An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery

Governments often allocate commodities at low prices and on a first-come-first-served basis (rationing by waiting), while bureaucrats who distribute the commodities usually take bribes. A model is developed to classify the efficiency implications of bribery, and socially optimal pricing schemes in rationing by waiting. If the rationed good and individual income spent on other goods (‘other’ income) are ‘complements’, then bribery may enhance allocative efficiency, and a ‘dual pricing’ scheme can augment social welfare. However, if the rationed commodity and ‘other’ income are ‘substitutes’, then bribery may not improve allocative efficiency, and distributing the rationed commodity free is socially optimal.     

How can a strong currency or drop in oil prices raise inflation and the black-market premium?

Based on the case of Venezuela, an oil exporter with a multiple exchange rate regime, this paper explains two counterintuitive phenomena. First, a fall in oil revenue can drive a steep rise in inflation by reducing foreign exchange for imports and raising the fiscal deficit financed by money growth. Second, when foreign exchange is rationed, a devaluation of the official exchange rate could produce a transitory fall in inflation by reducing the fiscal deficit and subsidies for buying foreign exchange. The paper also shows that the black market exchange rate can be rising far faster than overall inflation if it is driven by prices in the most distorted goods markets. The channels emphasized in this paper for determining inflation and the black market exchange rate are novel in the literature and may provide avenues of future research on commodity exporters and foreign exchange constraints.     

Fixed price equilibria in a multifirm model

In a simple temperary equilibrium model with three commodities (labour, goods and money) and two sectors, there are different firms, each having its own production function. There now exist four types of fixed price equilibria (Keynesian, classical, repressed inflation, undercounsumption). In the last type, consumers are not rationed, some producers are rationed on the goods market, and other producers on the labour market. There exist three different aggregate production functions, that have to be applied in Keynesian, classical, and repressed inflation situations respectively. For the fourth case no aggregate production function exists.     

The dual pricing system in China's industry

Since February 1985, China has permitted producer goods exchange at two different prices: a state-set price, for centrally rationed supplies, and a higher free-market price. The paper describes the origins of this system and its development from 1981 to 1985. The authors argue that its disadvantages outweigh its advantages, but that it is acceptable as a temporary, transitional device. J. Comp. Econ., September 1987, 11(3), pp. 309–318. Economic, Technical, and Social Development Research Center, Beijing, China; Economic Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China.     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

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The theory of mixed demand functions

The properties of Samuelson's mixed demand functions, which express demand as a function of a mixed set of prices and quantities, are derived. By analyzing compensated (or substitution) effects and uncompensated effects, the relationships between mixed demand functions and conditional (or rationed) demands are examined. This provides insights on the behavioral implications of consumer theory for alternative demand specifications.     

The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market: a Note

Hillier and Worrall (1994) derived a surprising result that credit should be further rationed in the costly-monitoring credit-rationing equilibrium. This note shows that their result may be reversed if monitoring costs are endogenously determined.     

Italian households’ debt: the participation to the debt market and the size of the loan

This paper analyses Italian households’ participation to the debt market, separating the probability of demanding a loan from the probability of being rationed by lenders; on the supply side of the market specific attention is paid to enforcement costs of the loan contract when customers default. A new result is that the age of the household head acts essentially as a demand factor, rather than a variable influencing the lender’s choice. Both current and future households’ income increase the demand for loans and reduce credit rationing. Self-employed workers are more rationed by lenders. Credit constraints are also linked to the area where the household lives, partly because of different enforcement costs. The final part of the paper analyses the equilibrium quantity of the loan, for households who have a loan and are not constrained. The loan size is positively linked to household net wealth and income profile. An important contribution of this paper is the finding that, not only the participation to the debt market, but also the loan size is negatively affected by enforcement costs.      

Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means‐test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost‐effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their cost–benefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost‐effectiveness equilibrium than the means‐test equilibrium.     

