基于市场分割的地方政府补贴对地区贸易出口的影响

选取2002年到2015年14年间中国30个省（直辖市、自治区）数据,采用系统GMM模型,考量中国地方政府补贴对中国地方贸易出口量的影响。结果发现：地方政府补贴对地区贸易出口的影响主要是通过市场分割实现,但FDI会弱化地方政府补贴对地区贸易出口的正向效应。     

When to go abroad: economic policy uncertainty and Chinese firms’ overseas investment

We study how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) influences firms’ overseas investments for Chinese listed companies. We find a significant negative relationship between EPU and firms’ overseas investments after controlling for firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Chinese firms seem to reduce their overseas investments on fixed income securities when facing domestic policy uncertainty. The negative relationship is pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms relying on government subsidies and with low overseas revenues, and SOEs. Firms operating in high marketisation regions can mitigate the negative effect of EPU on firms’ overseas investments. Our results remain significant when considering endogeneity problems.     

Government R&D spending,fiscal instruments and corporate technological innovation

Using panel data from 242 cities in China, we examine the impact of government research and development (R&D) spending on corporate technological innovation. We find that listed firms located in cities with higher government R&D expenditures are more innovative than firms in other cities. Further, the positive effect of government R&D spending depends on fiscal instruments and factor allocation. Through subsidies and tax incentives, government R&D spending enhances firm innovation by alleviating financing constraints, improving employee creativity and ensuring efficient operations. We demonstrate that subsidies are more effective than taxes in spurring corporate technological innovation. We also show that the impact of government R&D spending is stronger for state-owned and high-tech enterprises than for other enterprises. Overall, our findings suggest that government R&D spending can substantially improve corporate technological innovation through fiscal instruments.     

Chairman’s government background,excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises

Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China continue to face government interference in their operations. They are influenced both by the government’s “grabbing hand” and by its “helping hand.” Our study examines how SOE chairmen with connections to government influence their firm’s employment policies and the economic consequences of overstaffing. Using a sample of China’s listed local state-owned enterprises, we find that the scale of overstaffing in these SOEs is negatively related to the firms’ political connections to government. However, this relationship turns positive when the firm’s chairman has a government background. Appointing chairmen who have government backgrounds is a mechanism through which the government can intervene in local SOEs and influence firms’ staffing decisions. We also find that in compensation for the expenses of overstaffing, local SOEs receive more government subsidies and bank loans. However, the chairmen themselves do not get increased pay or promotion opportunities for supporting overstaffing. Further analysis indicates that whereas the “grabbing hand” of government does harm to a firm’s economic performance, the “helping hand” provides only weak positive effects, and such government intervention actually reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.     

政府创新补贴时点对企业技术跨越影响的实证研究

基于2015-2018年816家A股上市公司的数据,通过Logit模型和中介效应模型研究政府事前创新补贴和事后创新补贴对企业技术跨越的影响.结果表明:政府事前补贴和事后补贴对企业技术跨越有显著的促进效应,且存在企业性质和地区的异质性.政府事前补贴的企业技术跨越效应不存在信号传递机制路径和企业"寻租"路径,政府事后补贴可通过企业研发支出的增加,促进企业技术跨越.     

Childcare Assistance: Are Subsidies or Tax Credits Better?

We evaluate price subsidies and tax credits for childcare. We focus on partnered women's labour supply, household income and welfare, demand for childcare and government expenditure. Using Australian data, we estimate a joint, discrete structural model of labour supply and childcare demand. We introduce two methodological innovations – a more flexible quantity constraint that total formal and informal childcare hours are at least as large as the mother's labour supply and the explicit inclusion of maternal childcare in the utility function as a proxy for child development. We find that tax credits are more effective than subsidies in terms of increasing average hours worked and household income. However, tax credits disproportionately benefit wealthier and more educated women. Price subsidies, while less efficient, have positive redistributional effects.     

Canada's Budget Triumph

In the mid‐1990s Canada's federal government, concerned about a debt‐to‐GDP ratio that was approaching 70%, began a decade‐long policy of cutting government spending. It also increased taxes, but by only one dollar for about every six dollars of spending cuts. The Canadian government cut subsidies to individuals, corporations, and provincial governments while tightening eligibility for unemployment insurance. The government also sold off its holdings of various state‐owned enterprises. One major success was its shifting of air traffic control to NAV Canada, a private, non‐profit user cooperative. This step netted the government $1.4 billion at the outset, saved about $200 million a year in subsidies, and resulted in a technological revolution in air traffic control that has put Canada years ahead of the United States. From 1997 to 2008, Canada's government had an unbroken string of annual budget surpluses; and by 2009, Canada's debt‐to‐GDP ratio had fallen below 30%. Starting in 2000, the government used some of what otherwise would have been surplus to cut taxes on individuals and corporations. The corporate tax rate was cut in stages from 28% in 2000 to 21% by 2004.     

