Why good projects fail anyway

Big projects fail at an astonishing rate--more than half the time, by some estimates. It's not hard to understand why. Complicated long-term projects are customarily developed by a series of teams working along parallel tracks. If managers fail to anticipate everything that might fall through the cracks, those tracks will not converge successfully at the end to reach the goal. Take a companywide CRM project. Traditionally, one team might analyze customers, another select the software, a third develop training programs, and so forth. When the project's finally complete, though, it may turn out that the salespeople won't enter in the requisite data because they don't understand why they need to. This very problem has, in fact, derailed many CRM programs at major organizations. There is a way to uncover unanticipated problems while the project is still in development. The key is to inject into the overall plan a series of miniprojects, or "rapid-results initiatives," which each have as their goal a miniature version of the overall goal. In the CRM project, a single team might be charged with increasing the revenues of one sales group in one region by 25% within four months. To reach that goal, team members would have to draw on the work of all the parallel teams. But in just four months, they would discover the salespeople's resistance and probably other unforeseen issues, such as, perhaps, the need to divvy up commissions for joint-selling efforts. The World Bank has used rapid-results initiatives to great effect to keep a sweeping 16-year project on track and deliver visible results years ahead of schedule. In taking an in-depth look at this project, and others, the authors show why this approach is so effective and how the initiatives are managed in conjunction with more traditional project activities.     

Campaigning for change

Most organizations must change if they're to stay alive. Change is tough to accomplish, but it's not impossible and can be systematized. The author, who has been involved in change initiatives at scores of companies, believes that the success of such programs has more to do with execution than with conceptualization. The successful change programs he observed had one thing in common: They employed three distinct but linked campaigns--political, marketing, and military. The author cites examples from such companies as Hewlett-Packard, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Saturn to illustrate how effective such campaigns can be. A political campaign creates a coalition strong enough to support and guide the initiative. Sometimes, coalitions arise from changes to a company's formal structure. But they may come out of the informal structure, or they could stem from a temporary counterstructure. A marketing campaign must go beyond simply publicizing the initiative's benefits. It focuses on listening to ideas that bubble up from the field as well as on working with lead customers to design the initiative. A clearly articulated theme for the transformation program must also be developed. A military campaign deploys executives' scarce resources of attention and time. Successful executives secure their supply lines by, for instance, piggybacking onto initiatives that have already captured people's interests or already exist as bootleg projects. These managers also set up pilot projects that turn into beachheads because the projects expose them to the difficult dynamics they will ultimately face. Successful executives launch all three campaigns simultaneously. The three always feed on one another, and if any one campaign is not properly implemented, the change initiative is bound to fail.     

Ethical breakdowns

Companies are spending a great deal of time and money to install codes of ethics, ethics training, compliance programs, and in-house watchdogs. If these efforts worked, the money would be well spent. But unethical behavior appears to be on the rise. The authors observe that even the best-intentioned executives may be unaware of their own or their employees' unethical behavior. Drawing from extensive research on cognitive biases, they offer five reasons for this blindness and suggest what to do about them. Ill-conceived goals may actually encourage negative behavior. Brainstorm unintended consequences when devising your targets. Motivated blindness makes us overlook unethical behavior when remaining ignorant would benefit us. Root out conflicts of interest. Indirect blindness softens our assessment of unethical behavior when it's carried out by third parties. Take ownership of the implications when you outsource work. The slippery slope mutes our awareness when unethical behavior develops gradually. Be alert for even trivial infractions and investigate them immediately. Overvaluing outcomes may lead us to give a pass to unethical behavior. Examine good outcomes to ensure they're not driven by unethical tactics.     

