On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent. Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive form to the normal (or agent-normal) form of a game.     

New axioms for top trading cycles

The school choice problem is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota rationality, MBG-robust efficiency is weaker than robust efficiency, which is stronger than the combination of efficiency and group strategy proofness. The TTCM is characterized by MBG-quota rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. Our results construct a new basis to compare the TTCM with the other school choice mechanisms, in terms of both fairness and incentive-related axioms.     

Some remarks on ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results

An earlier work by Dutta and Sen provides characterizations of a set of decision rules for the ranking of opportunity sets. This paper begins by demonstrating the redundancy of one of the axioms in the said characterizations and goes on to analyze in detail one of the theorems, the Generalized Utilitarian rules theorem, which is incorrect. Basically, we find that one of the axioms that the authors provide is not in all cases satisfied for the Utilitarian rules. In this paper, we discuss this issue before proposing an alternative characterization which preserves the spirit of the original authors.     

On the properties of the Dickey-Pantula test against fractional alternatives

The limit properties of the testing sequence underlying the Dickey-Pantula test for a double unit root in a time series are derived when the true data generating process is assumed to be nonstationary fractionally integrated.     

On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

Probabilistic choice models often invoke a behavioral assumption referred to as the independence from irrelevant alternatives. The implications of this condition have not been fully developed in probabilistic choice contexts. It is well known that nonpathological preferences may not exhibit the independence from irrelevant alternatives, which is apparently an assumption of convenience; and the obvious question is then whether the assumption is very restrictive. This paper addresses this question. A common model of probabilistic choice is constructed. A measure of the likelihood that independence from irrelevant alternatives holds is seen to arise naturally in this model. Given this measure, it is demonstrated that the condition will almost always fail to hold.     

An agency model of search for alternatives

The agency model of organization is augmented by a sampling process in which the agent continues search as long as the expected marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. It is shown that even if the agent is risk neutral in money due to the form of compensation, he may behave either like a risk averter or a risk preferrer. Sufficient conditions are given for the rent contract to be Pareto-optimal in this environment; if the ‘dominant’ factor in the agent's utility function is his pecuniary income then the rent contract dominates all the fee functions for which the principal's income is not negatively correlated with the agent's effort.     

On some alternative criteria for justice between generations

This paper is concerned with Rawls' principle of just savings. Both the intergenerational maxi–min solution and the Nash equilibrium are analyzed in the context of a simple growth model and a specific preference structure. The results are compared to the Utilitarian solution. The maxi–min solution is intertemporally inconsistent and all the Nash equilibria are Pareto inefficient. The latter part of the paper analyzes intergenarational strong equilibria, the α-core and the β-core. It is shown that for the model in question the set of strong equilibria is empty, and that both the α- and β-cores are roughly speaking equal to the set of all Pareto efficient programmes of accumulation.     

On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria

It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called ‘strict equilibrium set’ and show the following. For a large class of evolutionary dynamics, including all monotone regular selection dynamics, every asymptotically stable set of rest points that contains a pure strategy combination in each of its connected components is a strict equilibrium set. A converse statement holds for two-person games, for convex sets and for the standard replicator dynamic.     

Fair ranking of teachers

Economic theory suggests that it is optimal to reward teachers depending on the relative performance of their students. We develop an econometric approach, based on stochastic frontier analysis, to construct a fair ranking that accounts for the socio-economic background of students and schools and the imprecision inherent in achievement data. Using German PIRLS (IGLU) data, we exploit the hierarchical structure of the data to estimate the efficiency of each teacher. A parsimonious set of control variables suffices to get a “fair” estimate of unobserved teacher quality. A Hausman–Taylor type estimator is the preferred estimator because teacher efficiency and some exogenous variables may be correlated.     

Riskiness for sets of gambles

Aumann–Serrano (J Polit Econ 116:810–836, 2008) and Foster–Hart (J Polit Econ 117:785–814, 2009) suggest two new riskiness measures, each of which enables one to elicit a complete and objective ranking of gambles according to their riskiness. These riskiness measures were created with a risky world in mind, but not an uncertain one. We apply similar arguments to models of decision under uncertainty and develop complete and objective rankings of sets of gambles, which arise naturally in many such models. Clearly, these results extend the previous riskiness measures, and they have a natural interpretation in terms of those measures even when uncertainty does play a significant role.     

A ranking of journals for the aspiring health economist

This article identifies and ranks 104 journals that might logically serve as the core for the interdisciplinary field of Health Economics. These journals are identified by analysing approximately 15 000 articles contained in the current CVs of 100 top health economists. Of the nearly 1200 journals spanned by these CVs, 104 journals were outlets for more than five of these top health economists. The 104 journals are ranked using eigenfactor and article influence scores as well as the percentile rank for each journal within its Institute for Scientific Information category. The primary intention is to create a broad-based journal list that exposes possible research outlets for aspiring health economists and to report the relative rankings of such outlets using established metrics.     

On the computation of stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria

Summary. In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game. Recieved: December 29, 1999; revised version: February 17, 2000     

A quantitative model for the evaluation of technological alternatives

This paper presents a quantitative model that may be of use to the national development planners, investment funding authorities, and entrepreneurs, who are confronted with the problems of choosing the appropriate technology among many available alternatives. The model provides a systematic and analyst-independent methodology for the multicriterion technology selection process, which requires consideration of socioeconomic as well as technological factors. The procedure is mathematically straightforward and has the capability of integrating both objective and subjective aspects of the evaluation process, resulting in a unified technology measure as a guide for decision making. A case study is presented to illustrate the applicability and workability of the development model.     

On the economics of immigration: some empirical evidence for Switzerland

The paper sheds light on the question of whether immigration represents a cost factor or an economic benefit for the host society. Starting with some conceptual issues of immigration research, it then gives some theoretical and empirical insights on this question. In particular, empirical evidence on the distributional effects of immigration is presented for Switzerland. Based on a large first-hand data set by the Swiss Statistical Office, this case study shows that in 1990, the presence of resident foreigners has not put additional strain on the public coffers, but that, on the contrary, there was a favourable financial effect for the native population. An overall judgement on the distribution issue, with special attention given to public goods and club goods, is thus possible.     

The relevance of irrelevant alternatives

In an experimental setting, subjects face a standard elicitation task for certainty equivalents. We show that when a third, objectively irrelevant, option is added to the standard task, the willingness to take risks increases.     

An ordinal ranking of economic institutions

We provide the first ranking of countries’ economic institutions using an ordinal methodology. Using the five areas of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index, we find that final rankings of a country’s institutions are sensitive to the importance-ordering of Area 1 (Size of Government). When Areas 2–5 are in the most important position, we find that there is no significant difference between the EFW rankings and our rankings. When Area 1 is placed in the most important position, however, a number of European countries with large welfare states but good governance do poorly.     

The unit root problem: Affinities between ergodicity and stationarity,its practical contradictions for central bank policy,and some consideration of alternatives

The initial focus in this article is the problem of mismatch between policy goals and statistical analysis, based on how data is transformed and processed. This intrinsically raises ontological issues regarding the nature of an economy within which policy is made and to which statistical analysis is applied. These are of general significance to post Keynesians irrespective of the position they take on the specifics of the ergodicity debate. However, they involve some issues that overlap with some aspects of that debate. The problem as posed in this article is specific and involves a practical contradiction regarding central bank policy and the problem of unit roots. The authors then consider some additional ways in which one can go beyond common practice based on the example of Forward Guidance in the United Kingdom and a more institutional approach to post Keynesian analysis.