On the relationship between the number of a broker’s real estate listings and transaction outcomes

This paper documents that sellers who employ brokerage offices that list a large number of properties (“active brokerages”) obtain higher selling prices, smaller negotiated discounts from the corresponding list prices, and shorter times on the market for their listed properties. Sellers who employ active brokerages list their properties at prices that are closer to our hedonic model’s predicted prices. Interestingly, properties that are listed at discounts relative to their predicted prices are snapped up more quickly only if they are associated with brokerages that list a relatively small number of properties. In addition, properties listed by active brokerages are less likely to be listed “as is” and are more likely to have their defects repaired prior to being listed. Moreover, because the efficacy of brokerage services varies across brokerage offices, the results also suggest that the use of an indicator variable for the use of brokerage services is not sufficient to capture the complete impact of the use of a real estate broker on transaction outcomes. In addition, the Appendix discusses the concern for potential endogeneities between the number of brokerage listings and transaction outcomes. It documents that the Durban–Wu–Hausman test indicates that exogeneity cannot be rejected.     

Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

This paper examines the role of downward earnings management and political connection on the receipt of government subsidies and market pricing of subsidies. Using subsidies data hand-collected from Chinese listed firms over the period 2004–2014, the results show a significantly positive association between downward earnings management and the receipt of government subsidies. The results also reveal that a firm's political connection is conducive to securing subsidies for poor performers, but not for good performers. Market pricing analyses demonstrate that share markets value subsidies positively in general, but the effect is ameliorated in firms conducting downward earnings management. No discernible difference is found between the market pricing of subsidies received by firms with political connections and those without.     

子女照料、家庭负债与已婚女性就业——基于Becker家庭决策模型的微观实证

子女照料与家庭负债对已婚女性的就业选择具有重要影响。为此,在Becker家庭决策模型基础上,建立资产负债约束下已婚女性“子女照料—闲暇—就业”效用最大化决策模型,利用2016年CFPS数据分析发现：子女照料对已婚女性就业概率及周工作时间存在负向影响,且家庭的银行负债对子女照料与已婚女性就业的关系存在负向调节效应。因此,在鼓励女性生育的政策背景下,政府需要综合考虑子女照料负担与家庭负债约束,制定更加有效的已婚女性就业保障政策。     

政府补助、融资结构与中小企业研发投入--基于动态面板系统GMM与门槛效应分析

采用2015—2019年中小板上市企业面板数据,实证检验政府补助对中小企业研发投入的影响,并基于融资结构视角,进一步应用动态面板门槛模型研究发现:政府补助能够显著促进企业研发投入,且由于财务冗余以及资金使用偏好等因素的存在,该影响表现出滞后性与门槛异质性特点。当内源融资水平低于或等于0.353、债权融资水平与股权融资水平分别处于20.938—30.728、-0.357—14.489区间时,补助效果最佳。据此提出完善监督机制、优化补助政策、加大资本市场改革力度等提高政府补助使用效率的相关建议。     

地方政府举债影响工业经济增长的空间效应研究

通过构建了地方政府举债影响工业经济增长的理论模型,并分析两者呈正向相关的作用机制;基于空间关联模型,采用2010-2015年全国30个省份地方政府债务的面板数据,对地方政府举债的工业经济增长效应进行实证研究.结果表明:(1)地方政府举债对工业经济增长具有显著的促进作用.地方政府通过对国有土地的绝对垄断来经营城市,利用土地抵押融资来大规模举债,并改善城市基础设施吸引投资,促进工业经济增长;(2)地方政府举债对地区工业经济增长的溢出效应不明显.地方政府债务主要投向了市政建设、交通运输等基础设施建设领域,对邻近地区的工业经济发展很难起到推动作用.     

Earnings‐based Delisting Regulations and Government Subsidies

This paper examines who receives government subsidies when a firm faces delisting risk and how subsidies affect such a firm's performance in China. It focuses on the accounting‐based delisting rule issued in 1998 that relies heavily on the profitability of firms. Using the probit model, this study finds that subsidies are less likely to be granted to a firm that has a higher risk of being delisted than a healthy firm, but are more likely to be granted to such a firm if it is state‐owned. It is also found that having a political connection increases a firm's chance of receiving subsidies, but such an effect disappears when a firm faces a delisting risk. In assessing the impact of a subsidy on firm performance, this study shows that a subsidy increases a firm's valuation and profitability for firms at delisting risk.     

What drives China's current account?

