Is parity good? Externalities in professional sports

In professional sports there are externalities. If one team acquires too much talent then that may impact the quality of the competition negatively. This means that the league can improve social welfare by distorting the competitive equilibrium allocation. This idea has been used to explain that there should be parity among teams to improve social welfare. We develop a theoretical model based on Biner's (2009) empirical results to capture the effect of this externality on the revenue levels and wages when local fans care about winning only. Social Planner's Problem for stadium revenues implies that it is possible to increase the total revenue made in the league compared to competitive equilibrium levels by increasing big market teams' talent level, therefore less parity. In other words due to externalities competitive market allocation is too equal compared to SPP allocation. We show when local audience is mainly interested in seeing their local team dominating the visiting team and national audience only interested in watching a close game on TV, the only way in the model for it ever to be efficient to enforce parity is if we introduce a national TV market into the analysis. For the national TV market, parity is going to lead to a wider TV audience. The greater the weight on this revenue stream, the more likely it is a parity policy can increase league revenues.     

Demand,innovation, and the dynamics of market structure: The role of experimental users and diverse preferences

The history of a number of industries is marked by a succession of eras, associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry concentration tends to grow. Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent uses, has the potential to become competitive. In many case new entrants survive and grow, and the large established firms do not make the transition. In other cases, the established firms are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era. This paper explores a model which generates this pattern and has focused on the characteristics of the demand. We argue that the ability of the new firms exploring the new technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively launched depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does not serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need to find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the new technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche markets, or experimental users, can provide that space.

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Franco MalerbaEmail:

     

Bargaining with subjective mixtures

This paper reconsiders the Bargaining Problem of Nash (Econometrica 28:155–162, 1950). I develop a new approach, Conditional Bargaining Problems, as a framework for measuring cardinal utility. A Conditional Bargaining Problem is the conjoint extension of a Bargaining Problem, conditional on the fact that the individuals have agreed on a “measurement event”. Within this context, Subjective Mixture methods are especially powerful. These techniques are used to characterise versions of the Nash and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions. This approach identifies solutions based only on the individuals’ tastes for the outcomes. It is therefore possible to do Bargaining theory in almost complete generality. The results apply to Biseparable preferences, so are valid for almost all non-expected utility models currently used in economics.     

Search cost,trading strategies and optimal market structure

The theory of Walrasian equilibrium yields a set of prices at which the aggregate competitive demand for each commodity equals its aggregate competitive supply. However, even at equilibrium prices the theory of competitive equilibrium does not explicitly offer explanation regarding the manner in which trades are actually executed. This paper considers a model where trade takes place in a decentralized fashion and examines in a dynamic game-theoretic framework, the role of social institution of money and markets in facilitating exchange. The steady state Nash equilibrium derived in the paper demonstrates how, depending on the level of transaction costs associated with a market setup (synonymously, trading posts to exchange possible pairs of goods) appropriate monetary trade emerges, which like a hub and spoke network (Starr and Stinchcombe, 1999) makes some markets non-functioning and in equilibrium only the markets having trade through the medium of exchange continue to exist. However, despite the obvious advantages of a market setup in reducing search costs, pure random search for a complementary trading partner (as considered by Ostroy and Starr, 1974; Kiyotaki and Wright , 1989; and others) prevails in many economies, especially, in many developing economies. This paper models this feature of developing economies by introducing differences in transaction costs across agents and shows why sustainable equilibria might exist exhibiting random search for certain commodities even in the presence of established markets.     

Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks

This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a suitably defined recursive equilibrium.     

A model with endogenously determined cycles, discounting and growth

Summary. This article reexamines the role of consumption in growth and emphasises the external effects of aggregate consumption, viewed as consumption standards, as an additional impediment in the growth process. These external effects raise the productivity of the individuals and are positively related to their valuation of the future. Conditions are established under which this results in a marginal value of wealth that is an increasing function of consumption. This brings new types of multiple steady states, local indeterminacies and cyclical motions. Imposing extra homogeneity restrictions, balanced growth solutions with endogenous impatience emerge. The possibility of multiple convergent paths is univocally related to endogenous discount effects. A comparison with a benchmark planning economy indicates an excessive value for the rate of time preference and emphasises its insufficient adaptation to future utility in a stationary setting. Discrepancies along the transition path that rest on endogenous impatience versus fixed discount appear in a non-stationary environment when the competitive balanced growth solution is indeterminate. Received: May 5, 1996; revised version: May 19, 1997     

Money,nonconvex preferences,and the existence of equilibrium: A note

Nonconvexities play a major role in several theories of money. This note suggests an additional such role. In particular, an economy is presented which fails to have a competitive equilibrium in the absence of fiat money. When fiat money is present, a steady-state competitive, equilibrium does exist and has the feature that money necessarily has value. This is because in any steady state, monetary equilibrium relative prices are bounded in such a way that the discontinuous portions of excess demand functions may become irrelevant.     

The estimation of profit efficiency

This article discusses a way of solving the ‘Greene Problem’ that has been termed for a technical difficulty in estimating a profit system with technical and allocative inefficiencies. As the ‘Greene Problem’ is due to the existence of unobserved technical inefficiency interactive in a nonlinear form, the article proposes a use of homogeneity in technology to untangle the nonlinear form, enabling the estimation of a profit system as well as the identification of the source of inefficiencies.     

