The Institutional Context of an ‘Empirical Law’: The Wage Curve under Different Regimes of Collective Bargaining

The wage curve postulates that the wage level is a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. In testing this hypothesis, most studies have not taken into account that differences in the institutional framework may have an impact on the existence (or the slope) of a wage curve. Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset for Western Germany, this article provides a first direct test of the relevance of different bargaining regimes (and of works councils) for the existence of a wage curve. In pooled regressions for the period 1998 to 2006, as well as in worker‐level or plant‐level fixed‐effects estimations, we obtain evidence for a wage curve for plants with a collective bargaining agreement at firm level. The point estimates for this group of plants are close to the ?0.1 elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment postulated by Blanchflower and Oswald. In this regime, we also find that works councils dampen the adjustment of wages to the regional unemployment situation. In the other regimes of plants that either do not make use of collective contracts or apply sectoral agreements, we do not find a wage curve.     

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm-Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian-linked employer–employee panel data, our findings show that firm-level agreements increase both wage costs and labour productivity (with respect to sector-level agreements). Relying on approaches developed by Bartolucci and Hellerstein et al., they also indicate that firm-level agreements exert a stronger impact on wages than on productivity, so that profitability is hampered. However, this rent-sharing effect mostly holds in sectors where firms are more concentrated or less exposed to international competition. Firm agreements are thus mainly found to raise wages beyond labour productivity when the rents to be shared between workers and firms are relatively big. Overall, this suggests that firm-level agreements benefit both employers and employees — through higher productivity and wages — without being very detrimental to firms’ performance.     

The Coverage of Collective Pay-setting Institutions in Britain, 1895–1990

Fewer than 50% of British employees now have their pay and conditions affected by collective pay-setting institutions — collective bargaining or wages councils. This paper charts the historical context for the current picture of a decollectivized Britain, constructing a time series on coverage from 1895 to 1990. Extant estimates and sources of coverage data are presented and discussed alongside estimates drawn from a source used only sparingly before now — the number of workers affected by changes in wage rates of national agreements or wage orders. The recent decline in collective bargaining coverage is the most prolonged ever recorded and has been noticeably steeper than the fall in union density, such that the proportion of British workers covered is lower now than in the 1940s. With the abolition of wages councils in 1993, collective pay-setting machinery now affects the pay and conditions of fewer workers than it did in the 1930s.     

Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel Data

Traditional estimates that often find minimum wage disemployment effects include controls for state unemployment rates and state‐ and year‐fixed effects. Using CPS data on teens for the period 1990–2009, we show that such estimates fail to account for heterogeneous employment patterns that are correlated with selectivity among states with minimum wages. As a result, the estimates are often biased and not robust to the source of identifying variation. Including controls for long‐term growth differences among states and for heterogeneous economic shocks renders the employment and hours elasticities indistinguishable from zero and rules out any but very small disemployment effects. Dynamic evidence further shows the nature of bias in traditional estimates, and it also rules out all but very small negative long‐run effects. In addition, we do not find evidence that employment effects vary in different parts of the business cycle. We also consider predictable versus unpredictable changes in the minimum wage by looking at the effects of state indexation of the minimum wage.     

Wages Councils: Was There a Case for Abolition?

The 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act removed the remaining minimum wage protection for some 2.5 million low paid workers by abolishing the last 26 UK Wages Councils. The Government's case for abolition rested on three key arguments: (1) minimum wages do little to alleviate poverty since most covered workers do not live in poor households; (2) when in operation, minimum wages reduced employment in covered industries; (3) the problems of poverty that the wages councils were set up to deal with in 1909 are not relevant in today's labour market. In this paper we address each of these points in turn. We find that: (a) 50 per cent of families with at least one earner being paid wages council rates come from the poorest 20 per cent of families; (b) the existing evidence suggests that abolishing the Wages Councils is unlikely to create jobs; (c) the widening earnings distribution in the UK means that low pay is an increasingly important determinant of poverty. If anything, there appears to be an increasing need for minimum wage legislation in the UK.     

Decentralized Wage Formation in Sweden

Recent Swedish collective bargaining agreements have incorporated provisions for local pay review talks and opportunities for individuals to negotiate their own wages. Using trade union data, we show that members who participate in local pay review talks and members who negotiate their own wages have significantly higher monthly wages than those who do not. Pay decentralization either improves an individual's bargaining position or attracts more productive trade union members. Either way, trade union wage policies to increase individual‐level wage variance are achieving their intended effects.     

