Who offers tax-based business development incentives?

Many American communities seek to attract or retain businesses with tax abatements, tax credits, or tax increment financing of infrastructure projects (TIFs). The evidence for 1999 indicates that communities are most likely to offer one or more of these business development incentives if their residents have low incomes, if they are located close to state borders, and if their states have troubled political cultures. Ten percent greater median household income is associated with a 3.2% lower probability of offering incentives; 10% greater distance from a state border is associated with a 1.0% lower probability of offering incentives; and a 10% higher rate at which government officials are convicted of federal corruption crimes is associated with a 1.2% greater probability of offering business incentives. TIFs are the preferred incentive of communities whose residents have household incomes between $25,000 and $75,000; whereas TIFs are much less commonly offered by communities whose residents have household incomes below $25,000. The need to finance TIFs out of incremental tax revenues may make it infeasible for many of the poorest of communities to use TIFs for local business development.     

Site Value Taxation and the Timing of Land Development

A bstract . Recent writers have challenged the traditional view that a tax on site value is neutral, but there is still disagreement as to the effects of the tax. The site value tax affects the timing of land development in that it provides an incentive for landowners to develop land sooner than under a property tax levied on improvements also. Confusion has resulted from a failure to distinguish market value from development value. The incidence of the site value tax must take into account the dynamics of untaxing capital and of the capitalization of the tax increase on land values , as well as of the resulting increase of land supply and its effect in further reducing land values. The increased profitability of capital improvements could then increase land rent from the demand side. Obviously, amidst such dynamic changes, the overall effect on land values and rents is unsettled pending further research.     

Property taxes and the timing of urban land development

This paper develops an optimal timing model which extends our understanding of the effects which property taxes have on the timing of land development. Comparative static effects of changes in property tax rates are investigated and policy rules are developed for the use of differential pre- and post-development tax rates to affect the timing of development. Changes in the property tax rate are found to be non-neutral with respect to the timing of development in most cases, accelerating or delaying development depending upon specific market conditions.     

Three-rate property taxation and housing construction

This paper examines the effect of property taxation on housing construction. In 2001, Finnish municipalities were allowed to levy an extra property tax on undeveloped land zoned for housing. Municipalities that adopted the new tax instrument have a three-rate tax property tax system with different tax rates on land before development, land after development and buildings. The remaining municipalities have a two-rate system with a uniform land tax and a building tax. A theoretical model of decisions by landowners suggests that the pre-development land tax ought to lead to faster development, but also the density of development may be affected. In the two-rate system land tax is neutral. The empirical results suggest that landowners respond to the tax incentives. Municipalities that adopted the three-rate property tax system saw an increase in single-family housing starts of roughly 12 percent.     

Central-city income redistribution and the flight to the suburbs: A stylized model

This paper characterizes the optimal tax policy of a central-city government whose goal is to redistribute income from the rich to the poor to maximize the intertemporal utility of the latter group. Since redistribution erodes the tax base by stimulating suburban flight on the part of the rich, choosing the optimal path for the income tax rate is a problem in optimal control. The nature of the solution to the problem is shown to depend crucially on the level of the discount rate and the time path of exogenous income for the poor.     

Siting noxious facilities: A siting lottery with victim compensation

This paper proposes a scheme to facilitate the siting of noxious facilities. A regional government announces that it will (a) use a lottery to choose a site for a noxious facility and (b) transfer income from tenants to host-city landowners to at least partly offset the effects of the noxious facility on local property values. The government will hold the lottery only if all citizens agree, in advance, to abide by the resulting siting decision. The lottery approach is superior to the conventional approach to siting (advance notification) in the sense that the lottery approach achieves unanimous support for the siting decision with less compensation. The compensation scheme can be financed with a regionwide tenant tax or a tax on residents in the nonhost city. For “small” compensation programs, the nonhost tax is superior to the regional tax.     

On the land assembly problem

We consider a segment of the land market where the entire available land stock is needed for the realization of some indivisible development project. The stock is shared by several landholders who either collude or negotiate independently with the developer over the prices of their lots. Investigating the price setting behavior of the landowners and the optimal strategy of the developer, we show that landowners set more moderate prices under collusion than when acting independently; in the latter case, the individual asking price falls with the size of the land share, and the total price increases with the number of landowners. As regards the optimal strategy, we find that the developer will in general not offer the lowest price he expects to be accepted by the landowners.     