Desperately seeking synergy

Corporate executives have strong biases in favor of synergy, and those biases can lead them into ill-advised attempts to force business units to cooperate--even when the ultimate benefits are unclear. But executives can separate the real opportunities from the mirages, say Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell. They simply need to take a more disciplined approach to synergy. These biases take four forms. First comes the synergy bias, which leads executives to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of synergy. Then comes the parenting bias, a belief that synergy will be captured only by cajoling or compelling business units to cooperate. The parenting bias is usually accompanied by the skills bias--the assumption that whatever know-how is required to achieve synergy will be available within the organization. Finally, executives fall victim to the upside bias, which causes them to concentrate so hard on the potential benefits of synergy that they overlook the possible downside risks. In combination, these four biases make synergy seem more attractive and more easily achievable than it truly is. As a result, corporate executives often launch initiatives that ultimately waste time and money and sometimes even severely damage their businesses. To avoid such failures, executives need to subject all synergy opportunities to a clear-eyed analysis that clarifies the benefits to be gained, examines the potential for corporate involvement, and takes into account the possible downsides. Such a disciplined approach will inevitably mean that fewer initiatives will be launched. But those that are pursued will be far more likely to deliver substantial gains.     

Effects of the institutional environment on public-private partnership (P3) projects: Evidence from Canada

The purpose of this paper is to understand the effects of the institutional environment on project outcomes in order to contribute to the accumulating accounting literature on P3s. Based on an empirical study of Alberta’s institutional environment, using Edmonton’s Anthony Henday Highway P3 projects, we analyze how the: a) political environment enables or disenables P3 outcomes; b) policy/business environment impacts project development and implementation; and c) organizational capacity affects P3 outcomes and vice versa.Adopting a neo-institutionalism perspective and a case study approach, we investigate the effects of the institutional environment on P3 project outcomes. This research is based on 35 semi-structured interviews of public sector executive managers, political actors, senior industry executives, project consultants/advisors, labour union, media specialists, community advocates and public policy analysts in the P3 industry who participated in Alberta’s P3 projects from 2004 to 2016.We find that the institutional environment has significant influence on project performance, and program permanence/continuity. Our study suggests that P3 enabling environments present: 1) relevant P3 policy measures and committed political support by field actors; 2) a path-dependent response to project outcomes; and 3) institutional environment elements that are mutually re-enforcing with synergistic effects.In effect, we document that a strong political leadership support for P3s, a favourable policy environment, and effective organizational capacity are pre-requisite factors for the successful implementation of P3s. Given the unsettled debate about various methodological approaches to value for money (VfM) determination for assessing P3s, we are unsure whether our findings are partly influenced by inconsistent accounting standards for P3s across jurisdictions.Our study highlights critical P3 enabling attributes that would be beneficial to accounting researchers interested in institutional environment studies and co-operative arrangements, accountants, public sector policy managers, regulators, and private sector partners saddled with the task of developing and implementing P3 projects in various institutional and/or contextual settings.     

Extreme negotiations

CEOs and other senior executives must make countless complex, high-stakes deals across functional areas and divisions, with alliance partners and critical suppliers, and with customers and regulators. The pressure of such negotiations may make them feel a lot like U.S. military officers in an Afghan village, fending off enemy fire while trying to win trust and get intelligence from the local populace. Both civilian and military leaders face what the authors call "dangerous negotiations," in which the traps are many and good advice is scarce. Although the sources of danger are quite different for executives and officers, they resort to the same kinds of behaviors. Both feel pressure to make quick progress, project strength and control (particularly when they have neither), rely on force rather than collaboration, trade resources for cooperation rather than build trust, and make unwanted compromises to minimize potential damage. The authors outline five core strategies that "in extremis" military negotiators use to resolve conflicts and influence others: maintaining a big-picture perspective; uncovering hidden agendas to improve collaboration; using facts and fairness to get buy-in; building trust; and focusing on process as well as outcomes. These strategies provide an effective framework that business executives can use to prepare for a negotiation and guide their moves at the bargaining table.     

