The London Business School with Gower Publishing

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the course of the world economy in 1988 was a product not so much of the stock market crash of October 1987 but of the reaction to the crash. Monetary policy and to a lesser extent fiscal policy were eased and consumer spending responded to cuts in interest rates and rising real incomes. With the world recovery in its sixth year, capacity pressures began to emerge and investment also boomed, helped by a lower cost of capital. As a result of this strong private sector demand, OECD output increased 4 per cent in 1988 as a whole and industrial production and world trade rose even more rapidly. Against the background of buoyant demand and output, inflationary fears have resurfaced. Since the spring monetary authorities in most countries have been tightening policy, raising interest rates by early 1989 above the levels which helped bring about the stock market crash. Their aim is to effect a slowdown in demand before a significant upward movement in inflation and inflationary expectations takes hold. In our judgement the present policy stance will achieve its aim of a "soft landing" for the world economy. The pick-up in world inflation is contained below 5 per cent and by the second half of this year inflation eases, paving the way for a relaxation of monetary policy. Output growth slows from 4 per cent to 3 percent in 1989 and 2 per cent in 1990, picking up again as interest rates are lowered in 1991–2.     

Can a stochastic cusp catastrophe model explain stock market crashes?

This paper is the first attempt to fit a stochastic cusp catastrophe model to stock market data. We show that the cusp catastrophe model explains the crash of stock exchanges much better than other models. Using the data of U.S. stock markets we demonstrate that the crash of October 19, 1987, may be better explained by cusp catastrophe theory, which is not true for the crash of September 11, 2001. With the help of sentiment measures, such as the index put/call options ratio and trading volume (the former models the chartists, the latter the fundamentalists), we have found that the 1987 returns are bimodal, and the cusp catastrophe model fits these data better than alternative models. Therefore we may say that the crash has been led by internal forces. However, the causes for the crash of 2001 are external, which is also evident in much weaker presence of bifurcations in the data. In this case, alternative models explain the crash of stock exchanges better than the cusp catastrophe model.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

World output, which was strengthening immediately prior to last October, appears to have barely suffered in the short term from the stock market crash. Apart from an early reaction by US consumers - since reversed - demand is proving robust and in early 1988 OECD industrial production is, we estimate, 6 per cent up on year-earlier levels, with GNP more than 4 per cent higher. Indeed such is the strength of activity that the present balance of risk is not that recession is imminent but that inflation may pick up again. In the United States, where activity rates are at their highest level for eight years and unemployment is at a fourteen-year low, monetary policy has been tightened and interest rates are moving higher. The Bundesbank is keen to follow suit and the BoJ is keeping the situation under review. Nevertheless, with wages in most countries still adjusting to the low inflation rates of the last two years, there is little evidence yet that prices are accelerating.
We expect to see world interest rates edging higher in the second half of the year as recorded inflation picks lip. But we believe that underlying inflation remains low and that, even on the assumption that oil prices return to 18 a barrel, OECD consumer price inflation will peak early next year at a little over 4 per cent. Tighter monetary policy is also expected to hold back demand over the next 12 months. Consequently, we expect some weak- ness in output in the first half of next year but discount the possibility of a severe recession. GNP growth in the OECD area is forecast to decline from the 3 per cent rate of 1987–8 to a little over 2 per cent next year and to a sustainable 2½ per cent p.a. over the medium term.     

Analyst Herding and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

We examine the proposition that firms with disproportionately more analysts herding in their coverage, as measured by a larger herding index value, have higher crash risk. Our findings are consistent with the main proposition. The results suggest that information production, rather than monitoring, is the primary mechanism behind the positive relation between herding and crash risk. Our conclusion is robust to different measures of crash risk, crash risk windows, herding measures, subsamples, and instrumental estimation. In addition, using post‐earnings announcement drift, we report that analyst herding slows down bad news transmission in the market. Our findings extend the literature by documenting that analyst herding plays a role in enhancing crash risk. Analyst herding has economic consequences on the covered firms. We offer support for the concern in the literature regarding analyst herding and market fluctuations.     

Financial Depth and the Asymmetric Impact of Monetary Policy

This paper investigates the importance of financial depth in evaluating the asymmetric impact of monetary policy on real output over the course of the US business cycle. We show that monetary policy has a significant impact on output growth during recessions. We also show that financial deepening plays an important role by dampening the effects of monetary policy shocks in recessions. The results are robust to the use of alternative financial depth and monetary policy shock measures as well as to two different sample periods.     

