Employment protection regulation,trade unions and tenure of employment: An analysis in 23 European countries

This article focuses on the relationship between employment protection regulation (EPL), trade unions and tenure of employment. A main hypothesis is that EPL strictness tends to prolong tenure, because rigorous rules imply that remaining with the same employer gives more job security. The role of unions can be expected to be similar. These assumptions are related to issues regarding dualisation in the labour market. Data used are the European Working Conditions Survey 2010—including 23 countries and more than 18,500 employees—combined with national‐level data on EPL, unemployment, union density and collective bargaining coverage. The analyses reveal that EPL strictness and bargaining coverage are associated with longer tenure. The same goes for having an employee representative in the workplace. The institutional variables work through interactions with individual‐level variables. For example, the impact of age, which is strongly linked to tenure, increases with stricter EPL and higher bargaining coverage.     

The industrial relations practices of multi-plant foreign owned firms

Data from a survey of 143 enterprises indicates that foreign-owned firms are likely to devote more resources to, and be more advanced in, modern human resource management techniques while being similar in the extent to which unions are recognised for collective bargaining.     

Union effects on pay levels in Britain

The contraction of union representation in Britain raises the question of whether or not unions still achieve a wage premium. Analysis of matched employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that there is now no demonstrable premium for private sector workers in general. However, unions do achieve a wage premium of around 9% for about half of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The effect of union bargaining spills over to other employees in the same workplaces. The paper identifies circumstances where union effects are strongest—employer endorsement of union membership, high collective bargaining coverage and multi-unionism.     

Collective bargaining in Portugal in the aftermath of the crisis: trends and prospects

This article examines the decline of collective bargaining in Portugal during the recent economic crisis and why, following significant improvements in the economic and political contexts, the number of collective agreements published each year remains lower than before. Drawing on theoretical work on institutional change by Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Baccaro and Howell (2017), it argues that industrial relations institutions in Portugal have been subject to an incremental but transformative process of liberalisation. The analysis of national data and in‐depth interviews with key informants reveals that serial legal amendments since the 1990's weakened unions, converted bargaining into a mechanism to introduce flexibility and wage austerity and reduced incentives for the parties to conclude agreements. While these changes were gradual, their consequences became clear during the crisis. By improving understanding of recent developments in Portuguese collective bargaining, the article enriches knowledge of processes of liberalisation of industrial relations in Europe.     

Coordinated employer bargaining and globalisation: a study of the men's clothing industry in Quebec, 1974–2012

This article looks at the political economy of employer coordination of collective bargaining in the clothing or apparel manufacturing industry in Canada over three phases of globalisation: from the Multi‐Fiber Agreement in 1974 to the impact of the entry of China in the WTO. Although prevailing accounts emphasise the force of exogenous change and the likely decentralisation of bargaining structures and demise of bargaining coordination by employers, this case highlights how unions and employers sought to preserve their institutional model. We find that actor strategies and their interrelations are a central part of the explanation of this apparent institutional stability, despite the real force of economic, organisational and public policy factors. However, it is a dynamic stability in which change processes, reflecting shifting power relations, are leading to important shifts in the nature of employer coordination.     

‘Unbound’ employers' associations and derogations: erosion and renewal of collective bargaining in the German metalworking industry

Declining union density, the reduction in coverage or informal derogations from collective agreements are signs of erosion of the corporatist German system of collective bargaining. However, new developments can be observed like ‘unbound’ employers' associations or derogations from collective agreements. These new developments make it necessary to reassess the prospects of collective bargaining. At the first sight they seem to be little more than indicators of erosion or exhaustion, but the in‐depth analysis reveals that these developments can be starting points of renewal because they give stimuli to increase the associational power of employers' associations and, even more important for collective bargaining, unions. As a result, however, collective bargaining will become less corporatist in style.     

The bargaining power of teachers’ unions and the allocation of school resources

This paper examines how district size affects the bargaining power of teachers’ unions and the allocation of school resources. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that 33 states mandate collective bargaining while 5 states prohibited it. In states that mandate collective bargaining, we find that beginning salaries and the premium paid to experienced teachers increase with district size while the teacher–pupil ratio declines with district size. In contrast, in states that prohibit collective bargaining we find a negative relationship between district size and the premium paid to experienced teachers. District size also has a stronger positive effect on beginning salaries and a weaker negative effect on teacher–pupil ratios in states that prohibit collective bargaining. Collectively, our results suggest that more powerful unions bargain for more generous returns to teacher seniority at the expense of staffing ratios and base salaries.     

