Asymmetry and Duration Dependence in Australian GDP and Unemployment

The periodic structure of business cycles suggests that significant asymmetries are present over different phases of the cycle. This paper uses markov regime-switching models with fixed and duration dependent trasition probabilities to directly model expansions, contractions and durations in Australian GDP growth and unemployment growth. Evidence is found of significant asymmetry in growth rates across expansions and contractions for both series. GDP contractions exhibit duration dependence implying that as output recessions age the likelihood of switching into an expansion phase increases. Unemployment growth does not exhibit duration dependence in either phase. Evidence is also presented that non-linearities in unemployment growth are well explained by the asymmetries in the GDP growth cycle. The analysis suggests that recessions are periods of rapid and intense job destruction, that Australian unemployment tends to ratchet up in recessionary periods and, in contrast to US and UK studies, that shocks to Australian unemployment growth are more persistent in recessions than expansions.     

Long COVID? Prospects for economic scarring from the pandemic

This paper examines the potential persistent effects (scarring) of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and the channels through which they may occur. Our findings from a broad set of historical recessions confirm that recessions are associated with persistent output losses and that the greatest scarring has occurred following financial crises. The amount of scarring following pandemic and epidemic recessions in the sample is in between that of typical recessions and financial crises. Results on the channels show that the productivity channel is important, as all types of recessions have been followed by persistent losses to total factor productivity.     

Predicting Canadian recessions using dynamic probit modelling approaches

Abstract This paper examines the ability of various financial and macroeconomic variables to forecast Canadian recessions. It evaluates four model specifications, including the advanced dynamic, autoregressive, dynamic autoregressive probit models as well as the conventional static probit model. The empirical results highlight several significant recession predictors, notably the government bond yield spread, growth rates of the housing starts, the real money supply and the composite index of leading indicators. Both the in‐sample and out‐of‐sample results suggest that the forecasting performance of the four probit models is mixed. The dynamic and dynamic autoregressive probit models are better in predicting the duration of recessions while the static and autoregressive probit models are better in forecasting the peaks of business cycles. Hence, the advanced dynamic models and the conventional static probit model can complement one another to provide more accurate forecasts for the duration and turning points of business cycles.     

The lean times in the Peruvian economy

The growth rate of “nonprimary gross domestic product (GDP)” (Perú’s urban economy) dropped to 3.6 percent in 2014 and to 2.4 percent in 2015, far below the annual average of 7.3 percent recorded over the previous decade; moreover, an equally low growth rate of 2.8 percent per year is projected in 2016. In the macroeconomic history of Peru, the times of plenty —that is, the more or less prolonged booms—are also times of high prices of the commodities that the country exports; meanwhile, the lean times—that is, the more or less intense recessions in which economic activity slows down—are times of low commodity prices. This article describes the negative external shock undergone by the Peruvian economy and its recessionary and inflationary effects over 2014–15, analyzes the fiscal and monetary policies applied in response to the external shock, and outlines the macroeconomic challenges faced by the new government of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.     

Interest rate policy and interbank market breakdown

Using a DSGE-model with interbank market frictions, calibrated to match the frequency of financial crises, I investigate central banks' ability to prevent credit-related recessions by following an interest rate rule which accounts for financial conditions —an approach called ‘leaning against the wind’. The model's key feature is that boom-bust cycles emerge as a result of a savings glut and moral hazard in the banking sector. Although financial conditions predict crises, the policy maker cannot break the boom-bust cycle and reduce the crisis-frequency. When crises become more likely, low inflation forces the central bank to decrease the interest rate despite its intention to do otherwise. Responding to crisis-predictors eventually dilutes the primary objective of stabilizing inflation and leads to higher inflation volatility. The results suggest that central banks should refrain from leaning against the wind.     

Growth and Crisis in Transition: A Comparative Perspective

The paper provides an empirical analysis of the growth performance of transition countries in a comparative perspective, separating episodes of crises from those of growth. Performance is measured by the output response following recessions, by the capacity to rebound, as well as the depth and length of the crisis rather than average rates of growth that aggregate periods of recessions and periods of growth. Results highlight that the post‐recession performance in Central and Eastern Europe resembles that of emerging and developing countries in the aftermath of banking and financial crises, often following significant liberalizations. In contrast, the post‐crisis performance of CIS countries resembles the output response observed during episodes of civil wars, and remains significantly different from the normal response of an average market country. Moreover, performance depends on economic reforms and especially on the complementarities among different reforms.     