Compensating for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence

We conduct experiments on common value auctions with rationing. In each auction, the good is randomly allocated to one of the k highest bidders, at the (k+1)st highest price. When k>1, bidders are rationed. As the degree of rationing increases, the equilibrium bid function increases. Consistent with prior literature, we find that bidders suffer from the winner's curse and lose money on average. However, bids in the experiments do adjust in the appropriate direction as the degree of rationing changes, providing support for the comparative statics implications of the theory. Our results are consistent with subjects having an intuitive understanding of the winner's curse, but being unable to compute the equilibrium bid levels.     

Market Failures in Real-Time Metering

Policies to promote real-time metering (RTM) require more than showing benefits from more timely responses to variations in cost. They require positive externalities to imply that too few meters would be installed through private transactions. RTM presents no systematic externalities when utilities must serve peak period users, and may present negative externalities under some conditions. Positive externalities are likely when electricity is rationed through blackouts. RTM may or may not increase welfare when peak period wholesale markets are not competitive; a prohibition on RTM might be appropriate in such situations even if metering itself were costless.     

A note on stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.'s model.     

The Borrower's Curse: Comment

This paper explores the implications of entrepreneurs holding biased perceptions about the probability of project success and/or the size of payoff if successful. When entrepreneurs are optimistic only about the probability of success credit is not rationed. Credit rationing can occur where optimists over-estimate payoffs.     

Fair imposition

We introduce a new mechanism-design problem called fair imposition. In this setting a center wishes to fairly allocate tasks among a set of agents whose cost structures are known only to them, and thus will not reveal their true costs without appropriate incentives. The center, with the power to impose arbitrary tasks and payments on the agents, has the additional goal that his net payment to these agents is never positive (or, that it is tightly bounded if a loss is unavoidable). We consider two different notions of fairness that the center may wish to achieve. The central notion, which we call k-fairness, is in the spirit of max-min fairness. We present both positive results (in the form of concrete mechanisms) and negative results (in the form of impossibility theorems) concerning these criteria. We also briefly discuss an alternative, more traditional interpretation of our setting and results, in the context of auctions.     

Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection

Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity. Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm. We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms) exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium. No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000     

Labour Tax Reform, the Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs

We analyse recent proposals to shift the tax burden away from low‐paid labour, assuming a dual labour market where the “good” high‐paying jobs are rationed. A shift in the tax burden from low‐paid to high‐paid workers has an ambiguous effect on the level of aggregate employment while the allocation of aggregate employment is further distorted. Even if the tax reform raises total employment, economic efficiency may be reduced because labour is reallocated from high‐productive to low‐productive jobs. We also find that opportunities for on‐the‐job search have important implications for the policy effects.     

Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

Informal employment in developing countries : Opportunity or last resort?

There is an ongoing debate among researchers and policy makers, whether informal sector employment is a result of competitive market forces or labor market segmentation. More recently it has been argued that none of the two theories sufficiently explains informal employment, but that the informal sector shows a heterogenous structure. For some workers the informal sector is an attractive employment opportunity, whereas for others - rationed out of the formal sector - the informal sector is a strategy of last resort. To test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we formulate an econometric model which allows for several unobserved segments within the informal sector and apply it to the urban labor market in Côte d'Ivoire.     

Econometric analysis of credit constraints of chinese rural households and welfare loss

Using recent survey data of Chinese rural households, we estimate the impact of credit constraints on Chinese rural households’ income and consumption. Results reveal that 71% of rural households are rationed in the credit markets. The credit constraints have significant negative effects on the income and consumption of rural households. The expenditures on education and medical treatments, the size of land holdings, household head education and the balance of financial capital all affect the demand of credit. Personal connections (relationship) are the most important determinate of the supply for credit.     

Noxious Facilities, Environmental Damages, and Efficient Randomized Siting

This paper considers the efficient siting of a noxious facility that causes environmental damages (for example, increased pollution) in the host community. The analysis shows that there can be multiple efficient locations without transfers, and that an efficient location need not have the smallest WTA or WTP. In general, there exist randomized outcomes that are ex ante efficient and that Pareto dominate efficient outcomes. The analysis also shows that a community’s most preferred lottery never provides full insurance. Under some conditions, lotteries with no host compensation are Pareto superior to those with compensation.