Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution

We find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: The number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and funds of all ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns, indicating a reversal in fund performance following small gains. This result suggests that the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily overstated returns.     

Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination

We examine different types of derivative instruments used by corporate insiders. These instruments are more likely to be used when there is greater insider ownership and greater capital market scrutiny. While these instruments may be allowed by boards to mitigate agency problems relating to overvalued equity and high equity‐based pay, our evidence regarding forwards and collars is more consistent with the strategic timing of transactions by insiders. Exchange funds appear to be primarily used for diversification and are associated with higher personal tax rates. Collectively, our results suggest that there is significant heterogeneity in the motivation to use these instruments.     

Does Hedge Fund Performance Persist? Overview and New Empirical Evidence

The contribution of this paper is to provide an overview and new empirical evidence on hedge fund performance persistence, which has been a controversial issue in the academic literature during the last several years. In the first step, we review recent studies and put them into a joint evaluation of hedge fund performance persistence. In the second step, the methodological framework developed in the overview is used to present new empirical evidence. We find different levels of performance persistence depending on the statistical methodology and the hedge fund strategy employed. In our study, performance persistence cannot be explained by the use of option-like strategies, but it can be partially explained by survivorship and backfilling bias. Differences among hedge fund strategies might be explained by return smoothing. Finally, we develop a rationale for choosing between different methodologies to measure performance persistence and conclude that the multi-period Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is the most useful for evaluating performance persistence of hedge funds.     

Do Corporate Governance Motives Drive Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Activities?

We document empirical evidence that both hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) investments are driven by corporate governance improvements, but address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HFs focus on firms without a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PEs invest in firms with low managerial ownership. Both appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at increasing dividends, HFs tend to use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. PEs are inclined to longer‐term strategies: they target firms that are particularly well suited for leverage increases because of low expected financial distress costs.     

Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions

This paper uses commercial aircraft transactions to determine whether capital constraints cause firms to liquidate assets at discounts to fundamental values. Results indicate that financially constrained airlines receive lower prices than their unconstrained rivals when selling used narrow-body aircraft. Capital constrained airlines are also more likely to sell used aircraft to industry outsiders, especially during market downturns. Further evidence that capital constraints affect liquidation prices is provided by airlines' asset acquisition activity. Unconstrained airlines significantly increase buying activity when aircraft prices are depressed; this pattern is not observed for financially constrained airlines.     

Are There Hot Hands Among Mutual Fund Houses in Hong Kong?

This paper examines the short-term performance persistence of thirty-two fund houses in Hong Kong during January 1986 to December 1995. We compute fund house returns using averages of all equity funds in each house. Then we evaluate their hot hand performance using the median return as benchmark on a rolling monthly basis. The results show that there were only two 'hot hand' fund houses. Findings using annual returns confirm the non-existence of a hot hand phenomenon. However, we find a strong correlation between conditional and unconditional probabilities of winning repeatedly in consecutive months     

What Style Liquidity Timing Skills Do Mutual Fund Managers Possess?

Recent studies claim that mutual fund managers demonstrate strong MARKET liquidity timing skills. We extend their liquidity timing tests to the four‐factor case and investigate liquidity timing skills with respect to the MARKET, SIZE, VALUE and MOMENTUM factors. Contrary to these claims, we find no evidence that fund managers adjust market exposure in anticipation of market liquidity changes. We find rather strong evidence that fund managers successfully overweight small stocks as market liquidity increases. Our study also demonstrates that it is easy to misidentify SIZE liquidity timing as MARKET liquidity timing in models that focus only on MARKET liquidity timing.     

Do Managerial Skills Vary Across Fund Managers? Results Using European Mutual Funds

This paper uses stochastic dominance techniques to examine whether managerial skills vary across fund managers in European equity funds. The use of these techniques allows us to compare different investment alternatives in an uncertain setting under very simple assumptions regarding investor behaviour. The results for style-adjusted returns are consistent with varying degrees of managerial skill and cannot be explained by the impact of the choice of style-adjustment procedure, country, fee policy, and fund age, fund size or survivorship bias. This result allows us to conclude that style-adjusted returns may provide a reliable guide for selecting European investment funds.     

Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis

Using a large database of private firms in Italy, we analyze the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) by comparing the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts after high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by lower cost of credit and increased turnover in control.     

Change You Can Believe In? Hedge Fund Data Revisions

We analyze the reliability of voluntary disclosures of financial information, focusing on widely‐employed publicly‐available hedge fund databases. Tracking changes to statements of historical performance recorded between 2007 and 2011, we find that historical returns are routinely revised. These revisions are not merely random or corrections of earlier mistakes; they are partly forecastable by fund characteristics. Funds that revise their performance histories significantly and predictably underperform those that have never revised, suggesting that unreliable disclosures constitute a valuable source of information for investors. These results speak to current debates about mandatory disclosures by financial institutions to market regulators.     

Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?

We provide evidence suggesting that some hedge funds manipulate stock prices on critical reporting dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings exhibit abnormal returns of 0.30% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. A significant part of the return is earned during the last minutes of trading. Analysis of intraday volume and order imbalance provides further evidence consistent with manipulation. These patterns are stronger for funds that have higher incentives to improve their ranking relative to their peers.     

Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.     

Should Asset Managers Hedge Their “Fees at Risk”?

Although the recent financial crisis afflicted all asset managers, the problem of general market exposure was in some respects worse for the long-only funds that rely almost completely on asset-based fees than for the “absolute return” and other kinds of hedge funds that also receive performance-based fees. While the revenue generated by performance-based fees is expected to be volatile, asset-based fees tend to be viewed as an “annuity” stream that involves little or no earnings risk. But, especially in the case of long-only funds, large shortfalls in asset fees were caused by the combination of significant redemptions and sharp reductions in assets under management that accompanied the plunge in asset prices. In this article, the author attempts to quantify the expected effect of market fluctuations on the asset fees and profitability of long-only asset managers. Having done so, he then argues that traditional long-only asset managers—managers whose only reason for being is their ability to generate above-market returns (or “alpha”) on a fairly consistent basis—routinely retain too much beta risk in their primarily asset-based fee structures. The author offers two main reasons for long-only asset managers to hedge beta risk: (1) it would reduce the need for fund management firms to hold liquid capital to ensure solvency and fund important projects during market downturns; (2) it would provide the firm's current and prospective clients with a clearer signal of whether its managers are succeeding in the firm's mission of generating alpha, as well as the possibility of more equity-like and cost-effective incentive compensation systems for those managers.     

Picking Winners? Investment Consultants’ Recommendations of Fund Managers

Investment consultants advise institutional investors on their choice of fund manager. Focusing on U.S. actively managed equity funds, we analyze the factors that drive consultants’ recommendations, what impact these recommendations have on flows, and how well the recommended funds perform. We find that investment consultants’ recommendations of funds are driven largely by soft factors, rather than the funds’ past performance, and that their recommendations have a significant effect on fund flows. However, we find no evidence that these recommendations add value, suggesting that the search for winners, encouraged and guided by investment consultants, is fruitless.     

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.     

How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

Do Islamic Stock Returns Hedge Against Inflation? A Wavelet Approach

This article makes an initial attempt to study the hedging effectiveness of Islamic stock returns against inflation for different investment horizons. We applied the wavelet analysis to measure the cross-correlations between the time series as a function of time-scales using data ranging from 2007 to early 2015. The main results tend to indicate the following: First, that for investment horizons not exceeding 3 years, the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Emas Shariah Index constituent returns may potentially hedge against inflation. Additionally, the hedging ability of stock returns was absent from 2008 to 2009 following the global financial crisis. Finally, a buy-and-hold strategy exceeding 3 years may erode investments. The results are plausible and have strong policy implications.