Going up and down: rethinking the empirics of growth in the developing and newly industrialized world

Growth dynamics are remarkably heterogeneous, in particular when one focuses on developing countries. Economic miracles and failures are embedded within extended phases of either growth or decline. In this paper, we analyze the growth patterns of developing and newly industrialized countries on the basis of structural breaks and growth regimes experienced. Emphasizing the presence of broken trends, we focus on the difference between expansionary and recessionary regimes of medium length, and we show that models of takeoffs and exponential growth are inadequate to characterize the majority of observed growth dynamics. Then, we move to a systematic classification of different patterns and we isolate an additional stylized fact characterizing the process of growth and development. In particular, our results show that expansionary regimes are associated with convergence and positive correlation between growth and (short run) volatility. By contrast, in recessionary regimes, poorer countries face deeper failures and a negative correlation between growth and volatility is found, indicating that output fluctuates less around the trend during strong rather than mild recessions. Catching-up phenomena are infrequent but more likely to occur across categories of growth patterns rather than within. Finally, we discover that regimes of growth and recession show similar average length (about 16 years). Although recessions are, on average, remarkably pronounced (14% loss of GDP per capita), the magnitude of growth is much larger during expansions. In sum, our results underline that stable positive growth is hardly achieved in developing countries, which rather alternate long phases of expansions with equally long phases of recession. Moreover, cross-sectional empirical regularities are found to differ between regimes of positive and negative growth.     

The recent boom–bust cycle: The relative contribution of capital flows, credit supply and asset bubbles

We use an estimated open economy DSGE model with financial frictions for the US and the rest of the world to evaluate various competing explanations about the recent boom–bust cycle. We find that the savings glut hypothesis is insufficient for explaining all aspects of the boom in the US. Relatively strong TFP growth and expansionary monetary policy are also not able to explain fully the volatility of corporate and in particular residential investment. We identify bubbles in the stock and housing market as crucial. Concerning the downturn in 2008/2009, the fall in house prices and residential investment only plays a minor role. Mortgage defaults have more explanatory power, especially in a specification of the model with a segregated equity market. Finally, the bursting of the stock market bubble was at least as important in this recession as in 2001. Because of various negative shocks hitting the economy at the same time in 2008/2009 and continued positive technology growth, not only the real interest rate declined but inflation fell rapidly and left insufficient room for monetary policy to play a similar stabilising role as in previous recessions.     

Determinants of housing price volatility in Canada: a dynamic analysis

This article tries to identify the determinants of housing price volatility and to examine the dynamic effects of these determinants on volatility using quarterly data for Canada. The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) and the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models have been employed to analyse possible time variation of the housing price volatility and the interactions between the volatility and the key macroeconomic variables. We find the evidence of time varying housing price volatility for Canada. Our VAR, Granger causality and variance decomposition (VDC) analyses demonstrate that housing price volatility is affected significantly by gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, housing price appreciation rate and inflation. On the other hand, volatility affects GDP growth rate, housing price appreciation and volatility itself. The impulse response analysis reveals the asymmetric of the positive and negative shocks. The findings of this article have important implications, particularly for those seeking to develop derivatives for housing market prices.     

Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory

This paper explores the implications of the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) [8] for the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle. The model predicts that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical with debt increasing in recessions and decreasing in booms. Public spending increases in booms and decreases during recessions, while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in recessions. In both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale. When calibrated to the US economy, the model broadly matches the empirical distribution of debt and also its negative correlation with output. However, the predictions of pro-cyclical spending and counter-cyclical taxation do not find empirical support. The calibrated model generates the same fit of the data as a benevolent government model in which the government faces an exogenous lower bound on debt. Nonetheless, the two models have very different comparative static implications.     

Cyclical Dynamics of the Turkish Economy and the Stock Market

Abstract

We analyze the cyclical dynamics of the Turkish economy and the stock market as well as their interactions. We use hidden Markov models that are robust to parameter instability arising from major shifts in economic policy, which have been typically observed in the Turkish economy. These models provide estimates of turning points for the growth, business, and stock market cycles. We identify three states of growth cycles and two states of business cycles in Turkey characterized by different mean estimates. We find that the economy went through five recessions since 1987. Crises are characterized by sharp drops in economic activity and are preceded by slowdowns. These crises are typically followed by strong recoveries during which the economy grows above its long-run average rate. We show that the Turkish stock market goes through three regimes having distinct risk-return dynamics. Bear markets associated with negative returns precede every recession with an average lead time of three quarters, suggesting that the stock market may be a useful forward-looking indicator of the Turkish economy.     

How Does Fiscal Consolidation Impact on Income Inequality?

