Firm Investment Behavior and Collective Bargaining Strategy

Using survey data on labor union coverage at the firm level, this paper examines union-nonunion differences in investment activity among 706 U.S. companies during the 1970s. Consistent with a model of union rent seeking, firm-level collective bargaining is associated with significantly lower physical capital and R&D investment, even after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Deleterious union effects on investment are considerable throughout the 1972–80 period, but they vary across industries. Without significant changes in collective bargaining power or strategies, diminished investment activity by unionized companies is likely to exacerbate the already considerable decline in U.S. union coverage     

Collective Bargaining, Macroeconomic Performance, and the Sectoral Composition of Trade Unions

Strong exposed-sector unions and weak public-sector unions are seen as having beneficial effects on macroeconomic performance. Although these effects must work through the bargaining structure, the interaction with union composition is unclarified. This paper argues that the interaction effect qualitatively differs with the bargaining type. The findings show that the performance of pattern bargaining significantly increases with growing exposed-sector union strength whereas uncoordinated bargaining and centrally coordinated bargaining do not interact with union composition.     

Collective Bargaining Coverage under Trade Unionism: A Sociological Investigation

Does high union density lead to high collective bargaining coverage? Since collective bargaining is seen as the raison d'être of trade unions, this is often assumed to be the case; some observers think that union density is ‘a floor’ below which collective bargaining coverage is unlikely to fall. With its very high union density, Denmark is a case in point. This article investigates the collective bargaining coverage issue in the Danish case, based on an individual-level employee survey with 1720 respondents. Collective bargaining coverage is shown to be much lower than union density, and some methodological issues in this connection are considered. In order to find some possible explanations for this surprising finding, the question of variance of collective bargaining coverage between groups of employees is discussed in the light of theories of service society and recent research results and theories. The impact of central variables is investigated through multivariate analysis, and it turns out that by far the most important variable predicting an employee's collective bargaining coverage is a variable mostly neglected in comparative analyses: occupational status. Salaried employees have a much lower collective bargaining coverage than manual workers in Denmark, and some possible reasons for this are given.     

The Impact of Union Wage Concessions on Union Premiums

Previous research showing that union wage premiums actually rose from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s suggests that concession bargaining was more media hype than the result of a fundamental change in collective bargaining. Our study found that nonrandom attrition of workers from the union sector does lead to an upward bias in the measured growth of union premiums, but concession bargaining was not a sufficiently widespread occurrence to reduce the size of union premiums during the sample period.     

Collective Bargaining and Faculty Job Satisfaction

Estimates of the impact of union membership on job satisfaction suffer from nonrandom self‐selection of employees into unions. In this paper, we circumvent this problem by examining the impact on satisfaction of collective bargaining representation, rather than of union membership. We use a two‐stage technique that controls for nonrandom selection of faculty into institutions, and apply that to a panel of faculty at repeatedly observed four‐year universities. We find that bargaining agreements increase satisfaction with compensation but reduce satisfaction with faculty workload. Bargaining has no statistically measurable impact on overall job satisfaction or on faculty's satisfaction with their authority to make decisions regarding their instructional duties.     

Bargaining over employment as a firm strategic choice

This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the product market may find it optimal to commit to bargaining outcomes with their specific union, which are off the labor demand curve, hence restricting their behavior to non-profit maximizing practices in their product markets. The prediction that power over labor conceded strategically to the union by the firm is negatively linked to union wage power is not rejected on a panel of Belgian firms as well as the prediction that the union bargaining power can be affected by product market structure and other variables affecting union wages.     

The Social Cost of Rent Seeking by Labor Unions in the United States

The conventional welfare loss to trade unions and collective bargaining has been put at some fraction of 1.0 percent. Added to this should be the costs of resources deployed by the parties as they compete for monopoly gains. These additional social costs turn out to be on the same order as the conventional welfare loss. The analysis finds in passing that the investment by union members in paying dues yields very handsome dividends.     

What Sort of Collective Bargaining Is Emerging in China?

