The effects of uncertainty on the roles of controllers and budgets: an exploratory study

This paper explores how contextual uncertainty and the use of the budgetary system explain cross-sectional variation in the organisational role of business unit controllers. We argue that there are complementarities between the role of the budgetary control system (i.e. coercive vs. enabling) and the role of the controller (i.e. corporate policeman vs. business partner). Thus, we explore both the direct effect of uncertainty on the role of the controller and the indirect effect through the role of the budgetary control system. Using survey data from 134 business unit controllers, we find that uncertainty provides a partial explanation of the variation in the role of budgetary control systems and in the role of controllers. In particular, our data suggest alignment between the coercive (enabling) use of the budgetary control system and the role of controllers acting as corporate policemen (business partners). These findings add to our understanding of the functioning of business unit controllers within their organisational context.     

Current trends in hospital mergers and acquisitions

Healthcare reform will impact hospital consolidation in three key areas: Payment rates will decrease, indirectly encouraging consolidation by forcing hospitals to find new ways to reduce costs and increase negotiating clout with suppliers and payers. The cost of doing business will increase as hospitals spend more on compliance, technology, and physician employment. The ACO model will encourage hospital network formation by rewarding integrated healthcare systems that can reduce costs and improve quality.     

The Rationale for Cost Allocation: a Study of UK Divisionalised Companies

This paper reports the results of an empirical study designed to examine how top management in divisionalised companies perceive central costs allocation for the purposes of performance evaluation. Data for the study were collected from senior management using a questionnaire survey. The empirical evidence shows that top management allocate costs to influence the behaviour of managers to take action in the best interests of the company as a whole. Following from this, top management perceive allocations as being likely to encourage the optimal utilisation of resources. However, top management perceive allocations as being unlikely to reduce both divisional managers' expenditure on perquisites and budgetary slack.     

Personality variables as predictors of budget system characteristics

Personality measures, perceptions of organizational climate, and attitudes toward the budgetary system were gathered from 97 operating executives with heavy budgetary responsibilities in 18 companies, along with data concerning the degree of rigidity or degree of participation in the budgetary system of each company. The personality traits of authoritarianism, need for independence, and flexibility were found to be correlated with the individual's perception of organizational climate and with certain attitudes toward the budgetary system. A discriminant analysis of these personality variables indicates that they have predictive ability concerning the rigidity or participativeness of the budgetary system but have no predictive ability concerning the individual's attitude toward the system.     

The moderating effects of hierarchy and control systems on the relationship between budgetary participation and performance

This study investigates the moderating effects that an organizational unit's hierarchical level and control systems have on the relationship between budgetary participation and performance. Using moderated regression analyses, we find a three-way interactive effect on performance between hierarchical levels, types of control systems, and budgetary participation. Further analyses reveal that at the high level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation has a positive relationship with performance and this relationship is stronger for organizational units that use output control than for those that use behavior control. By contrast, at the low level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation has a negative relationship with performance and this relationship is stronger for organizational units that use output control than for those that use behavior control.     

A Bangladesh soap opera: privatisation, accounting, and regimes of control in a less developed country

This paper reports an intensive case study of a soap manufacturing company in Bangladesh that was nationalised upon Bangladesh's independence in 1971 and privatised in 1993. Theoretically it is informed by Burawoy's contributions to labour process theory, especially how the consent of labour is manufactured through internal states, internal labour markets and games, and how regimes of control in less developed ex-colonial countries are transformed by state and production politics. How the role of accounting systems may shape and be shaped by these processes is traced. Nationalisation brought state attempts to manufacture consent by the methods described in Burawoy's depiction of hegemonic regimes. However, idealistic attempts to secure accountability, rational planning and control, and consent through bureaucratic means were subverted and transformed into a regime of political hegemony. Here control was secured by political interventions, often at the behest of trade unions, for party political rather than commercial ends. Detailed systems of accounting for control and accountability were maintained but became marginal, ritualistic, and de-coupled from operations. Privatisation brought changes consistent with Burawoy's prediction of coercive controls within a new despotic regime. New owners destroyed the internal state and internal labour markets and, following widespread redundancies, most workers were hired through internal subcontracting. The changes heightened worker divisions and rendered workers powerless to resist. Gaming was observed but this relieved the pressures of work intensification and proved functional to management. Significant changes to accounting controls were made. External reporting ceased in violation of legal requirements — financial accounting became the preserve of the owning family and was beset with irregularities. Budgets became more market oriented and were transmitted downwards in a physical form to reinforce coercive pressures upon managers and thence the shop floor. The paper concludes by relating the findings to a revised model of transformation of control regimes in Bangladesh     

