The Performance of the European Central Bank

The European Monetary Union has been in operation since 1 January 1999. The paper offers an interim assessment of the operations of the European Central Bank (ECB) during this period. It describes how the ECB defined its monetary strategy and carried out its policy. The evaluation offered in the paper is largely positive, the principal objects of criticism being found to stem from the constitution which defines the position and principal objective of the ECB. This constitution embodies an extreme version of Central Bank independence and creates a 'democratic deficit' in consequence. Albeit the operating record is not without some blemishes, for example in regard to the ECB's communication policy. So far, the ECB has benefitted from a favourable macroeconomic conjuncture. This has changed and a more testing time may now be in store.     

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

评析欧元区统一的货币政策

本文对欧洲中央银行在欧元区实行统一的货币政策进行了评析,通过研究提出了影响统一货币政策实施和效果的潜在矛盾,认为统一货币政策所面临的问题不是技术问题而利益问题,欧元区成员国对待不对称冲击的政策以反应呈现为一种动态博弈过程,并据此提出只有通过加强成员国的利益趋同、经济周期同步、财政政策的协调配合,甚至统一经济政策的实施才能进一步促使统一货币政策的有效运作。     

Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey from 2000 to 2011 and estimate probit regressions with sample selection. We find that transparency exerts a non-linear effect on trust. Transparency increases trust, but only up to a certain point; too much transparency harms trust. This result is robust to controlling for a number of macroeconomic conditions, financial stability transparency measures, and economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, including examining respondents in European Union countries that do not use the euro and addressing clustering issues.     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

欧洲央行难以为M3自圆其说

<正> 谈到最广义货币供应量(M3)和公共关系,欧洲央行(European Central Bank)似乎永远处于左右为难的境地。欧洲央行所面临的政策困境之实质,就是货币供应量和通货膨胀率越来越背道而驰这一悖论。因此,欧洲央行在过去一年中耗费了大量时间和精力向人们解释并淡化处理M3的古怪走势。“他们有两个选择,”德国商业银行(Commerzbank)高级经济学家迈克尔·舒伯特(Michael Schubert)说,“一个选择是     

Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary Policy

Abstract. Over the last decade, the simple instrument policy rule developed by Taylor has become a popular tool for evaluating the monetary policy of central banks. As an extensive empirical analysis of the European Central Bank's (ECB) past behaviour still seems to be in its infancy, we estimate several instrument policy reaction functions for the ECB to shed some light on actual monetary policy in the euro area under the presidency of Wim Duisenberg and answer questions like whether the ECB has actually followed a stabilizing or a destabilizing rule so far. Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, the evidence presented suggests that the ECB is accommodating changes in inflation and hence follows a destabilizing policy. However, this impression seems to be largely due to the lack of a forward-looking perspective in such specifications. Either assuming rational expectations and using a forward-looking specification, or using expectations as derived from surveys result in Taylor rules that do imply a stabilizing role of the ECB. The use of real-time industrial production data does not seem to play such a significant role as in the case of the United States.     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

National representation in supranational institutions: The case of the European Central Bank

Supranational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. On the one hand, hiring decisions are based, as in most organizations, on a candidate’s professional qualifications. On the other hand, supranational institutions often aim for broad national representation. Reviewing evidence from the European Central Bank, we show that nationality is indeed relevant for both hiring and decision-making. Specifically, we find a disproportionately narrow spread of national representation in the top management of the ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence of national networks between adjacent management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to national representation in the core business areas of the ECB. Examining a sample of 27 European countries over the period from 1999 to 2008, we estimate Taylor rules for alternative sets of euro area aggregates derived from different weighting schemes of national macroeconomic data. Our results indicate that weights based on national representation in the mid-level management of the ECB’s core business areas best describe the central bank’s interest-rate setting behavior.     

Explaining European Union Citizens’ Trust in the European Central Bank in Normal and Crisis Times

We study the determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) as measured by the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey, in particular during the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. We find that the fall in trust in the ECB in crisis times can be rather well explained based on the pre‐crisis determinants. We also show that the fall in trust reflected the macroeconomic deterioration, a more generalized fall in the trust in European institutions in the wake of the crisis, and the severity of the banking sector's problems, to which the ECB was associated in the public opinion.     

Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy

The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks. First, consideration is given to what is today implied by the view that central banks are primarily interested in maintaining their independence, maximising their discretion, and avoiding blame for poor outcomes. Second, the ECB's explanations of how it sees its role and status and its presentation of its strategy are considered. Certain limitations in the form of obscure explanation, confused analysis and selective referencing are identified. These appear to suggest that the ECB is concerned with the pursuit of its own agenda. Particular attention is drawn to the danger of paying too much attention to what it says about its own 'accountability'.     

The Repo Auctions of the European Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle*

Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ECB's liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system. Yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ECB's practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target.     

Policy Assignments for Central Bank Activities

This paper contrasts different policy assignments for central bank operations. Two types of asset market transactions (domestic, foreign) and two policy targets (interest rate, exchange rate) are examined within a portfolio-balance model. It is demonstrated that assigning domestic asset transactions to the internal target, and foreign asset transactions to the external target, produces stable policy paths, while the opposite assignment does not. [310]     

Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence

This paper uses results of a questionnaire survey to look at how central bankers inthe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia view various criteria of centralbank independence and compares their responses with central bankers in industrialcountries. Central bankers from both groups agree very strongly on the importanceof two pillars of central bank independence: goal independence and freedom toimplement these goals, together with a system of how credit is granted by a centralbank to a government that gives the central bank powers to determine terms andlimits the extent of such credit. Based on the responses, the paper also identifiessome weaknesses of the most frequently used indices of central bank independenceand makes recommendations on how to improve them.     

The Evolution of European Central Bank Independence: An Updating of the Masciandaro and Spinelli Index

In an earlier paper in this journal, Masciandaro and Spinelli computed an index of central bank independence for a number of countries on the basis of the institutional arrangements in place in 1990. Since then the situation has changed and therefore that work needs an updating. This shows that the Bundesbank remains the most independent central bank, but several other central banks have increased their independence: see the cases of Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Great Britain. The Bank of Spain has registered the biggest improvement and the Bank of Portugal remains the least independent.     

欧洲中央银行统一货币政策的内外制约与协调改进

欧洲央行的统一货币政策实施中在维持物价稳定、促进经济增长等方面起到了一定的作用 ,但在运行中也暴露出了央行责任弱化、决策过程忽略整体利益、货币政策战略目标互相冲突等政策机制的内在缺陷 ;同时 ,也存在货币政策难以达到统一、有效的目标、欧元区成员国相对独立的财政政策与统一的货币政策难以协调等外在制约。因此 ,欧洲中央银行需通过强化非正式的责任义务、保持决策的公开性、建立经济与政治各领域新的制衡机制、处罚机制、调整货币政策战略、统一协调财政政策等措施来改进货币政策。     

Impact of Central Bank Intervention during Periods of Speculative Pressure: Evidence from the European Monetary System

Abstract. This paper studies the effects of Banco de España and Banque de France interventions during the 1992–93 European Monetary System crises. In particular, a Markov Switching model is estimated where interventions influence the probabilities of transition between a calm and a turbulent regime. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of intervention on the expected rate of realignment. On balance, the results are consistent with the view that publicly known interventions but not secret interventions increased both the probability of switching to the turbulent regime as well as the expected realignment rate.