Growing talent as if your business depended on it

Traditionally, corporate boards have left leadership planning and development very much up to their CEOs and human resources departments-primarily because they don't perceive that a lack of leadership development in their companies poses the same kind of threat that accounting blunders or missed earnings do. That's a shortsighted view, the authors argue. Companies whose boards and senior executives fail to prioritize succession planning and leadership development end up experiencing a steady attrition in talent and becoming extremely vulnerable when they have to cope with inevitable upheavals- integrating an acquired company with a different operating style and culture, for instance, or reexamining basic operating assumptions when a competitor with a leaner cost structure emerges. Firms that haven't focused on their systems for building their bench strength will probably make wrong decisions in these situations. In this article, the authors explain what makes a successful leadership development program, based on their research over the past few years with companies in a range of industries. They describe how several forward-thinking companies (Tyson Foods, Starbucks, and Mellon Financial, in particular) are implementing smart, integrated, talent development initiatives. A leadership development program should not comprise stand-alone, ad hoc activities coordinated by the human resources department, the authors say. A company's leadership development processes should align with strategic priorities. From the board of directors on down, senior executives should be deeply involved in finding and growing talent, and line managers should be evaluated and promoted expressly for their contributions to the organization-wide effort. HR should be allowed to create development tools and facilitate their use, but the business units should take responsibility for development activities, and the board should ultimately oversee the whole system.     

Brealey,Myers, and Allen on Real Options

Real options are valuable sources of flexibility that are either inherent in, or can be built into, corporate assets. The value of such options are generally not captured by the standard discounted cash flow (DCF) approach, but can be estimated using a variant of financial option pricing techniques. This article provides an overview of the basics of real option valuation by examining four important kinds of real options:

• 1 The option to make follow‐on investments. Companies often cite “strategic” value when taking on negative‐NPV projects. A close look at the payoffs from such projects reveals call options on follow‐on projects in addition to the immediate cash flows from the projects. Today's investments can generate tomorrow's opportunities.
• 2 The option to wait (and learn) before investing. This is equivalent to owning a call option on the investment project. The call is exercised when the firm commits to the project. But often it's better to defer a positive‐NPV project in order to keep the call alive. Deferral is most attractive when uncertainty is great and immediate project cash flows—which are lost or postponed by waiting—are small.
• 3 The option to abandon. The option to abandon a project provides partial insurance against failure. This is a put option; the put's exercise price is the value of the project's assets if sold or shifted to a more valuable use.
• 4 The option to vary the firm's output or its production methods. Companies often build flexibility into their production facilities so that they can use the cheapest raw materials or produce the most valuable set of outputs. In this case they effectively acquire the option to exchange one asset for another.

The authors also make the point that, in most applications, real‐option valuation methods are a complement to, not a substitute for, the DCF method. Indeed DCF, which is best suited to and usually sufficient for safe investments and “cash cow” assets, is typically the starting point for real‐option analyses. In such cases, DCF is used to generate the values of the “underlying assets”—that is, the projects when viewed without their options or sources of flexibility.     

Open-market innovation

Companies in many industries are feeling immense pressure to improve their ability to innovate. Even in these tough economic times, executives have pushed innovation initiatives to the top of their priority lists, but they know that the best ideas aren't always coming out of their own R&D labs. That's why a growing number of companies are exploring the idea of open-market innovation--an approach that uses tools such as licensing, joint ventures, and strategic alliances to bring the benefits of free trade to the flow of new ideas. For instance, when faced with the unanticipated anthrax scare last fall, Pitney Bowes had nothing in its R&D pipeline to help its customers combat the deadly spores. So it sought help from outside innovators to come up with scanning and imaging technologies that could alert its customers to tainted letters and packages. And Dow Chemical and Cargill jointly produced a new form of plastic derived from plant starches--a breakthrough product that neither company could have created on its own. In this article, Bain consultants Darrell Rigby and Chris Zook describe the advantages and disadvantages of open-market innovation and the ways some companies are using it to gain competitive advantage. By importing ideas from the outside, the authors say, companies can collect more and better ideas from different kinds of experts. Creative types within a company will stick around longer if they know their ideas will eventually find a home--as internal R&D projects or as concepts licensed to outside buyers. Exporting ideas also gives companies a way to measure an innovation's real value. However, the authors warn against entering into open-market innovation without properly structuring deals: Xerox and TRW virtually gave away their innovations and had to stand by while other companies capitalized on them.     

