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1.
What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global
environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion
leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions
within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the
Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable
preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3′a), here called
“Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective. 相似文献
2.
This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures
and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent
analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application
to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study
of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure,
(interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies.
In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and
other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.” 相似文献
3.
We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an
inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations.
The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an
a priori evaluation of any given feasible resource allocation. The fairness ratio for an allocation provides a bound on the
discrepancy between this allocation and any other feasible allocation with respect to a large class of social welfare functions.
We provide a simple representation of the fairness ratio as well as a general method that can be used to directly determine
optimal fair allocations. For general convex environments, we provide a fundamental lower bound for the optimal fairness ratio
and show that as the population size increases, the optimal fairness ratio decreases at most logarithmically in what we call
the “inhomogeneity” of the problem. Our method yields a unique and “balanced” fair optimum for an important class of problems
with linear budget constraints. 相似文献
4.
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term
growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets
for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which
tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially
requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though
a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets
is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap”
may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications
are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can
lead to stagnation in the long term.
相似文献
5.
We study the effects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium framework where production of consumption
goods requires two resource inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the
former contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which affects welfare. There is a specific research
sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths
in a decentralized economy. We go on to study the effects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the polluting
resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental policy has two main effects; it delays the extraction
of the resource and with it the level of polluting emissions and it reallocates research efforts, decreasing the amount put
into “grey” research to the benefit of “green” research. We also show that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the
short-term, and green-biased in the long-term. Finally, we compute the optimal values for these tools.
相似文献
6.
Dimitrios Xefteris 《Constitutional Political Economy》2011,22(3):221-237
Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and,
therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom
(absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase
social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover
use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of
“democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world. 相似文献
7.
It is [my] contention... that the wake for all welfare economics is premature, and that welfare economics can be reconstructed
with the aid of the concept of demonstrated preference. This reconstruction, however, will have no resemblance to either of
the “old” or “new” edifices that preceded it. In fact...our proposed resurrection of the patient may be considered by many
as more unfortunate than his demise. 相似文献
8.
Benefit Transfer Equivalence Tests with Non-normal Distributions 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Equivalence testing reverses traditional null and alternative hypotheses—welfare estimates are assumed different unless tests
demonstrate that the difference is smaller than a specified tolerance limit. Within benefit transfer, researchers have universally
used the “two one-sided t-test” (TOST) equivalence test, an approach that is invalid for non-normal welfare distributions. This paper proposes an alternative
based on the difference between independent empirical distributions, denoted the “two one-sided convolutions” (TOSC) test.
The TOSC permits valid inference for non-normal distributions. Empirical assessments show large divergences between TOST and
TOSC p-values when distributions are non-normal—demonstrating the likelihood of erroneous inference under the TOST. 相似文献
9.
Multilateral subsidy games 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric
multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are “friendly”, raising rival profits in
total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers
are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments over-subsidize
investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from
a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.
For helpful comments we are grateful to two referees, to Arijit Mukherjee, and to participants in seminars at Prague and UCD,
at the EEA Conference in Lausanne and at the GEP Conference on “New Directions in International Trade Theory” at the University
of Nottingham, June 2007. Dermot Leahy acknowledges the support of the Science Foundation Ireland Research Frontiers Programme
(Grant MAT 017). 相似文献
10.
Hartmut Kliemt 《Constitutional Political Economy》1993,4(2):159-172
Since anarchy is not viable, limited government is the best that the realistic libertarian can hope for. But limited government
will itself always be threatened by an inherent tendency to transgress its limits. In modern western societies the regulatory
and redistributive welfare state is the major threat to a constitution of liberty. However, a “minimum welfare state” which
redistributes personal income among its citizens may comply with the same principles of individual liberty and the rule of
law that are embodied in the protective state. Since any state, including the minimal state, necessarily incorporates regulation
and redistribution and thus is a welfare state of sorts the non-anarchist liberal should turn against welfare state privileges
rather than against redistribution and regulation per se. He may even have good reason to go beyond the minimal state to found
a “minimum welfare state” if this is instrumental in securing liberty under the rule of law.
I am grateful to the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University for hospitality both during the period
in which this paper was written and on other occasions. I am deeply indebted to the people at the Center for their criticisms
and comments. As far as this paper is concerned Geoffrey Brennan's and Richard Wagner's comments were particularly helpful.
I should also like to acknowledge helpful oral comments from Kevin Mulligan and Philip van Parijs, who of course is much more
of an expert on demogrant schemes than I am. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. The
general caveat applies. 相似文献
11.
Jason Potts 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2007,20(2-3):123-135
This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework
of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination
and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value
paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the
economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination,
adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general
“generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.
相似文献
12.
