Strategic R&D Commitment and the Gains from Trade

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal markets when firms pre‐commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output levels. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Liberalizing Services Trade In APEC: A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition

The paper studies services-sector trade liberalization in the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum using a global, multicountry, multisector applied general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive service sector. Reducing the service sector's nontariff barriers is modeled by eliminating the possibility for oligopolistic firms to price-discriminate between client countries within APEC and lowering the fixed costs of the firms doing service exporting business. The results suggest that services trade liberalization reinforces existing sectoral trade balances. Increase in demand for intermediate services tends to reinforce rather than counteract the role of primary factors in determining sectoral comparative advantage. The western APEC members received the greatest welfare gains from services trade liberalization, while the developing economies gained more if only tariffs were eliminated.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

服务贸易的货物贸易条件效应研究——基于伯格斯模型的分析与扩展

文章基于伯格斯模型,分析检验了服务贸易的净进口与我国货物价格贸易条件恶化之间的关系,初步证明了该模型在我国的适用性。进一步地,文章对2004-2008年我国价格贸易条件恶化有所趋缓这一特征进行了分析。结果表明,不同服务部门的净进口对我国货物贸易条件的影响不尽相同。文章得出的政策启示在于:当考察我国服务业开放和服务贸易自由化的收益时,要同时注意到货物价格贸易条件恶化可能带来的福利损失;我国在制定服务业对外开放与服务贸易自由化发展战略时,采取逐步开放和参与的战略尤为重要;另外,可以优先加强对通信、建筑、计算机和信息服务、咨询以及电影音像五大类服务部门的扶持以促进其出口。     

A Welfare Ranking of Multilateral Reductions in Real and Tariff Trade Barriers when Firms are Heterogenous

Trade liberalization comes about through reductions in various types of trade barriers. This paper introduces, apart from the customary real trade costs (i.e. iceberg and fixed export costs), two revenue generating trade barriers (i.e. an ad valorem tariff and a trade license) into a standard heterogeneous‐firms‐trade model with Pareto distributed productivities. We derive analytical welfare rankings of all four liberalization channels for an equal effect on two openness measures, for any trade cost level and while all four barriers are simultaneously present, i.e. for any initial equilibrium. We show that when openness is measured at retail prices, not border prices, the welfare rankings are sensitive to the degree of efficiency in revenue redistribution, e.g. the share of tariff revenues wasted on rent‐seeking activities. As a result, multilateral tariff reductions can switch from the least to the most preferred mode of liberalization. Among the other three barriers we establish a universal welfare ranking for any strictly positive level of revenue redistribution and for either measure of openness.     

WAGE SUBSIDY AND WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper seeks to answer if wage subsidy to workers displaced due to trade reform raises welfare in a developing country. We use a general equilibrium model with non‐specific factor inputs and trade liberalization as a policy variable. A combination of wage subsidy and tariff rate obtains the second‐best welfare level. The theoretical result is new, policy‐relevant and important in view of political‐economy aspects of free trade in developing and transition countries.     

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

This paper investigates the labor market effects of trade liberalization. We incorporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz framework. Workers differ with respect to their abilities. Our main findings are: (i) trade liberalization harms low‐ability workers, they lose their job and switch to long‐term unemployment (worker‐selection effect); (ii) high‐ability workers are better off in terms of both higher wages and higher employment; (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low‐ability workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment—in this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare; (iv) the overall employment and welfare effect crucially hinges on the characteristics of the wage bargain.     

Trade liberalization in environmental goods

Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and agglomeration

Abstract In this study, we develop an economic model to examine agglomeration of heterogeneous firms following trade liberalization. In a closed economy, we show that high‐productivity firms are more likely to agglomerate because they benefit more from agglomeration than their low‐productivity counterparts. However, trade liberalization, especially with a high‐productivity partner, favours partial agglomeration; that is, low‐productivity firms relocate away from the region where high‐productivity firms agglomerate. Consequently, the welfare gap between the domestic regions of an economy narrows following trade liberalization. The latter result suggests that trade liberalization promotes regional economic development.     