The four faces of mass customization

Virtually all executives today recognize the need to provide outstanding service to customers. Focusing on the customer, however, is both an imperative and a potential curse. In their desire to become customer driven, many companies have resorted to inventing new programs and procedures to meet every customer's request. But as customers and their needs grow increasingly diverse, such an approach has become a surefire way to add unnecessary cost and complexity to operations. Companies around the world have embraced mass customization in an attempt to avoid those pitfalls. Readily available information technology and flexible work processes permit them to customize goods or services for individual customers in high volumes at low cost. But many managers have discovered that mass customization itself can produce unnecessary cost and complexity. They are realizing that they did not examine thoroughly enough what kind of customization their customers would value before they plunged ahead. That is understandable. Until now, no framework has existed to help managers determine the type of customization they should pursue. James Gilmore and Joseph Pine provide managers with just such a framework. They have identified four distinct approaches to customization. When designing or redesigning a product, process, or business unit, managers should examine each approach for possible insights into how to serve their customers best. In some cases, a single approach will dominate the design. More often, however, managers will need a mix of some or all of the four approaches to serve their own particular set of customers.     

Changing the way we change

More and more companies struggle with growing competition by introducing improvements into every aspect of performance. But the treadmill keeps moving faster, the companies keep working harder, and results improve slowly or not at all. The problem here is not the improvement programs. The problem is that the whole burden of change typically rests on so few people. Companies achieve real agility only when every function and process--when every person--is able and eager to rise to every challenge. This type and degree of fundamental change, commonly called revitalization or transformation, is what many companies seek but rarely achieve because they have never before identified the factors that produce sustained transformational change. The authors identify three interventions that will restore companies to vital agility and then keep them in good health: incorporating employees fully into the principal business challenges facing the company, leading the organization in a different way in order to sharpen and maintain incorporation and constructive stress, and instilling mental disciplines that will make people behave differently and then help them sustain their new behavior. The authors discovered these basic sources of revitalization by tracking the change efforts of Sears, Roebuck & Company, Royal Dutch Shell, and the United States Army. The organizations used these interventions to alter the way their people experienced their own power and identity, as well as the way they dealt with conflict and learning. As at Sears, Shell, and the U.S. Army, any major shift in those four elements will create a landmark shift in any organization's operating state or culture.     

How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results

Companies, investors, and regulators around the world are now seeking to tie executives' payoffs to long-term results and avoid rewarding executives for short-term gains. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of top executives' pay, the authors analyze how such compensation should best be structured to provide executives with incentives to focus on long-term value creation.
To improve the link between equity compensation and long-term results, the authors recommend that executives be prevented from unwinding their equity incentives for a significant time period after vesting. At the same time, however, the authors suggest that it would be counterproductive to require that executives hold their equity incentives until retirement, as some have proposed. Instead, the authors recommend that companies adopt a combination of "grant-based" and "aggregate" limitations on the unwinding of equity incentives.
Grant-based limitations would allow executives to unwind the equity incentives associated with a particular grant only gradually after vesting, according to a fixed, pre-specified schedule put in place at the time of the grant. Aggregate limitations on unwinding would prevent an executive from unloading more than a specified fraction of the executive's freely disposable equity incentives in any given year.
Finally, the authors emphasize the need for effective limitations on executives' use of hedging and derivative transactions that would weaken the connection between executive payoffs and long-term stock values that a well-designed equity arrangement should produce.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Mapping your innovation strategy

