基层央行国债监管问题解析

人民银行作为国债监督和管理部门,在规范国债发行秩序、规避国债资金风险、维护投资人权益、促进国债市场稳定健康发展等方面发挥了重要作用。但随着国债品种的增加、国债市场运营情况日趋复杂,基层央行国债监管中存在的问题日益显现。如何解决这些问题,提高基层央行国债监管工作的质量和效率,提升国债监管工作水平,值得深入探讨。     

基层央行征信业务监管工作存在的难点及对策

近年来,随着个人信用报告查询业务量的增加,一些银行基层网点出现了违规查询、泄露甚至出卖个人信用信息的行为,给基层央行征信业务监管工作带来较大压力.分析目前基层征信监督管理工作中存在的难点和暴露的不足,从征信业务监督管理制度层面、信用报告档案电子化、信用报告查询加大科技投入等方面提出政策建议,以期改善基层央行征信业务监管工作.     

目前基层央行绩效考核工作的难点与对策

监管职能分离后，人民银行的职责和工作轴心随之转移，内控建设摆上突出位置，绩效考核成为“重头戏”。特别是今年来，总行对分支行逐级实施目标管理，划分等级工资，与员工工作绩效挂钩。许多基层央行因此在绩效考核中投入了较大精力，促使员工抓学习，树立竞争、创新和大局意识，提高工作效率、工作质量和工作效能。但是，目前基层央行这项工作仍面临着不少困难，亟待进一步探讨与解决。为此，最近笔者对人民银行衡阳市中心支行(包括辖内6个县支行)进行了一次专题调查。     

国债热销形势下基层人民银行监管工作的难点与对策

最近两年,尤其是1999年11月份,国家对居民储蓄存款利息收入开征20%的个人所得税政策出台以来,凭证式国债以其利率略高且免征个人收入所得税为最大卖点持续热销,基层人民银行国债监管工作随之出现了新的变化和一些难点:     

基层央行国债监管问题探析

国债监管是法律法规赋予人民银行的一项重要职责,是金融服务的一个重要方面,是央行国库的一项重要工作内容。     

基层央行反洗钱工作面临的难点及建议

基层央行在反洗钱工作中肩负着为基层金融机构服务,同时监督、管理和指导金融机构开展反洗钱工作的重要职责。本文分析了基层央行开展反洗钱工作中面临的难点,提出进一步做好反洗钱监管工作的建议。     

基层央行国库监管工作存在的问题及建议

实施国库监管,对于全面履行人民银行国库职能,防范和化解国库资金风险,保证围库预算收支计划顺利执行,提高国库工作质量和服务水平有着十分重要的意义。人民银行职能的调整和财税体制改革的深化对国库监管工作提出了更高要求,全面提高国库服务和监督水平,努力适应国库业务量加大、工作难度增强、资金风险环节增多的新形势,切实履行人民银行经理国库的职能,都要求进一步加强国库监管力度。但目前国库监管工作在基层人民银行的重要性还未真正得到体现,国库监管职能也未真正发挥其作用。     

基层央行会计监管中存在的问题及对策

一、会计监管过程中存在的问题1.监管观念淡薄和客观条件的限制影响了会计监管职能的发挥。人民银行独立行使中央银行职能以来,会计部门由于仍然承担着部分人民银行自身的业务核算工作,会计工作人员只是侧重于日常的核算业务,忽视了会计监管职能的发挥。一是基层中央银行的会计     

浅谈基层央行金融服务工作的难点及对策

目前,金融服务已成为基层人民银行最基本、最重要的职能。笔者结合近年来金融服务工作实践,就如何不断提高基层央行金融服务水平,谈谈自己的浅见。     

央行信息技术审计的现状及其对策

随着全球信息化和审计理论的发展,信息技术审计（IT审计）逐渐引起人们的关注。特别是近年来,信息技术在央行各业务领域得到了广泛应用,业务信息的存储、传输、加工、处理等过程全部由信息系统自动完成,取消了传统的纸质凭证,这就给银行内部审计工作带来了重大的影响。如何做好央行信息技术内部审计监督管理工作,是银行内审部门面临的一个新课题。     

