The Sustainability of Italian Public Debt and Deficit

In this paper, we analyse the sustainability of Italian public debt using a unique database, reconstructed by Forte (2011), which covers the years 1862–2013. The study focuses on empirical tests for the sustainability and solvency of Italian public finance. The results of unit root and stationarity tests show that public debt and deficit variables are non-stationary at levels, but stationary in first-differences form, or I(1). However, some breaks in the series emerge, given internal and external crises (wars, oil shocks, regime changes, institutional reforms). Therefore, the empirical analysis is conducted for the entire period, as well as two sub-periods (1862–1913 and 1947–2013). In essence, the paper’s results reveal that Italy has sustainability problems in the Republican age (1947-2013). Our Markov-switching dynamic regression model indicates the existence of two distinct states, both for public debt and deficit, with means and standard deviations rather different. Both states are extremely persistent.     

An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses

Recent events highlight primary type as an institutional variable that merits further examination in the economics literature on voter turnout. Using panel data for U.S. gubernatorial elections and treating primary type as a proxy for candidate deviation from the median voter, we test whether primary type changes voter turnout and whether that change is dominated by instrumental or expressive voting. The results show that states with more open primaries tend to have greater voter turnout in general elections, and that this increase reflects the effect of open primaries on expressive voting.

Term limits and pork barrel politics

We develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies. Voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies, so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re-election decisions. We characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare. Contributions of our paper include:

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We detail how pork provision by more senior incumbents interacts with term limits to affect electoral outcomes. Pork provision—transfers of resources from districts with junior legislators to districts with more senior legislators—induces voters to be more forgiving of extreme location by incumbents, especially incumbents in small or poor districts. Pork provision can explain why re-election probabilities in Congress exceed those for governors.

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Term limits reduce voter welfare when all that matters are the ideological positions taken by the office holder.

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Term limits may be advantageous when senior incumbents can extract benefits for their constituencies at the expense of districts with more junior representatives. Large or rich districts especially value term limits when there is substantial pork provision.

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We characterize the welfare of all voters, not just the median voter.

     

Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant

Recent data on the accumulation patterns of public debt across OECD countries suggests a synthesis is possible between the theoretical and empirical approaches to public debt and also between the traditional and more recent political economy explanations of public debt accumulation. The inductive approach of recent political economy explanations is combined with the intertemporal constraints highlighted in the Ricardian–Barro theory to present a reinterpretation of cross-country debt accumulations patterns. Like the elephant in the blind men and the elephant fable, the conclusion is glaringly obvious. Formal and informal budgetary constraints matter.

Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.     

Does debt market timing increase firm value?

Survey evidence indicates that firm managers try to time debt markets when choosing the maturity of new debt issues, but we do not know whether these strategies increase firm value. This research examines differences in value across nontimers and timers, where timers are defined as firms that follow either a naïve strategy of choosing long-term debt when the term premium is low or a strategy from Baker et al. (2003 Baker, M, Greenwood, R and Wurgler, J. 2003. The maturity of debt issues and predictable variation in bond returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 70: 261–91. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) based on the predictability of future excess bond returns. After controlling for various determinants of firm value, the research finds no differences in value across timers and nontimers. It also documents that the timing strategies do not increase firm value and do not affect announcement effects of long-term debt offerings. The results suggest that corporate debt markets are efficient and well integrated with equity markets.     

Local public expenditure in Sweden a model where the median voter is not necessarily decisive

This paper deals with local public expenditures, and the analysis is based on cross-section data for the Swedish municipalities. Two models are estimated; one is the basic median voter model where the decisive voter is assumed to be the voter with median income, while the other is a more general statistical alternative. The statistical alternative nests the basic median voter model as a special case, which makes it easy to test the null hypothesis that the basic median voter model is the correct model, given that the alternative is the true general structure. Although our results indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis, the estimation results are, nevertheless, similar for the two models.     

