Induced Institutional Change in the Trade and Environment Debate

Because of the assumption of constant emission factors, economy-environment models often show that free trade has negative environmental consequences. However, this pessimistic view ignores the possibility of trade strengthening the demand for regulatory institutions. An `institutional optimism hypothesis, stating that the net environmental result of trade liberalization is benign, is thus formulated in this paper. The hypothesis is examined with a CGE model that treats institutional change as an endogenous process dependent on income. Application to NAFTA, using a broad range of scenarios, provides some support for the institutional optimism hypothesis. The net pollution effect of trade liberalization is in many cases beneficial or low, even for the country specializing in polluting industries. The implication is that in many cases environmental interests are served better by a focus on institution building in trading partners, than on the process of trade liberalization itself.     

Is Tinkering with Institutional Quality a Panacea for Firm Performance? Insights from a Semiparametric Approach to Modeling Firm Performance

There is a large and growing literature on the impact of institutional quality on economic performance and the broad consensus is that “good” institutions facilitate better economic performance. The literature that provides micro‐level support for the policy discourse about institutional quality does not, however, account for significant intra‐country variation in reactions of firms to changes in business environments, even within the same industry, and it generally ignores the possibility that the impact of institutional quality on firm performance may not be neutral. In this paper, we analyze the impact of institutions on firm performance using an approach that enables us to overcome these problems with the stylized approach. Using cross‐country firm‐level data, we demonstrate that not only does the marginal impact of institutional quality vary significantly within countries, but also that the impact is economically significant only at the two extremes of the distribution. We view this as prima facie evidence that policies that tinker with institutional quality on the basis of the popular wisdom about the impact of these institutions on the average firm may not have the desired or expected impact, at least at the micro level.     

The institutional dynamics of early modern Eurasian trade: The commenda and the corporation

The focus of this article is on legal-economic institutions that organized early-modern Eurasian trade. It identifies two such institutions that had divergent dispersion patterns, the corporation and the commenda. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that did not migrate until the era of European colonization. The commenda that originated in Arabia migrated all the way to Western Europe and to China. The article explains their divergent dispersion based on differences in their institutional and geographical environments and on dynamic factors, claiming that institutional analysis errs when it ignores migration of institutions and providing building blocks for the modeling of institutional migration.     

Redistribution,trade and corruption: an empirical assessment

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of institutional quality in the trade and inequality nexus. Does corruption shape the relationship between trade and inequality through its impact on redistribution? Our answer to this question builds on the hypothesis that trade raises inequality and that governments may want to intervene through appropriate redistribution schemes that aim at taxing the gains from trade in a way that offsets the negative effects of trade on inequality. Moreover, we argue that this mechanism may be distorted by corruption and bad institutions in general. Quite to the contrary to common wisdom, we find that trade reduces inequality in countries with high institutional standards by means of a low level of corruption but increases inequality in countries with low levels of institutional quality.     

Trade liberalization and institutional reforms1

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the 1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the functioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE countries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non‐tariff barriers. The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between trade and institutions, and the pro‐trade effect of institutional similarity.     

Differences in the degree of unionization as a source of comparative advantage in open economies

This paper considers two integrated countries that differ only in their labour markets: one country hosts unions, whereas the other one pays competitive wages. These institutional differences are a source of comparative advantage, which crucially impact inter‐industry trade and welfare in the open economy. In this setting, deunionization exerts opposing welfare effects in the two economies. Increasing product market competition is beneficial for the unionized country and detrimental for its trading partner. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis that provides strong support for the main hypotheses of our theoretical model.     

Institutions and the financial development–economic growth nexus in sub-Saharan Africa

Using a sample splitting approach that does not impose an exogenous quadratic term, we examine the effect of financial development on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa by allowing the link to be mediated by the level of institutions. Our findings reveal a disproportionate growth-enhancing effect of finance, given countries’ distinct level of institutional quality. More specifically, when the International Country Risk Guide-based measure of institutions is used as the threshold variable, below the optimal level of institutional quality, financial development does not significantly promote economic growth. For countries with institutional quality above the threshold, higher finance is associated with growth. However, when institutions are measured by World Governance Indicators proxy, we find a significant effect of financial development, irrespective of whether a country is below or above the threshold. Interestingly, the growth-enhancing effect of finance is greater for low-institution countries relative to high-institution countries. Thus, through its ability to provide some crucial roles, the well-developed financial sector may also perform the function of sound institutions in influencing economic growth.     

International flows of people and institutional change

International travel clearly increases human interaction over space and exposes societies to foreign influences, foreign ideas, and foreign institutions. Does international travel promote institutional change in a traveler's home country? This paper uses panel data from 149 countries to test the hypothesis of institutional change stemming from international travel. We generally find that foreign travel does not affect political institutions. In one sub-sample, we find limited evidence that international travel can be a determinant of institutional quality in the home country depending upon whether the home country is an autocracy or democracy.     

The nexus of economic and institutional evolution

The current state of the development economics literature ascribes an indisputable central role to institutions. This paper presents a formal model of institutional evolution that is based on the dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions and economic development; the main features of the model is consistent with the fundamental theories that shed light to institutional evolution, namely the collective action and transaction cost theories, as well as dialectics. As informal institutional quality accumulates like technological know-how, while the level of formal institutional quality is chosen by the government to maximize welfare, subject to the economic and political costs. The solution of the model yields a punctuated trajectory of formal institutional evolution. Simulations reveal that the extent of diversity in informal institutional quality across a country delays formal institutional reforms. We also observe that, both the optimal quality of formal institutions and welfare are higher the more homogeneous is the country with respect to its informal institutions or the cultural attributes.     