当前央行集中采购工作中存在的问题及其对策

集中采购工作自2004年在中国人民银行系统内实施以来，在规范采购程序、合理利用资金、提高使用效率、促进廉政建设、推动行务公开等方面取得了一些成绩，建立起了一套较为完善的操作规程和内部约束机制，基本实现了《中国人民银行集中采购管理试行办法》所要求的管理目标。但是，在实践中也发现了集中采购工作中存在一些不足，需要进一步完善。     

国库资金清算业务中的风险点与应对措施

随着国库会计核算系统的不断完善和大额支付系统的开通,国库部门摆脱了长期以来通过会计营业部门汇划资金的传统做法,国库会计核算形成了独立的核算     

Asset redeployability and the choice between bank debt and public debt

A firm with less redeployable assets, which are assets that have fewer alternative uses outside the firm, is more likely to borrow from banks than issue public debt. These findings are consistent with firms with less redeployable assets valuing the ability to renegotiate bank debt contracts instead of selling assets in the event of default. Consistent with this mechanism, firms with lower asset redeployability sell fewer assets following covenant violations. Our results contribute to work on the determinants of which debt markets a firm chooses to borrow from and the role that banks play as intermediaries.     

Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt

This article examines the relation between a borrowing firm's ownership structure and its choice of debt source using a novel data set on corporate ownership, control, and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. We find that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant negative impact on the firm's reliance on bank debt financing. In addition, we show that the control-ownership divergence affects other aspects of debt structure including debt maturity and security. Our results indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights may choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring.     

Diversification and the cost of debt of bank holding companies

In this study, we investigate the relationship between various dimensions of diversification and the cost of debt for publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that both domestic geographic diversification of deposits and diversification of assets lead to a lower bond yield-spread. Diversification of non-traditional banking activities leads to a lower cost of debt only when yield-spread and diversification are estimated simultaneously. In addition, we find that medium-sized BHCs experience a greater reduction in bond yield-spread than small-sized and large-sized BHCs. This is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) effects in the banking industry. Furthermore, we document that the association between diversification and yield-spread is bidirectional with higher yield-spreads being associated with greater asset and activity diversification and lower geographic deposit dispersion. The effect of diversification on bond yield-spread is robust after accounting for cross-sectional and serial correlation, and the endogeneity of diversification.     

Politicians and financial supervision unification outside the central bank: Why do they do it?

An increasing number of countries show a trend towards a certain degree of consolidation of powers in financial supervision, which has resulted in the establishment of unified regulators, that are different from the national central banks. By contrast a high involvement of the central bank in supervision seems to be correlated with a multi-authorities regime (central bank fragmentation effect). This paper, using a simple application of a general common agency game, sheds light on which conditions the politicians prefer when implementing an unified sector supervision outside the central bank. From a theoretical point of view the quality of public sector governance plays a crucial role in determining the supervision unification. Focusing on the behaviour of the “good” policymaker (helping hand type), it will prefer a unified financial authority that is different from the central bank if the correspondent welfare gains-linked to at least one of the three effects: moral hazard, conflict of interest, bureaucracy—are considered higher respect to the information losses. The “bad” policymaker (grabbing hand type) will choose the single financial authority if the financial industry likes it, and the central bank is not a captured one. On the other hand, the paper tests the model, confirming the robustness of the institutional position of the central bank in explaining the recent trend in supervision consolidation, with an empirical analysis performed with ordered functions on an updated dataset.     

Learning and the central bank

It is well known that sunspot equilibria may arise under an interest rate operating procedure in which the central bank varies the nominal rate with movements in future inflation (a forward-looking Taylor rule). This paper demonstrates that these sunspot equilibria may be learnable in the sense of E-stability.     

Investor information and bank instability during the European debt crisis

Outside of financial crises, investors have little incentive to produce private information on banks’ short-term liabilities held as information-insensitive safe assets. The same does not hold during crises. We compare the information effects of different policy interventions. We measure information production using credit default swap spreads during the Global Financial Crisis and the European debt crisis. We study abnormal information production around major events and find that capital injections reduced abnormal information production while early European stress tests increased it. High levels of information production predict bank balance sheet contraction and higher government expenditures to support financial institutions.     

The role of accruals quality in the access to bank debt

This work analyses the effect of accruals quality in the access of firms to bank debt in a panel data of SME Spanish firms. The results show a positive association between accruals quality and bank debt, even when controlling for other determinants of bank debt and for possible endogeneity between bank debt and accruals quality, which suggests that higher precision of earnings reduces information asymmetries with banks and favors the access of firms to bank loans.