Management accounting within world class manufacturing: a case study

This is a case study of a U.K. chemical company implementing World Class Manufacturing (WCM). In the late 1980s the company encountered serious problems due to the rapid contraction of major customers. It embarked on a programme of improving manufacturing introducing, inter alia, new quality programmes and computerized production controls including MRPII. Whilst these programmes were successful they failed to produce the turnaround sought. Faced with impending extinction, the managers sought external advice from consultants during a WCM workshop organized by government development agencies. Following this the company embarked on a benchmarking and strategic assessment exercise which diagnosed the company as unduly manufacturing oriented, poor on new product development and marketing, and insufficiently responsive to consumer needs. They adopted WCM principles embracing six broad objectives: customer responsiveness, employee involvement, quality, reduced lead-times, continuous improvement, and shop floor training for flexibility and problem solving skills. The implementation of WCM was successful: there was objective recorded evidence of improved performance against targets set in the WCM programme. Management accounting superficially appeared unaffected by WCM. The budgetary control system run by the accounting department remained intact. Product costing systems were not changed to incorporate Activity-Based drivers, as predicted in the literature. However, there was a marked decline in the influence of the accounting department, partly due to the cost module within MRPII. The accountant became dependent on production for cost data. Whilst his responsibilities continued to include the preparation of financial accounts and periodic budgets, cost management in terms of cost reduction, target setting, diagnosis and problem-solving came to lie with production. The suggestion of the case is that financial improvement may lie more with programmes of employee development and involvement, making the company more quality conscious, flexible and adaptive rather than in any redesign of costing systems. The implications of the research upon management accounting change debates are discussed in the concluding section.     

Coals from Newcastle: an evaluation of alternative frameworks for interpreting the development of cost and management accounting in Northeast coal mining during the British Industrial Revolution

How have the power and organisational effects of modern accounting systems developed? What is the appropriate theoretical framework for interpreting that development? Researchers in the ‘Neoclassical’ tradition of ‘economic rationalism’ focus on tracing how efficiently developments in accounting techniques, from the British Industrial Revolution (BIR) to the present, have been engineered to match the demands for new forms of rational economic management of emergent big business, while those adopting a ‘Foucauldian’ approach emphasise how it was that the emergence of new practices and knowledge-based discourses for calculating human performance, and for establishing new forms of human accountability, engendered the creation of the modern kind of business organisations through ‘disciplinary power’. To evaluate the relative merits of these two frameworks, we re-examine the primary archival evidence about managerial practices in the Northeast BIR coal mines. We focus on two unique features—the cadre of professional managers/consultants (the ‘viewers’) and the form of direct labour contract—since comparable features have been held to be significant in the rational economic development of sophisticated cost and management accounting techniques in other industries. We find that, while the records include sophisticated valuations of mines and calculations of technological efficiency, surprisingly absent, as compared with ‘modern’ accounting and managerialism, is any detailed measurement of human performance for setting piece rates and controlling production. Although our particular findings here could be explained within both the ‘Neoclassical’ and ‘Foucauldian’ theoretical frameworks, their consistency with the evidence being obtained from other historical sites further questions the adequacy of ‘economic rationalism’ to explain fully the genesis of modern management and the development of accounting's modern power.     

THE ART OF STRATEGIC DIVESTMENT

Divestiture makes sense only as part of a sound, long-term strategy. Before simply shedding business units, companies must consider all the options, and be willing to constantly review, replenish, and trim portfolios as markets change and evolve. In so doing, a company increases not only its flexibility but also its chances of adding shareholder value.
This article examines the corporate restructuring "big picture," in which divestments are only one alternative. It reviews additional measures besides divestments, such as outsourcing, joint ventures, asset swaps, and using new technologies to cut costs, and provides case studies of each. It also raises some interesting issues regarding divestiture, such as ways to sell a business unit without strengthening a competitor's hand, as well as strategies for improving a business unit's valuation in preparation for sale. The authors, who are M&A advisors at Accenture, conclude that "a carefully planned and well-executed restructuring that involves divestiture can be as significant a victory for management and shareholders as a successful acquisition."     

The interaction between a standard time incentive payment scheme and a simple accounting information system

Under a standard time incentive payment scheme, workers “manage” their recorded job times. A job cost accounting system allocates labour costs and sometimes overheads on the basis of the recorded job times. By simulating the interaction of two such systems at a medium sized engineering firm, it is found that the direct labour costs for a product could be over-estimated by up to 35%. Further, these over-estimates occur on those products on which the workers earn their highest bonuses and, hence, whose discontinuation could damage industrial relations.     

