Review and comments: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont,Incentives in public decision making

This paper develops a procedure for testing the signalling hypothesis as advanced by Spence et al. The approach used is to examine directly the question of whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring decisions. An application of the method to a recruitment by the Swedish auto manufacturer Volvo is presented.     

Starting Wages Respond to Employer's Risk

Firms hiring new graduates face uncertainty on the future productivity of workers. Theory suggests that starting wages reflect this, with lower pay for greater uncertainty. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education as an indicator of the unobserved heterogeneity that employers face. We find solid evidence that starting wages are lower if the variance of exam grades is higher and higher if the skew is higher: employers shift the cost of productivity risk to new hires, but pay for the opportunity to catch a really good worker. Estimating the extent of risk cost sharing between firm and worker shows that shifting to workers is larger in the market sector than in the public sector and diminishes with experience.     

The role of hard-to-obtain information on ability for the school-to-work transition

When information about the abilities of job seekers is difficult to obtain, statistical discrimination by employers may be an efficient strategy in the hiring and wage-setting process. In this article, we use a unique, longitudinal survey that follows the PISA 2000 students in their early educational and work–life careers. We find that a deviance in the PISA test scores from what one would have predicted based on easy-to-obtain observable characteristics influences the probability of succeeding in the transition from compulsory schooling to a firm-based apprenticeship significantly but in a non-symmetric way. Only those who had a test result below their predicted result have significantly lower chances of getting an apprenticeship. We also find evidence that the importance of hard-to-obtain information on ability is further revealed in the course of the apprenticeship.     

EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE LABOR MARKET

Some have criticized government antidiscrimination programs for causing efficiency losses both by devoting public resources to monitoring and enforcement and by distorting personnel decisions. This paper examines the efficiency consequences of such programs when discrimination is caused by a market failure and when regulators are imperfectly informed about individual firms' personnel policies.
This paper outlines a simple model of "statistical discrimination" and shows that an equal opportunity rule, which constrains employers from offering different wage schedules to different groups, will improve the efficiency of this economy. Employers will attempt to evade such regulation, and the paper describes an evasion strategy in which employers search for worker "qualifications" that can act as proxies for race or sex. The paper discusses problems involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance, and considers two possible responses by the regulatory agency. The first is analogous to "disparate impact" judgments in which the type of information that employers can use in personnel decisions is regulated. The second is an affirmative action-type policy that monitors the outcomes, rather than the process, of hiring and compensation decisions. Affirmative action policies have some advantages since they permit employers to use information more efficiently than do policies that attempt to regulate personnel decisions directly. However, affirmative action policies are likely to lead to charges of preferential treatment.     

A Moral Hazard Approach to Wage Discounts under Informal Hiring

This study discusses informal hiring in terms of a standard principal–agent model. We have developed an adverse selection model of the labour market where effort is not contractible and employers have the opportunity to use informal search channels for hiring purposes. This standard framework enables us to provide an effort‐based explanation of the wage gap associated with informal hiring. Besides the wage discount, another feature of the equilibrium is that low‐ability workers informally hired shirk.     

Advances in supervision technology and economic welfare: a general equilibrium analysis

We analyze the impact of improvements in the technology by which employers monitor their workers. It is unclear a priori whether workers should benefit or not from such advances. On the one hand, they decrease the total costs of hiring workers and stimulate labor demand. On the other hand, as supervision becomes less costly employers tend to substitute monitoring for wages as a means of motivating workers. We show how the impact on firms and workers of such technological progress depends on the nature of the labor market equilibrium (i.e. whether there is full employment or not) and the cost (technology) of monitoring. A distinct possibility is that unemployed workers welcome the changes in supervision because they promote employment, while employed workers resist such changes and the more intensive supervision they encourage.     

The Age of Hiring and Deferred Compensation: Evidence from Australia

The factors affecting age of hiring are estimated using Australian establishment data. Lower ages of new hires are associated with training and with workplaces using steeper tenure–wage profiles. Lower ages of hires are associated with steeper profiles throughout the age of hire distribution, whereas lower ages of hires are associated with the provision of training only among younger hires. Moreover, the evidence confirms that larger employers are more likely to hire younger workers but that lower ages of hire continue to be associated with steeper tenure–wage profiles even among larger employers. The robust role of the tenure–wage profile suggests that it is too early to conclude, as some have, that specific training is the paramount reason for the reduced hiring prospects of the old.     

