Trade and Gains from Trade Between Profit-maximizing and Labour-managed Countries with Imperfect Competition

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade.     

Imperfect Competition and the Gains from Trade in a Macro Duopoly Model

A general-equilibrium duopoly trade model is developed. In the micro model, constant-elasticity market demand curves produce backward-bending reaction functions. This is combined with a macro analysis in which the real wage is determined competitively, while nominal variables depend on the money supply. Trade can lead to large increases in aggregate output, employment, and real wages. The gains from trade are the result of increases in market size, and greater competition in each market. The benefits of trade are largest when marginal-cost curves slope downward and the labor supply curve is elastic.     

Customs Union and Gains from Trade Under Imperfect Competition: Variation of a Kemp-Wan Theme

In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-member countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.     

International Trade with a Public Intermediate Good and the Gains from Trade*

This paper presents a one‐primary factor, two‐consumer good, and two‐country model of international trade where each country’s government supplies a country‐specific public intermediate good so as to attain efficient production. By introducing the Marshallian adjustment process, it is demonstrated that the country with larger factor endowment exports the good whose productivity is more sensitive to the public intermediate good. Our normative analysis of free trade shows the following results. First, at least one country gains from trade. Secondly, if a country incompletely specializes in the trading equilibrium, the country necessarily loses from trade.     

Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

International Income Transfer under Imperfect Competition

This paper examines the effects of an international income transfer under international monopoly. One of the markets in the donor country is monopolized and there exist two distinct types of agent: monopolist and factor owners. The transfer is provided by the agents with different lump sum tax (burden‐share) rates. The burden‐share rate plays a key role concerning the welfare effects of a transfer. We show that the government of the donor country can raise both its social welfare and the wellbeing of the recipient country by providing a further transfer and by simultaneously adjusting the burden‐share rates.     

Gains from Trade with Lump-sum Compensation

This paper analyses the use of lump-sum compensation to ensure a Pareto improvement under free trade. It first shows how households, which are aware of the free-trade and compensation policy, may falsify autarkic consumption to get larger transfers. Despite consumption falsification, however, trade could still be gainful using lump-sum compensation under certain conditions. This paper also suggests a case in which an incentive-compatible lump-sum compensation scheme exists.     

Some Implications of Imperfect Competition For Recent Trade Theory*

This paper argues that in a general-equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono-polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal cost.     

Environmental Policies, Comparative Advantage and the Gains/Losses from International Trade

A multihousehold economy with multilateral nondepletable externalities, environmental (output) taxation and governmental production of pure, nonexclusive and nonrivalrous public goods is assumed. Modelling many different households the "almost perfect" isomorphism between the normative analysis of public goods and environmental policies is highlighted. Globally valid necessary and sufficient conditions for gains from international trade are derived and interpreted. A simple yet general environmental policy rule ensuring trade gains is put forward. The law of comparative advantage is generalized to economies with multilateral nondepletable externalities and over or underproduced pure public goods.     

论APEC服务贸易的自由化进程——不完全竞争条件下的一般均衡分析

原文出处:本文译自作者于1997年9月向美国国际贸易委员会经济学办公室提交的工作论文:Liberalizing APEC Trade in Services:A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition一、引言(一)服务贸易服务业在每一个国家都是一个重要的行业,在大多数国家它都占到GDP的50%到80%。集体而言,由于服务业是几乎所有国家中最大的行业,所以,把服务业说成是其他行业生产中重要的中间投入也就不奇怪了。服务业还在国际贸易中起着日益重要的作用。虽然,在过去,服务曾经被认为是不可交易的,但现在,国际服务贸易已成为世界贸易中发展最快…     

Tax Principles and Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies Under Imperfect Competition

We construct an exporting monopoly model to compare destination‐ and origin‐based commodity taxes in a context of a trade and domestic tax reform. We show that an export tax reduction and a change in destination (resp. origin) tax that fix the world price is strictly Pareto‐improving (resp. deteriorating), which holds whether markets are integrated or segmented. This result may provide a new rationale for preferring the destination‐based consumption tax to the origin‐based production tax that has been discussed in the literature of tax harmonisation and tax competition.     

