基于证据理论的审计过程改进

一定意义上来说，审计过程是一个证据的过程，故此，审计过程的改进也应该考虑证据的基本理论。文章根据证据理论的基本要素，提出了扩大审计了解范围、强调所获证据的实质、清晰认识审计认定与欲取证据之间的关系、考虑审计证据的证明标准、重视审计主体的职业怀疑态度等五方面的审计过程改进措施，以提高审计过程的合理性和夯实审计结果的基础。     

On optimal cartel deterrence policies

This paper studies audit policies designed to deter explicit cartels in the most effective way. We first compare a standard random and stationary audit strategy with a simple deterministic but non stationary strategy; we show that the certainty of an ulterior control may better deter collusion than the recurrent threat of a sword of Damocles that would lead on average to same frequency of audit.We then explore more complex non stationary strategies and show that it is theoretically possible to deter collusion in the whole economy, even with a small audit budget.     

Cartel sustainability in retail markets: Evidence from a health service sector

This paper studies the role of cost asymmetries and product differentiation on cartel sustainability by drawing data from a failed retail cartel. Unlike the extensive theoretical literature, little empirical evidence exists on these relationships. First, we analyze cartel compliance and find that players are more likely to comply when cost is symmetric and own cost is high. Next, based on a structural model and counterfactual experiments, we show that a cartel price that satisfies all cartel members does not exist. This result indicates an inherent difficulty of sustaining collusion in retail markets with heterogeneous players. We also show that firm heterogeneities, especially product differentiation rather than cost asymmetries, hinder collusion more. Finally, we derive the level of patience (or the discount factor) required for cartel sustainability when firms split profits based on the Shapley value.     

Vertical integration and downstream collusion

We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors. The integrated firm, accessing the input at marginal cost, faces higher profits in the deviation phase and in the non-cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care of the increased incentive to deviate of the integrated firm, while optimal punishment erases the difficulty related to the asymmetries in the non-cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion.     

会计师事务所伦理困境与伦理体系之构建——基于传统儒家文化的思考

结合传统儒家文化的精髓,梳理了会计师事务所的伦理关系,分析了我国会计师事务所面临的伦理困境,提出了结合传统文化,发挥＂仁义礼智信＂在会计审计层面的独特效应,构建适应和谐社会发展需求的会计师事务所伦理体系。     

PDCA循环下乡镇内部审计工作开展初探

乡镇内部审计的重要性得到各级党委政府以及上级审计机关的高度重视,加强乡镇内部审计可以为实现高质量发展,促进社会和谐稳定发展提供有效保障.在对乡镇内部审计存在问题进行分析后,将PDCA循环与乡镇内部审计相结合,按照PDCA循环开展乡镇内部审计,在推动审计质效的同时,也进一步增强了审计的信服力和权威性.     

REIT Auditor Fees and Financial Market Transparency

This article examines the relationship between overinvestment in audit services, abnormal nonaudit fees paid to the auditor and market-based measures of firm transparency. Because real estate investment trusts (REITs) must distribute 90% of their earnings as dividends, many are repeat participants in the seasoned equity market. Thus, REITs have unusually strong incentives to strive for security market transparency. We find that the capital markets reward REITs that overinvest in audit services with better liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads. However, firms with abnormally high nonaudit expenditures appear to be penalized with wider spreads, consistent with the notion that such fees may compromise auditor independence.     

Optimal lot sizing in a non-cooperative material manager-controller game

It is important for manufacturing companies to optimise purchase order quantities. Inaccurate lot size planning raises costs and lowers profits, which top management of course attempts to avoid through controlling processes. The lot size decision becomes even more relevant in the case of just-in-time delivery within a supply chain.The interaction between lot sizing and auditing can be described in terms of a modified inspection game. This paper considers how probabilities, which are the basis for the mixed strategies at equilibrium in the inspection game, will change if the level of penalties accruing to the two players (material manager and controller) depends on the cost deviation caused by the material manager's poor lot-size planning. It is evident that the Nash equilibrium shifts to the strategy combination (methodically determined decision and low auditing level), if the penalties imposed on the controller and material manager increase.Penalties that depend on such deviations, and an accurate audit of the controller's report by top management, prove to be the best instruments for avoiding mismanagement by the material manager and poor controller work, both of which lead to high costs.     

A partial identification framework for dynamic games

Empirical work on strategic interactions is often subject to the critique that equilibrium selection assumptions drive the results. We develop a framework for partially identifying parameters of dynamic games without equilibrium selection assumptions. Our framework relies on incentive compatibility constraints that incorporate game theoretical results on equilibrium payoff sets to bound the unknown continuation payoffs. We apply this framework to identify cost parameters in three dynamic games where collusion is a potential outcome. The identified set demonstrates the ease of sustaining collusion with patient firms, in low demand and when monitoring is perfect, and can also be used to detect collusion.     

