Seller honesty and product line pricing

We study upselling in markets where the seller observes consumer need but the consumer herself may not (e.g., medical care, durable repairs, financial and legal services). The seller may recommend excessive product features to uninformed consumers. In a monopoly with two types of consumer (one with a basic need and the other an advanced need) and two types of service (a basic service which fulfills only the basic need and an advanced service which fulfills both needs), we investigate the firm’s honesty and product-line pricing. We reach several results. First, the firm is honest if the basic service is superior (in that it generates higher per-capita social surplus than the advanced service under the efficient allocation) or if the consumers with the basic need are sufficiently many. Second, when there exist informed consumers who neglect seller recommendation, the presence of informed consumers may cause consumer welfare to decrease, and a larger informed population may cause firm profits and social welfare to increase or decrease. Lastly, when the informed consumers boycott a dishonest firm and withhold purchase, firm profits may increase because the threat of boycotting makes the firm more credible and allows a higher price of the advanced service.     

Developing a model of antecedents to consumers' perceptions and evaluations of price unfairness

Drawing on previous research in pricing, we propose three broad antecedents to perceptions of price unfairness. Consumers perceive price unfairness when (1) they feel that the firm is making excessive profits, (2) they are not able to understand the pricing structure applied, and (3) they sense the firm is acting in an immoral or unethical manner. Survey data were collected from 969 consumers to understand their perceptions of price unfairness. In the survey, respondents were asked to provide their perceptions of pricing practices for fifteen products or services. A content analysis of consumers' comments confirms a wide array of drivers of price unfairness discussed by researchers and uncovers a few under-researched antecedents.     

Balancing Profitability and Customer Welfare in a Supermarket Chain

We investigate the impact of price discrimination by a large Chicago supermarket chain. First we measure the impact of the chain's current zone-pricing policy on shelf prices, variable profits and consumer welfare across its stores. Using the chain's database to simulate a finer store-specific micro-pricing policy, we study the implications of this policy on profits and welfare. We show how a store-pricing policy that is constrained to offer consumers at least as much surplus as a uniform chain wide pricing policy still enables the retailer to generate substantial incremental profits.To ensure our pricing problem exhibits a well-defined optimum, we use the parsimonious, mixed-logit demand function that allows for flexible substitution patterns across brands and also retains a link to consumer theory. We discuss the issue of price endogeneity when estimating the demand parameters with weekly store-level data. Standard instrumental variables techniques used to account for such endogeneity also seem to increase the magnitudes of own-price elasticities thereby offsetting the problem encountered by previous researchers of predicted prices from a demand model exceeding those in the actual data.     

Why offer lower prices to past customers? Inducing favorable social price comparisons to enhance customer retention

Price discrimination policies vary widely across companies. Some firms offer new customers the lowest price; others give preferential prices to their past customers. We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in behavior-based pricing by exploring how customers’ social price comparisons, i.e., comparing one’s price to that received by similar peers, impact the optimal structure of price discrimination. Social price comparisons have a negative (positive) impact on customers’ transaction utility if the price charged to past customers is higher (lower) than a new customer’s price. Using an analytical model with vertically differentiated firms, we show that a firm with relatively large market share will reward its past customers with relatively low prices when social price comparisons have a sufficiently large impact on utility. Furthermore, we find that social price comparisons lead to a relaxation of the price competition for new customers. Thus, both firms can earn higher profits when such comparisons are made than when they are absent. We also examine how other factors, such as horizontal competition and strategic customers, interact with social price comparison concerns to impact pricing strategies. Finally, we show how pricing behavior differs when price comparisons are based on historic reference prices rather than on peers’ prices.     

Do Consumers Care about how Prices are Set?

Using a survey approach, we ask consumers to reveal their preferences over pricing schemes that may differ in terms of the average price of consumption, the amount of price variation, and the probability of being rationed. We find that consumers dislike pricing schemes that vary prices more but that they are willing to trade off price variation and rationing. Surprisingly, they are not willing to trade off an increase in price variation for a decrease in expected prices. We discuss the implications of these findings for firm pricing policies.     

Pricing and persuasive advertising in a differentiated market

This paper examines the effects of consumer preferences, firms’ costs, and advertising efficiencies on firms’ pricing and persuasive advertising strategies. We show that as the firms’ horizontal differentiation increases, the firm with a lower value-added product tends to increase persuasive advertising, whereas its competitor tends to reduce advertising. Second, the firm receiving a favorable shock in product valuation will complement the favorable change with additional persuasive advertising rather than reduce advertising spending. Third, an equal improvement in advertising efficiency in the industry will lower the profits for both firms, whereas a decrease in advertising efficiency in the industry can benefit both firms. Fourth, a larger shock that improves a firm’s product valuation or unit cost is more likely to induce higher advertising spending in the industry. Lastly, an exogenous increase in the separation between firms’ product valuations or perceived qualities may actually reduce the price dispersion in the industry.     

