Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions

Using the Progresa data from Mexico, we investigate intrahousehold decision making using a variety of outcomes. We exploit both the experimental nature and the (short) panel dimension of the data to measure the impact of exogenous changes in the intrahousehold distribution of resources on household decisions. We test for global pooling of resources within households, which would correspond to the unitary model of household decision making. We also exploit a set of questions about power and the decision making process in the household to investigate aspects of strategic interactions between household members. Our findings confirm previous rejections of income pooling. We also cannot reject that the wife's relative income share is a significant determinant of the wife's decision making power in the household, with a higher share of income associated with more decision making power. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, D13, H31.     

Remittances and Household Expenditures on Education in Ghana's Northern Region: Why Gender Matters

Studies of the impact of migrant remittances on receiving households assume that these households act as a unit in receiving remittances and making decisions about their use. Thus, many of these studies use the gender of the household head as a key control variable. This study questions this assumption, using original qualitative and quantitative data on rural–urban migration of women in Ghana to show that gendered social norms of household provisioning influence the intrahousehold flow of remittances. Regression results indicate that migrant women are more likely to send remittances to other women, creating female-centered networks of remittance flows even within male-headed households. The implications of this for intrahousehold resource allocation are explored through an analysis of the impact of the gender of the remitter and recipient on education expenditure. The results show that regardless of the gender of the household head, households in which women are the primary recipient of remittances spend more than twice as much on education as households in which men are the primary recipient.     

Intrahousehold moral hazard frictions and household poverty traps in rural India

We empirically study the role of assets held by women in the creation of household wealth using data from rural India. We design a streamlined model of intrahousehold project funding where moral hazard frictions between spouses and women's asset control are the main ingredients. As predicted by the model, the data show that household asset accumulation depends on women's asset control in a non-monotonic way. Results indicate no presence of multiple equilibrium poverty traps, but do show that exogenous negative shocks will trigger assets aggregation within households where both spouses are present. This resilience mechanism is, however, not found in female headed household as these households have a monotonic relationship between women's wealth control and asset creation. We thus argue that policies to support women's empowerment need to distinguish women based on their individual wealth levels and headship status to enhance household well-being in remote Indian communities.     

Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution

This paper considers the assignment of tradable permits—representing property rights of an environmental good—to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms. These community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences. For a special case with a sole household, market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level. However, for a group of households, the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods. We design a revenue-sharing mechanism akin to unitization, under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation. Importantly, in some cases, efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good.     

Adding value through the mechanization of post-harvest cassava processing,and its impact on household poverty in north-eastern Zambia

This article investigates the impact of adopting a mechanized cassava processing system on household poverty levels in Zambia. An Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measure was used to compare poverty levels among households using a mechanized cassava processing system against those households using a nonmechanized process. Based on the FGT poverty measure’s specifications, a significantly lower poverty status of 49% was found among households using the mechanized process when compared to the 58% found among households using the nonmechanized process. The significant factors contributing to these differences in poverty levels include whether households are using a mechanized process or not, the number of years’ schooling among household members, the number of years’ farming experience, household income and membership of associations. The study concludes that the mechanization of cassava processing, particularly if done on the right scale, can transform primary production activities, in turn leading to higher incomes and reduced poverty levels in rural villages. Thus, policies should be introduced aimed at encouraging the promotion of mechanized post-harvest cassava processing technologies among rural households, so as to enhance crop productivity and household income levels, as well as reduce poverty among rural households.     

Conflicting Interests in Environmental Policy-making?

This paper focuses on possible conflicts of interests between the political aims of reduced emissions from energy consumption, redistribution of welfare and efficient policy-making. We use the results from a LES estimation to calculate the consumption reductions, compensating variations and excess tax burdens of three different tax schemes: one linear and two non-linear. Unless the tax scheme is optimally designed to correct for externalities, there is a conflict of interests between the aims of reduced consumption and efficient policy-making. When ranking different tax schemes, there is a conflict between the aims of redistributing welfare and reduced consumption if we are concerned with the well-being of individual households, but not if we are concerned only with the mean household in different parts of the income distribution.     

Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination

The paper introduces trade into dynamic models with externalities and capital accumulation, and evaluates the efficiency of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. It considers mixed economies characterized by a blend of strategic and nonstrategic sectors. Also, there are two sources of interdependence: the existence of production externalities and the endogenous determination of market prices. It is shown that policy coordination is not needed when preferences are the same. In this case, the production externalities are internalized, so that an inefficient solution becomes the efficient integrated world equilibrium due to trade.     

Expenditure behavior and children's welfare: an analysis of female headed households in Jamaica

This paper presents an analysis on the expenditure behavior and children's welfare among female-headed households in Jamaica. Included in the examination of household composition are the demographic effects, endogeneity of total expenditure, the headship variable and the endogeneity of family structure. Using the 1989 Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (SLC), expenditure estimation on over 100 goods for 3500 household was examined. This study utilized the Ordinary Least Square estimates, 2 SLC and endogeneity tests, and partnered and unpartnered household heads. Results for the demand for preventive health care were significant among older children in female-headed households, with a 4% increase in the probability of a check-up across all ages. This study presents a partial explanation of lower morbidity rates in female-headed households despite lower budget and total per capita expenditure levels. In conclusion, this study confirms the significant influence of sex and union status of the household head on household expenditure behaviors with implications for individual household members, with more positive outcomes among children despite differences in budget allocation and lower health expenditures.     

Redistributive taxation and the household: the case of individual filings

In this paper I look at the tax treatment of households under individual filings and characterise the efficiency properties of an income tax schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. Because tax liabilities are determined on individual incomes but the decision to earn those incomes is made at the household level, tax liable members of the same household can side trade leisure for net income with one another, and such side trade enables them to carry out tax arbitrage. I analyse the problem for a two-class economy both with and without perfect assortative mating. The main conclusion is that the prevention of tax arbitrage imposes structure on the graduation of the tax schedule.     

Groups, collective decisions and markets

We consider a general equilibrium model where multi-member households make efficient collective consumption decisions and operate in a competitive market environment. Individuals have the option to leave the household and make it on their own or join another household. We study the effect of these outside options on household formation, household stability and equilibrium existence.     

Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets

In a general equilibrium model, we allow for households with several, typically heterogeneous, members; households that make (efficient) collective consumption decisions where different households may use different collective decision mechanisms; yet households that operate within a competitive market environment. The interaction of two allocation mechanisms, collective decisions and competitive markets, is investigated, with a focus on the efficiency properties and decentralization possibilities of the dual allocation mechanism.     

Methods of household consumption measurement through surveys: Experimental results from Tanzania

Surveys of consumption expenditure vary widely across many dimensions, including the level of reporting, the length of the reference period, and the degree of commodity detail. These variations occur both across countries and also over time within countries, with little current understanding of the implications of such changes for spatially and temporally consistent measurement of household consumption and poverty. A field experiment in Tanzania tests eight alternative methods of measuring household consumption, finding significant differences between consumption reported by the benchmark personal diary and other diary and recall formats. Under-reporting is particularly apparent for illiterate households and for urban respondents completing household diaries; recall modules measure lower consumption than a personal diary, with larger gaps among poorer households and for households with more adult members. Variations in reporting accuracy by household characteristics are also discussed and differences in measured poverty as a result of survey design are explored.     

Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification

This paper provides an exhaustive characterization of testability and identifiability issues in the collective framework in the absence of price variation; it thus provides a theoretical underpinning for a number of empirical works that have been developed recently. We first provide a simple and general test of the Pareto-efficiency hypothesis, which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possible consumption externalities between household members, and all types of interdependent individual preferences and domestic production technology. The test is proved to be necessary and sufficient. We then provide conditions for the identification of the sharing rule and the Engel curves of individual household members for a variety of different observational schemes.     