The decollectivisation of trade unions? Ballots and collective bargaining in the 1980s

Balloting has been held to undermine collective decision making within unions. This article, based upon analysis of the rule books of all TUC affiliated unions and case study material, outlines the law on balloting and collective bargaining, and examines the response to legislative changes. The authors argue that although legislation has led to greater formalisation and centralisation in decision-making on collective action, decision-making remains collective.     

Convergent and divergent country trends in coordinated wage setting and collective bargaining in the public hospitals sector

Drawing on the findings of research in the public hospitals sector in five European countries 1 —France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK—this article assesses the character of change in wage setting and collective bargaining. It demonstrates the diversity of national arrangements by comparing key characteristics: (i) the bodies of collective representation (unions, professional associations and employer bodies); (ii) the degree of integration with the wider public sector framework; (iii) coordination (or competition) with the private hospitals sector; and (iv) the practice of à la carte provisions within individual hospitals. Despite national varieties of wage setting and collective bargaining, each country sector faces similar tensions—most notably the opposition between public (labour market) rules and health (product market) rules, and pressures to segment or integrate employment conditions by labour force group. By examining the nature of change in institutions for wage setting and collective bargaining in each country, the article contributes to our understanding of the extent of coordination and change of public sector wage setting and describes three scenarios: fragmentation (Germany); continuity (France and the Netherlands); and reconstruction (the UK and Norway).     

Bargaining: separately or together?

This paper explores conditions under which economic agents will want to bargain collectively instead of individually with a common third party—when, for example, two firms (or unions), who are bargaining with the same, indispensable, outside party, will want to merge and bargain as one. I use a non-cooperative sequential bargaining model to analyze this question. Previous work has shown that agents prefer to bargain collectively if they are substitutes for each other in production. This result, however, depends on an exogenously fixed sequence of bargaining. I allow the bargaining sequence to be determined endogenously and investigate how incentives for collective bargaining vary with heterogeneity when delay is costly. The previous results are not robust when the agents are substitutes. In particular, substitute agents prefer individual to collective bargaining if they are heterogeneous and sufficiently patient. In the presence of transaction costs, substitutability of agents is no longer the sole determinant of collectivization. Rather, the degree of heterogeneity in production, in conjunction with the degree of substitutability between agents determine the incentives for collective action.     

What has been happening to collective bargaining under New Labour? Interpreting WERS 2004

The late 20th century saw the rapid decline of collective bargaining, which had hitherto been the dominant means of regulation of employment in Britain. The article uses a comparison of the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys for 1998 and 2004 to assess how far this changed during the later period of economic growth and sympathetic labour legislation. Contrary to expectations, the data show that collective bargaining coverage has continued to fall, although much of this decline is concentrated in small firms in the private sector. The article goes on to analyse the recent change at sectoral level and examines evidence on the extent to which the character, as well as the extent, of collective bargaining had changed. The locus of management decision making has continued to move down organisations, both where collective bargaining occurs and also where unions are absent. Finally, the article evaluates how the perceptions of those involved in the bargaining process have shifted at a time of greatly diminished trade union influence.     

Antecedents of concession bargaining in the Great Recession: evidence from Ireland

Concession or ‘give back’ bargaining involves firms seeking changes in pay and conditions of employment from trade unions in return for pledges of enhanced job security and sometimes other forms of reciprocation. Several distinct modes of concession bargaining are distinguishable in the literature, and three modes of concession bargaining have been identified in Ireland during the Great Recession: integrative, distributive and minimal engagement. Deploying qualitatively informed quantitative data on the conduct of collective bargaining during the Great Recession, this article examines a series of antecedent influences on the choices firms make in conducting concession bargaining with unions.     