China is experiencing a rapid expansion of what is termed ‘collective bargaining’. The article draws on workplace and sectoral examples to assess what underlies this. Recent changes in labour policy are outlined. Four studies at establishment level describe the use of hybrid representation in response to growing worker activism and internal union reform. Two studies of sectoral bargaining shed light on decentralized decision‐making on pay. Attention is drawn to the growth of employer organizations and increased articulation within the trade union. A form of collective bargaining is emerging where the union draws on state power to improve conditions of employment.     

What Do Unions Do to Work Design? Computer Use,Union Presence,and Tayloristic Jobs in Britain

The task framework has focused on employee survey data to analyze how computer use changes the content of jobs. In this article, we add another factor of work design, namely trade union presence. Using data from the UK Skills and Employment Surveys for the period 1997–2012, we find that union presence is associated with more Tayloristic jobs involving less autonomy, lower relevance of problem solving, and more control. In line with theory, the union effect moves in the opposite direction to the effect of computer use. The article has two important general implications. First, the Tayloristic/holistic distinction is an instructive dichotomy to evaluate changes in work design. Second, the presence of unions may induce managers to design jobs in Tayloristic ways in order to curb union bargaining power.     

Exclusion and Disarticulation: The Transport and General Workers' Union in the Road Haulage Industry, 1979–1998

The attrition of trade union organization and collective bargaining in the UK is accepted as having been a principal feature of industrial relations since 1980, but there is no general agreement as to the causes. This paper explores trade union disarticulation and exclusion in a 1979–98 study of the Transport and General Workers' Union Road Transport Commercial trade group, which organizes in the road haulage industry. It emphasizes the importance of the legal framework established by the Conservative government in inhibiting union power at a time of the ongoing restructuring of road haulage, providing companies with the opportunity and incentive to exclude trade union organization and fragment union bargaining power.     

Between Fragmentation and Centralization: South Korean Industrial Relations in Transition

This study investigates profound changes in South Korean industrial relations after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Korea's neoliberal labour reforms have produced a large number of non‐standard workers, deepening the union representation gap. Realizing that the fragmented enterprise unions could not adequately protect workers from this degradation of labour, trade union leaders began a major organizational drive at the industry level and tried to institutionalize sectoral bargaining. A political space for union centralization was partially opened because the state needed labour's co‐operation to implement neoliberal reform packages. However, disorganized centralization in Korea, where important decisions on wages and working conditions have been negotiated mainly at the company level, has faced limitations in achieving meaningful changes in the dualistic structure of the labour market. This study concludes with a review of changes in Korea's labour law in 2010 and a discussion on the effects of the law on bargaining rights of non‐standard workers and the incipient industry‐level bargaining. This trend towards union centralization may continue, but the notable gap between the formal bargaining structure and actual practice is expected to widen.     

Lopsided inclusion: The impact of multi-employer bargaining and class-based unionism on non-regular employment in South Korea

This study examines the impact of multi-employer bargaining on non-regular workers across different unions and types of non-regular employment. Using national representative survey data from South Korea, I find that multi-employer bargaining increases the likelihood that a workplace union would address a pay increase for non-regular workers when the union was affiliated with a confederation espousing class-based as opposed to business-unionism. However, such a relationship was weaker for temporary agency workers and subcontractors than for direct-hire fixed-term workers. This mechanism is further illustrated through a second round of data collection and analysis, namely in-depth interviews. I identify two factors that characterize the class-based confederation: (1) centralized pressure from the union and (2) activists and their identity work. Altogether, these results further an understanding of how the identities of national union confederations can influence local representatives’ approach to representing non-regular workers and how those influences are manifested through workplace-level collective bargaining.     

Linking Union Density and Union Effectiveness: The North American Experience

This study considers how union performance in terms of organizing, bargaining, and political activity are related to severely declining union density (the percentage of the workforce in unions) in the United States and the higher and stable union density in Canada. Canadian unions have remained active in recruiting new members and assign a high priority to organizing, while American unions have shown diminished organizing effort and ability. Canadian unions have demonstrated superior performance in collective bargaining as measured by resistance to concession bargaining and negotiated wage gains, among other factors. Finally, although Canadian unions experienced some political setbacks, they wielded more political influence than their American counterparts in promoting union-specific as well as broad social legislation. Density is examined as both a consequence and determinant of the divergence in union performance.     

