外资溢出对中国私营企业生产率的异质性影响-来自普查数据的证据

本文利用第一次全国经济普查的企业微观数据研究中国私营企业生产率的异质性对吸收外资溢出的影响。我们发现:(1)企业层面外资份额及其控股与否对企业生产率的积极影响随生产率水平递增;(2)私营企业存在着吸收外资水平溢出和后向溢出的生产率"门槛"效应,即吸收能力的差别;(3)下游外资控股企业的溢出促进了上游大部分私营企业的生产率,而非外资控股的合资企业则对上游生产率较低的私营企业有负的净效应。私营企业面临的外资竞争格局正从各方面形成,而私营部门内部生产能力分化也日渐明显。     

外资溢出对中国私营企业生产率的异质性影响——来自普查数据的证据

本文利用第一次全国经济普查的企业微观数据研究中国私营企业生产率的异质性对吸收外资溢出的影响。我们发现：（1）企业层面外资份额及其控股与否对企业生产率的积极影响随生产率水平递增;（2）私营企业存在着吸收外资水平溢出和后向溢出的生产率“门槛”效应,即吸收能力的差别;（3）下游外资控股企业的溢出促进了上游大部分私营企业的生产率,而非外资控股的合资企业则对上游生产率较低的私营企业有负的净效应。私营企业面临的外资竞争格局正从各方面形成,而私营部门内部生产能力分化也日渐明显。     

举办中外合资企业不应有“控股”说

中外合资经营企业是中外投资者依照《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》及《合资法实施条例》而建立的企业。按上述法律规定,此类企业系“有限责任公司”。有限责任公司,不同于股份有限责任公司,更不同于控股公司。 近一时期,在外商投资举办中外合资企业的谈判中,经常遇到,外方提出要对合资企业控股;中方投资者往往提出不同意外方控股,从而有的又提出中方要控股。这些提法都有悖于法律的规定。     

提高城市公共品供给效率的研究与探讨

随着时代的进步,城市公共品的供给已经成为衡量一个城市甚至是一个国家文明及进步程度的关键因素.本文首先对城市公共品进行了界定,分析了现有城市公共品的主要供给模式.然后针对当前我国城市公共品供给存在的主要问题:政府和公共部门的过度干预控制,而私人部门或是第三部门在城市公共品的供给过程中参与程度却比较低,整体供给效率不高等,进一步剖析其原因.最后指出为了提高我国城市公共品的供给效率,应继续推进并不断地深化城市公共品的供给市场化改革思路,进行配套地改革,建立起多样化的投融资模式;进一步探求多样化的公共品供给模式,以地方政府和民间资本为城市公共品的有效供给者;建立和规范规制机构,建立健全补偿机制和供给机制;转变政府的职能角色,由“划桨”向“掌舵”进行转变,树立起服务理念;同时还要提高市民享有城市公共品的权利意识.     

制度环境、所有制差异与内资独资化绩效评估

建立合资企业是本土企业向外商学习先进技术及管理经验的重要路径,但外资流出后企业绩效的变化却较少受到研究关注.本文以4051家由合资经营转向内资独资经营的企业为样本,考察了合资企业内资独资化后的绩效变化,并重点比较了合资企业国有化与民营化的绩效变化差异.研究发现:总体上合资企业内资独资化后企业绩效显著提升;区分企业所有制后发现,民营合资企业民营化后企业绩效明显提升,然而国有合资企业国有化后企业绩效没有呈现明显改变;进一步从企业内部来看,合资企业民营化后企业管理成本下降并且企业研发创新提升,这一特征在合资企业国有化上并不存在;另外从企业外部来看,地方政府的干预会明显抑制合资企业国有化后的绩效提升.研究启示为,FDI的溢出效应在外资流出后仍然具有持续性,并且合资企业内资独资化的绩效改善不仅依赖于企业自身,同时依赖于地区制度环境的质量.     

跨国公司在华合资企业股权结构变动的成因--基于一个合作博弈模型的分析

文章从资产专有性理论出发,通过构建合资双方的合作博弈模型,分析了近年来跨国公司在华合资企业独资倾向的成因.文章认为,由于东道国的政策管制,合资企业股权与合资双方的实际控制权并不一致;合资企业的控制权分配取决于在既定市场条件下合资双方拥有资产的专有性,而控制权的分配又决定了合资双方对合资企业创造的组织租金的分配比例.当合资企业的股权结构和控制权结构相背离时,由于存在转移成本,合资双方有内在的动力使它们趋于一致.近年来跨国公司在华合资企业股权结构的变动是在我国开放程度不断扩大的环境下,跨国企业资产专有性相对提高和中方企业资产专有性相对减弱的必然结果.     