Pension Reforms: An Illustrated Basic Analysis

The paper examines pension reforms under population ageing.The concepts of "implicit pension debt", "implicit tax" and"internal rate of return" are first introduced with the helpof a three-period model. Using stylised facts, ageing is tracedto low fertility and increasing longevity. Formulating a benchmarkfor intergenerational fairness leads to a framework for designingpension reforms such that leaving an unfair burden to futuregenerations is avoided. Secondly, a yearly simulation modelis used to arrive at the following main results for reform blueprints: (1) In a Defined Benefit (DB) system, partial pre-funding isneeded to achieve intergenerational fairness unless benefitsare sufficiently reduced; partial privatisation is an optionfor the management of the accumulating funds. (2) Transition from a DB to a Notional Defined Contribution(NDC) system is another reform option; it reduces the replacementrates to levels which match prescribed contribution rates; anNDC public pillar can be accompanied by a second pillar, managedby the private sector. (3) An effective increase in the retirement age is necessaryto moderate the increase in pension expenditure and to preserveadequate pension levels. (4) Pension reforms have important effects on public financetarget setting. (JEL H1, H5, H6)     

Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Summary. Arrows original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrows proof. My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).Received: 9 July 2001, Revised: 2 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D7, D70, D71.John Geanakoplos: I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Chris Avery, Don Brown, Ben Polak, Herb Scarf, Chris Shannon, Lin Zhou, and especially Eric Maskin for very helpful comments and advice. I was motivated to think of reproving Arrows theorem when I undertook to teach it to George Zettler, a mathematician friend. After I presented this paper at MIT, a graduate student there named Luis Ubeda-Rives told me he had worked out the same neutrality argument as I give in my third proof while he was in Spain nine years ago. He said he was anxious to publish on his own and not jointly, so I encourage the reader to consult his forthcoming working paper. The proofs appearing here appeared in my 1996 CFDP working paper. Proofs 2 and 3 originally used Mays notation, which I have dropped on the advice of Chris Avery.     

Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy

This paper analyzes the impact of alternative political institutions on sustainable fiscal policies. We study the choice of intergenerational transfers as outcomes of an infinite social security game among successive selfish median voters. Majoritarian systems accord the current median voter maximum fiscal discretion but no direct influence over future policy. This political arrangement sustains, among others, dynamically inefficient transfers and volatile, non-stationary sequences. Constitutional rules award to the minorities veto power over fiscal policy changes proposed by the majority. This unanimity provision is equivalent to partial precommitment. Under constitutional rules, sustainable fiscal policies feature Pareto efficient, non decreasing transfer sequences.     

Scope and scale economies in multi-utilities: evidence from gas,water and electricity combinations

Within the recent debate on liberalization of local public services, the paper investigates the cost properties of a sample of Italian public utilities providing in combination gas, water and electricity. The estimates from a Composite Cost Function econometric model (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992 Pulley, LB and Braunstein, YM. 1992. A composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking. Review of Economics and Statistics, 74: 221–30.  ) are compared with the ones coming from other traditional functional forms such as the Standard Translog, the Generalized Translog, and the Separable Quadratic. The results highlight the presence of global scope and scale economies only for multi-utilities with output levels lower than the ones characterizing the ‘median’ firm. This indicates that relatively small specialized firms would benefit from cost reductions by evolving into multi-utilities providing similar network services such as gas, water and electricity. However, for larger-scale utilities the hypothesis of null cost advantages is not rejected. Thus, it is possible that the recent diversification waves of leading companies are explained by factors other than cost synergies, so that the welfare gains that can be reasonably expected from such examples of horizontal integration, if any, are likely to be very low.     

Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis

We study interactions between two policymakers, central bank and government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the first stage, the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution for the second stage, in which a differential game is played between the two policymakers. It is shown that, if the policymakers can communicate before the game is played (multiple-equilibrium), coordination problems can be solved by using the concept of correlated equilibrium.

Debt Relief Incentives in Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC): An Empirical Assessment

For more than two decades, the majority of countries in the African continent have experienced repeated episodes of rising external debt and debt service, which has led to numerous efforts of external debt relief. This paper provides new evidence on the effects of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative on different economic and social indicators in 60 low income countries (LICs). Results show that LICs that were included in the HIPC Initiative marginally performed better than non-HIPC countries. There is evidence that countries that have reached the completion point of the HIPC Initiative by 2005 have experienced an average improvement in investment, health care, gross secondary education enrollment, and GDP per capita growth.

Public Debt, Migration, and Shortsighted Politicians

We analyze a model where local public debt levels are set by politicians who are chosen in local elections. Migration causes an externality across districts, and leads to overaccumulation of local public debt. Since debt is a strategic substitute, the median voters in each district prefer shortsighted political leaders who “borrow and spend,” thereby exacerbating the problem of overaccumulation of local public debt.     