Competitive strategies,innovation, and firm performance: an empirical study in a developing economy environment

This paper studies the relationships between competitive strategies, innovation, and firm performance within the context of Turkish manufacturing companies. The data were collected from top management of the firms via Computer Assistant Telephone Interviewing method. One hundred and forty manufacturing firms operating in various sectors including textile, automotive supply, computer and electronics provide the basis for this empirical research. In order to test our model, we employ structural equation modelling using partial least squares. The results show that competitive strategies such as cost-leadership and differentiation can lead to innovation, which, in turn, increase firm performance. Managers implement cost-leadership and differentiation strategies to take part in competitive market conditions; however, they should put additional importance on innovation that plays a significant role as a bridge between competitive strategies and firm performance.     

Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model

Summary. This paper analyzes the equilibrium growth paths of two economies that are identical in all respects, except for the organization of their financial systems: in particular, one has a competitive banking system and the other has a monopolistic banking system. In addition, the sources of inefficiencies, as a result of monopoly banking, and their relationship to the existence of credit rationing are explored. Monopoly in banking tends to depress the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock for either of two reasons. When credit rationing exists, monopoly banks ration credit more heavily than competitive banks. When credit is not rationed, the existence of monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit financed investment. Both of these have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. In addition, monopoly banking is more likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive banking. Finally, the scope for development trap phenomena to arise is considered under both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system. Received: September 20, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Exhaustible Resources,Non-Convexity and Competitive Equilibrium

Theoretical underpinnings of competitive equilibrium in an exhaustible-resource market with non-convex (u-shaped) costs are proposed. The analysis extends to intertemporal production Novshek and Sonnenschein’s approximation of static competitive equilibrium by limits of Cournot equilibria. A problem with using Novshek and Sonnenschein’s method is that oligopolistic equilibrium, even an open-loop equilibrium, to which limits might be applied, does not exist when there is a non-convex technology. Using epsilon equilibrium as the equilibrium concept finesses this problem. There are two types of limiting competitive equilibrium. A third type of competitive equilibrium that has been prominent in the literature is found to be inconsistent with limiting approximations.     

Cost Competition, Fragmentation, and Globalization

This paper proposes a model in which the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility is associated with endogenous fragmentation of the value–added chain. Fragmentation is the outcome of cost competition—the profit–maximizing choice of cost structure by monopolistically competitive firms. An expansion of the integrated trading area can induce globalization not only in the horizontal dimension associated with love–of–variety preferences, but also vertically as firms vary specialization of production stages. While increased trade is likely to induce fragmentation when the number of firms is fixed, free entry can either reverse or intensify this result.     

Kyou‐sou in the Nippon baseball leagues

There is a well‐established long‐term trend towards increased competitive balance in US major‐league baseball. Kyou‐sou (competing) in the Nippon leagues has been on a similar upward trend. Nippon baseball, however, has not undergone the substantive institutional changes that mark the major leagues. After accounting for some of the factors that might explain this upward trend and eliminating some other plausible explanations, it is concluded that the greater competitive balance that currently exists may be the outgrowth of management policies that work to the benefit of fans as well as owners.     

Pure numbers effects, market power, and tacit collusion in posted offer markets

This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no-power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in this design. Unilateral market power raises prices, as predicted. However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration. Excess capacity appears to explain observed tacit collusion levels.     

QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT*

The paper analyzes the phenomenon of industry-specific direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to defusing the threat of future protection by the host country (quid pro quo), under alternative imperfectly competitive market structures. It is established that, even in the absence of government intervention, firms in imperfectly competitive markets change the level of trade and DFI in response to future protectionist threats.     

The 'Sussex School' and the history of economic thought: British Intellectual History, 1750-1950

After a brief survey of the Japanese literature on Sraffa, the author explains how his own theory of the microfoundations of Keynesian macro-economics was influenced by Sraff's view of competitive markets. This view can be interpreted that firms perceive kinked demand curves. It is emphasized that Azariadis's theory of implicit contracts can explain unemployment only if we take Sraffa's not Walras's, view of competitive market.     

Trade liberalization,firm entry,and income inequality

This paper examines the short‐ and long‐run effects of trade liberalization via tariff reductions on income inequality in an economy, which is characterized by an imperfectly competitive urban manufacturing sector and a perfectly competitive rural agricultural sector. Tariff reductions reduce domestic output in the importable urban manufacturing sector, leading to shifts of capital from the urban sector to the rural agricultural sector. This can narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in the short run. However, the lowered capital cost attracts new firms, and subsequently excessive entry of firms, to the urban manufacturing sector. This firm entry effect can mitigate the favorable effect of tariff reductions on wage inequality in the long run. Empirical study confirms the findings.     

湖南省区域农业竞争力比较研究

从农业生产要素竞争力、农产品需求状况竞争力、农业经营主体竞争力和农业科技及政策竞争力等四个方面,选取11项指标构建了区域农业竞争力的评价指标体系,采用因子分析法对湖南省14个地级市的农业竞争力进行了综合评价。并将湖南省区域农业竞争力可划分为3种区域类型,结论可为制定区域农业发展改革提供借鉴。     

Species protection from current reserves: Economic and biological considerations, spatial issues and policy evaluation

The expansion of nature reserves is an important public policy strategy for the protection of biological diversity. In this paper, the authors use integer programming model structures derived from Location Set Covering Problem and Maximal Covering Location Problem approaches of location science as tools for selectively augmenting nature reserve sites for special status species protection. The linear programming models presented incorporate the following: biological constraints in the form of species' area needs; economic constraints in the form of opportunity costs of converting smaller administrative districts into nature reserves; and spatial constraints in the form of required connectivity among districts in site selection. The construction of a taxonomic data set for Thailand enables the implementation of the models, the comparison of results and evaluation of the differences in outcomes. The models build upon the existing nature reserve network in Thailand and suggest various public policy options that would augment the reserves for enhancing species protection and for possibly improving national conservation efforts at lowest costs.