Bargaining Credibility and the Limits to Within‐firm Pensions

Abstract ** ** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo. : A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low‐risk investment policy for firms which offer within‐house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined.     

The adjustment of external tariffs in the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme

Abstract.  This paper considers the adjustment of external tariffs when two countries integrate and implement the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme. Attention is also paid to the restrictions set by Article XXIV of GATT. This paper shows how the external tariffs would change in a three‐good, three‐country model under the assumption of gross substitutability. The results are sensitive to the initial trade pattern. In particular, they depend on the number of goods initially traded between the member countries. The analysis can be extended to a multi‐commodity model if the preferences of the countries have identical CES representation. JEL classification: F11, F15     

The Level of Wage Bargaining as a Firm–Union Choice

There is a trade-off between central bargaining which allows local externalities to be internalized and local bargaining which gives firms and unions the scope to determine both wages and employment simultaneously and efficiently in the sense of McDonald and Solow (1981). A model of strong unions is presented where workers are also concerned with relative wages. The trade-off is resolved by the individual firm and union on the basis of choice, using the Pareto-criterion. In the presence of a small extra contract cost under local bargaining, the main findings are: (i) central bargaining is Pareto-optimal only for extreme values of the reservation income level—a change in unemployment remuneration may cause centralization to breakdown; and (ii) centralization may also be sustained as a suboptimal Nash-equilibrium through workers' concern with relative wages—the familiar Keynesian coordination failure.     

A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.     

Network of Collaborations for Innovation: The Case of Biotechnology*

The 'life science' revolution related to the development of biotechnology affects many different markets. In the pharmaceutical business new drugs are continuously developed, tested, and submitted to governmental institutions for the required approval. In the agricultural business the so-called 'green revolution' is well under way with many new products designed in order to appeal to farmers or to consumers. The increasing pace of introduction of new biotech products—particularly drugs and agrochemical (Ag) foods—leads firms to look for collaborations in the different phases of the introduction process. Basing on an empirical study conducted on a sample of 27 organisations involved in the process of introduction of biotech products, the paper aims at comparing and contrasting the nature and the processes involved in inter-institutional collaborations occurring at various stages of new product development and commercialisation of new biotech products (particularly drugs and Ag foods).     

Quasi‐geometric discounting: A closed‐form solution under the exponential utility function

This paper studies a discrete‐time utility maximization problem of an infinitely‐lived quasi‐geometric consumer whose labour income is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We restrict attention to a first‐order Markov recursive solution. We show that under the assumption of the exponential utility function, the problem of the quasi‐geometric consumer admits a closed‐form solution.     

The closed‐loop effect and the profitability of horizontal mergers

Abstract.  We study the profitability of horizontal mergers in a dynamic competition context with sticky prices. It is shown that, when firms use open‐loop strategies, a merger is profitable only if the share of the market that merges is significant enough. In the case where firms use closed‐loop strategies we provide a method to conduct analytically the study of the profitability of horizontal mergers. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium of the game when a subset of firms merges. When firms use feedback strategies, mergers are profitable even when the share of the market that merges is arbitrarily small. JEL Classification:D4, L13     

Monetary policy in a cash‐in‐advance economy: employment, capital accumulation, and the term structure of interest rates

Abstract.  In this paper we study the effects of monetary policies on employment, capital accumulation, consumption, and the term structure of interest rates in a cash‐in‐advance economy, where money is required for consumption expenditures. Monetary policy involves targeting the inflation rate. The detailed dynamics of the model are fully worked out. As no numerical analysis is involved, we are able to identify very clearly the different channels through which monetary policy will impinge on the important macroeconomic variables. The model is also used to discuss the 'Great Canadian Slump.' JEL Classification: E52 and E43     

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model

This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.     

Industry-Level Wage Bargaining: A Partial Rehabilitation—The German Experience

In order to reduce unemployment, it is often recommended that industry-level wage bargaining in Germany should be replaced by a more decentralized system. This paper provides a critical assessment of the current wage bargaining institutions and re-examines the case for a more decentralized system. Based on a theoretical model integrating Insider–Outsider aspects into the comparison, the uniformly superior employment performance of a decentralized wage bargaining system is questioned. We conclude that, rather than solely trying to decentralize wage bargaining, a promising policy option may be to improve the skills of the unemployed by efficient labour market policies and to foster institutional reforms such that wage bargaining takes account of the long-run employment consequences of wage setting.     

Government Underpricing of Share‐Issue Privatizations

Abstract *** :  The purposes of the paper are to determine whether governments underprice shares in fixed‐price share‐issue privatizations (SIPs) and, if so, what their motivations are for doing so. This paper develops three models of SIP underpricing: one based on revenue goals, one based on political goals and an inclusive model which supposes that the level of underpricing depends on both government revenue goals and political goals. These models are estimated using an international sample of 104 SIPs from 25 countries. We find that, on average, SIPs are underpriced by approximately the same amount as private sector initial public offerings (IPOs). This is not consistent with the sole goal of revenue maximization because SIPs should not require the same degree of underpricing as IPOs. The inclusive regression fits the data well and indicates that both revenue and political goals affect the level of SIP underpricing .     

The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax‐competition Paradox

Information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal‐taxation framework. We introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital‐income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under‐provision of publicly provided goods. However, in contrast to previous results in the literature, under‐provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public‐good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.     

Trading Behavior and Asset Returns: Evidence from the Interday Serial Correlations of Intraday‐to‐Intraday Daily Returns of Taiwan

This paper sheds light on the importance of trading behavior in the determination of asset prices by examining the interday serial correlations of intraday‐to‐intraday daily returns of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC). The TSEC exhibits positive serial correlation in the beginning and the end of the week and negative serial correlation in the middle of the week. The interday serial correlation is not a result of non‐synchronous trading, bid‐ask bounce in transaction price, or price limits. The serial correlation is positively related to trading volume and similar to the pattern in the US. We suggest that trading behavior seems to be an important determinant of asset prices.     

环境金融发展与金融创新的关联性研究

低碳经济是当今世界经济发展的新趋势,是解决全球气候问题的重要理念。如何发挥金融功能与经济发展的互动作用,从而更有效地促进低碳经济的发展,是目前环境金融领域研究的重点。文章从金融创新的视角,总结国内外环境金融研究与发展现状,并探究金融创新与环境金融发展的关联性,旨在得到金融创新对环境金融发展促进作用的路径依赖,从而可以为我国环境金融发展的具体实践提供一些有益的建议。     

The Organisational Evolution of the Childcare Regime in Germany: Issues and Dynamics of a Public‐private Partnership

In many European countries, institutional childcare has developed as a field shaped by both statutory and associative agency, the German system being emblematic for this. In Germany, a considerable proportion of childcare services are provided by nonprofit organizations under public regulation. Departing from a historical overview, the article elaborates on the mixed economy of welfare in that system and sheds light on recent transformations of the existing public‐private partnership. It is argued that with a range of cultural and civil‐society‐related evolutions, the system is going to adopt elements of a market regulation that are prone to change the rules of games within the partnership as such.     

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.