消费者绿色偏好视角下乳制品定价模型研究

在乳制品行业安全质量问题频发的背景下,消费者对于乳制品的绿色偏好程度越来越高,这种偏好会直接影响市场需求和企业生产决策。从消费者绿色偏好出发,将消费者按照绿色等级进行划分,运用均衡价格理论和消费者剩余理论构建了乳制品定价模型。经过数值仿真分析,结果发现,随着区间内消费者比例和消费水平的提高,区间内的需求量也会随之提高;且区间内消费者绿色偏好程度与企业利润呈正相关。     

Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion

We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively the pricing strategy (perfect price discrimination or uniform pricing), and from the second stage onward collude on prices. We show that for intermediate discount factors and high firms’ asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing price discrimination. In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms’ asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates. When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.     

Who pays for switching costs?

Earlier work characterized pricing with switching costs as a dilemma between a short-term “harvesting” incentive to increase prices versus a long-term “investing” incentive to decrease prices. This paper shows that small switching costs may reduce firm profits and provide short-term incentives to lower rather than raise prices. We provide a simple expression which characterizes the impact of the introduction of switching costs on prices and profits for a general model. We then explore the impact of switching costs in a variety of specific examples which are special cases of our model. We emphasize the importance of a short term “compensating” effect on switching costs. When consumers switch in equilibrium, firms offset the costs of consumers that are switching into the firm. If switching costs are low, this compensating effect of switching costs causes even myopic firms to decrease prices. The incentive to decrease prices is even stronger for forward looking firms.     

Uniform pricing effect: The influence of uniform pricing on product value judgement and purchase intention

Uniform pricing, which is a pricing strategy that sets a unified price for all products in the store or all products in the same category, is becoming increasingly popular over the past decades. However, scarce attention has been paid to investigating its impact on consumer behaviour. This research investigates the influence of uniform pricing on product value judgements and purchase intentions. Four studies demonstrate that uniform pricing (vs. non-uniform pricing) could induce stronger promotion perception, which leads to more positive product value judgements and purchase intentions. Moreover, price sensitivity and product involvement moderate this effect, and this effect only exists for high price-sensitive consumers and low product involvement consumers.     

Is transparency a good thing? How online price transparency and variability can benefit firms and influence consumer decision making

The internet has empowered consumers and changed the way they search and shop for products and services by increasing the availability and transparency of pricing and other comparative information. However, what is less clear from a managerial perspective is just how transparent pricing information should be. While it might seem that increasing price transparency would reduce consumer search, we find that it may actually increase search and delay. In this article, we review the use of firms’ application of price transparency in practice and propose that specific types of information can influence how transparent prices are to consumers, and how such transparency can influence consumer decisions in a way that is beneficial for the firm. We focus on a specific form of transparency: whether or not the consumer knows the range of pricing. We also discuss whether a high variability pricing approach versus a low variability pricing approach influences consumer decision making—and whether this influence is moderated by transparency.     

Quality signaling via strikethrough prices

Why do firms often advertise their current price together with their past price? Although consumers expect high quality products to have high prices, such firms may optimally charge lower prices when faced with low production costs. Thus in markets in which quality is difficult to ascertain and costs often fall over time, for example technology products, high quality firms may face a challenge of signaling their quality through current price alone. In this paper we develop a price signaling model in which uninformed consumers draw inference not only from the current price but also the prior period's price (the “strikethrough price”) if the firm chooses to disclose it. We find that a high quality firm benefits from using strikethrough pricing when the prior probability of high quality is relatively low while the probability of costs falling is relatively high.     

The price is right? Guidelines for pricing to enhance profitability

Pricing is a key element of the marketing strategy. It does not require significant investments or resources, and is perhaps the most accessible lever to manage profitability. Even minor fluctuations in pricing can have a significant impact on both revenues and profitability. As such, lack of careful planning in pricing is a wasted opportunity. With this as a backdrop, we make a case for precision in pricing to enhance profitability. Since consumers vary in their preferences, motivations, and propensity to spend, they assign varying degrees of emphasis regarding price upon their purchase decisions. We argue that pricing is a creative exercise in math and behavioral economics, and companies should stay focused on profits. We also provide a series of guidelines for creating effective base prices, and then modifying them to enhance profitability. Finally, monitoring prices at the transaction level will reduce leakage in profits and further add to the bottom line.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Intertemporal price discrimination with forward-looking consumers: Application to the US market for console video-games