Quantifying the impact of services liberalization in a developing country

We compare goods versus services liberalization in terms of welfare, outputs, and factor prices in Tunisia using a CGE model with multiple products, services and trading partners. Restraints on services trade involve both cross-border supply (tariff-equivalent price wedges) and on foreign ownership (monopoly-rent distortions and inefficiency costs). Goods-trade liberalization yields a modest gain in aggregate welfare. Reducing service barriers generate relatively large welfare gains and low adjustment costs. Services liberalization increases economic activity in all sectors and raise the real returns to both capital and labor. The results point to the potential importance of deregulating services provision for economic development.     

A welfare analysis of unilateral trade and FDI liberalization

This paper uses a heterogeneous‐firms model to examine the pro‐competitive channel through which FDI affects national welfare. The model shows that the country from which FDI originates experiences a welfare gain following liberalization. However, a counterintuitive finding is that the welfare of the host country deteriorates. This is explained by the production relocation process that leads to an increase in the mass of domestic firms in the source country and a decrease in the host country. The model also confirms that unilateral trade liberalization brings a similar result even in the presence of bilateral FDI flows.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Trade Liberalization with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper examines the various aspects of trade liberalization with heterogeneous firms using the Melitz (2003 ) model. We find a number of novel results and effects including a Stolper–Samuelson‐like result and several results related to the volume of trade, which are empirically testable. We also analyze what might be called an anti‐variety effect as the result of trade liberalization. We show that this effect is most pronounced for small countries. This resonates with the often voiced criticism from antiglobalists that globalization leads the world to become more homogeneous by eliminating local specialties. Nevertheless, we find that trade liberalization always leads to welfare gains in the model.     

Privatization in a Small Open Economy with Imperfect Competition

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.     

How deep is your love? A quantitative spatial analysis of the transatlantic trade partnership

This paper explores the quantitative effects of trade liberalization envisioned in a transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union. We use a quantitative trade model that, in contrast to other works, features consumptive and productive uses of land and we allow for labor mobility and a spatial equilibrium. Our calibration draws mainly on the world input–output database (WIOD). The eventual outcome of the negotiations is uncertain. Tariffs in E.U.–U.S. trade are already very low, however, so that an agreement will have a major impact only by eliminating nontariff barriers. These are extremely hard to quantify. We address these uncertainties by considering a corridor of trade‐liberalization paths and by providing numerous robustness checks. Even with ambitious liberalization, real income gains within a TTIP are in the range of up to 0.46 percent for most countries. The effect on outside countries is typically negative, yet even smaller. Taking land into account scales down the welfare effects strongly. Interestingly, we find that all German counties derive unambiguous welfare gains even though the model allows for negative terms‐of‐trade effects. Our analysis also implies that in order to arrive at the same welfare gains as under a TTIP, a multilateral liberalization would have to be much more ambitious for the U.S. than for the E.U.     

Learning How To Export

In this paper, we present a standard quality ladders endogenous growth model with one significant new assumption: it takes time for firms to learn how to export. It is known that the welfare gains from trade liberalization implied by a large class of models like the Armington gravity model, the Krugman model, and the Melitz model are small. Our quality ladders model is consistent with a number of firm‐level stylized facts from the heterogeneous firms trade literature and is, in addition, capable of generating very large welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Trade,Wage Gaps,and Specific Human Capital Accumulation*

We develop a new framework for the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on the wage structure and on welfare. Our model focuses on the decision of workers to accumulate firm‐specific skills, by “on‐the‐job” training, knowing that this means their future wages will have to be negotiated, and that the outcome of negotiation will depend on the profitability prospect of firms operating in a new trading environment. We show that trade liberalization may reduce the welfare of a developing country because of its adverse effect on skill accumulation. We also explore the effects of trade liberalization on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

Additive versus multiplicative trade costs and the gains from trade liberalizations

This paper addresses welfare effects from trade liberalization in a Melitz ( 2003 ) heterogeneous‐firms trade model including the empirically important per‐unit (i.e., additive) trade costs in addition to the conventional iceberg (i.e., multiplicative) and fixed trade costs. The novel contribution of the paper is the result that the welfare gain for a given increase in trade openness is higher for reductions in per‐unit (additive) trade costs than for reductions in iceberg (multiplicative) trade costs. The ranking derives from differences in intra‐industry reallocations and, in particular, from dissimilar impacts on the number of exporters (i.e., the extensive margin of trade).