政府效率的空间溢出效应研究

文章首先选取“税收—公共品”组合,利用数据包络方法分析了1997~2004年我国30个省市地方政府的相对效率;然后在此基础上,运用空间回归计量模型研究了政府效率的空间特征。研究体系结果显示,政府效率具有空间溢出作用,并且这种空间溢出作用还在逐年增强;政府效率在空间上存在着显著的互补效应说明地方政府之间有“邻里模仿”行动。     

参与合资有利于促进企业对外直接投资吗?

本文利用外商投资审批(备案)数据库识别了企业参与合资的行为,进而研究了参与合资对企业对外直接投资的影响。事实分析表明：2004—2013年近14%的企业在对外直接投资之前,与外国投资商共同出资设立了在华合资企业,即参与了合资;参与合资的企业更多投资到信息不对称的远距离地区和生产率门槛较高的发达经济体。计量分析发现：参与合资显著促进了企业对外直接投资,在进行一系列稳健性检验并缓解内生性问题后,该结论仍然成立。机制分析表明,参与合资通过信息传递和技术溢出机制发挥作用。在与发达经济体投资商共同投资、投资长期运营的合资企业和控股合资企业等情境下,参与合资对企业对外直接投资的促进效应更大。本文拓展了国际化进程理论相关研究,为中国实现高水平对外开放提供了有益借鉴。     

透视跨国公司苏州合资企业的独资化

本文以跨国公司在华投资独资趋势为背景．以苏州为样本,对跨国公司在苏州合资企业的独资化倾向进行实证研究。结果显示,合资企业的独资化倾向,是跨国公司为适应母公司战略调整与中国投资环境变化的相机结果;中国政府对外商投资市场准入领域的放宽、中方投资者资金供给困难以及中国投资环境的改善,只是跨国公司由合资经营向独资化经营战略转变的促成因素,真正的决定性因素是跨国公司在华投资战略的转变,合资企业中方母体与跨国公司追求目标的不同,以及投资双方文化背景、经营哲学的差异,使得合资企业只是在特定的制度背景、特定的市场环境下存在的一种主导组织方式。蕴涵的政策含义是,政府引进外资政策应该由依靠政策优惠为主向依靠增强本土企业实力为主转变。     

公共品供给的政府效率解及其条件分析

传统经济理论认为,在任何一个集体中,因任何一种公共品的成本分摊与收益分享,都普遍存在着"搭便车"者的个人理性行为以及由此导致的集体非理性的结局———人人都无"车"可搭的"公共"悲剧,断言公共品供给是市场失败的领域,必须由政府替代。用斯密的市场秩序概念来处理所有的私人品,用霍布斯的主权国家概念来处理所有的公共品,也是市场经济国家资源配置制度安排的普遍选择。我认为,"搭便车"或经济人理性行为是合乎公理的经济学假设,但"搭便车"问题并不一定非由政府强制来解决不可。从理论上说,公共品的供给存在政府效率解,但政府效率解有严格的约束条件,公共品供给中的政府职能与政府失灵也都是相对于其效率条件以及满足这些条件的程度而言的。     

中国财政竞争与地方公共支出结构分析

This article examines the impact of intergovernmental fiscal competition on local public expenditure in China under current performance assessment system in which GDP is a critical factor. First, we present the assignment of public goods and tax burden and the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) of 30 provinces, and we find that current fiscal competition in China has taken the form of public expenditure improvement accompanied by preferential tax policies. Second, we regress the share of FDI on different components of provincial public expenditure, and find that the share of FDI is correlated negatively with the public service, tax burden and health care service while positively with infrastructure development. Therefore, FDI-based infrastructural investment crowds out public services investment, which fails to support the view that fiscal competition improves social welfares.     

Does foreign direct investment promote growth? Exploring the role of financial markets on linkages

Do multinational companies generate positive externalities for the host country? The evidence so far is mixed varying from beneficial to detrimental effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth, with many studies that find no effect. In order to provide an explanation for this empirical ambiguity, we formalize a mechanism that emphasizes the role of local financial markets in enabling FDI to promote growth through backward linkages. Using realistic parameter values, we quantify the response of growth to FDI and show that an increase in the share of FDI leads to higher additional growth in financially developed economies relative to financially under-developed ones.     