In the complex sport of American football, teams rely on playbooks as thick as the Manhattan phone directory. But when it comes to creating innovative growth businesses-which is at least as complicated as professional football--most companies have not developed detailed game plans. Indeed, many managers have concluded that a fog enshrouds the world of innovation, obscuring high-potential opportunities. The authors believe that companies can penetrate that fog by developing growth strategies based on disruptive innovations, as defined by Clayton Christensen. Such innovations conform to a pattern: They offer an entirely new solution; they perform adequately along traditional dimensions and much better along other dimensions that matter more to target customers; and they are not initially appealing to powerful incumbents. Companies can develop customized checklists, or playbooks, by combining this basic pattern with analysis of major innovations in their markets. The key early on is to focus not on detailed financial estimates--which will always guide companies toward the markets most hostile to disruptive innovations--but on how well the innovation fits the pattern of success. It's also crucial to encourage flexibility: Companies must be willing to kill projects that are going nowhere, exempt innovations from standard development processes, and avoid burdening project teams with extra financing, which can keep them heading in the wrong direction. Companies can create competitive advantage by becoming champions at defining the pattern of successful innovations and executing against it. But as that pattern becomes obvious--and others emerge-building a sustainable advantage on innovation competencies will again prove elusive.     

Creating project plans to focus product development

The long-term competitiveness of most manufacturers depends on their product development capabilities. Yet few companies approach the development process systematically or strategically. They end up with an unruly collection of projects that do not match long-term business objectives and that consume far more development resources than are available. Instead of working on important projects, development engineers spend their time fighting fires. Their productivity sinks, and products are invariably late to market. To attack development malaise and reinvigorate the process, companies should put together an "aggregate project plan." The plan helps managers restructure the development process so they no longer think in terms of individual projects but in terms of the "set" of projects. It is the set, not individual projects, that shapes the creation of a successful product line. The aggregate project plan also helps managers allocate resources, sequence projects, and build critical development capabilities. A central element of the aggregate project plan is the project map. The map categorizes projects into five types: breakthrough, platform, derivative, research and development, and partnerships. Each project type has its own unique characteristics and requires a different amount of development time. Companies should have projects in all categories to ensure a robust development process.     

Strategy under uncertainty

At the heart of the traditional approach to strategy lies the assumption that by applying a set of powerful analytic tools, executives can predict the future of any business accurately enough to allow them to choose a clear strategic direction. But what happens when the environment is so uncertain that no amount of analysis will allow us to predict the future? What makes for a good strategy in highly uncertain business environments? The authors, consultants at McKinsey & Company, argue that uncertainty requires a new way of thinking about strategy. All too often, they say, executives take a binary view: either they underestimate uncertainty to come up with the forecasts required by their companies' planning or capital-budging processes, or they overestimate it, abandon all analysis, and go with their gut instinct. The authors outline a new approach that begins by making a crucial distinction among four discrete levels of uncertainty that any company might face. They then explain how a set of generic strategies--shaping the market, adapting to it, or reserving the right to play at a later time--can be used in each of the four levels. And they illustrate how these strategies can be implemented through a combination of three basic types of actions: big bets, options, and no-regrets moves. The framework can help managers determine which analytic tools can inform decision making under uncertainty--and which cannot. At a broader level, it offers executives a discipline for thinking rigorously and systematically about uncertainty and its implications for strategy.     

Empowerment: the emperor's new clothes

Everyone talks about empowerment, but it's not working. CEOs subtly undermine empowerment. Employees are often unprepared or unwilling to assume the new responsibilities it entails. Even change professionals stifle it. When empowerment is used as the ultimate criteria of success in organizations, it covers up many of the deeper problems that they must overcome. To understand this apparent contradiction, the author explores two kinds of commitment: external and internal. External commitment--or contractual compliance--is what employees display when they have little control over their destinies and are accustomed to working under the command-and-control model. Internal commitment occurs when employees are committed to a particular project, person, or program for their own individual reasons or motivations. Internal commitment is very closely allied with empowerment. The problem with change programs designed to encourage empowerment is that they actually end up creating more external than internal commitment. One reason is that these programs are rife with inner contradictions and send out mixed messages like "do your own thing--the way we tell you." The result is that employees feel little responsibility for the change program, and people throughout the organization feel less empowered. What can be done? Companies would do well to recognize potential inconsistencies in their change programs; to understand that empowerment has its limits; to establish working conditions that encourage employees' internal commitment; and to realize that morale and even empowerment are penultimate criteria in organizations. The ultimate goal is performance.     

