Are mutual funds sitting ducks?

We find that patient traders profit from the predictable, flow-induced trades of mutual funds. In anticipation of a 1%-of-volume change in mutual fund flows into a stock next quarter, the institutions in the same 13F category as hedge funds trade 0.29–0.45% of volume in the current quarter. A third of the trading is associated with the subset of 504 identified hedge funds. The effect is stronger when quarterly mutual fund portfolio disclosure is required and among hedge funds with more patient capital. A one standard deviation higher measure of anticipatory trading by a hedge fund is associated with a 0.9% higher annualized four-factor alpha. A one standard deviation higher measure of anticipation of a mutual fund's trades by institutions is associated with a 0.07–0.15% lower annualized four-factor alpha. The effect is stronger for more constrained mutual funds.     

Stock market dynamics with rational liquidity traders

In the Kyle (1985) finite horizon model of stock market dynamics with a trader who holds long-lived information, informed trading intensities rise with time, and the slopes of the equilibrium price schedules fall. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on the irrational liquidity trader assumption. We replace the irrational noise traders with a sequence of rational, risk averse, liquidity traders who receive endowment shocks to their holdings of the risky asset. We demonstrate that unless liquidity traders are sufficiently risk averse, the slope of equilibrium price schedule rises over time, while informed trading intensities fall. In particular, Kyle's result holds only when liquidity traders are so risk averse that they ‘over-rebalance’ their portfolio's holdings of the risky asset, so that their final holdings of the risky asset have the opposite sign of their initial position.     

Monitoring: Which institutions matter?

Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the subset of monitoring institutions.     

The Dynamic Properties of Financial‐Market Equilibrium with Trading Fees

We incorporate trading fees into a dynamic, multiagent general‐equilibrium model in which traders optimally decide when to trade. For that purpose, we propose an innovative algorithm that synchronizes the traders. Securities prices are not so much affected by the payment of the fees itself, but rather by the trade‐off that the traders face between smoothing consumption and smoothing holdings. In calibrated examples, the interest rate and welfare decline with trading fees, while risk premia and volatilities increase. Liquidity risk and expected liquidity are priced, leading to deviations from the consumption‐CAPM. With trading fees, capital is slow‐moving, generating slow price reversal.     

High-frequency trading and institutional trading costs

Using data on Canadian bond futures, we examine how high-frequency traders (HFTs) interact with institutions building large positions. In contrast to recent findings, we find HFTs in the data act as small-sized liquidity suppliers, and we reject the hypothesis that they engage in back running, a predatory trading strategy. Using a quasi-experiment in November 2011, in which a number of HFTs started trading the bond future, we run a difference-in-differences event study and find more competition among HFTs improves implementation shortfall, effective spreads, and short-term price impacts for institutional trading in Canadian bond futures.     

Did institutions herd during the internet bubble?

We examine the trading behavior of institutional investors during the internet bubble and crash of 1998–2001, and its impact on stock prices. Similar to some recent findings concerning the trading behavior of hedge funds and NASDAQ 100 stocks, we find that during the bubble all types of institutions herded with great intensity into internet stocks for a comprehensive sample of institutional investors and internet stocks. In addition to this, we present three entirely new results. First, institutional herding was much greater than what can be explained by momentum trading. Second, institutions as a group continued to increase their holdings of internet stocks for two quarters past the market peak during the first quarter of 2000, and three quarters past the peak for individual stock prices, suggesting that institutions were unable to time the price peaks. Finally and most importantly, we find positive abnormal returns contemporaneous with institutional herding and negative abnormal returns (reversals) at the point that herding ceased. This finding suggests that institutions’ trading created temporary price pressures, and may have contributed to the bubble.     

Institutional Herding

Institutional investors' demand for a security this quarteris positively correlated with their demand for the securitylast quarter. We attribute this to institutional investors followingeach other into and out of the same securities ("herding") andinstitutional investors following their own lag trades. Althoughinstitutional investors are "momentum" traders, little of theirherding results from momentum trading. Moreover, institutionaldemand is more strongly related to lag institutional demandthan lag returns. Results are most consistent with the hypothesisthat institutions herd as a result of inferring informationfrom each other's trades.     

The impact of competition and information on intraday trading

In a dynamic model of financial market trading multiple heterogeneously informed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade immediately, worse informed delay – even though they expect the market to move against them. This behavior generates intraday patterns with decreasing spreads, decreasing probability of informed trading (PIN), and increasing volume. We predict that policies that foster market entry improve the welfare of uninformed traders and lead to increased market participation by incumbent traders. Technological advances that lead to better signal processing also encourage market participation and increase volume but at the expense of uninformed traders’ welfare.     

Trading costs, liquidity, and asset holdings

In this article I develop a model that accounts for interdependencebetween trading costs in various asset markets arising fromthe optimizing behavior of liquidity traders. The model suggeststhat noise trading is an important determinant of the liquidityof asset markets and provides a positive theory for diversifiedasset holdings by risk-neutral liquidity traders.     