FDI and Outsourcing in a Service Industry: Welfare Effects of Liberalising Trade and Investment

This study examines a foreign firm's entry decision and its effects on the host country's welfare in a model with a composite good in which both commodity and service generate utility for consumers. Along with the commodity it produces, a producer can provide the service by itself or outsource the service. The result shows that the incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service sector increases under liberalising trade in the final‐good market. Moreover, there exist policy combinations of trade and investment liberalisation, whereby the domestic firms' profitability is traded off with the host country's social welfare when the foreign firm provides a service through FDI or through outsourcing, respectively. Finally, the welfare after simultaneously liberalising trade and investment is not necessarily greater than that under autarky.     

Democracy in the neighborhood and foreign direct investment

The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been extensively studied. Even though there is extensive research in the area, most of it is based on analyzing the effects of host country characteristics on FDI flows, and yet there is little research on how neighboring country characteristics play a role in facilitating FDI flows to host countries. This paper analyzes the association between the democracy level in neighboring countries and FDI flows to host countries. Using bilateral FDI flows from the OECD countries, with a large host country sample, we find that countries surrounded by democratic countries attract higher FDI flows. Furthermore, we find evidence that countries that are surrounded by neighboring countries with good institutions tend themselves to have better institutions, experience lower civil conflict, and have higher political stability and hence indirectly attract higher FDI flows. Our findings suggest that if neighboring countries act in such way as to become more democratic, FDI flows to these countries would be higher since not only does improving the quality of democracy attract more FDI inflows, but also being surrounded by neighboring advanced democratic countries will also lead to higher FDI flows to them.     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry

Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Labor Quality in Developing Countries

The quality of local labor is an important factor in a multinational corporation's (MNC) decision to set up production operations in a developing country. It is often observed that developing country governments attempt to attract MNCs by enhancing labor quality. This paper studies the interaction between an MNC and a local government which has superior information on local labor quality. The local government has an incentive to enhance the labor quality and share that information with the MNC because it increases both its net tax revenue and profit of the MNC. The paper provides an explanation for recent findings of FDI in developing countries: the bulk of FDI has been directed toward a limited number of countries and human capital plays an increasingly important role in attracting FDI.     

The role of information in the competition for FDI under uncertainty

This paper mainly focuses on the role of information in the competition for FDI when host countries are not sure of the “fixed cost” differences MNEs are working with to make FDI in different countries. It is found in this paper that as the public information increases and the uncertainty declines, host countries will first provide more and more subsidies to compete for FDI, which will reduce their welfare; then after the current uncertainty has been reduced to a relatively low level, any further reduction in uncertainty will pull down their subsidies and increase their welfare.     

FDI Policy,Greenfield Investment and Cross‐border Mergers

This paper examines a multinational's choice between greenfield investment and cross‐border merger when it enters another country via foreign direct investment (FDI) and faces the host country's FDI policy. Greenfield investment incurs a fixed plant setup cost, whereas the foreign firm obtains only a share of the joint profit from a cross‐border merger under the restriction of the FDI policy. This trade‐off is affected by market demand, cost differential, and market competition, among other things. The host country's government chooses its FDI policy to affect (or alter) the multinational's entry mode to achieve the maximum social welfare for the domestic country. We characterize the conditions shaping the optimal FDI policy and offer intuitions on FDI patterns in developing and developed countries.     

Foreign direct investment and host country policies: A rationale for using ownership restrictions

This paper examines host governments' motivation for restricting ownership shares of multinational firms (MNFs) in foreign direct investment (FDI) projects. An MNF with a productivity advantage is willing to invest in a host country. The host government wants to capture the MNF's surplus yet cannot observe it due to the MNF's private information about its firm-specific advantage. In contrast, a joint venture (JV) partner might observe this surplus depending on its ownership share. The host government can alleviate its informational constraints by using ownership restrictions to force a JV. This calls into question the wisdom of calls for ‘liberalizing’ FDI flows by the wholesale elimination of domestic JV requirements. We show that the optimal mechanism involves ownership restrictions that decrease as the size of the MNF's firm-specific advantage increases.