NEGLECTED WOMEN AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH

Comparable worth proposals presume that the gender wage gap is a result of occupational segregation. The proposals argue that females are channeled into "women's jobs" and that overcrowding depresses women's wages below the "value" of the work performed. Comparable worth legislation proposes replacing the idea of equal pay for equal work with a principle of equal pay for different work of comparable worth determined by job evaluations. Such job evaluations are feasible only for the public sector and large private employers. The analysis in this paper recognizes that comparable worth wage adjustments are to be limited to the large employers. It examines how employers in the covered sector tend to alter their pay packages and hiring standards. Comparable worth legislation also affects wages in the uncovered sector populated by small employers. The rationing of women's jobs and the changes in hiring standards for men's jobs in the covered sector tend to redound to the benefit of smart, energetic women and dull, indolent men.     

Arithmetics of research specialization

In hiring decisions, universities explicitly reward focusing on a specific field. I model the use of research specialization (focusing) in hiring as a signal of ability. Without explicit reward for focusing, candidates who focus are more likely to be able. However, if job market rewards focusing, less able candidates who would otherwise be indifferent between focusing or not, start focusing, which leads to smaller likelihood of observing an able candidate among those who focus than among those who do not. Specialization works as an effective ability signal only when generation of good ideas is highly likely for all ability levels.     

高校扩招后果的经济学分析--基于劳动市场信号发送理论的研究

文章运用劳动市场信号发送理论,分析近年来我国高校大规模扩招所产生的社会经济后果。其基本观点是:在假设教育只具有能力信号功能的前提下,扩招提高了就业门槛,导致教育信号的过度投资,这是雇主和雇员互动博弈的结果。若引入教育的生产力功能,扩招使特质对应的教育水平分布区间加大,原来教育水平可以分离的特质分布区间降低,意味着本科教育的信号区分功能减弱。高能力的本科生为了分离自己会选择更高的教育信号(如研究生),或是追求名校、特殊资质证书等其他信号,教育信号投资的激励增强。如果高校不断扩招,则会形成教育信号投资的不断攀升,并最终导致教育过度。     

Allocation of Resources in Educational Production: The Budget Puzzle

This study examines why educational expenditures seem to be unrelated to educational achievements according to empirical evidence. An overlapping generations model of budgetary and allocation decisions is presented in a political dynamic equilibrium framework. The model's key feature is that the size of the budget is predetermined according to majority voting, taking into account the subsequent allocation decisions. Then, funds are allocated either efficiently or inefficiently on a quality–quantity frontier in hiring teachers. Under these assumptions, this study highlights the implications of existing inefficiencies and demonstrates how they might explain stylized facts. First, the majority of voters may channel more funds to an inefficient education system, in case its return to the marginal units of funding is higher, which helps explain the difficulty in finding budget effects in the data. Second, in certain circumstances, the majority of voters may actually prefer an inefficient education system. Finally, other disadvantages of inefficient education systems, in addition to low educational achievements, include high income inequality and low teacher quality in the long run.     

Approaches to learn about employer learning

The empirical literature on employer learning assumes that employers learn about unobserved ability differences across workers as they spend time in the labour market. This article describes testable implications that arise from this basic hypothesis and how they have been used to quantify the contribution of job market signalling and human capital in measured returns to education. While the empirical basis is still thin, the results suggest that signalling contributes at most about 25% to the observed returns to education.     

Educational attainment and cohort size

"We argue that the postwar baby boom [in the United States] caused substantial fluctuations in both the economic rewards to education and educational attainment over the last 3 decades. If substitutability between young and old workers diminishes with education, the present value of lifetime earnings for a boom cohort is depressed more for highly educated workers, reducing incentives for educational attainment. The opposite is true for pre- and postboom cohorts. The diminishing substitutability hypothesis explains the declines in both the returns to college and college completion rates in the 1970s and predicts a substantial increase in educational attainment for postboomers."     

高校扩招引发教育信号贬值的机理分析

本文运用劳动市场信号发送理论,分析我国高校扩招引发的教育信号贬值的内在机理.扩招降低了进入大学的学习成本,导致了教育信号的过度投资及分离均衡的教育水平提高(即就业门槛提高),文凭的信号作用贬值.扩招后不同群体的信号投资方式和境遇不同,大学生的信号投资激励增强,而高中生缺乏信号分离自己.信号投资的一个重要特点是,通过雇主与雇员的相互博弈过程会产生自增强效应.如果高校不断扩招,会导致信号投资的不断攀升,形成信号投资泡沫.     