Firms in durable good product markets face incentives to intertemporally price discriminate, by setting high initial prices to sell to consumers with the highest willingness to pay, and cutting prices thereafter to appeal to those with lower willingness to pay. A critical determinant of the profitability of such pricing policies is the extent to which consumers anticipate future price declines, and delay purchases. I develop a framework to investigate empirically the optimal pricing over time of a firm selling a durable-good product to such strategic consumers. Prices in the model are equilibrium outcomes of a game played between forward-looking consumers who strategically delay purchases to avail of lower prices in the future, and a forward-looking firm that takes this consumer behavior into account in formulating its optimal pricing policy. The model outlines first, a dynamic model of demand incorporating forward-looking consumer behavior, and second, an algorithm to compute the optimal dynamic sequence of prices given these demand estimates. The model is solved using numerical dynamic programming techniques. I present an empirical application to the market for video-games in the US. The results indicate that consumer forward-looking behavior has a significant effect on optimal pricing of games in the industry. Simulations reveal that the profit losses of ignoring forward-looking behavior by consumers are large and economically significant, and suggest that market research that provides information regarding the extent of discounting by consumers is valuable to video-game firms.

To Groupon or not to Groupon: The profitability of deep discounts

We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a relatively new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating firms’ goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms whereby a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated firms: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers with access to vouchers must generally be lower than those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers tends to be more profitable for firms that are patient or relatively unknown, and for firms with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of firm price reoptimization and multiple voucher purchases. We find potential benefits of online discount vouchers to certain firms in certain circumstances, but vouchers are likely to increase firm profits under relatively narrow conditions.     

Mixed pricing in online marketplaces

A rich theory literature predicts mixed strategies in posted prices due to standard price discrimination, search frictions, and various other rationales. While typically interpreted as implying occasional sales or price dispersion, online marketplaces enable a firm to truly use randomization as a tool in pricing, and so such behavior should be expected to arise in online settings. We investigate a case of mixed pricing across a large subset of products on a major e-commerce website. We first test for randomizing behavior, and then construct a model of price discrimination that would generate randomization as optimal behavior. We estimate the model and use it to assess pricing effects of a proposed merger in the industry.     

Upgrade pricing, market growth, and social welfare

This paper studies the monopolist's dynamic pricing strategy when introducing successive generations of a durable product. We show that when consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified and the innovation is minor, the firm always offers an upgrade discount to former customers. However, the discount depends only on the quality of the old product. In contrast, for moderate and major innovations, the discount depends on the qualities and costs of both the old and the new products. The market growth rate affects the firm's pricing strategy only if consumers are anonymous; furthermore, the effect on prices depends on the discount rate and whether the market growth rate is high or low. For minor innovations, social welfare is maximized if consumers are anonymous. An interesting and paradoxical result is that, when innovations are moderate or major and consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified, price discrimination can actually lead to higher social welfare.     

Increasing Price Transparency: Implications of Consumer Price Posting for Consumers' Haggling Behavior and a Seller's Pricing Strategies

In an attempt to gain a better position in haggling, consumers often seek a seller's pricing information (e.g., whether the posted price is negotiable, the discount and transaction prices) before going to that seller. Although traditionally difficult to obtain, such information is becoming increasingly available due to consumer price posting (CPP), whereby consumers post and share their purchase price information on the Internet. In this analytical study, we consider a market in which a seller, who chooses between a fixed price policy and a haggling policy, serves two types of consumers who differ in their willingness to pay and haggling costs. We explore how CPP can affect consumers' behavior and the seller's pricing strategies (i.e., pricing policy and the associated prices). In the absence of CPP, our model features a two-sided uncertainty: the seller does not know individual consumer's type and thus may find it optimal to use a haggling policy to price discriminate consumers, whereas consumers do not readily observe the seller's cost type and pricing policy, and thus are uncertain whether their haggling will be fruitful. In the presence of CPP, consumers' uncertainty about the seller's pricing policy is resolved. Because CPP can improve price transparency, inhibit consumers' acceptance of a posted price and spur price haggling, it seems apparent that it should benefit consumers and hurt the seller. However, our analysis shows that CPP can lead to fewer purchases, higher prices and even a greater seller profit. It further shows that although CPP surely increases information accessibility, it can also reduce the amount of information available to consumers. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom in the literature.     

Weathering consumer pricing sensitivity: The importance of customer contact and personalized services in the financial services industry

In a low-cost switching environment, certain firm actions undertaken by service employees can improve consumer loyalty, satisfaction and reduce price sensitivity. Interestingly, consumers' satisfaction levels can actually increase when experiencing a price increase. Counterintuitively, when consumers experience a price decrease, their loyalty decreases, suggesting that it might be in the firm's best interest to not offer such pricing discounts as these customers may be hypersensitive to price. Overall, it appears much easier for service employees to positively influence customer satisfaction than customer loyalty; satisfied consumers do not necessarily become loyal consumers.