非效率投资、审计监督与股价崩盘风险

选取2008年至2013年A股上市公司的数据,研究非效率投资行为可能引发的经济后果,并研究了审计监督对非效率投资行为经济后果的影响。实证研究表明,在其他条件一定的情况下,管理层的非效率投资状况越严重,就越有动机向外界隐瞒其代理动机和利益侵占行为等负面消息,造成上市公司未来的股价崩盘风险越高。独立审计作为公司治理的外部监督主体与保证机制,能够通过缓解代理问题和降低代理成本,显著抑制非效率投资对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究结论表明防范和化解股市的风险需要从上市公司代理问题的源头上做起这一政策性意义。     

Decomposing the effects of monetary policy using an external instruments SVAR

We study the effects of monetary policy on economic activity separately identifying the effects of a conventional change in the fed funds rate from the policy of forward guidance. We use a structural VAR identified using external instruments from futures market data. The response of output to a fed funds rate shock is found to be consistent with typical monetary VAR analyses. However, the effect of a forward guidance shock that increases long‐term interest rates has an expansionary effect on output. This counterintuitive response is shown to be tied to the asymmetric information between the Federal Reserve and the public.     

Forecast Summary

Led by manufacturing industry, output has accelerated and GDP growth approaching 4 per cent is likely this year. But strains are emerging and we expect slower growth from now on. Over the medium term GDP is forecast to rise at a sustain- able 3 per cent rate, nearly 31/2 per cent for non-oil output. This should enable the reduction in un- employment to continue, though at a slower pace than in the last year. Against a background of rising activity, we expect inflation to remain at its present underlying rate of about 4 per cent and the current account deficit to settle at about £2bn p.a. We show in the Focus how this forecast might change if the stock market fails to recover from its mid-October crash     

The zero lower bound,the dual mandate,and unconventional dynamics

This paper examines monetary policy when it is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Our analysis uses a nonlinear New Keynesian model with technology and discount factor shocks. Specifically, we investigate why technology shocks may have unconventional effects at the ZLB, what factors affect the likelihood of hitting the ZLB, and the implications of alternative monetary policy rules. We initially focus on a New Keynesian model without capital (Model 1) and then study that model with capital (Model 2). The advantage of including capital is that it introduces another mechanism for intertemporal substitution that strengthens the expectational effects of the ZLB. Four main findings emerge: (1) In Model 1, the choice of output target in the Taylor rule may reverse the effects of technology shocks when the ZLB binds; (2) When the central bank targets steady-state output in Model 2, a positive technology shock at the ZLB leads to more pronounced unconventional dynamics than in Model 1; (3) The presence of capital changes the qualitative effects of demand shocks and alters the impact of a monetary policy rule that emphasizes output stability; and (4) In Model 1, the constrained linear solution is a decent approximation of the nonlinear solution, but meaningful differences exist between the solutions in Model 2.     

Nonlinearity in the Fed's monetary policy rule

This paper investigates the nature of nonlinearities in the monetary policy rule of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) using the flexible approach to nonlinear inference. We find that while there is significant evidence of nonlinearity for the period to 1979, there is little such evidence for the subsequent period. Possible asymmetries in the Fed's reactions to inflation deviations from target and the output gap in the 1960s and 1970s may tell part of the story, but do not capture the entire nature of the nonlinearity. The inclusion of the interaction between inflation deviations and the output gap, as recently proposed, appears to characterize the nonlinear policy rule more adequately. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ARE THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ASYMMETRIC? EVIDENCE FROM A SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether the effects of monetary policy on output in Europe are asymmetric. Data from the 1953–90 period are used to identify money-supply shocks and their effects on output for a panel of 18 European countries. Many different specifications and estimation methods strongly support asymmetry: negative money-supply shocks are shown to have a statistically significant effect on output, whereas the effect of positive shocks is statistically insignificant. A similar asymmetry governs the output effects of interest rate changes. The sources of these asymmetries are traced to similar behavior for consumption and investment. These findings imply that positive money-supply shocks may be an ineffective anti-recession policy, and more generally, that the monetary component of the optimal stabilization policy should be less activist than generally thought.     

Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information

The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output volatility.     

Some empirical evidence on the real effects of nominal volatility

It has been argued that volatility in nominal macroeconomic aggregates has had a negative effect on real output, in particular that such volatility contributed to slow output growth in the early 1980s. This paper reexamines the effects of volatility in nominal macroeconomic aggregates in the context of a modern simultaneous equation framework where the volatility of, nominal macroeconomic variables is modeled as the conditional variance of two variables of interest: the federal funds rate and inflation. The empirical framework is the recently developed multivariate GARCH-in-mean vector autoregressive model. We confirm evidence that inflation volatility and tight monetary policy have directly affected output growth, but find that volatility in the federal funds rate has not.     

