Capital taxation,investment, growth,and welfare

This paper formulates a model of economic growth to study the effects of broad capital taxation (of profits, dividends, and capital gains) on macroeconomic outcomes in small open economies. A framework of exogenous growth permits modeling countries in transition to a country-specific steady state and to discern steady-state and transitory effects of shocks on economic outcomes. The chosen framework is amenable to structural estimation and, in view of the parsimony of the model, fits data on 79 countries over the period 1996–2011 well. The counterfactual analysis based on the estimated model suggests that capital-tax reductions induce positive effects on output and the capital stock (per unit of effective labor) that are economically significant and are accommodated within time windows of 5 years without much further economic response after that. The responses of economic aggregates are found to be relatively strongest to changes in corporate-profit-tax rates and weaker for dividend and capital-gains taxes.     

Firm-specific forward-looking effective tax rates

This paper computes effective (marginal and average) tax rates that account for bilateral aspects of taxation and, therefore, vary across country-pairs and years. These tax rates serve to estimate the impact of corporate taxation on outbound stocks of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) among OECD countries between 1991 and 2002. The findings indicate that outbound FDI is positively related to the parent and host country tax burden and negatively associated with bilateral effective tax rates. Relying only on unilateral (country and time variant) rather than on both unilateral and bilateral (country-pair and time variant) effective tax rates leads to biased estimates of the impact of corporate taxation on FDI.     

Bilateral effective tax rates and foreign direct investment

This paper computes effective (marginal and average) tax rates that account for bilateral aspects of taxation and, therefore, vary across country-pairs and years. These tax rates serve to estimate the impact of corporate taxation on outbound stocks of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) among OECD countries between 1991 and 2002. The findings indicate that outbound FDI is positively related to the parent and host country tax burden and negatively associated with bilateral effective tax rates. Relying only on unilateral (country and time variant) rather than on both unilateral and bilateral (country-pair and time variant) effective tax rates leads to biased estimates of the impact of corporate taxation on FDI.     

Machines,buildings, and optimal dynamic taxes

The effective taxes on capital returns differ depending on capital type in the U.S. tax code. This paper uncovers a novel reason for the optimality of differential capital taxation. We set up a model with two types of capital – equipments and structures – and equipment-skill complementarity. Under a plausible assumption, we show that it is optimal to tax equipments at a higher rate than structures. In a calibrated model, the optimal tax differential rises from 27 to 40 percentage points over the transition to the new steady state. The welfare gains of optimal differential capital taxation can be as high as 0.4% of lifetime consumption.     

Inflation and Growth: Impatience and a Qualitative Equivalence

This paper studies the role of an endogenous time preference on the relationship between inflation and growth in the long run in both the money-in-utility-function (MIUF) and transactions-costs (TC) models. We establish a qualitative equivalence between the two models in a setup without a labor–leisure tradeoff. When the time preference is decreasing (or increasing) in consumption and real balances, both the MIUF and TC models are qualitatively equivalent in terms of predicting a negative (or positive) relationship between inflation and growth in a steady state. Both a decreasing and an increasing time preference in consumption are consistent with the arguments found within the literature. While a decreasing time preference in real balances corroborates with empirical evidence, there is no evidence in support of an increasing time preference in real balances.     

On the optimal lifetime redistribution and social objectives: a multidimensional approach

We characterize optimal redistribution policy when there are differences not only in individuals’ productivities but also in their tastes towards the timing of consumption, i.e. some are patient and others impatient in consumption over the life cycle and this preference together with productivity is non-observable to government. We consider different social objectives and incorporate a novel approach taken in the spirit of Roemer (Equality of opportunity, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1998) and Van de Gaer (Equality of opportunity and investments in human capital, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1993). This approach applies a compromise between the principle of compensation and the principle of responsibility. We derive analytical expressions which describe the optimal distortion (upward or downward) in saving. As the multidimensional problems become very complicated, to gain a better understanding, we also numerically examine the properties of an optimal lifetime redistribution policy. We find support for a nonlinear tax/pension program in which impatient types are taxed at the margin, and patient low ability types are subsidized in their retirement consumption. Numerical simulations show quite big differences in terms of the levels of marginal tax rates between different social objectives, indicating that the optimal income taxation results are sensitive to the choice of the social planner’s goals.     