An Individual‐Level Study of Contract Ratification Support

This study uses constructs developed from theoretical models of both unit‐level ratification studies and individual‐level studies of strike support to predict individual employee ratification voting behavior and contract satisfaction. Surveys were given to union members before and after ratification voting. The results suggest that constructs assessing economic factors, employment relations, union relations, and the importance of contract information from the union all influence ratification support. While the bargaining issues are important in explaining ratification support, factors beyond the bargaining issues, such as employer and union loyalty and providing information about the contract, are related to ratification support.     

The Impact of Competition on Investment: Evidence From California Hospitals*

I examine the relationship between bargaining leverage and capital investment using data on California’s hospital markets. I find evidence that investment increases with bargaining leverage; a hospital whose bargaining position improves by one standard deviation will increase its investment rate by 16 percentage points. A positive causal relationship between bargaining leverage and investment fits the institutional details of the health care sector, where many firms have non-profit tax status, making it difficult to return monopoly rents to shareholders. Consistent with this explanation, I find that non-profit hospitals with bargaining leverage invest more than for-profit ones, all else equal. I do not find strong evidence that financing constraints matter disproportionately for hospitals operating in more competitive markets, supporting the hypothesis that the incremental investment may not be socially efficient.     

Integration and Dealignment in Public Enterprise Industrial Relations: A Study of British Rail

This paper considers whether a process of dealignment of workplace organizations from the national union and industrial relations system has occurred in British Rail. As a starting point, it is noted that workplace representatives have traditionally been closely integrated with other actors in the system. Integration has been based on the supply of bargaining resources by the national union and other bargaining institutions. If new management industrial relations policies have cut back the supply of these, it is possible that workplace organizations will dealign themselves from the national union. This hypothesis is considered using data obtained from a survey of train drivers' representatives. It is found that there is no evidence for dealignment and that in a significant minority of cases closer rather than weaker links are being forged.     

Decentralized Wage Formation in Sweden

Recent Swedish collective bargaining agreements have incorporated provisions for local pay review talks and opportunities for individuals to negotiate their own wages. Using trade union data, we show that members who participate in local pay review talks and members who negotiate their own wages have significantly higher monthly wages than those who do not. Pay decentralization either improves an individual's bargaining position or attracts more productive trade union members. Either way, trade union wage policies to increase individual‐level wage variance are achieving their intended effects.     

The Impact of Union Political Activities on Public-Sector Pay, Employment, and Budgets

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the political power of public employee unions has been a major cause of excessive growth in municipal expenditures. Previous studies, however, have not directly measured union political activities but instead have used some type of unionization or collective bargaining proxy. This paper uses unpublished data from the International City Management Association (ICMA) to develop a more direct measure of police and fire union political activity. It is found that increased union political activity leads to greater department expenditures but not necessarily to greater municipal expenditures or revenues. The results also suggest that unions increase department spending through political activity and not through the collective bargaining process itself. Further, it appears that political activity increases department spending through higher employment and not through higher compensation.     

The Evolution of Enterprise Unionism in Japan: A Socio‐Political Perspective

This article proposes an alternative framework for understanding enterprise unionism by emphasizing political dynamics and the role of the state in labour relations. Our framework delineates the strategic behaviour patterns of each of the tripartite IR actors under collective bargaining. It maintains that the initial period of the collective bargaining era constituted a critical juncture for state labour policy that occurred in distinctive ways in different countries and that these differences played a central role in shaping the different union structures in the following decades. Our historical analysis shows that unlike its Western counterparts, the Japanese state was able to eradicate the horizontal union movement at the onset of the collective bargaining era because of its advantages as a late developer and Cold War politics, which resulted in enterprise unionism in Japan.