中国省级政府债务风险测度与分析

将财政收入分解为税收收入,土地出让收入以及其他收入。假设三类收入分别服从扩散过程,利用伊藤引理和投资组合理论,建立地方政府债务违约概率测算模型。省级政府债务违约风险的评价结果表明：税收收入和其他收入对地方政府债务违约风险的影响较大,“土地财政”的影响相对较小;偿还债务的期限越长,地方政府债务的违约风险越低;东、中、西部地区的省级地方政府债务的违约风险存在显著差别。西部地区省份的违约风险最高,东部发达地区的违约风险最低。发债试点的8个省市的违约风险普遍较低。四是如果偿还期限为5年,有29个省份的地方政府债务违约风险低于50%。     

Income taxes and urban spatial structure

This paper examines the impact of an income tax in a monocentric city where households equilibriate their allocation of time between work, commuting, and leisure. An increase in the income tax rate lowers the implicit value of time, and hence transportation costs. “Compensated equilibrium” comparative statics analysis shows that under certain conditions, this results in a larger, more dispersed urban area, with lower land rents at the city center and less population within any given distance from the center. The welfare effect of an income tax rate change is also studied, and an expression for the marginal excess burden is derived. The income tax produces welfare losses both because it induces substitution in favor of leisure and in favor of travel—the latter accompanied by excessive spatial dispersion and consumption of space. The marginal excess burden depends not only on the compensated demand elasticity for leisure, but also on that for space. Finally, the problem of benefit measurement for transportation projects in this tax-distorted spatial economy is examined. Benefit measures should be deflated to adjust for the fact that further transportation improvements lead to reduction of land use intensity, exacerbating the problem of spatial resource misallocation in an already excessively dispersed urban area.     

房地产税改革与土地财政困局破解——基于对地方财政影响的情景分析

地方政府过度依赖土地出让收入是当前中国公共管理面临的重要难题。改革房地产税制并触发土地制度的连锁反应是破解中国土地治理困局的基本出路。通过预测不同改革方案下典型城市住房相关土地财政收入变化,评估房地产税替代土地出让（纯）收益成为地方支柱性收入源的前景。研究发现,如果合理设计覆盖城市存量和新增住房的房地产税,可在短期内保证地方土地财政收入的相对稳定,并在远期实现房地产税替代土地出让金成为地方财政支柱的目标,增强土地财政收入的可持续性。近期政府应改变“重流转、轻保有”的状况,将房地产税培育成为地方主体税种,远期应推进城乡一体化土地市场体系、土地出让制度和土地增值税制度联动改革,使地方土地财政收入从以一次性的土地出让纯收益为主向以持续的房产保有税、土地增值税等为主转变,促进政府土地管理本位职能回归,破解土地财政与政府治理困局。     

Sooner or Later? – Paradoxical Investment Effects of Capital Gains Taxation under Simultaneous Investment and Abandonment Flexibility

This paper analyzes the impact of capital gains taxation on investment timing decisions for risky investment projects with entry and exit flexibility under differential tax rates for ordinary income and capital gains. We investigate whether capital gains taxation influences immediate and delayed investments asymmetrically, given the optimal abandonment decision. If capital gains taxation induces a lock-in effect, this effect is anticipated in the investment timing decision. In contrast to prior research, our numerical simulations show that this lock-in effect of capital gains taxation can induce normal as well as paradoxical effects on investment timing under simultaneous entry and exit flexibility. A paradoxical timing effect, i.e., investment accelerated by capital gains taxation, especially emerges for high liquidation proceeds or, more conservative tax accounting, low interest rates, and low volatilities. In these cases, capital gains taxation reduces the value of the option to invest and hereby increases the propensity to invest immediately. As a second paradoxical tax effect, capital gains taxation may favor delayed real investment over financial investment. Facing these results, tax legislators should not use capital gains taxation as a short-term tax policy instrument to influence investors' timing decisions.     

Theoretical analysis and empirical measurements of the effects of the Philadelphia income tax

This study develops policy-oriented measures of optimal local taxes and their maxima which take into account the existence of macro multipliers, other taxes, and discounting. It also presents an estimate of the effects of the Philadelphia income tax on employment tax and revenues. An upper bound for the optimal tax rate is suggested. The current tax rate is found to perhaps be above both the optimal and the revenue maximizing (or monopoly) point.     