Exemption vs. Credit Method in International Double Taxation Treaties

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation.     

Dividend Imputation Systems in Industrialized Countries: An Examination of Relative Tax Burdens

Dividend taxation has been a controversial issue especially since the enactment of the 2003 U.S. legislation entitled “Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act” (JGTRRA). This paper presents taxonomy of dividend tax systems and illustrates dividend relief practices in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. None of the OECD countries follow the conduit (i.e., full imputation) system, and the classical system (where double taxation of dividends occurs) prevailed only in one country (Ireland) other than U.S. in 2003. Dividend imputation in most of the OECD countries is only partial and takes place at the shareholder level in the form of tax credit or split rate. The paper also demonstrates a method to compute the effective tax rates (corporate plus individual taxes) on dividends, and presents such rates for the OECD countries. In comparison with the average dividends tax rate of 39.6% in other OECD countries, the U.S. had a rate of 60.7%, which JGTRRA has brought down to 44.8%.     

The economics of interest rates

The paper looks at the behavior of investors in an economy consisting of a production process controlled by a state variable representing the state of technology. The participants in the economy maximize their individual utilities of consumption. Each participant has a constant relative risk aversion. The degrees of risk aversion, as well as the time preference functions, differ across participants. The participants may lend and borrow among themselves, either at a floating short rate, or by issuing or buying term bonds. We derive conditions under which such an economy is in equilibrium, and obtain equations determining interest rates.     

Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy

A two-sector trade model with specific factors and perfect international capital mobility is used to analyze the optimal mix of factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy that faces domestic or international constraints on its tax instruments. In the unconstrained benchmark case, the small country will tax specific factors and domestic consumption but chooses zero tax rates for a selective production tax (i.e., an origin-based commodity tax) and a source-based tax on capital income. When commodity taxation must follow a combination of origin and destination principles, then this mixed commodity tax rate will be positive and its production effects are partly compensated in the optimum by a capital subsidy. These international restrictions interact with domestic constraints when rents accruing to fixed factors cannot be taxed by a separate instrument, and a positive tax rate on capital serves as an indirect way of rent taxation.     

An empirical study of the impact of corporate taxation on the global allocation of foreign direct investment: a broad tax attractiveness index approach

The question of whether a country’s corporate tax regime has a significant influence on the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) into that country is an important consideration in the design of national tax policy. This is especially relevant today in view of the recent increase in the global mobility of capital and subsequent increase in the importance of FDI to nations’ economies. Although several prior quantitative studies have investigated the link between taxation and FDI, they have tended to be restricted in geographical scope and in their measure of taxation.This study constructs indices of “corporate tax attractiveness” for selected countries and then analyses the relationship between the indices and measures of the flow of FDI into those countries. The indices are constructed by obtaining evaluations from international investors and taxation experts on the various attributes of the tax systems of those selected countries. A significant positive relationship was found to exist between the indices and measures of FDI inflows, and between individual tax system attributes and those inflows, thus adding support to the supposition that host country corporate taxation influences the size of FDI inflows.     

Intertemporally Dependent Preferences and the Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation

The welfare cost of capital income taxation is analyzed utilizing intertemporally dependent preference operationalized using a variable rate of time preference. It is shown that if households exhibit increasing marginal impatience, then the welfare cost of capital income taxation is inversely related to the elasticity of the rate of time preference with respect to consumption. Therefore, the welfare cost of capital income taxation reported using time additive preferences may not be robust. Numerical examples show that the use of time additive preferences could result in the welfare cost of capital income taxation to be overestimated by as much as 25%.     

向数字巨头征税的新税制之三种制度安排——比较法视野下的分析

随着数字经济的发展,从前制定的税收原则已经不再适用,税基被侵蚀已经是各国之间的共识.事实上,国与国之间争夺的只是征税权,以便获得更高的税收收入.例如法国、英国强调用户所在地创造的价值,实际上是为了把税收留在境内,而美国对此政策的不满也反映了这样的政策会对其造成收入流失.于是各国纷纷推出诸如“补丁型”税制、“实质认定型”...     