In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Using a panel of 18 industrialized countries from 1978 to 2009, we find that income inequality significantly rises during periods of fiscal consolidation. In addition, while fiscal policy that is driven by spending cuts seems to be detrimental for income distribution, tax hikes seem to have an equalizing effect. We also show that the size of the fiscal consolidation program (in percentage of GDP) has an impact on income inequality. In particular, when consolidation plans represent a small share of GDP, the income gap widens, suggesting that the burden associated with the effort affects disproportionately households at the bottom of the income distribution. Considering the linkages between banking crises and fiscal consolidation, we find that the effect on the income gap is amplified when fiscal adjustments take place after the resolution of such financial turmoil. Similarly, fiscal consolidation programs combined with inflation are likely to increase inequality and the effects of fiscal adjustments on inequality are amplified during periods of relatively low growth. Our results also provide support for a non‐linear relationship between inequality and income and corroborate the idea that trade can promote a more equal distribution of income.     

Systemic financial crises and the housing market cycle

Using quarterly data for a group of 20 industrialized countries and both continuous- and discrete-time duration models, we show that financial crisis recessions are associated with a two- to three-fold increase in the likelihood of the end of a housing boom. Additionally, recessions preceded by booms in mortgage credit are especially damaging, as their occurrence coincides with an increase in the duration of housing market slumps of almost 90%.     

The short- and long-run impacts of financial crises on youth unemployment in OECD countries

The impact of financial crises on the youth unemployment rate (YUR), compared to the total unemployment rate (UR), is estimated for a panel of OECD countries over the period 1981–2009, using bias-corrected dynamic panel data estimators of short- and long-run coefficients. Both YUR and UR are found highly persistent. Also, short- and long-run effects of financial crises on YUR are significantly large, respectively, some 1.9 and 1.5–1.7 times higher than the short- and long-run effects on UR. Similar results are found for the unemployment impacts of GDP growth lagged 1 year and institutional variables. These results are robust to various dynamic specifications.     

What are the effects of fiscal policy on asset markets?

We investigate the link between fiscal policy shocks and asset markets. Our results show that spending shocks have: a positive and persistent effect on GDP in the U.S. and in the U.K., while for Germany and Italy, such impact is temporary; a positive and persistent effect on housing prices; a negative effect on stock prices; and mixed effects on the price level. A VAR counter-factual exercise suggests that fiscal shocks play a minor role in the asset markets of the U.S. and Germany, and substantially increase the variability of housing and stock prices in the U.K., while government revenue shocks have increased volatility in Italy.     

Does external shock trigger systemic banking distress?

Before 2007, many studies claimed that wide-scale banking distress in various countries was preceded and could be predicted by deteriorating macroeconomic indicators such as falling GDP growth rate. However, these researches were mostly based on “event studies” which identified crises too late. By using banking sector asset price data, the paper finds that economies still thrive in the “pre-crisis” period in terms of increasing GDP growth. The slowdown of economy in terms of a fall in GDP growth is generally associated with the post-crisis period coinciding with the bubble burst process. Thus, this result supports the policy view that it is not useful to postpone macroeconomic stability to conceal banking sector weakness.     

A contribution to the empirics of convergence in real GDP growth: the role of financial crises and exchange-rate regimes

This paper investigates the convergence in real gross domestic product growth focusing on the impact of financial crises (i.e. banking crises, currency crises and debt crises) and nominal exchange-rate regimes (i.e. fixed, intermediate and flexible) on convergence. To that end, we compute four convergence indicators (σ-convergence, γ-convergence, absolute β-convergence and conditional β-convergence) for 163 countries classified into four income groups during the period 1970–2011. The results suggest that (i) there is evidence in favour of σ-convergence and γ-convergence only for high-income countries; (ii) absolute and conditional β-convergence are present in each of the four income groups of the countries under study; (iii) exchange-rate regimes seem to play some role in upper-middle and lower-middle-income countries; and (iv) financial crises have a negative and significant impact on GDP growth independently of the income level of the countries.     

Do the global stochastic trends drive the real house prices in OECD countries?

This paper demonstrates that in the long-run the main determinants of the real housing prices for a panel dataset comprising the quarterly observations of 12 OECD countries are the real GDP per capita and the real interest rate along with the global stochastic trends.     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

The limited usefulness of macroeconomic Bayesian VARs when estimating the probability of a US recession

The Bayesian VAR model provides a convenient tool for generating predictive densities and making probability statements regarding the future development of economic variables. This paper investigates the usefulness of standard macroeconomic Bayesian VAR models to estimate the probability of a US recession. Defining a recession as two quarters in a row of negative GDP growth, the probability is estimated for two quarters of the most recent US recession, namely 2008Q3–2008Q4. In contrast to judgemental probabilities from this point in time, it is found that the BVAR assigns a very low probability to such an event. This is true also when survey data, which generally are considered as good leading indicators, are included in the models. We conclude that while Bayesian VAR models are good forecasting tools in many cases, the results in this paper raise question marks regarding their usefulness for predicting recessions.