Empirical analysis of the relationship between labour cost stickiness and labour reforms in Spain

This study performs an empirical analysis on the relationship between labour cost stickiness and the decrease in employment protection in the Spanish labour reforms in 2010 and 2012. Following these reforms, the sticky behaviour of labour costs substantially decreased with respect to the pre-reform period. All constituents of total labour costs followed a similar pattern: wages, social security contributions and number of employees. Results are robust to different models, estimation methods, periods of time, and industries, as well as with respect to endogeneity concerns.     

我国企业预算管理的引进与发展——纪念我国改革开放30周年

本文旨在总结改革开放30年来我国企业预算管理引进与发展的历程和成果,其内容包括:(1)在将企业形式的演变分成工厂制为主导和公司制为主导两个基本阶段的基础上考察了中西方企业预算发展的历程,从中发现经济体制、企业组织形式和市场类型等是驱动企业预算管理的主要因素;(2)确认我国企业预算管理引进与发展的成果,主要是在理论上构建起由三个变量和三个要素组成的企业预算管理框架,用于解释和预见企业预算管理现象;在实务上一是以邯钢经验为代表的责任成本预算制度——它既是工厂制企业又是集团公司基层单位提高效率的工具,二是以中国石油为代表的全面预算管理系统——它是集团公司实现"多元同心"和资源整合的工具。     

Transfer Pricing and the Control of Internal Corporate Transactions

One potential weakness of all divisional profitability schemes is their inability to capture synergies among business units. One way of managing this problem is to design a transfer pricing scheme that attempts to assign common costs and benefits to different business units. What makes transfer pricing both so interesting, and such a challenge, is that the solution involves finding a way to encourage divisional managers whose pay is likely to depend on such transfer prices to reveal their private or unbiased information about the firm's costs in a way that serves the interest of the rest of the firm. With that end in view, the authors provide a general analytical framework for setting transfer prices and go on to discuss the costs and benefits of each of the most common transfer‐pricing methods: (1) market pricing; (2) marginal cost pricing; (3) full‐cost pricing; and (4) negotiated prices.     

The European flying geese: New FDI patterns for the old continent?

This article attempts to apply the flying geese metaphor to emerging foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns in Europe and the Mediterranean. Such a division of labour is at best at a nascent stage, given the overwhelming share of Western Europe in both inward and outward foreign direct investment flows. Because of these imbalances, special attention is to be paid to Central and Eastern Europe’s (CEE) potential, both in the group joining the European Union (EU) in 2004 and the rest of the subregion. For the former, middle-income countries, risks in investment promotion are related to uncertainty brought about by the transition to European Union’s acquis and an eventually too fast increase in production costs. Policy response to that requires a modernisation of both general and specific investment promotion policies, adjusted to the rules of the Union. For the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, the challenge is to adjust to the enlarged European Union and to improve the business and investment environment, in order to capture the foreign direct investment outflows of other European countries searching for optimum labour costs.     

CONTRACTING FOR VALUE: EVA AND THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATIONS

EVA becomes more difficult to apply the farther down in the company you go, especially in organizations with more traditional “functional” designs. Because centralized functions are not independent self-contained entities with direct control over their own revenues, costs, and capital, the performance measures used to evaluate them are necessarily incomplete; they reveal only part of the picture. For example, Marketing may increase sales and operating income—the measures on which it is evaluated—but at the same time drive excessive use of capital in the Manufacturing plants. Manufacturing may reduce unit cost through long production runs, thereby minimizing changeovers and setups, but create excess inventory in the process. Costreducing measures could also lead to declining quality and customer satisfaction, ultimately eroding the company's reputation. In short, each critical function influences results in other parts of the company, and focusing only on activities under a manager's direct control can result in myopic and misleading measures of performance. In organizing key processes as internal EVA Centers, joint costs and benefits shared by different corporate functions or business units can be built into financial measures in a way that encourages collaboration. As one example, a firm can attempt to replicate market forces internally by requiring each marketing region to contract for capacity with the internal manufacturing group. In a traditional management system, Marketing reserves (and relinquishes) manufacturing capacity at no cost; the consequence is excessive demand for resources. An internal pricing mechanism that requires Marketing to pay a fee for capacity will force its managers to assess trade-offs as if it were contracting with an outside party. Such a system effectively requires that functional managers take a more company-wide view of their responsibilities. By including the cost of capital, it forces managers to define costs more carefully. By including the impacts on other functions, it also forces a broader definition of costs. And by using multi-year contracts among different divisions, the framework extends the time horizon over which costs and benefits matter.     

Don't homogenize, synchronize.

