Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior

Signaling is the most commonly cited explanation for stock repurchases in the academic literature. Yet, there is little evidence on whether managers intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Using a firm's financial reporting behavior to infer managerial intent, we find evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase tender offers to signal undervaluation. In contrast, we find no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction tender offers to signal undervaluation. Instead, firms engaging in Dutch-auction repurchases act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the repurchases to further reduce the repurchasing price.     

Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading

Abnormally high net insider selling is commonly observed after repurchase tender offer (RTO) announcements although, on average, firms experience positive abnormal returns in the years after the repurchases. We explore two potential explanations: liquidity trade timing and informed trading. Consistent with the notion that fixed price RTOs are more likely than Dutch-auction RTOs to signal undervaluation, the results suggest that insider selling after fixed price RTO announcements are driven largely by insiders who time their trades with the repurchase announcements. In contrast, selling after Dutch-auction RTOs seems to be driven primarily by informed traders who exploit mispricing associated with the repurchase announcements.     

Capital structure,equity mispricing,and stock repurchases

We evaluate motives for share repurchases using a unified framework where a firm has a target capital structure and has equity that can be mispriced. We document that capital structure adjustments are a value-increasing motive for repurchases and that the extent to which adjusting capital structure through a repurchase creates value depends on the undervaluation of the firm. Underlevered and undervalued firms enjoy the greatest economic gains from a repurchase, as evidenced by the stock price reaction to the repurchase announcement, and these firms are more likely to announce a share repurchase program.     

Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

Signaling Power of Open Market Share Repurchases in Germany

This paper shows that abnormal stock price returns around the date of open market repurchase announcements are four times higher in Germany than in the USA (12 ver. 3%). We hypothesize that this observation can be explained by national differences in repurchase regulations. Our empirical evidence indicates that German managers primarily buy back shares to signal an undervaluation of their firm. We demonstrate that the stringent repurchase process prescribed by German law attributes a higher credibility to undervaluation signals than do the lax US regulations, and thereby corroborates our hypothesis.Financial support from the E-Finance Lab, Frankfurt am Main, and from Freitag & Co., Frankfurt am Main, is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments     

A comprehensive examination of the wealth effects of recent stock repurchase announcements

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the wealth effect of stock repurchase announcements using a sample of 11,862 repurchase programs announced during 1994–2007. The results of several recent industry surveys indicate that managerial motivations for repurchasing shares may have changed in recent years. To better understand the reasons for repurchasing shares we classify our sample in various ways—by year, by the method used for repurchasing shares, and by the stated purpose of the program. We find that the median size of firms repurchasing shares has increased dramatically recently, and concomitantly, the announcement returns have declined. Signaling undervaluation of share prices appears to become less important than previously assumed. While smaller firms signal undervaluation using open market repurchases, tender offers are chosen to enhance shareholder values by other means.     

Double signals or single signal? An investigation of insider trading around share repurchases

We examine directors’ dealing activity around share repurchasing periods in Hong Kong. There are significant insider trading activities before the share repurchasing period. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, the directors’ purchase activities during the share repurchase period are significantly higher than the expected level while the directors’ sale activities are significantly lower than the expected level. Double signals of share repurchase and directors’ purchases create a stronger signal in conveying undervaluation, while insider sales around share repurchase reduces the undervaluation signal. We find some evidence that is consistent with the free cash flow and signaling arguments for share repurchases.     

Signaling and Takeover Deterrence with Stock Repurchases: Dutch Auctions versus Fixed Price Tender Offers

This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.     

Managerial motivation and timing of open market share repurchases

There are two major mechanisms by which managers distribute cash to shareholders: through dividends and share repurchases. Historically, dividends have been the preferred method, but in recent years, share repurchases have become more popular, with more firms using repurchases than dividends to distribute cash. During the sample period of 2004–2006, 6.5 billion shares were repurchased for a total dollar volume amount of $222 billion. Using a unique dataset on actual monthly share repurchases, this paper investigates when and why managers repurchase shares in the open market. The paper finds evidence that firms which make repurchases are jointly timing their repurchases to perceived undervaluation and the presence of discretionary cash flow. In addition, the paper finds evidence which supports that (1) firms in competitive industries tend to repurchase less, (2) firms tend to substitute repurchases for anti-takeover provision adoption, and (3) firms attempt to manage earnings upward through the use of repurchases.     

Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?

Signaling undervaluation is often considered a primary motive for repurchasing stock, but insider trading activity by repurchasing firms is not always consistent with undervaluation. Net insider buying and selling are both more frequent in quarters when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock, with the odds of observing a repurchase the highest in quarters with net insider selling. In multinomial logit models, share repurchases associated with net insider selling are positively related to illiquidity, option exercises by insiders, and pre-repurchase returns and negatively correlated with industry-adjusted book to market ratios when compared to other repurchases. Hence, repurchases when insiders are selling stock are more likely done to support share prices or avoid dilution and are less likely undervaluation signals. We find that insider trades either validate or mitigate the undervaluation signal of the repurchase. Abnormal returns of repurchasing firms with net insider buying versus net insider selling in a given quarter are significantly higher for the quarter immediately after the repurchase and the three subsequent years. For repurchases accompanied by net insider selling, abnormal returns are negligible after only one year.     

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT STOCK REPURCHASES?

