Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach

Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restrictions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.     

Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining

We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction. Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to “robot” players, but offers to robots are only a little lower. When trained subjects (who quickly learned to do backward induction) bargained with untrained subjects, offers ended up halfway between equilibrium and $2.11. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9.     

Walras and Darwin: an odd couple?

General equilibrium theory and the evolutionary branches of economics and game theory take rather opposite positions in the spectrum covered by the economic science. However, we reveal and explore analogies between Darwinian dynamics and Walrasian tatonnement processes for pure exchange economies, as well as further analogies implied by these.     

社区主导型乡村旅游发展的博弈论——从个人理性到集体理性

我国社区主导型乡村旅游发展尚处于初级阶段,却已经显现出旅游市场的无序竞争和公共资源过度利用及破坏等公地悲剧问题。文章运用博弈论方法分析,认为这些问题是村民与村民之间以及村民与游客之间基于个人理性的相互博弈的结果。从长期来看,集体理性更符合村民长期利益最大化的心理需求,社区村民的博弈具有从个人理性向集体理性转变的机制和驱动力。为了避免和缓解公地悲剧的发生,缩短从个人理性到集体理性转变的时间距离,必须依赖于外部力量的引导以及合理的制度安排,文章提出了相应制度保障措施。     

The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement

Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood (SL) that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions. We show that the concept of SL improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses. Moreover, our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex-ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty.      

Socially Subjective Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games

This study provides a new framework and a new equilibrium concept, which are able to describe the situation where people have various images of the society and have various solution concepts for social outcomes, and where people accept the social outcomes. In socially subjective equilibrium, people have a coherence of their own norms in two senses. One is the consistency of the norm itself. Imagined outcomes should satisfy a certain (subjective) solution concept. The other is the consistency between the imagined outcomes and realized one. These are the main features of our equilibrium concept. This paper forms a part of my doctoral thesis, which is titled “On socially subjective equilibrium”. The first person I would like to thank is my direct supervisor Professor Ken Urai (Osaka University). I obtained a basic idea of the main concept of my doctoral thesis, that is, the solution concept scheme, from Professor Urai. I am grateful to Professor Hiroaki Nagatani (Osaka University) and Professor Ken-Ichi Shimomura (Kobe University), who monitored my works and took efforts in providing me with valuable comments on earlier versions of my thesis. I also obtained a fruitful advice from Professor Kenichi Amaya (Kobe University). Lastly, I specially thank to Kozo Shiraishi (Osaka University).     

Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame

This paper explores the impact of debt holdings on the output decisions of firms in an oligopoly supergame with stochastic demand fluctuations. It is demonstrated that when perfect collusion is not feasible then there exist circumstances in which increased debt holdings may facilitate tacit collusion. This occurs because higher debt levels act as a credible commitment device which lowers the payoffs accruing to a firm when it defects from the tacitly collusive equilibrium. It is further shown that in these circumstances firms may have an incentive to hold debt for strategic purposes which promote collusion.     

价格联盟博弈分析

随着市场竞争日益激烈，降价成为企业在竞争中常用的手段之一，竞相降价导致企业利润不断下滑，甚至引发整个行业亏损。为了避免恶性价格竞争，同行企业希望通过建立价格联盟，共同执行协议价格来阻止利润下滑。本文从博弈论的角度分析了价格联盟形成的动因、效用和解散等问题，并提出了政策建议。     

基于社会责任的企业环境信息披露博弈分析

企业的生产经营活动对人们赖以生存的环境产生着重大影响，所以企业应承担向社会公众披露有关环境信息的责任。目前,企业的环境信息披露情况不容乐观．为了促使经济健康发展．本文通过建立模型来分析企业与相关入之间的博弈关系，试图达到一种经济学上的“帕累托最优”状态。     

自然保护区管理与周边社区农民经济活动的博弈分析

从博弈的角度出发,系统地阐述了保护区管理与周边社区的冲突关系,以及存在的主要问题.并通过理性的选择,利用纳什均衡的方法来分析双方的冲突,以达到双赢的目的.     

A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems

We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria.     

The Nobel Prize Economics Lectures as a Teaching Tool

Because Nobel Prize economics lectures are written for various purposes and cover a range of topics at different levels of difficulty, the author uses them to add rigor and relevancy to an economics course.     

Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency

Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad but shallow” treaty.     

投资决策中个人理性与集体理性博弈分析及对策研究

针对近期多起曝光的企业对外投资、担保大案,本文应用博弈论分析方法,在强调个人理性与集体理性矛盾的基础上研究投资决策中两者的完全信息博弈及无限阶段重复博弈,并建立相应的定量分析模型,通过分析博弈参与人均衡行为,指出投资决策中寻租的存在的必然性及巨大危害,并针对性的提出了适合实际操作的对策建议.     

行为委托-代理激励新模型及分析框架

标准委托-代理激励模型及分析框架沿袭新古典经济学中关于理性经济人、偏好不变、预期效用等基本假定,存在一些无法解释的现象和悖论。本文从行为经济学对主流经济学的新古典经济学基本假设的挑战出发,对标准委托-代理激励模型及分析框架中代理人完全理性和风险规避等基本假设所带来的缺陷进行了系统分析,探究了如何利用期望理论的价值函数替代期望效用函数、有限理性替代完全理性来构建新的委托一代理激励模型及分析框架。新模型和框架考虑了代理人的心理特征和非理性行为,将增强激励模型及分析框架对现实制度的解释力和适用性。