Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem

We give a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181-1206] model of distributive politics. We prove that as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter's ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some delay, we prove that the agents' equilibrium continuation payoffs converge to the utility from the median, so that delay, if it occurs, is inconsequential. We do not impose stationarity or any other refinements. Our result counters intuition based on the folk theorem for repeated games, and it contrasts with the known result for the distributive bargaining model that as agents become patient, any division of the dollar can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.     

Local public expenditure in Sweden a model where the median voter is not necessarily decisive

This paper deals with local public expenditures, and the analysis is based on cross-section data for the Swedish municipalities. Two models are estimated; one is the basic median voter model where the decisive voter is assumed to be the voter with median income, while the other is a more general statistical alternative. The statistical alternative nests the basic median voter model as a special case, which makes it easy to test the null hypothesis that the basic median voter model is the correct model, given that the alternative is the true general structure. Although our results indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis, the estimation results are, nevertheless, similar for the two models.     

Empirics of the median voter hypothesis in Japan

This paper empirically analyses for the first time the median voter hypothesis in Japan as a means of investigating whether or not Japanese prefectural finance reflects the preference of the median voter. The hypothesis is tested by estimating the demand functions of local public goods in each prefecture. As official data on the income of the median voter is unavailable in Japan, respective prefectural data is constructed using official data on income distribution and taxation. Reasonable intuitive interpretation of results indicates that the median voter hypothesis is supported in prefectural finances, and that voter preference affects the outcome of gubernatorial elections, i.e., a governor's reelection probability, by estimating a probit model. When considering the centralized prefectural government system in Japan, these results indicate that central government management of prefectural expenditures via inter-regional grants ultimately reflects jurisdictional median voter preference. First version received: December 1997/Final version received: February 1999     

Redistribution,taxes, and the median voter

We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the “bang-bang” property.     

Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power

We match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6% points more than random voting and that a senator’s probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4% points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.     

The political economy of public debt

Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates??it reduces current rates and increases future rates. Accordingly, whether the share of the cost of a given public expenditure is reduced or increased by debt for a given individual depends on the time profile of that individual??s income (tax base) vis-à-vis others?? incomes. Therefore, given the age-profile of income in virtually all Western countries, individuals will tend to be better off under current taxes the younger they are. If (as most standard models of political economy assume) individuals vote according to their economic interests, and if they are tolerably well-informed, then the pattern of support for public debt will track age. And increases in the median age of the population will lead to larger public debt. In other words, public debt policy collapses to a kind of demographic politics. This explanation may, however, be sensitive to assumptions about motives for bequest. Specifically, if bequestors seek to leave positive bequests and are motivated exclusively by the lifetime consumption of their heirs (as well as themselves) then the aged may, under plausible assumptions about the age of their heirs, prefer current taxes over debt.     

Economies of scale and trade policy: The median voter model revisited

Why do some political economy models perform so poorly in predicting actual trade policy? Do scale economies provide the missing puzzle to our understanding of the anti-trade bias? By integrating economies of scale in production, this paper theoretically reinstates the median voter model as in Mayer [Mayer, W. (1984). Endogenous tariff formation. The American Economic Review, 74, 970–985] as a suitable political economy model in predicting trade policy. The modified model generates the scope for the anti-trade bias and predicts that sometimes economic, rather than political, considerations may lead to restrictive trade.     

Heterogeneous labor skills,the median voter and labor taxes

This paper analyzes the median voter?s most preferred sequences of labor taxes in the standard neoclassical growth model. We consider an infinite horizon economy in which agents are heterogeneous with respect to both initial wealth and labor skills. We start by providing a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner. We then characterize the most preferred tax sequence by the median agent. First, we show that marginal labor taxes depend directly on the absolute value of the distance between the median and the mean value of the skills? distribution. Second, we find that in contrast to the intuition stemming from standard representative agent economies, labor taxes are more volatile and counter-cyclical taxation (e.g., increasing taxes in recession) might be optimal depending on the correlation between inequality and TFP. To assess the quantitative relevance of these findings, we calibrate the model economy to six countries and find that counter-cyclical labor taxation is optimal for all but the US.     

Thomas Jefferson on the repudiation of public debt

Thomas Jefferson's theory of public debt repudiation illustrates both the normative and positive aspects of public debt repudiation. Using Jefferson's model, this paper attempts to reveal several characteristics of public debt repudiation. First, that the positive characteristics of repudiation can not be analyzed apart from the normative and institutional issues. Second, how a debt repudiation rule might be incorporated into a country's constitution and, finally, how such a rule may lead to an improvement of the country's credit terms over those that would exist otherwise. In other words, a country may be better off announcing its standards for repudiation then if it denied any intention to repudiate under any conditions. A related issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is the sufficient conditions for repudiation. Jefferson's model develops only the necessary conditions. I would like to thank J. Richard Aronson, Wayne Brough, Dean Crawshare, James Dearden, Kenneth Greene, Vince Munley, the anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the 1990 Public Choice Society meetings and at Lehigh University for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, the author is responsible for any errors. The author is grateful to The Martindale Center for the Study of Private Enterprise which supplied research support.     