Liberalizing Services Trade In APEC: A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition

The paper studies services-sector trade liberalization in the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum using a global, multicountry, multisector applied general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive service sector. Reducing the service sector's nontariff barriers is modeled by eliminating the possibility for oligopolistic firms to price-discriminate between client countries within APEC and lowering the fixed costs of the firms doing service exporting business. The results suggest that services trade liberalization reinforces existing sectoral trade balances. Increase in demand for intermediate services tends to reinforce rather than counteract the role of primary factors in determining sectoral comparative advantage. The western APEC members received the greatest welfare gains from services trade liberalization, while the developing economies gained more if only tariffs were eliminated.     

Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy

This study investigates the effect of a country's suppression of competition in its market for nontradables. It assumes that the initial equilibrium is stationary and demonstrates that if competition is suppressed in a small country, the country's trade surplus increases in the short run. In the large country case, the same change creates an excess demand for future tradables and affects the relative price between present and future tradables. Using a two‐country model, the study shows that this price change redistributes real wealth from the country with a trade deficit to the country with a trade surplus.     

中国服务贸易竞争力的国际比较研究

服务贸易是当前国际贸易中发展最为迅速的领域,已成为我国经济新的增长点.通过服务贸易的国际横向比较,服务贸易TC指数大部分长期为负值,且各行业之间TC指数差异大,我国服务贸易竞争力水平远远落后于发达国家.从制约因素分析来看,提升我国服务贸易的国际竞争力,必须重视服务贸易营销,寻求国内市场支持,建立服务贸易扶持政策.     

Shared Renewable Resources: Gains from Trade and Trade Policy

This paper examines the effects of international trade and trade policy in a two‐country, two‐good model with an open‐access renewable resource that is internationally shared. We show that both countries may still benefit from trade when they specialize in the production of their comparative advantage good, although the shared resource is reduced by trade. In addition, we demonstrate that the steady state utility of a resource‐good importing country may be reduced by trade, even if it specializes in the production of a non‐resource good. Import tariffs and export taxes on a resource good may increase or decrease the shared stock level depending on the production patterns in a trading steady state. The trade policy is likely to be Pareto‐improving when the shared stock rises, while both countries may be made worse off by the trade policy when the shared stock falls.     

Imperfect Competition and Growth with Entrepreneurial Risk

Abstract. This paper analyzes an overlapping generations endogenous growth model of occupational choice under risk in a two-sector economy with intermediate and final goods. Agents choose between business ownership in the monopolistically competitive intermediate goods industry or employment as a worker in this sector. Firm-specific profits are stochastic. Occupational choice under risk endogenizes the number of firms and products in the intermediate goods industry. The analysis shows that economic performance and growth both depend on the entrepreneurship rate and are inefficiently low compared with an economy with perfect markets for pooling risks. Monopolistic competition partly offsets the negative income effects from a too low level of entrepreneurial risk-taking.     

Dynamic Gains and Market Access Insurance: Another Look at the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement

We revisit the benefits of the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) and, in particular, evaluate the insurance value of this agreement in the face of regional and global trade wars. The insurance benefits are quantified by comparing the AUSFTA against alternative scenarios where some or all regions raise tariffs by 10 percentage points. Issues regarding expectations and the timing of potential trade wars are considered by using a dynamic model. The potential gains relative to these alternative trade war status quo scenarios are found to be as much as four times larger than the traditional efficiency gains.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

The Gains from Trade and Policy Reform Revisited

The primary purpose of the paper is to provide characterizations of the conditions for welfare improvements in several situations that have received very little attention in the existing literature. The first aim is to exhibit the gains that can accrue to a country from the elimination of excess supplies as a result of a policy move from autarky to free trade. The second aim is to characterize the conditions under which the introduction of new goods into the economy will generate welfare gains. The third main area discussed is the extension of the authors’ methodology to a large open economy that can influence its terms of trade. The techniques used to illustrate the gains from eliminating excess supplies and from the introduction of new goods have a much wider applicability; they may be used to obtain and synthesize several welfare results from the literature.