Wage councils,product markups and wage markdowns: Evidence from Uruguay

In 2005, after a leftist coalition won the national election for the first time, Uruguay returned to sector-level wage bargaining councils with active government participation. We estimate product markups and wage markdowns using firm-level data for the period 2002–2016, and report decreasing wage markdowns and increasing -to a lesser extent- firm-level product markups. We find statistically significant impacts of minimum mandated wages on product markups and wage markdowns, and additional effects of unions on wage markdowns. The evidence suggests that firms operate in monopsonistic labor markets. Though their bargaining power in the labor market was reduced over time as a result of wage councils, firms were able to pass a sizable part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.     

Where the Grass Is Greener: Voluntary Turnover and Wage Premiums

Standard economic and compensation theories suggest that voluntary turnover should decline when a firm pays wages that are higher than those of its competitors. Turnover behavior in the State of California's Civil Service, however, does not support this prediction. Using a fixed-effects estimator to control for job-specific characteristics, I find that the wages California pays relative to those of its competitors has little or no effect on turnover. In addition, estimates of the elasticity of turnover with respect to alternative wages indicate that higher wage rates do not pay for themselves through lower turnover costs. Instead, the absolute wage level and wage growth have large effects. In other words, it appears that workers are less likely to quit jobs that pay high wages and have larger wage increases no matter how their wages compare with those paid by other employers.     

Rent‐Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using Belgian linked employer–employee data, we examine how collective bargaining arrangements affect the relationship between firms' profitability and individual wages via rent‐sharing. In industries where agreements are usually renegotiated at firm‐level (‘decentralized industries’) wages and firm‐level profits are positively correlated regardless of the type of collective wage agreement by which the workers are covered (industry or firm). On the other hand, where firm‐level wage renegotiation is less common (‘centralized industries’), wages are only significantly related to firms' profitability for workers covered by a firm‐level collective agreement. Thus, industry‐wide contracts that are not complemented by a firm‐level collective agreement suppress the impact of firm profits on workers' wages in centralized industries.     

Wage-fixing Behaviour of Managers in Australia

Researchers have conducted surveys of firms in an attempt to test various theories of wage rigidity. The survey of Australian firms reported in this paper found strong support for the view that hiring and training costs are important reasons why employers do not reduce wages, consistent with the surveys of Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1995, 1999) and Kaufman (1984). All the surveys find pervasive support for the notion of fairness as an explanation for wage rigidity. Qualified support was found for the idea that fear of unemployment motivates worker effort.     

Skilled Immigration,Innovation, and the Wages of Native‐Born Americans

The paper examines the effects of skilled immigration on wages that can be credited to immigrants’ contribution to innovation. Using both individual and state‐level datasets from the United States, we find a significant and positive effect of immigration on wages that is attributable to skilled immigrants’ contribution to innovation. Our results confirm previous findings that immigrants contribute substantially to the host economy's innovation, which is a major driver of technological progress and productivity growth. When we augment the analysis to an immigration–innovation–wages nexus, the results suggest that as the share of skilled immigrants in a particular skill group increases, the wages of both natives and immigrants in that group also get a positive boost. We also identify evidence in favor of a positive spillover effect of skilled immigrants on a state's wage level of all workers, including those who do not directly contribute to innovation.     

Minimum Wages and Youth Employment: Evidence from the Finnish Retail Trade Sector

Following an agreement between the trade unions and the employer organizations in 1993, Finnish employers could temporarily pay less than the existing minimum wage for young workers. We examine the effects of these minimum wage exceptions by comparing the changes in wages and employment of the groups whose minimum wages were reduced with simultaneous changes among slightly older workers for whom the minimum wages remained unchanged. Our analysis is based on payroll record data and minimum wage agreements from the retail trade sector. The results show that average wages in the eligible group declined only modestly. We find no significant effects on employment.     

Low Pay and Wage Regulation in the European Community

The prospect of direct intervention in the process of wage determination as envisaged in the Social Charter has met with considerable criticism. In particular, employers' organizations and certain governments have rejected outright the proposal to require firms to pay an equitable wage. However, in all member-states except the UK and Ireland, arrangements exist to ensure that nearly all workers are covered by minimum wage protection (through national minimum wages or full-coverage collective agreements). In this article the nature of low-paid employment in member-states is examined and different methods of wage regulation are described. After reviewing the economic effects of wage regulation, we discuss possible initiatives on wage regulation at the Community level.     

Menu Costs, Nominal Wage Revisions, and Intracontract Wage Behavior

We use data from indexed and nonindexed Canadian wage agreements to study the intracontract profile of nominal and real wages. Allowing for endogenous switching between the two indexation categories, we conclude that the number of nominal wage revisions depends on contract duration, expected inflation, and the cost of adjusting wages. Our results have implications for the menu cost, overlapping contracts, dynamic monopoly union, and efficient bargain literatures.     