Delusions of success. How optimism undermines executives' decisions

The evidence is disturbingly clear: Most major business initiatives--mergers and acquisitions, capital investments, market entries--fail to ever pay off. Economists would argue that the low success rate reflects a rational assessment of risk, with the returns from a few successes outweighing the losses of many failures. But two distinguished scholars of decision making, Dan Lovallo of the University of New South Wales and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman of Princeton University, provide a very different explanation. They show that a combination of cognitive biases (including anchoring and competitor neglect) and organizational pressures lead managers to make overly optimistic forecasts in analyzing proposals for major investments. By exaggerating the likely benefits of a project and ignoring the potential pitfalls, they lead their organizations into initiatives that are doomed to fall well short of expectations. The biases and pressures cannot be escaped, the authors argue, but they can be tempered by applying a very different method of forecasting--one that takes a much more objective "outside view" of an initiative's likely outcome. This outside view, also known as reference-class forecasting, completely ignores the details of the project at hand; instead, it encourages managers to examine the experiences of a class of similar projects, to lay out a rough distribution of outcomes for this reference class, and then to position the current project in that distribution. The outside view is more likely than the inside view to produce accurate forecasts--and much less likely to deliver highly unrealistic ones, the authors say.     

Unleash innovation in foreign subsidiaries

In multinational corporations, growth-triggering innovation often emerges in foreign subsidiaries from employees closest to customers and least attached to the procedures and politeness of the home office. But too often, heavy-handed responses from headquarters squelch local enthusiasm and drive out good ideas--and good people. The authors' research into more than 50 multinationals suggests that encouraging innovation in foreign subsidiaries requires a change in attitude. Companies should start to think of foreign subsidiaries as peninsulas rather than as islands--as extensions of the company's strategic domain rather than as isolated outposts. If they do, innovative ideas will flow more freely from the periphery to the corporate center. Basing their arguments on a rich array of examples, the authors say that encouraging such "innovation at the edges" also requires a new set of practices, with two aims: to improve the formal and informal channels of communication between headquarters and subsidiaries and to give foreign subsidiaries more authority to see their ideas through. The challenge for executives of multinationals is to find ways to liberalize, not tighten, internal systems and to delegate more authority to local subsidiaries. It isn't enough to ask subsidiary managers to be innovative; corporate managers need to give them incentives and support systems to facilitate their efforts. The authors suggest four approaches: give seed money to subsidiaries; use formal requests for proposals as a way of increasing the demand for seed money; encourage subsidiaries to be incubators for fledgling businesses; and build international networks. As part of the last approach, multinationals also need to create roles for idea brokers who can link entrepreneurs in foreign subsidiaries with other parts of the company.     

Mastering the management system

Companies have always found it hard to balance pressing operational concerns with long-term strategic priorities. The tension is critical: World-class processes won't lead to success without the right strategic direction, and the best strategy in the world will get nowhere without strong operations to execute it. In this article, Kaplan, of Harvard Business School, and Norton, founder and director of the Palladium Group, explain how to effectively manage both strategy and operations by linking them tightly in a closed-loop management system. The system comprises five stages, beginning with strategy development, which springs from a company's mission, vision, and value statements, and from an analysis of its strengths, weaknesses, and competitive environment. In the next stage, managers translate the strategy into objectives and initiatives with strategy maps, which organize objectives by themes, and balanced scorecards, which link objectives to performance metrics. Stage three involves creating an operational plan to accomplish the objectives and initiatives; it includes targeting process improvements and preparing sales, resource, and capacity plans and dynamic budgets. Managers then put plans into action, monitoring their effectiveness in stage four. They review operational, environmental, and competitive data; assess progress; and identify barriers to execution. In the final stage, they test the strategy, analyzing cost, profitability, and correlations between strategy and performance. If their underlying assumptions appear faulty, they update the strategy, beginning another loop. The authors present not only a comprehensive blueprint for successful strategy execution but also a managerial tool kit, illustrated with examples from HSBC Rail, Cigna Property and Casualty, and Store 24. The kit incorporates leading management experts' frameworks, outlining where they fit into the management cycle.