Is the household demand for in-home services sensitive to tax reductions? The French case

Our paper examines the impact of tax reductions on the demand for services in the home. For that purpose, we estimate a structural model of demand for such services by using household individual data collected by INSEE (Paris) in 1996. In this model, the net hourly wage paid to the domestic employee, the household preferences for consumption of in-home services and the decision to take advantage of the tax reduction are considered as endogenous variables. Estimation of the econometric model uses the fact that some households are observed to consume domestic services and to take advantage of the tax reduction, while others either consume such services but do not take advantage of the tax reduction, or do not consume these services at all. Its identification relies on an exclusion restriction resulting from the tax credit schedule. Results show that the probability of consuming in-home services increases with age and income. A 10% increase in the tax reduction would increase from 45.9 to 50.8% the proportion of households benefiting from the tax reduction among those who consume paid in-home services. Moreover, 13.5% of households who do not actually consume such services would do so after the 10% increase in the tax reduction. These simulated variations would mainly concern high-income households.     

Changes in household composition as a shock-mitigating strategy

This paper uses data from the Russian Longitudinal Survey that span the two recent economic recessions of 1998 and 2008 to study the effect of declining incomes on household composition. We hypothesize that individuals face a trade-off between taking advantage of economies of scale and specialization when living with others, and individual privacy. Consumption smoothing is achieved by forgoing privacy during the crisis and results in increases in household size. Our empirical results suggest that members of households that experienced negative income shocks are more likely to move in with others compared to individuals residing in households whose income remained the same or increased.     

Mandating behavioral conformity in social groups with conformist members

Social interaction among individuals with a preference for conformity gives rise to coordination externalities which are not internalized in a non-cooperative setting. Mandating behavioral conformity, by centrally imposing a common, group-wide action, internalizes these coordination externalities, but also comes at a cost of restraining individuals’ self-regarding goals. We explore a framework of social interaction among privately informed individuals with conformist preferences to examine when mandating behavioral conformity improves group welfare. Our analysis elucidates how the desirability of mandating behavioral conformity is shaped by the group's socio-economic structure. We find that mandating behavioral conformity is not desirable in social groups that are ex ante homogeneous—either with respect to members’ contribution to group welfare or their innate conformist tendency. In contrast, mandating behavioral conformity can be beneficial in those ex ante heterogeneous social groups where the individuals who contribute most to group welfare also exhibit the strongest preference for conformity.     

Migration with fiscal externalities

"This paper analyses the distribution of a country's population among regions when migration involves fiscal externalities. The main question addressed is whether a decentralized decision making [by] regional governments can produce an optimal population distribution...or a centralized intervention is indispensable, as argued before in the literature....It turns out that, while with costless mobility the fiscal externality is fully internalized by voluntary interregional transfers, with costly mobility, centrally coordinated transfers still remain indispensable for achieving the socially optimal allocation."     

Is power more evenly balanced in poor households?

The structure of intra-household allocation is crucial to know whether a transfer from a rich household to a poor one translates into a transfer from a rich individual to a poor one. If rich households are more unequal than poor ones, then a progressive transfer among households reduces intra-household inequality, hence inequality among individuals. More specifically, two conditions have to be satisfied for extending Generalized Lorenz judgments from household level to individual one. The fraction of the couple's expenditures devoted to goods jointly consumed should decrease at the margin with the couple's income as well as the part of private expenditure devoted to the disadvantaged individual. This double concavity condition is non-parametrically tested on the French Household Expenditure Survey (2000). It is not rejected by the data and supports the view that power is more evenly distributed in poor households.     

When inefficiency begets efficiency

Summary. Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact on market performance depends on whether household inefficiencies are caused by inefficient net trades with the market or by inefficient distribution of resources within households. Inefficient internal distribution always results in inefficient equilibrium allocations. This leads us to consider competitive forces as disciplinary device for households. Competition of households for both resources and members can eliminate or reduce inefficient internal distribution.Received: 5 February 2003, Revised: 12 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D10, D51, D62.This paper is an abbreviated and revised version of Gersbach and Haller (2003). It addresses issues raised during seminar presentations at the University of Texas, Austin, and the Center for Economic Studies (CES), Munich. The hospitality and financial support of CES, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Clive Bell for helpful comments and two referees for thoughtful suggestions.     

Household Demand, Network Externality Effects and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of households that have purchased the durable good. Next, in a model with a continuum of household types, we extend the analysis to the case where households consume both a durable good and a stream of non-durable goods. We show that in both settings, the presence of network externalities facilitates a sales strategy with intertemporal price discrimination.