Stock repurchases by U.S. companies experienced a remarkable surge in the 1980s and ‘90s. Indeed, in 1998, the total value of all stock repurchased by U.S. companies exceeded for the first time the total amount paid out as cash dividends. And the U.S. repurchase movement has gone global in the past few years, spreading not only to Canada and the U.K., but also to countries like Japan and Germany, where such transactions were prohibited until recently. Why are companies buying back their stock in such amounts? After dismissing the popular argument that stock repurchases boost earnings per share, the authors argue that repurchases serve to add value in two main ways: (1) they provide managers with a tax‐efficient means of returning excess capital to shareholders and (2) they allow managers to “signal” to investors their view that the firm is undervalued. Returning excess capital is value‐adding for two reasons: First, it helps prevent companies from pursuing growth and size at the expense of profitability and value. Second, by returning capital to investors, repurchases (like dividends) play the critically important economic function of allowing investors to channel their investment from mature or declining sectors of the economy to more promising ones. But if stock repurchases and dividends serve the same basic economic function, why are repurchases growing more rapidly? Part of the explanation is that, because repurchases are taxed as capital gains and dividends as ordinary income, repurchases are a more tax‐efficient way of distributing excess capital. But perhaps even more important than their tax treatment is the flexibility that (at least) open market repurchases provide corporate managers‐flexibility to make small adjustments in capital structure, to exploit (or correct) perceived undervaluation of the firm's shares, and possibly even to increase the liquidity of the stock, which could be particularly valuable in bear markets. For U.S. regulators, the growth in open market stock repurchases raises some interesting issues. Perhaps most important, companies are not required to (and rarely do) furnish their investors with details about a given program's structure, execution method, number of shares repurchased, or even its duration. Policy regulators (and corporate executives as well) should consider some of the benefits provided by other systems, notably Canada's, which provide greater transparency and more guidelines for the repurchase process.     

Stock repurchases: How firms choose between a self tender offer and an open-market program

In practice, open-market stock repurchase programs outnumber self tender offers by approximately 10–1. This evidence is puzzling given that tender offers are more efficient in disbursing free cash and in signaling undervaluation – the two main motivations suggested in the literature for repurchasing shares. We provide a theoretical model to explore this puzzle. In the model, tender offers disburse free cash quickly but induce information asymmetry and hence require a price premium. Open-market programs disburse free cash slowly, and hence do not require a price premium, but because they are slow, result in partial free cash waste. The model predicts that the likelihood that a tender offer will be chosen over an open-market program increases with the agency costs of free cash and decreases with uncertainty (risk), information asymmetry, ownership concentration, and liquidity. These predictions are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Stock Repurchase and Agency Problems: New Evidence in Taiwan's Stock Market

This paper explores stock repurchase and agency issues in an emerging market with special regulations. Using match samples, agency-related variables are investigated for pre- and postannouncement periods. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that stock repurchase is related to agency cost mitigation. Agency problems are also significantly related to the preannouncement undervaluation of stock repurchase, after controlling for the effects of growth opportunity and asymmetric information. Finally, a company with a higher ratio of expected repurchase or higher agency costs normally enjoys better market response upon announcement.     

Information content of repurchase signals: Tangible or intangible information?

The outperformance of repurchasing firms with a high book-to-market (B/M) ratio is usually explained by investors’ undervaluation of the firm’s past performance. However, several studies suggest that the underestimation of future intangible value may explain the high return associated with the share repurchase. To better understand the actual information content of repurchases, I decompose the B/M ratio into past tangible information and future intangible information and find that repurchase signals an undervaluation of the intangible return. In addition, I investigate several potential proxies for intangible information—R&D expenses, intangible assets, and future operating performance. My results show that intangible information signals the undervaluation of future operating performance.     

Short‐selling constraints and corporate payout policy

This study shows that managers adjust corporate payout policies to counteract intensified short‐selling pressures following the removal of a short‐selling constraint. We use a controlled experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to find that changing the short‐selling rule brings small companies to increase cash dividends, but not to repurchase more shares. Because paying dividends is costly, it is acknowledged as a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchase. While our evidence suggests that companies select this payout strategy to deter predatory short sellers, it also shows that a short‐selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.     

Equity Undervaluation and Signaling Power of Share Repurchases with Legal Restrictions

This paper analyzes share repurchase programs, which are subject to specific legal restrictions in Taiwan, to determine whether the unique item repurchase price range conveys information regarding the degree of undervaluation and future prospects of a firm. We find that the price range conveys such information, not only about the past, but also the future. Companies with a higher upper bound of the repurchase price range experience better abnormal returns than do companies that do not. The lower bound of the price range does not efficiently convey the undervaluation effect, owing to the exemption clause in the announcement. Finally, the announced price range, in turn, conveys favorable information about the repurchasing firm and is a more powerful signal of future prospects than is the legal price range.     

Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.     

OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES: THE VALUE FROM BUYING SHARES AT A DISCOUNT

This article shows that share repurchase announcements create value for shareholders when the shares of the industrial firm sell at a discount from the value of the underlying assets, even when shareholders and managers share full information about the firm's prospects and the firm's operating performance is not expected to improve. The value created by capturing the discount on the repurchased shares is a function of only two variables: the percentage discount prior to the announcement and the proportion of shares to be repurchased.
For a sample of 100 companies selling below net asset value, the authors report that the excess stock returns surrounding their announcements of open market repurchases are (significantly) positively associated with the authors' estimates of the value captured from buying shares at a discount. Moreover, the stock market's response to repurchase announcements by companies that are selling at a discount is considerably more positive than to announcements by firms selling at a premium.     

The Conditional Performance of REIT Stock Repurchases

This paper uses a conditional performance measure to test whether real estate investment trust (REIT) managers announcing stock repurchases have private information about their firms' prospects. We use stock price to condition for public information and measure the managers' implied private information by the covariance between repurchase size and subsequent stock payoffs (or operating performance). Results show that managers have private information but mostly with respect to long-term as opposed to near-term payoffs. We also find that repurchase size is positively related to a stock's idiosyncratic return volatility, perhaps because noisy stocks deviate farther from fundamental value, offering informed managers larger profit potential. JEL Classification G12 G14 G35