Between trust and control: company‐level bargaining on flexible working hours in the Danish and German metal industries

Denmark is often highlighted as a good example of organised decentralisation in which employee bargaining power remains comparatively strong. However, comparative analysis of the Danish case rarely reflects how the social contracts between management and workers' representatives contribute to the bargaining outcome at company level. Drawing on 10 case studies in the German and Danish metal industries carried out in 2005, this article argues that the social contracts at the Danish case companies allow a more efficient use of company‐level agreements on flexible working hours than the social contracts at the German case companies.     

The collective bargaining of flexicurity: A case for sector‐level analysis? The Italian chemical and metalworking sectors compared

Although employment relations in Europe have long been seen as a factor of rigidity, limiting managerial discretion and adaptability, in the last 30 years, they have witnessed a trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining and negotiations increasingly centred on flexibility–security trade‐offs between employers and employees. Research on the contribution of collective bargaining to the so‐called flexicurity has mostly focused on national‐level institutional arrangements. In this article, we contend that meso‐level differences need to feature more prominently in the debate. Our comparison of two sectors in the same country (chemicals and metalworking in Italy) shows that decentralisation has divergent effects on flexicurity issues depending in particular on differences in market structures and on depth of bargaining. The interplay between these two factors affects what we refer to as procedural security, which we view as important in ensuring sustainable trade‐offs between flexibility and security.     

Problems with partnership at work: lessons from an Irish case study

This article uses a case study of a celebrated enterprise partnership in Ireland that broke down to get an insight into why such arrangements are hard to sustain. The argument of the article is that meaningful enterprise partnerships require trade unions and management to accept agency costs, which in practice involves management modifying their right to manage and unions accepting that issues normally addressed by the collective bargaining process may have to be delegated to the partnership arrangement. The evidence of the case study is that neither management nor unions were prepared to incur such costs. The case study suggests that the following trinity – meaningful partnership, full-blown collective bargaining and management's right to manage is exceptionally difficult to operate at the same time.     

The de-collectivisation of pay setting in Britain 1990–98: incidence,determinants and impact

What were the causes and consequences of declining collective bargaining coverage in Britain? The demise of collective bargaining did not lead to a greater use of individualised payment mechanisms, ‘high-involvement’ practices or productivity gains. Wage inequality rose as a result of the decline. However, workplaces that abandoned bargaining created more jobs. Overall, these results raise questions about Britain’s labour market performance during the 1990s because they suggest that falling unemployment as a result of weaker trade unions came at the price of slower productivity growth and widening male wage inequality.     

Bargaining and strikes: Towards an evolutionary framework

Conventional models of strikes start with the assumption that the bargainers' uniquely rational beliefs can be worked out in advance. Strikes are then explained as either the result of institutional constraints or of the possibility of irrationality. By contrast the evolutionary approach begins with a recognition that bargaining is naturally indeterminate and that, in the absence of a unique model of rational bargaining, conflict-free agreements between rational trades unions and firms reflect the evolution of one out of many possible conventions. This paper explores the alternative interpretation of strikes afforded by this perspective. In particular, it shows how strikes help shape the dispositions of bargainers (as opposed to just revealing it), how periods of conflict are succeeded by periods of industrial peace (and vice versa), and how the stability of bargaining protocols depends not only on the conventions regulating the relations between unions and firms but also on those between workers and union leaders as well as on technological innovations.     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

Learning from past mistakes? recent reforms in Italian industrial relations

Since the early 1990s, major reform efforts aimed at reducing industrial conflict, rationalising public sector labour relations, restructuring collective bargaining arrangements, and re-establishing tripartite ‘con-certation’ have transformed Italian industrial relations. This article argues that because these new reforms have been accompanied by significant shifts in both Italy's political system and the unions’ own organisation, they stand a better chance of succeeding than previous reform projects.     

Adapting to survive: The case of Danish employers' organisations

Scholars often characterise Danish employers' organisations (EOs) as relatively stable, with a continuing role in the coordination of industrial relations and corporatist policymaking. This article shows that, beneath surface stability, Danish EOs have significantly adapted structurally and functionally to survive environmental pressures. However, rather than converging onto a liberal market trajectory, we find that Danish EOs have layered new functions onto traditional collective functions. We also find significant variations in functional adaptation depending on the employer constituencies' exposure to international competition and position in value chains. We argue that these adaptations imply that the provision of collective goods, especially in collective bargaining, is no longer sufficient for the survival of EOs.