscal policies, indicating that an increase in public spending reduces inequality while a rise in indirect taxes increases income inequality.     

Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risk in EU-15 Sovereign Yield Spreads after Seven Years of Monetary Union

The market capitalisation of international bond markets is much larger than that of international equity markets. However, compared to the large body of literature on international equity market linkages, there are far fewer empirical studies of bond systemic risk or international bond market co-movements. The extent of international bond market linkages merits investigation, as it may have important implications for the cost of financing fiscal deficit, monetary policymaking independence, modelling and forecasting long-term interest rates, and bond portfolio diversification. In this paper, we investigate the relative influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on yield spreads over 10-year German government securities during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. We estimate both panel regressions for the two groups of EU-15 countries (EMU and non-EMU) and specific-country regressions for the nine countries in the EMU group and the three countries in the non-EMU group. All estimations include both domestic (differences in market liquidity and credit risk) and international risk factors. The results present clear evidence that it was mostly idiosyncratic rather than systemic risk factors that drove the evolution of 10-year yield spread differentials over Germany in all EMU countries during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. Conversely, in the case of non-EMU countries, adjusted yield spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange factor) are influenced more by systemic risk factors. The fact that these countries do not share a common Monetary Policy might explain these results, which may show that government bonds from EMU countries have a better safe-haven status that those of non-EMU countries.     

Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union at the Zero Lower Bound

This paper constructs a two‐country core–periphery New Keynesian model of a currency union to address the interaction between the objectives of regionally directed fiscal policy constrained by a single currency and the aggregate use of fiscal policy in face of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy interest rates. We identify an optimal path of aggregate and relative fiscal policy responses to a negative region‐specific demand shock. Our results show that (i) in a monetary union, the optimal policy response to an asymmetric reduction in demand concentrated in the periphery always entails a relative shift of fiscal expenditure toward the worse‐affected regions, (ii) though no aggregate fiscal response is required outside the ZLB, and (iii) optimal union‐wide fiscal policy is expansionary at the ZLB. Therefore, optimal policy always entails an expansion in the periphery at the ZLB, but the optimal fiscal response in the core regions can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on the parameters of the model. However, (iv) fiscal expansion in the core is warranted if the periphery cannot implement an expansion due to constraints on public spending.     

Fiscal Stimulus in Times of High Debt: Reconsidering Multipliers and Twin Deficits

We investigate the impact of fiscal stimuli at different levels of the government debt‐to‐GDP ratio for a sample of 17 European countries from 1970 to 2010. This is implemented in an interacted panel VAR framework in which all coefficient parameters are allowed to change continuously with the debt‐to‐GDP ratio. We find that responses to government spending shocks exhibit strong nonlinear behavior. While the overall cumulative effect of a spending shock on real GDP is positive and significant at moderate debt‐to‐GDP ratios, this effect turns negative as the ratio increases. The total cumulative effect on the trade balance as a share of GDP is negative at first but switches sign at higher levels of debt. Consequently, depending on the degree of public indebtedness, our results accommodate long‐run fiscal multipliers that are greater and smaller than one or even negative as well as twin deficit and twin divergence behavior within one sample and time period. From a policy perspective, these results lend additional support to increased prudence at high public debt ratios because the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli to boost economic activity or resolve external imbalances may not be guaranteed.     

促进我国农村小额信贷效率改进的财政保障机制研究

针对我国农村小额信贷资金使用效率低下的现状,本文从正确认识政府财政职能和金融职能等三个方面的关系出发,分析了政府加大农村地区公共事业建设的财政投入,建立农村社会公共事业财政保障机制和农业保险体系的路径、思路和方法,以有效促进农民增收,增强农户融资能力,达到提高农村小额信贷效率的最终目的。     

Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time-varying coefficient approach

We study the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads across 10 EMU countries between Q1/1999 and Q1/2010. We apply a semiparametric time-varying coefficient model to identify, to what extent an observed change in the yield spread is due to a shift in macroeconomic fundamentals or due to altering risk pricing. We find that at the beginning of EMU, the government debt level and the general investors’ risk aversion had a significant impact on interest differentials. In the subsequent years, however, financial markets paid less attention to the fiscal position of a country and the safe haven status of Germany diminished in importance. By the end of 2006, two years before the fall of Lehman Brothers, financial markets began to grant Germany safe haven status again. One year later, when financial turmoil began, the market reaction to fiscal loosening increased considerably. The altering in risk pricing over time period confirms the need of time-varying coefficient models in this context.     

The Strange and Futile World of Trade Wars

U.S. President Donald Trump has a misguided, mercantilist view of international trade. He believes that an external (or “trade”) deficit is a “problem,” and that this deficit is caused by foreigners engaging in unfair trade practices. Accordingly, the president and his followers feel that the U.S. is being—and has long been—victimized by foreigners. The reality, however, is that the negative external balance in the U.S. is neither a “problem” nor is it attributable to foreigners engaging in nefarious activities. The U.S.'s negative external balance, which the country has registered every year since 1975, is “made in the USA.” External balances are always and everywhere homegrown; they are the reflection and the result of the relationship between domestic savings and domestic investment. And it is the gap between a country's savings and domestic investment that is the fundamental driver and determinant of its external balance. Specifically, the current account balance, or “trade deficit,” is the sum of the private savings‐investment gap and the public savings‐investment gap, or what is known as the “fiscal balance.” From 1972 until the end of 2018, for example, the cumulative private sector savings‐investment gap in the U.S. was a positive $12.8 trillion; that is, U.S. companies and individuals collectively saved—that is, earned and retained—some $12.8 trillion more than they consumed and invested domestically. But this positive balance was completely overshadowed by the cumulative negative government gap—or cumulative fiscal deficits—of $24.2 trillion during this 47‐year period. And thus the U.S. as a whole experienced a savings‐investment gap of negative $11.4 trillion that is entirely attributable to the country's fiscal deficits. What's more, the fact that the U.S. recorded a cumulative current account deficit of $11.5 trillion during this period confirms that the U.S. external deficits simply mirror what is happening in the U.S. domestic economy, just as the savings‐investment identity suggests. And, of course, the savings‐investment identity holds true for all countries, even those with significant external surpluses. Japan and China have both long experienced savings surpluses, and both have run current account surpluses that have mirrored their positive savings‐investment gaps. If the U.S. mercantilists understood what causes trade and current account deficits, they would direct their ire at profligate government spending rather than at foreigners. But they don't understand. And the leader of the mercantilists, President Trump, is flying blind and presiding over ever‐expanding fiscal deficits—which will only ensure that the current account deficits not just continue, but get bigger.