中国自由贸易试验区（FTZ）：演变特征与深化趋势

建设高质量的中国自由贸易试验区,在我国改革开放进程中具有里程碑意义。本文在分析全球典型自贸区代表模式和制度特征的基础上,系统性总结中国自贸试验区的总体深化特征与趋势,以及各自贸试验区制度创新的差异,明确中国在自贸试验区建设改革中应发挥的使命。通过分析发现,中国自贸试验区发展存在四大主要问题,包括全球复杂局势带来的新挑战、自贸试验区建设侧重偏差、制度创新的立法保障缺位、高水平开放支撑动力不足,后续针对性提出了更好发挥自贸试验区作为高水平开放基点的制度创新对策,期望借此契机完善全国自贸试验区内部联动机制,尽快消除国内外经贸规则差异,为我国加快高质量自贸试验区的建设、加速高水平开放的实现,提供有益的经验启示。     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

Foreign direct investment: the role of institutional and cultural determinants

Using panel data for 29 source and 65 host countries in the period 1995–2009, we examine the determinants of bilateral FDI stocks, focusing on institutional and cultural factors. The results reveal that institutional and cultural distance is important and that FDI has a predominantly regional aspect. FDI to developing countries is positively affected by better institutions in the host country, while foreign investors prefer to invest in developed countries that are more corrupt and politically unstable compared to home. The results indicate that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries with less diverse societies than their own.     

The self-organisation of strategic alliances

This paper is based upon an analysis of various experiences of electronic commerce. It analyzes the role of private institutions in the organization of systems of transactions. Private institutions take place between public institutions (that are insufficiently specialized) and inter-individual governance structures (that do not benefit from scale and cognitive economies). These private institutions are very diverse and the paper points out the various types of services provided by diverse institutions depending on their constitutional mode.

While various possible institutional frameworks have very different features in terms of coordination, there is no most efficient institutional environment. Moreover, the emergence process of these institutional framework strongly influences their ability to survive. Very different institutional frameworks can therefore organize electronic trade quite differently in the various industries     

Institutional inequality and tax incidence

This paper analyses the effects of taxation when inequality is not innate. A theory of institutional inequality is presented which employs a trade model with circular production and the theory of clubs. Inequality is introduced by constraints on entry into sectors and ‘local’ groups within sectors. Individual time is treated as a fixed factor of production, and work and leisure are re-defined. The analysis suggests that when inequality is institutional and government policy does not alter the mechanisms by which institutions translate the distribution of power into the distribution of income, a redistribution of income by conventional tax-transfer schemes may not always be feasible.     

Contractual frictions and margins of trade

A recent body of work has shown that quality of national institutions that enforce written contracts plays an important role in shaping a country’s comparative advantage. The current paper contributes to this literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms through which institutional frictions affect the pattern of aggregate trade flow by distinguishing its effect on the intensive and extensive margins. We find that better contracting institutions not only increase the probability of exporting (the extensive margin) but also enhance the export sales after entry (the intensive margin), particularly in industries where relationship-specific investments are most important. With around two-third to three-fourth share (depending on the definition used), the contribution of institutions along the intensive margin dominates that along the extensive margin. The benefits of improved institutions, particularly via the intensive margin, favor the less developed countries over the more developed ones. In addition, better contracting institutions increase the probability of survival of export products in more contract-intensive industries in particular. These findings are robust to measuring the intensive and extensive margins using a more granular export data based on firm-level aggregates, as well as the variety and destination based definitions.     

Determinants of foreign direct investment

Empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity show substantial differences in specifications with little agreement on the set of included covariates. We use Bayesian statistical techniques that allow one to select from a large set of candidates those variables most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. The variables with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. There is little support for multilateral trade openness, most host‐country business costs, host‐country infrastructure and host‐country institutions. Our results suggest that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not robust.     

农村养老保障制度变迁分析

农村的养老保障制度正经历着一场变革。旧的以家庭养老为主的保障模式已突显出制度供需的不均衡,但新的有效率的农村社会养老保障制度至今尚未形成。其主要制约因素是现有改革方案的低效率和传统的非正式制度安排。建立农村社会养老保障制度,应继续采取强制性制度变迁方式,着重加大政府对建立农村社会养老保障制度的财政投入和推进力度,尝试发展产品换保障模式,并大力培育农民的社会养老保障意识,提高农民对社会养老保障的认同程度。     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

Trade and Renewable Resources in a Second Best World: An Overview

We provide an overview and introduction to the emerging field of trade and renewable resources, and discuss the potential impact of trade liberalization on welfare and resource conservation. A key factor determining the effect of trade reform is the institutional context or property rights regime, and our survey is organized such that it loosely follows the development of new insights with respect to institutions in this literature. This implies a transition from the benevolent planners model to the polar opposite benchmark of open access in the 1990s. Currently the pendulum is swinging back towards management and regulation, but institutions are treated as endogenous. We discuss and compare various key models in some detail and search for common ground between protagonists and antagonists of free trade. Paper based on Keynote address by Erwin Bulte, 12th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Bilbao (Spain), June 28–30, 2003.     

A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions

We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.