Sustainability of external debt: further evidence from non-linear framework

This study investigates sustainability of external debt under a two-step non-linear framework. The first step uses a general linearity test proposed by Harvey and Leybourne (2007 Harvey, David I. and Leybourne, Stephen J. 2007. Testing for time series linearity. Econometric Journal, 10: 149–165. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to determine the linearity property of external debt. The second step applies a non-linear ADF unit root test proposed by Kapetanios, Shin, and Snell (2003 Kapetanios, G., Y. Shin, and A. Snell. 2003. Testing for a unit root in the nonlinear STAR. Journal of Econometrics 112: 359–79.  [Google Scholar]) on the non-liner processes and the linear ADF test on the linear processes to examine the sustainability of external debt. The analysis of 36 debt and 55 current account ratios identifies strong evidence of non-linearity and sustainability. The results indicate superior performance of the non-linear unit root test over the ADF test in determining the stationary property of the data.     

Is the CSR Craze Good for Society? The Welfare Economic Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility

Abstract

Welfare economic analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) equates CSR with the provision of private goods bundled with provision of public goods (or, in the symmetrical case, bundled with the curtailment of public bads). Two common examples are cause-related marketing and “green goods” where private goods are sold at premiums that are then used to pay for provision of public goods and/or curtailment of public bads. This paper expands upon the model of Besley and Ghatak (2007 Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. 2007. “Retailing Public Goods: The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility,”. Journal of Public Economics, 91(9): 1645–1663. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) for the case of imperfect government to develop a complete typology for analyzing whether the provision/curtailment of public goods/bads will be best served by companies (through CSR), by imperfect governments or by non-profit organizations. Finally the paper discusses the main differences between the welfare economic approach to CSR and the general multi-disciplinary CSR literature.     

Size-corrected inference in fiscal policy reaction functions: a three country assessment

As a reflection of both strong persistence of debt-to-GDP ratios and correlation of respective innovations with governments’ primary surpluses, standard t-tests in policy reaction functions show actual significance levels that are up to five times larger than their nominal reference. Adopting size-controlled inference by means of Monte Carlo-based and asymptotic Bonferroni critical values, we diagnose fiscal policies in the US and the UK to be sustainable in samples covering more than 100 years. Conditioning on post-WWII subsamples and 5% nominal significance, conventional t-tests signal fiscal sustainability for these countries. In contrast, size-corrected inference hints at a lack of fiscal sustainability and, thus is recommended for the ‘real-time’ monitoring of public debt. The fiscal policy of Portugal is found to lack sustainability irrespective of the considered sample period.     

Empirics of the median voter hypothesis in Japan

This paper empirically analyses for the first time the median voter hypothesis in Japan as a means of investigating whether or not Japanese prefectural finance reflects the preference of the median voter. The hypothesis is tested by estimating the demand functions of local public goods in each prefecture. As official data on the income of the median voter is unavailable in Japan, respective prefectural data is constructed using official data on income distribution and taxation. Reasonable intuitive interpretation of results indicates that the median voter hypothesis is supported in prefectural finances, and that voter preference affects the outcome of gubernatorial elections, i.e., a governor's reelection probability, by estimating a probit model. When considering the centralized prefectural government system in Japan, these results indicate that central government management of prefectural expenditures via inter-regional grants ultimately reflects jurisdictional median voter preference. First version received: December 1997/Final version received: February 1999     

Taxation without commitment

This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which a benevolent government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is forced to keep budget balance in every period, then it may not be able to sustain zero capital taxes in the long run, as shown in Benhabib and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 77:231–259, 1997) and Phelan and Stachetti (Econometrica 69:1491–1518, 2001). However, (Dominguez in J Econ Theory 135:159–170, 2007) shows that if the government is allowed to borrow and lend to households, the optimal capital income tax still converges to zero in the long run, as long as the value of defaulting is independent of the level of government debt. This paper provides a game theoretic setup with government debt where the value of the worst equilibrium only depends on the initial level of capital and can be determined in advance. This implies that under our assumptions the best sustainable equilibrium has zero capital taxes in the long run, even in the absence of government commitment.