We study costly majority voting when voters rationally anticipate others have similar preferences. The correlation in preferences
lowers expected turnout because votes have a positive externality on those who abstain. We study the effects of the public
release of information (polls) on participation levels. Polls raise expected turnout but reduce expected welfare because they
stimulate the “wrong” group to participate resulting in a “toss-up” election. Our novel results highlight the adverse effects
of providing information about the electorate’s preferences and may explain why some countries bar opinion polls close to
an election date. 相似文献
13.
Stefano Fiori 《Constitutional Political Economy》2010,21(2):145-170
Herbert A. Simon acknowledged Friedrich A. Hayek as a founder of the notion of bounded rationality; yet Simon considered Hayek’s
perspective incomplete, and, more in general, their views on market mechanisms, planning, and organization exhibit considerable
differences. The comparison between these authors sheds light on Simon’s interpretation of planning, which emerges within
his theory of organization (and not in traditional debates on socialism). Contrary to Hayek, he maintained that planning,
in specific circumstances, is more advantageous than the market; and in both administration and organization, it involves
a decentralized structure based on near independent sub-units. Decentralization of decisions also appears in social planning,
which evolves through continuous interactions among planners (i.e., agents and institutions), and it is a process connoted
by the absence of “fixed goals”. Finally, Simon defined modern economies more in terms of “organizational economies” than
in those of “market economies” and this highlights a further difference with respect to the Austrian economist. This leads
to analysis of the nature of organizations as hierarchical and “near-decomposable” structures, which refers to Simon’s theory
of complexity and gives an epistemological explanation to the relation between centralization and decentralization. 相似文献
14.
Bin Yao 《Frontiers of Economics in China》2008,3(3):356-379
From the perspective of welfare, by synthesizing the normative and empirical analysis, this paper applies the framework of
“new open economy macroeconomics” to the qualitative and quantitative researches on the choice of RMB exchange rate regime
in the short and medium run. It sets up the structural model, takes the economical data during 1985–2005 to perform both the
positive and simulative analysis, and it is shown that: with the increases of international real demand and international
price index, in order to improve the welfare of people, the RMB exchange rate regime should be more flexible.
__________
Translated from Jingji yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2007, (11): 45–57 相似文献
15.
The “discovery” of social capital in the early 1990s led to an upsurge of research into the economic impact of social cohesion
and governmental effectiveness. This paper outlines key developments in the social capital literature over the past 13 years.
It then examines theory and evidence of the links between social cohesion, quality of governance, economic performance and
human welfare. The literature indicates that social capital makes a measurable contribution to economic development and overall
wellbeing, particularly in developing countries. Partly in response to this emerging body of evidence, there has been increased
interest in the application of community development principles to economic development initiatives. This paper argues that
the advent of social capital theory represents a partial convergence between social economics and mainstream economics, and
signifies an increased acceptance that economic activity cannot be meaningfully “disembedded” from social and political context. 相似文献
16.
Eduardo L. Giménez 《Economic Theory》2003,21(1):195-204
Summary. This paper argues that the introduction of a short-sale constraint in the Arrow-Radner framework invalidates standard definitions
of complete and incomplete markets. Two threshold values with familiar properties arise in this constrained set-up. If short
sales are not allowed on some security, then financial markets will be incomplete in the standard sense. Beyond a particular
level of the short-sale bound, financial markets are “complete”, since the short-sale constraint is not effective. For intermediate
bounds the distinction between complete and incomplete financial markets is blurred. Although some technical definitions hold,
agents can not fully transfer wealth among states. These intermediate cases, called “technically incomplete markets”, exhibit
interesting welfare properties. For instance, the resulting equilibrium allocations may not be Pareto-dominated by those of
the non-restricted complete markets equilibrium.
Received: November 28, 2000; / revised version: November 9, 2001 相似文献
17.
Michael C. Munger 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(2):169-175
The use of the “principal–agent” model makes an implicit assumption about the existence of an underlying global optimum or
“general will.” This assumption is debatable, and Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to realize how strong
an assumption it is. Still, it is standard in the literature, and Besley’s book is a very strong contribution to that literature.
Its two greatest strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the classical “comparative statics” approach to
analyze dynamics.
相似文献
18.
MARC DUHAMEL 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2006,8(2):321-343
This paper characterizes the general equilibrium foundation of arbitrary partial equilibrium welfare analysis in second‐best economies. While prior theory recognizes the importance of market distortions affected by relative price changes, it offers little guidance about the necessary scope of Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis. The paper determines necessary and sufficient conditions for optima of Marshallian total surplus functions to characterize second‐best Pareto‐optimal allocations. While these conditions confirm much of the traditional approach to applied welfare economics, they bring doubt about its reliability for public policy and concerns over its systematic use to build conventional economic wisdom. 相似文献
19.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,36(2):237-254
In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers
(green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and
environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that
more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental
attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it.
Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the
positive market effect.
相似文献
20.
Günther Rehme 《Journal of Economics》2007,91(1):1-40
Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing
(“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become
highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and
lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher
GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation
between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively
high growth. 相似文献