Sectoral Productivity and the Distribution of Wages

Policy reports suggesting that productivity growth will raise the earnings of low-wage workers are based on the concept that gains from productivity will trickle down to raise the wages of workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. The compensation and employment systems of American industry do strongly link gains in industry productivity to wage increases for most workers. However, this analysis finds that the linkage of productivity change to wage change for the workers at the lower end of the distribution is virtually nonexistent. The empirical results of this study suggest that productivity increases have no effect on the wage change of workers at the lowest 10th percentile of the distribution and widen the dispersion in industry wages.     

Collective Wage Contracts,Opt‐Out Clauses,and Firm Wage Differentials: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large linked employer–employee data set, this article studies whether the existence and use of flexibility provisions within centralized collective wage agreements alter the structure of pay across employers. Using level regressions and first‐difference methods, we find that—compared with contracts without any flexibility—wages under opt‐out clauses are more responsive to local profitability conditions in below‐average‐performing establishments. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to local profitability is smaller in high‐performance establishments. Our results provide further evidence for a threat potential of the existence of opt‐out clauses whose impact on flexibility is larger than the real application.     

LDC Labor Markets: Applications of Internal Labor Market Theory

This article does not attempt, nor has it delivered, a complete theory for the labor market in Egypt, let alone for LDC labor markets in general. The macro-model developed here serves mainly to demonstrate the diaculties involved in formulating macro-theories for LDC labor markets that, while necessarily simple, can still claim realism when confronted with certain fundamental “stylized h t s. Our considerations have, moreover, been limited to LDCs with mixed economies, using Egypt as the example. Hence, large-scale modern industry was assumed to belong to the public sector which then emerges as the country dominant, nonagricultural employer. Agriculture is the second large and relatively homogeneous sector, in Egypt dominated by small holdings. In-between we find the private, nonagricultural sector, overwhelmingly dominated by small-scale enterprises with large numbers of the self-employed, and with trade as the most important single activity. Labor is (in Egypt) generally unorganized or enrolled in government-controlled unions, active mainly in the public sector and without much real say in matters of wages and salaries. It is in this specific institutional setting that I have tried to discuss the application of internal labor market theory. This theory has, to the best of my understanding, nothing to offer by way of explaining public sector behavior (which is of crucial importance for wage and employment formation in a mixed economy). However, adapted to the circumstances, internal labor market theory goes a long way toward explaining wages and employment in agriculture and the “informal” small-scale sector. Our considerations, tentative though they are, do not point to any single, dominant labor market mechanism that could form the basis for a simple macro-theory. Wage flexibility differs greatly between sectors, overstaEng may be a more important phenomenon than unemployment in some activities, and unemployment may be of both the voluntary and involuntary variety, with withdrawals from the labor market related to well-defined reserve wages, and open unemployment related to internal labor market behavior. These considerations are based more on loose impressions than on solid facts. Further theorizing may be needed, but the development of labor market theory for LDCs has undoubtedly reached a point where progress depends critically upon painstaking empirical studies of basic labor market institutions such as employment and wage forms and responses, bargaining procedures, and conditions of both labor and output markets for small private enterprises in particular countries. Considerable work has been done in India but even here much remains for investigation. Studies of specific countries may, even for LDCs in rapid, turbulent transformation, disclose ongoing changes in institutions that for a full understanding of the labor market may be more important than the institutions themselves. Existing wage theory has little to offer for the analysis of such institutional change, but something may be learned from the American institutional school in labor economics whose leading exponent we are paying homage to with these papers.     

The Impact of Living‐Wage Ordinances on Urban Crime

We examine the impact of living wages on crime. Past research has found that living wages appear to increase unemployment while providing greater returns to market work. The impact on crime, therefore, is unclear. Using data on annual crime rates for large cities in the United States, we find that living‐wage ordinances are associated with notable reductions in property‐related crime and no discernable impact on nonproperty crimes.     

The Impact of Amnesty on Labor Market Outcomes: A Panel Study Using the Legalized Population Survey

This article tests whether amnesty, a provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, affected the labor market outcomes of the legalized population. Using a quasi‐experimental framework, we find that employment fell, unemployment rose, and wage growth rates were higher for newly legalized men after the implementation of the amnesty program. For women, employment fell, transitions out of the workforce increased, and wages grew at a faster rate among the newly legalized population.     

What Do We Know About Worker Displacement in the U.S.?

Each year during the eighties, plant closings in the U.S. displaced roughly one-half million workers with three-plus years on the job. The recent data and empirical research reviewed here show that wage cuts lower only slightly the probability that a plant will close. Average earnings losses due to long spells of unemployment and to subsequent reduced wages are substantial. Minorities suffer an above-average rate of displacement, but their earnings losses are not unusually high. Women and older workers are no more likely than others to become displaced or to suffer greater earnings losses, but high-tenure workers lose more.