Evaluating early warning indicators of banking crises: Satisfying policy requirements

Ideally, early warning indicators (EWI) of banking crises should be evaluated on the basis of their performance relative to the macroprudential policy maker’s decision problem. We translate several practical aspects of this problem — such as difficulties in assessing the costs and benefits of various policy measures, as well as requirements for the timing and stability of EWIs — into statistical evaluation criteria. Applying the criteria to a set of potential EWIs, we find that the credit-to-GDP gap and a new indicator, the debt service ratio (DSR), consistently outperform other measures. The credit-to-GDP gap is the best indicator at longer horizons, whereas the DSR dominates at shorter horizons.     

Forecasting banking crises with dynamic panel probit models

Banking crises are rare events, but when they occur, their consequences are often dramatic. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the toolkit of early warning models that is available to policy makers by exploring the dynamics and exuberances embedded in a panel dataset that covers 22 European countries over four decades (from 1970Q1 to 2012Q4). The in- and out-of-sample forecast performances of several (dynamic) probit models are evaluated, with the objective of developing common vulnerability indicators with early warning properties. The results obtained show that adding dynamic components and exuberance indicators to the models improves the performances of early warning models significantly.     

Banking efficiency in South East Europe: Evidence for financial crises and the gap between new EU members and candidate countries

In this study we compare the cost efficiency of banks in ten South East European countries and find out how differences in efficiency are related to EU membership. The results reveal a statistically significant cost efficiency gap between EU and non-EU banking systems in the region, where on average EU banking systems tend to be more cost efficient than their non-EU counterparts. In contrast to other similar studies analyzing banking efficiency in South East European countries, we also run β-convergence and σ-convergence tests, as proposed in the literature. Based on these tests we can draw conclusions concerning the existence of a catching-up effect, since the detected cost efficiency gap is closing predominantly because of adjustments on the side of the less efficient banks. Additionally, we found that during the 2008 global financial crisis, the average cost efficiency scores of banks in the region improved, which could be explained by enhanced incentives of bank managers for intensified cost optimization in banks in crisis times. Our results suggest that the institutional adjustments in the non-EU countries should continue towards EU standards, as the EU banking systems tend to dominate in terms of measured cost efficiency.     

The effect of raising deposit insurance coverage in times of financial crisis – Evidence from Croatian microdata

Typically, depositors in transition countries react very sensitively to the safety of deposits. Faced with rising deposit outflows in October 2008, many transition countries were forced to extend the limits of deposit insurance coverage. Has this calmed private agents? Or has it caused more uncertainty? We analyze these questions by employing household survey data for Croatia from exactly the time deposit insurance was extended. First, we provide evidence how the financial crisis has affected trust in banks and trust in the local currency. Then, we show that the increase in deposit insurance coverage had an immediate and positive impact on how people perceived the safety of deposits and the credibility of the local currency. Therefore, our results suggest that this policy measure helped to prevent a more serious and dangerous meltdown of deposits and a further shift towards foreign currency denominated assets. However, despite this effect the perceived safety of deposits remained lower than it was before the financial crisis. We also consider this finding to be of relevance for other countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.