The paper offers an empirical taxonomy of the factors driving China's current account. A simple present-value model with non-tradeable goods explains more than 70 percent of current account variability over the period 1982–2007, including the persistent surpluses since 2001. It also correctly predicts the decline of China's current account since 2008. Expected increases in the prices of non-tradeables (e.g. housing and medical care) and expected declines in net output (GDP less investment and government spending) are the main channels of external adjustment. Much of China's current account surplus seems driven by shocks that have global effects by persistently depressing the world real interest rate. This is consistent with recent theoretical models that suggest that factors related to China's domestic financial development are key in understanding global imbalances.     

政府信息公开、财政补贴配置及应用绩效

政府信息公开是提高政府透明度及行政效率的重要制度安排,深刻影响政府资源配置效率与应用绩效.以我国2011-2015年 A股民营上市公司为样本,研究企业注册地政府信息公开质量对企业财政补贴可获性及补贴绩效的影响,结果显示:政府信息公开程度越高的地区,民营企业通过政治关系获取财政补贴现象得以有效抑制,财政补贴配置效率和财政补贴的使用绩效更高.     

政府补贴和国有参股对参与PPP企业外部融资的影响

政府补贴和国有资本参股是政府参与PPP(政府和社会资本合作)的两种主要方式。本文借助一个资本具有外部性的一般均衡模型来分析这两种方式对企业外部融资的影响机制,并进行经验验证。理论分析发现,国有参股的担保效应增加了项目公司对高杠杆的需求,提升了金融中介发放贷款的意愿,使金融中介接受更低的借款利率。政府补贴不影响项目公司与金融中介之间的借贷合约。项目公司外部融资所受影响会进一步传导至参与PPP的企业。因此,国有参股增加稳态时的企业杠杆率,降低借款利率;政府补贴则不影响杠杆率和利率。实证部分通过整合2014-2018年财政部PPP项目库数据和2010-2018年上市公司财务数据,借助PSM-DID分析发现,国有参股程度显著降低参与PPP项目的上市公司的借贷成本并提升其杠杆率,但政府补贴支出没有明显作用,印证了模型结论。此外,市场化程度更高的地区,国有参股程度对参与企业外部融资的影响程度更小。本文研究对PPP模式下如何减少政府债务风险以及控制债务风险向企业转移具有一定的参考意义。     

Do insiders trade on government subsidies?

We examine whether and how insiders trade on government subsidies, a major instrument through which the governments intervene in the economy. Using a novel dataset of government subsidies of Chinese listed firms, we find that net insider purchase increases significantly during the month of subsidy receipt. The effect of subsidies on insider trading is weaker in firms with a more transparent information environment and when subsidies are granted in a more predictable manner. In contrast, the effect is more pronounced for politically connected firms. Further analysis shows that the subsidy-trading relation may reflect both insiders’ informational advantage concerning subsidies and their superior ability to detect mispricing-related opportunities. Our findings provide new insights into the capital market consequences of government subsidies through the lens of insider trading.     

Controlling Shareholders’ Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China

The split share structure reform removes a significant market friction in China's capital market by allowing previously non‐tradable shares to be freely tradable at market prices. Such a reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former now care more about stock prices. We find that state‐owned firms, but not non‐state‐owned firms, significantly increased their tax avoidance activities after the reform. We attribute this differential effect to the dual role of the government as state‐owned firms’ controlling shareholder as well as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced for state‐owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value. Overall, our study suggests that when controlling shareholders are more concerned about stock prices, state‐owned firms engage more in tax avoidance activities to enhance firm value.     

Protection or expropriation: Politically connected independent directors in China

This paper empirically investigates politically connected independent directors among Chinese listed firms using 7487 firm-year observations from the Shanghai stock exchange during the period of 2003–2012. We distinguish between privately controlled firms and state-controlled firms. We find that the value effect and incentives of appointing independent directors with political ties are shaped by a firm’s ownership structure. More exactly, Chinese listed privately controlled firms with a large fraction of politically connected independent directors tend to outperform their non-connected counterparts, due to the ease of access to external debt financing and more subsidies from the government. However, the appointment of politically connected independent directors also enlarges the magnitude of related-party transactions with the controlling party in listed privately controlled firms. In contrast, having politicians as independent directors does not help to add value to listed state-controlled firms, especially firms controlled by the local government, due to the expropriation of minority investors via more related-party transactions and more severe over-investment problems.     

Do state subsidies increase corporate environmental spending?

This study investigates the impact of state subsidies on corporate environmental spending of Chinese listed firms between 2011 and 2018, using a hand-collected data from corporate annual and environmental responsibility reports. We find a positive relationship between state subsidies and corporate environment spending, indicating firms receiving government subsidies are more likely to behave more environmentally responsible. In addition, the positive relationships are more pronounced among the non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and the firms experiencing financial constraints. It is because, non-SOEs are more likely to lose government support comparing to their SOE peers, thus making more efforts to address corporate pollution. Moreover, firms subject to financial difficulties tend to build an environmental responsible image and to contribute more in environment protection.