国外审计定价研究综述及其启示

审计定价是审计研究领域的热门话题。自1980年以来,西方学者从不同角度对审计定价的影响因素进行了研究。在我国,自2001年上市公司须公开披露审计费用信息以来,学者们开始借鉴西方模型对我国审计定价的影响因素进行研究,但现有研究在研究方法、研究深度等方面尚需进一步拓展,且许多因素对审计定价的影响尚未取得一致的结论。     

Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement

In this paper, we investigate the interaction between two firms, which are involved in a repeated procurement relationship modeled as a multiple criteria auction, and an auctioneer (a government employee) who has discretion in devising the selection criteria. Our main result is that favoritism substantially facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of bidders operating in a stochastically changing environment. A most simple allocation rule where firms take turns in winning, independently of stochastic social preferences and firms’ costs, achieves full cartel efficiency (including price, production, and design efficiency). In each period the selection criteria is fine-tailored to the in-turn winner: the “environment” adapts to the cartel. This result holds true when the expected punishment is a fixed cost. When the cost varies with the magnitude of the distortion of the selection criteria (compared to the true social preferences), favoritism only partially shelters the cartel from the environment. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost for society. Our analysis suggests some anti-corruption measures that could be effective in curbing favoritism and collusion in public markets. It also suggests that the much-advocated rotation of officials is likely to be counter-productive.     

携号转网政策对电信运营商合谋的影响研究

电信业是一个典型的寡头垄断产业,在运营过程中,电信运营商容易达成合谋,同时电信市场较高的转移成本为电信运营商合谋提供一定的基础。本文通过构建博弈模型,研究携号转网政策对电信运营商合谋的影响效应。研究得出：实施携号转网政策,通过有效降低消费者的转移成本,使得电信运营商坚持合谋的临界贴现因子提高,电信运营商将更难坚持合谋。该政策的实施效果随转移成本降低率的提高而增强,随电信运营商产品差异性的不断扩大而减弱。因此,携号转网政策的实施将在一定程度上降低电信运营商的合谋行为。     

Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation

We develop a supergame model of collusion between price-setting oligopolists located in different markets separated by trade costs. The firms produce a homogeneous good and sustain collusion based on territorial allocation of markets. We first show, in a much more general framework than some earlier literature, that a reduction in trade costs can paradoxically increase the sustainability of collusion. Then we prove a new paradox in which the scope for collusion may be enhanced by an increase in the number of firms. The paper thus highlights several hitherto unknown theoretical implications of collusion under price competition.     

Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines

This paper shows how antitrust laws against price-fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry, and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment. We consider two regimes of fines that are often used in practice. The first involves a fine based on revenues of the industry while the second is related to the damage caused to consumers. The analysis shows that since investigation is costly, it is optimal from a welfare point of view to tolerate some degree of collusion in both cases. Comparing the deterrence levels, we show that no regime is a priori better than the other. In addition, we show that for industries where the possibilities of collusion are small, the first system dominates the second in terms of efficiency. Conversely, for high possibilities of collusion, the second system is better.     

我国上市公司的会计欺诈问题研究

随着财务报告结构愈发复杂、商业竞争愈发激烈,上市公司会计欺诈的问题愈发严重。本文结合会计与审计相关理论,以我国进行会计欺诈的上市公司为研究对象,全面系统地分析了我国上市公司会计欺诈的问题,提出了解决上市公司会计欺诈的对策建议。     

惠州市政府能源审计问题研究

政府能源审计是实现一个地区节能减排目标的基础性工作,是实现经济持续发展的必要条件。阐述了政府能源审计的概念、作用,介绍了政府能源审计的开展情况,通过对惠州市政府能源审计情况进行资料收集、调查,提出了惠州政府能源审计存在的问题和解决问题的方法。     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine

We compare the experience with collusion in the market for lysine with the predictions of theory. The lysine market provides an ideal setting following the confessions of cartel participants in antitrust investigations. Data availability allows demand and cost functions to be estimated and observed mark-ups compared with predictions. We find that several integral aspects of collusion in the lysine market are not adequately addressed in the literature: the dynamics associated with entry and investment; persistent asymmetries between firms; the cartel's bargaining problem; and the existence of cheating in equilibrium. These issues are likely to have much wider applicability beyond the lysine market.     

Collusion through Coordination of Announcements

A theory is developed to explain how sellers can effectively collude by coordinating on list prices (or surcharges), while leaving sellers to set their final prices. List prices are interpreted to be cheap talk announcements about cost information unknown to buyers. Buyers use those announcements to decide whom to invite to their procurement auction and the reserve price to set. By coordinating on a high list price to signal high cost, sellers produce supracompetitive prices by inducing buyers to be less aggressive, as reflected in a higher reserve price. We show that collusion can raise social welfare.     

国有煤炭企业内部审计风险防范措施

阐述了对国有煤炭企业内部审计风险存在的主要问题,并从保障国有煤炭企业内部审计员独立性、规范国有煤炭企业内部审计行为等4个方面分析了有效的防范内部审计风险的具体措施。