On revenue recycling and the welfare effects of second-best congestion pricing in a monocentric city

This paper examines congestion taxes in a monocentric city with pre-existing labor taxation. When road toll revenue is used to finance labor tax cuts, 35% of the optimal road tax in our numerical model does not reflect marginal external congestion costs, but rather functions as a Ramsey–Mirrlees tax, i.e. an efficiency enhancing mechanism allowing for an indirect spatial differentiation of the labor tax. This adds a quite different motivation to road pricing, since welfare gains can be produced even in absence of congestion. We find that the optimal road tax is non-monotonic across space, reflecting the different impacts of labor supply elasticity and marginal utility of income, which both vary over space. The relative efficiencies of some archetype second-best pricing schemes (cordon toll, flat kilometer tax) are high (84% and 70% respectively). When road toll revenue is recycled lump-sum, the optimal toll lies below its Pigouvian level. Extensions in a bimodal framework show that the optimality of using road toll revenue to subsidize public transport depends on the initial inefficiency in public transport pricing.     

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

Political Economy of Property Tax Reform: Hawaii's Experiment with Split‐Rate Property Taxation

Economic theory suggests that switching from a general property tax to a split‐rate tax increases land use efficiency and stimulates urban core development while preserving the environment and reducing urban sprawl. Under split‐rate property taxation, land is typically taxed at a significantly higher rate than improvements. Beginning in 1965 Hawaii experimented with a statewide split‐rate property tax system to encourage economic growth and effect land reform. The experiment was ended in 1977. Following the transfer of property taxing powers to the counties in 1978, some counties brought back the split‐rate property tax at times. Since 2006, Kauai County has adopted the unusual practice of taxing improvements at a higher rate than land for most property classes. This article chronicles and explains the rationale behind Hawaii's state and county experiments with split‐rate property taxation.     

NIT picking: The macroeconomic effects of a Negative Income Tax

I study a revenue-neutral reform of the U.S. income tax and welfare system that involves the adoption of a Negative Income Tax (NIT). The reform is undertaken in a life-cycle economy with individual heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk. The optimal NIT consists of a 22% rate and a transfer equivalent to 11% of per-capita GDP. The ex-ante average welfare gain is a 2.1% annual increase of individual consumption. I show that a NIT outperforms a flat tax reform (income tax plus deduction) by a considerable margin. The key consequence of the reform is that high-productivity agents increase their relative importance in the labor supply at the expense of low-productivity agents.     

Layoff tax and employment of the elderly

In 1996 Austria introduced a tax for the layoff of older workers, which was tightened in 2000. The regulation requires employers to pay a tax of up to 170% of the gross monthly income when they give notice to employees aged 50 or more. We use data from Austrian social security records to investigate if such layoff taxes lead to less firing of older workers. We compare a control group of workers aged nearly 50 with the treatment group above 50. We apply a difference-in-difference approach to analyze the difference in the displacement probability of all prime aged workers. Results show substantial reductions in layoff behavior for workers aged 50 and above after the tightening of the tax.     

Tax Regimes and Capital Gains Realizations

This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.     

Property Tax Circuit-breakers: Good Causes but Bad Economics

A bstract . Since 1965, 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted programs designed to reduce the effective rate of property taxation for some low income households and for the elderly. Most often this relief is provided by so-called "circuit-breakers." It is contended that the economic arguments favoring circuit-breakers are empirically unproven and theoretically suspect. The tax may be progressive , not regressive , and the device may transfer income from low to high income households. Any short run redistribution of income to favor the poor or the elderly would, in the long run, merely shift the timing of their tax payments. Circuit-breakers encourage over-consumption of housing and misallocation of housing resources. Reducing the tax base, they produce higher rates and so increase the tax burden.     

Property Tax Rate Changes and Rates of Development

Theoretically, unanticipated and anticipated property tax rate increases should reduce and increase, respectively, residential development rates. A discrete-time event history analysis of 224 originally undeveloped parcels presents a first empirical test. Property tax rate changes one year in the future are anticipated; increases strongly increase the probability of development in the current year. Rate increases in the current year reduce the probability of development in the current year but with somewhat less certainty, probably because they are only partially unanticipated. Accordingly, pre-announced property tax increases might accelerate the underlying rate of development as effectively as would tax concessions.