Do employers avoid hiring workers from poor neighborhoods? Experimental evidence from the real labor market*

We investigate whether employers avoid hiring workers who live in neighborhoods with low socio-economic status and/or with long commuting times. In a large-scale field experiment in the Swedish labor market, we sent more than 4,000 fictitious résumés, with randomly assigned information about the applicants' residential locations, to firms with advertised vacancies. Our findings show that commuting time has a negative effect on the likelihood of being contacted by an employer, while the socio-economic status of a neighborhood does not appear to be important. These results offer guidance for policymakers who are responsible for reversing segregation patterns.     

Reputation from nested activities

Principals usually try to elicit the quality and behavior of agents from their performance. While sometimes success or failure in production does not provide accurate information about the agents, there may be activities not directly related to production that constitute a more precise signal. I show that, when agents face reputation concerns, introducing these activities after a success improves efficiency, while introducing them after a failure reduces efficiency. Hence, nesting activities in the right way may offer a cheap toolbox to provide incentives. As an illustration, I consider a model where reputation concerns drive the hiring decisions of managers in a firm and I show how scapegoating, an activity “nested” after failures in production, generates inefficiencies. While hiring efficient workers increases the probability of success, hiring less efficient workers provides a buffer against reputation loses from failures, since managers can blame them more easily.     

Educational Attainment and Family Background

Abstract. This paper analyses the effect of aspects of family background, such as family income and parental education, on the educational attainment of persons born from 1967 to 1972. Family income is measured at different periods of a child's life to separate long-term versus short-term effects of family income on educational choices. We find that permanent income matters to a certain degree, and that family income when the child is 0–6 years old is an important explanatory variable for educational attainment later in a child's life. We find that short-term credit constraints have only a small effect on educational attainment. Long-term factors, such as permanent family income and parental education, are much more important for educational attainment than are short-term credit constraints. Public interventions to alleviate the effects of family background should thus also be targeted at a child's early years, the shaping period for the cognitive and non-cognitive skills important later in life.     

Employers' recruitment behaviour and vacancy duration: an empirical analysis for the Dutch labour market

The functioning of labour markets from a demand-side perspective is examined. In particular, the determinants of vacancy duration are studied in the context of a model of employers' search behaviour. A model for the choice of the recruitment strategy at the start of the search process and the corresponding recruitment duration is developed in which allowance is made for different patterns of duration dependence for each recruitment strategy. This model is applied to data on employers' search behaviour in the Dutch labour market. It is found that employers prefer advertisements as the first recruitment channel when applicants are required to have work experience. Moreover, employers prefer to start searching via the labour exchange office when jobs in the secondary segment of the labour market have to be filled. It is also found that - when advertisements are used as the first recruitment strategy - employers need some time to acquire a pool of applicants and to select candidates from this pool. It is interesting as a contrast that applicants seem to be evaluated rather quickly if employers start searching via informal contacts.     

Flexicurity Labour Market Performance in Denmark

Unemployment is at a low and stable level in Denmark. This achievementis often attributed to the so-called flexicurity model combiningflexible hiring and firing rules for employers with income securityfor employees. Whatever virtues this model may have, a low andstable unemployment rate is not automatically among them sincethe basic flexicurity properties were also in place during the1970s and 1980s where high and persistent unemployment was prevalent.Labour market performance has changed due to a series of reformsduring the 1990s, the main thrust of which was a shift froma passive focus of labour market policies to a more active focuson job search and employment. The policy tightened eligibilityfor unemployment benefits and their duration as well as introducedworkfare elements into unemployment insurance and social policiesin general. Thereby, policy makers attempted to strengthen theincentive structure without taking resort to general benefitreductions. We argue that the workfare policies have playedan important role running primarily via motivation/threat andwage effects. However, active labour market policies are resourcedemanding, and although the workfare reforms have improved costeffectiveness, there is still an issue as to whether the resourcesgoing into active labour market policies are used efficiently.(JEL codes: J30, J40, J60, H53)     

Educated dictators attract more foreign direct investment

Since political risk is greater in dictatorships than in democracies, this paper investigates the hypothesis that foreign investors scrutinize public information on dictators to assess this risk. It checks whether foreign investors use five relevant dictators’ characteristics: age, political experience, education level, education in economics, and prior experience in business. The study is performed on a sample of 100 dictatorial countries from 1973 to 2008. We find that educated dictators are more attractive to foreign investors. We obtain strong evidence that greater educational attainment of the leader is associated with higher FDI. We also find evidence that the leader having tertiary education in economics and prior experience in business is associated with greater FDI. By contrast, the leader's age, and political experience have no relationship with FDI.