The influence of special district governments on public spending and debt

Growth in special district governments is examined as a reason behind public sector expansion in the United States. A theoretical model is developed of the optimal mix of government suppliers which predicts how special district governments affect the overall provision of government policies. The hypothesis that expansion of special district governments leads to expansion of the public sector is expirically examined over two time periods.     

The trade-off between public debt reduction and automatic stabilisation

This paper addresses the basic tradeoff between the stabilisation properties of budgets and the sustainability of long run fiscal positions. The modeling framework consists of a simple non-monetary endowment economy with overlapping generations, extended to account for stochastic endowments and borrowing constrained households. A benign government chooses the optimal degree of responsiveness of net taxes to individual incomes and an optimal measure of long-run public debt in order to smooth households' consumption across states of nature. In the presence of a deficit constraint for the government, the results point to the desire for lower debt levels than those currently prevailing in European Union countries in order to enable a more effective hedging of personal income uncertainty by means of more active automatic fiscal stabilisers. The optimal degree of automatic stabilisation and debt reduction is conditional on the characteristics of economic cycles.     

The structure of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime

Abstract This paper explores the relationship between the denomination of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime. Three types of debt (nominal, indexed, and foreign) and two regimes (fixed and flexible) are considered. Indexed debt is insulated against unexpected inflation. The real (domestic‐currency) value of foreign debt is subject to valuation effects from real exchange rate shocks. The ‘fear‐of‐floating’ result, that foreign debt makes pegging more attractive, is shown to hold unambiguously only if the peg is fully credible. If the peg lacks credibility, a critical factor is the perceived likelihood of using the ‘escape clause’ of a switch to a float, which raises the costs of pegging. Foreign debt increases the temptation to resort to the escape clause, so when a peg is not fully credible (as is almost always the case in reality), pegging tends to be less attractive than floating in the presence of foreign debt.     

Using inflation to erode the US public debt

Projections indicate the US Federal debt held by the public may exceed 70–100% of GDP within 10 years. In many respects, the temptation to inflate away some of this debt burden is similar to that at the end of World War II. In 1946, the debt ratio was 108.6%. Inflation reduced this ratio by more than a third within a decade. Yet there are some important differences – shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate, while the larger share of debt held by foreigners increases it. This paper lays out an analytical framework for determining the impact of a large nominal debt overhang on the temptation to inflate. It suggests that when economic growth is stalled, the US debt overhang may induce an increase in inflation of about 5% for several years that could significantly reduce the debt ratio.     

Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant

Recent data on the accumulation patterns of public debt across OECD countries suggests a synthesis is possible between the theoretical and empirical approaches to public debt and also between the traditional and more recent political economy explanations of public debt accumulation. The inductive approach of recent political economy explanations is combined with the intertemporal constraints highlighted in the Ricardian–Barro theory to present a reinterpretation of cross-country debt accumulations patterns. Like the elephant in the blind men and the elephant fable, the conclusion is glaringly obvious. Formal and informal budgetary constraints matter.

An empirical characterization of the effects of public debt on economic growth

Based on a data set of 115 economies, this article empirically investigates the relation between public debt and economic growth. Using the World Bank’s classification for income groups, we initially find that those countries that present the lowest public debt are characterized by the highest economic growth, while the smallest growth rates are associated with the highest public debt. Nevertheless, this conclusion is tempered when we analyse the countries by income level: low-income countries have a different behaviour with respect to lower-middle, upper-middle and high-income countries. When using the IMF’s country classification, the results do not suggest a clear pattern in the public debt–economic growth nexus across different countries, but indicate a heterogeneous relationship between such key macroeconomic variables.     

On the relationship between fertility and public national debt

Public debt and fertility are two issues of major concern in the current economic policy debate, especially in countries with below-replacement-fertility and large debt (which appears further enlarged as a consequence of the recent world financial distress 2008–2009). In this paper we show that, at the steady state, public debt is in general harmful for fertility, in that debt issuing almost ever crowds fertility. The relationship is however reversed if debt is sufficiently low and the share of capital (labor) in the economy is sufficiently low (high). Hence, our analysis would recommend that developed, capital intensive economies (such as OECD countries) aiming at a fertility recovery should reduce national debt, while developing, labor intensive economies, aiming at reducing fertility, should increase (reduce) national debt only if they are debt virtuous (vicious).     

The effect of monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt: empirical evidence from the Brazilian economy

This study relates to the literature regarding credibility effect on public debt for developing economies under inflation targeting. The novelty is the investigation of effects of both monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt and its management. The main idea is that high credibility might improve public debt management. With this purpose, this paper addresses empirical evidence based on the Brazilian experience. The findings denote that credibility is an important instrument to improve the public debt management under inflation targeting.