Revealing the preferences of the US Federal Reserve

We use Bayesian methods to estimate changes in US post‐war monetary policy in the Smets and Wouters model. We perform the estimations by allowing for a break in monetary policy at the time of Volcker's appointment as chairman. This enables us to capture changes in the monetary policy regime introduced by Volcker during the Volcker–Greenspan period. We find support for the assumption that monetary policy in the Volcker–Greenspan period performed optimally under commitment. Our estimation strategy allows us to estimate the preferences of the US Federal Reserve in the Volcker–Greenspan period, where the main objective of policy appears to be inflation, followed by interest rate stabilization, output growth and interest rate smoothing. We find that the Great Moderation of output growth is explained by a combination of two factors: the decrease in the volatility of the structural shocks and the improved monetary policy conduct. Inflation Stabilization, however, is mainly due to the change in monetary policy that took place at the beginning of Volcker's mandate. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trade credit financing and stock price crash risk

This study investigates the association between trade credit financing and stock price crash risk within China's context. We find that firms using more trade credit financing have significantly lower future stock price crash risk. This negative association is more pronounced for firms with greater information asymmetry and for firms located in less developed financial markets. This finding is robust to the endogeneity concern, alternative measures of stock price crash risk, and the inclusion of other factors identified in prior studies that might affect stock price crash risk. Further evidence suggests that both the monitoring mechanism and the disclosure mechanism drive the documented relation. Our study suggests that access to trade credit can significantly reduce the likelihood of crash risk in a country like China with less developed formal bank financing. Our study also suggests that investors can effectively avoid stock price crash risk by using the trade credit information disclosed in financial statements.     

Impacts of Monetary, Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policies on Output in China: A Var Approach

Applying the VAR model and using the interest rate as a monetary policy variable, we find that in the long run, output in China responds negatively to a shock to the interest rate, the real exchange rate, government debt, or the inflation rate, and it reacts positively to a shock to government deficits or lagged own output. When real M2 is chosen as a monetary policy variable, long-term output in China responds positively to a shock to real M2 or lagged own output, and it reacts negatively to a shock to the real exchange rate, government debt, or government deficits. Its response to a shock to the inflation rate is negative when government debt is used and is positive when government deficits are considered. In the short run, fiscal policy is more important than monetary policy in three out of four cases. In the long run, monetary policy is more influential than fiscal policy in three out of four cases. Therefore, the government may consider conducting monetary and fiscal policies differently in the short run and long run. The government needs to be cautious in pursuing deficit spending as its long-term impacts depend on the monetary variable employed. The policy of maintaining a relatively stable exchange rate is appropriate as the depreciation of the Yuan may hurt the economy in the short run.JEL Classifications: E5, F4, H6     

Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information

In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the full-information outcome (unlike in standard screening models, where the agent earns an information rent in the high-demand state and output is distorted in the low-demand state). Our results have implications for fidelity rebates, all-units discounts, and competition policy. Although some crowding out of the fringe may occur when demand is low, we show that market-share contracts need not be harmful for welfare.     

Credit rationing and threshold effects in the relation between money and output

The possibility that the effect of monetary policy on output may depend on whether credit conditions are tight or loose can be expressed as a non-linearity in the relation between real money supply and output, of which a simple case is a threshold effect. In this case, consistent with the credit-rationing model of Blinder (1987), the monetary variable has a more powerful effect if it is below some threshold than when it is above. Testing for the importance of this threshold is straightforward if the appropriate threshold value is known a priori, but where the value is not known and must be chosen based on the sample, the testing problem becomes more difficult. We apply recently-developed tests applicable in this situation to both US and Canadian data, and find substantial evidence of a threshold effect, particularly in US data. However, the estimated threshold values are high.     

Trilemma policy convergence patterns and output volatility

We examine the development of open macroeconomic policy choices among developing economies from the perspective of the powerful “trilemma” hypothesis. We construct an index of divergence of the three trilemma policy choices, and evaluate its patterns in recent decades. We find that the three dimensions of the trilemma configurations are converging toward a “middle ground” among emerging market economies, equipped with managed exchange rate flexibility, underpinned by sizable holdings of international reserves, and intermediate levels of monetary independence and financial integration. We also find emerging market economies with more converged policy choices tend to experience smaller output volatility in the last two decades. Emerging markets with relatively low international reserves/GDP could experience higher levels of output volatility when they choose a policy combination with a greater degree of policy divergence while this heightened output volatility effect does not apply to economies with relatively high international reserves/GDP holding.