Institutional stakeholdings and better-informed traders at earnings announcements

Utama and Cready [Utama, S., Cready, W.M., 1997. Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 129–150] use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.     

Entry, exit and trading profits: A look at the trading strategies of a proprietary trading team

We examine the behavior of a 15 strong proprietary stock trading team and show how consistent intraday trading profits were generated. The team, who worked for a large US direct access trading firm, executed over 96 thousand trades in 3 months in 2000. Profitable intraday trading occurred in an anonymous dealer capacity, on both long and short positions, especially when volume and price volatility were higher. The traders rapidly entered long (short) positions when the number of dealers and size become greater on the bid (offer) side of the spread. Profits were taken early against the trend.     

News Trading and Speed

We compare the optimal trading strategy of an informed speculator when he can trade ahead of incoming news (is “fast”), versus when he cannot (is “slow”). We find that speed matters: the fast speculator's trades account for a larger fraction of trading volume, and are more correlated with short‐run price changes. Nevertheless, he realizes a large fraction of his profits from trading on long‐term price changes. The fast speculator's behavior matches evidence about high‐frequency traders. We predict that stocks with more informative news are more liquid even though they attract more activity from informed high‐frequency traders.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Overconfident individual day traders: Evidence from the Taiwan futures market

A specific day-trading policy in Taiwan futures market allows an investigation of the performance of day traders. Since October 2007, investors who characterize themselves as “day traders” by closing their day-trade positions on the same day enjoy a 50% reduction in the initial margin. Because we can identify day traders ex ante, we have a laboratory to explore trading behavior without the contamination of potential behavioral biases. Our results show that the 3470 individual day traders in the sample incur on average a significant loss of 61,500 (26,700) New Taiwan dollars after (before) transaction costs over October 2007–September 2008. This implies that day traders are not only overconfident about the accuracy of their information but also biased in their interpretations of information. We also find that excessive trading is hazardous only to the overconfident losers, but not to the winners. Last, we provide evidence that more experienced individual investors exhibit more aggressive day trading behavior, although they do not learn their types or gain superior trading skills that could mitigate their losses.     

Expiration day effects and market manipulation: evidence from Taiwan

In this study, we analyze the expiration day effects of index futures on the cash market in Taiwan, and find that both volatility and trading volume are higher on the final settlement days than on other trading days. We also calculate the volume of open interest for the final settlement of index futures contracts relating to different classes of traders, as well as the profits they earn from their open interest positions. We find that proprietary traders exhibit superior performance whereas foreign investors achieve the worst returns. Our empirical results support the view that the expiration day effects in the Taiwan futures market are at least partially attributable to attempts at ‘marking the close’.     

2012年上半年货币市场运行概况与特点

2012年上半年,人民银行通过多种手段调节市场流动性,货币市场反应灵敏,主要特点表现为：交易规模快速增长,利率总体低水平运行,交易期限结构仍以短期为主,交易主体以银行类机构为主,融资格局总体稳定但存在阶段性变化,各类机构交易利差有序分布,非银行类市场主体交易更加活跃。     

Identifying informed traders in futures markets

We use daily positions of futures market participants to identify informed traders. These data contain 8,921 unique traders. We identify between 94 and 230 traders as overnight informed and 91 as intraday informed with little overlap. Floor brokers/traders are over-represented in the overnight informed group. The intraday informed group is dominated by managed money traders/hedge funds and swap dealers, with commercial hedgers under-represented. We find that characteristics such as experience, position size, trading activity, and type of positions held offer significant predictive power for who is informed. An analysis of daily trader profits confirms that we select highly profitable traders.     

Momentum or contrarian investment strategies: Evidence from Dutch institutional investors

This paper analyses investment strategies of three types of Dutch institutional investors - pension funds, life insurers and non-life insurers - over the period 1999-2005. We use balance sheet and cash flow data, including purchases and sales of equity, fixed income and real estate. We trace asset reallocations back to both active trading and revaluations and link investment decisions to firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Overall, our results indicate that all three investor types tend to be contrarian traders, i.e. they buy past losers and sell past winners. Especially pension funds showed this behaviour in the most turbulent part of the sample - the crash of 2002 and early 2003 - implying that these institutions have a stabilising impact on financial markets when this is needed most. Life insurers tend to be contrarian traders when they have a high proportion of unit-linked policies, while non-life insurers are contrarian when they have a more risky business model.     

Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders’ characteristics in a foreign exchange electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with high price impact. More information is conveyed by those traders’ trades which—simultaneously—use medium-sized orders (practice stealth trading), have large trading volume, are located in a financial center, trade early in the trading session, at times of wide spreads and when the order book is thin.     

The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.