To be more responsive to customers, companies often break down organizational walls between their units--setting up all manner of cross-business and cross-functional task forces and working groups and promoting a "one-company" culture. But such attempts can backfire terribly by distracting business and functional units and by contaminating their strategies and processes. Fortunately, there's a better way, says the author. Rather than tear down organizational walls, a company can make them permeable to information. It can synchronize all its data on products, filtering the information through linked databases and applications and delivering it in a coordinated, meaningful form to customers. As a result, the organization can present a single, unified face to the customer--one that can change as market conditions warrant--without imposing homogeneity on its people. Such synchronization can lead not just to stronger customer relationships and more sales but also to greater operational efficiency. It allows a company, for example, to avoid the high costs of maintaining many different information systems with redundant data. The decoupling of product control from customer control in a synchronized company reflects a fundamental fact about business: While companies have to focus on creating great products, customers think in terms of the activities they perform and the benefits they seek. For companies, products are ends, but for customers, products are means. The disconnect between how customers think and how companies organize themselves is what leads to inefficiencies and missed opportunities, and that's exactly the problem that synchronization solves. Synchronized companies can get closer to customers, sustain product innovation, and improve operational efficiency--goals that have traditionally been very difficult to achieve simultaneously.     

Globalisation squeezes the public sector—is it so obvious?

It is widely perceived that globalization squeezes public sector activities by making taxation more costly. This is attributed to increased factor mobility and to a more elastic labour demand due to improved scope for relocation of production, and thus employment across countries. We argue that this consensus view overlooks that gains from trade unambiguously work to lower the marginal costs of public funds. Moreover, we argue that a more elastic labour demand may actually reduce the marginal costs of labour income taxation and that globalization may actually reduce the labour demand elasticity.     

Are labour markets in the new member states sufficiently flexible for EMU?

New Member States (NMS) coming from central planning are often advised against early Euro adoption because of their rigid labour markets. But are labour markets so rigid in these countries? We argue in this paper that this is not the case. Labour market institutions are no more “rigid” than among current EMU Members whilst wage bargaining institutions are actually better equipped for microeconomic wage flexibility than in the EU-15. NMS also achieved substantial reallocation of jobs and workers in the transition to markets, display relatively large job turnover rates and are reducing their regional mismatch. The view that NMS have rigid labour markets is fuelled by the low job content of growth in the region. But there is evidence that the latter is related to productivity enhancing job destruction in the aftermath of prolonged labour hoarding. Reduced-form employment equations estimated in this paper also suggest that tight fiscal policies, rather than being harmful to job creation, may actually improve the employment performance of the region. Our interpretation of this result is that loose fiscal policies weaken the confidence of investors and crowd-out private employment growth through generous pay rises to civil servants.     

Energy Infrastructure Investment and the Rise of the Uncorporation1

While most large U.S. businesses have long been organized as corporations, a significant portion of our economy, including major parts of our energy infrastructure, are organized as other types of legal entities. These “uncorporations” include such business forms as Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). Many practitioners have dismissed these alternative entities as merely tax devices and only peripherally important to mainstream business. But this view misses important features of the uncorporation that make it an important alternative in dealing with the “agency” costs that arise in public companies from separating managerial control from equity ownership. Corporate governance relies heavily on agents such as auditors, class action lawyers, judges, and independent directors to protect shareholders from managerial self‐interest. The obvious costs and defects of relying on these governance mechanisms have generally been seen as a reasonable price to pay for the benefits of the corporate form. But this conclusion depends on the availability and effectiveness of the alternative mechanisms for addressing agency costs. Uncorporations provide such an alternative by tying managers' economic well‐being so closely to that of their firms that corporate monitoring devices become less necessary. Uncorporate governance mechanisms include managerial compensation that is based largely (if not entirely) on the firm's profits or cash distributions, and restrictions on managers' control of corporate cash through liquidation rights and requirements for cash distributions. Business people and policy makers should evaluate the potential benefits of uncorporations before concluding that the costs of corporate governance are an inevitable price of separating ownership and control in modern firms.     

Competitive pressure and firm investment efficiency: Evidence from corporate employment decisions

This study examines the link between product market competition and labour investment efficiency. We find that competitive pressure distorts the efficiency of corporate employment decisions by creating an underinvestment problem. This finding withstands a battery of robustness checks and remains unchanged after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between product market competition and labour investment efficiency is stronger for firms facing higher competitive threats, greater financial constraints, higher information asymmetry and higher labour adjustment costs. Our results suggest that as competition increases bankruptcy risk, it leads managers to underinvest in labour to avoid incurring labour-related costs.