Exploring Formula Allocation for the European Union

This paper explores the efficiency impacts of two methods of consolidated base taxation with formula allocation under consideration in the European Union. The first method, common (consolidated) base taxation (CCBT), would allow companies to choose a single tax base for their EU-wide operations. This tax base would be common throughout the participating member states. The second method, Home State taxation (HST), would also allow companies to choose a single tax base for their EU-wide operations. But, unlike with CCBT, the tax base would be defined according to the rules in the company's residence, or home, state. Thus, several different tax bases would exist within the EU. Both methods would use a common formula to distribute profits across countries. This paper finds that since countries continue to set corporate income tax rates, economic inefficiencies continue to exist under both methods. However, under HST, since the tax base differs according to residence, additional inefficiencies may arise depending on whether countries reduced their tax rates to combat the incentive for companies to relocate to locations with narrow tax bases.     

Migration,wages and income taxes

We analyze labor migration flows between two countries (regions) with different-sized populations and different levels of productive efficiencies to determine the effects of such flows on income taxation. The residents are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs, although they are otherwise identical. Each resident compares her post-tax revenue at home with that obtained abroad, including migration costs, and each country’s government maximizes tax receipts. We study the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wages and for any difference in the relative sizes of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium, whenever it exists, for any set of parameters, sizes and wage differentials. Finally, we show that equilibrium migration flows affect the level of income taxation in both the origin and destination countries.     

Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth: Searching for Hills among Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains

The historical path of gross domestic product (GDP) per capitain the United States is, except for the interlude of the GreatDepression, well characterized by reasonably stable exponentialtrend growth with modest cyclical deviations: graphically, itis a modestly sloping, slightly bumpy hill. However, almostnothing that is true of U.S. GDP per capita (or that of othercountries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment) is true of the growth experience of developingcountries. A single time trend does not adequately characterizethe evolution of GDP per capita in most developing countries.Instability in growth rates over time for a single country isgreat, relative to both the average level of growth and thevariance across countries. These shifts in growth rates leadto distinct patterns. While some countries have steady growth(hills and steep hills), others have rapid growth followed bystagnation (plateaus), rapid growth followed by decline (mountains)or even catastrophic falls (cliffs), continuous stagnation (plains),or steady decline (valleys). Volatility, however defined, isalso much greater in developing than in industrial countries.These stylized facts about the instability and volatility ofgrowth rates in developing countries imply that the explodingeconometric growth literature that makes use of the panel natureof data is unlikely to be informative. In contrast, researchinto what initiates (or halts) episodes of growth has high potential.     

Consumer Search,Incomplete Exchange Rate Pass‐Through,and Optimal Interest Rate Policy

This paper studies utility‐maximizing monetary policy in a two‐country economy with consumer search frictions. Search frictions provide a microfoundation for incomplete exchange rate pass‐through and international deviations from the law of one price (LOP). I show that optimal interest rate policy targets deviations from the LOP and acts to mitigate the effect of search frictions. In a quantitative setting, with internationally correlated technology and preference shocks, optimal policy generates positive cross‐country correlation of nominal interest rates.     

Determinants of Bilateral Effective Tax Rates: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries*

This paper identifies the relevant determinants of a company's effective tax burden. Thereby, we account for bilateral aspects of corporate taxation by calculating bilateral effective tax rates as proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1999 and 2003). The empirical evidence of a large panel of nearly 8,000 bilateral effective tax rates within the OECD suggests that country size is an important determinant of the effective tax rate. In line with the literature, bilateral tax rates with small host countries exhibit a smaller overall effective tax rate, despite the fact that larger countries are more likely to reduce the tax burden by means of tax treaties at the bilateral level. Further, we find that geographically remote countries impose higher taxes, whereas economic integration tends to reduce the extent of the bilateral effective tax burden.