Market Implications of the Audit Quality and Auditor Switches: Evidence from China

Independent audits enhance the credibility of corporate financial reports and assist investors to make rational decisions in the capital market. Nonetheless, the utility of the auditing function depends upon the quality of audits, which is determined by the independence and expertise of auditors. Hence, auditor choice and switch will not only affect an audit's quality, but will also influence decisions made by investors and other market participants. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how investors respond to the quality of audits and auditor switches in the Chinese context. Empirical results show that the quality of an audit and switching to a larger auditor have a positive (negative) impact on earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for firms with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. In contrast, switching to a smaller auditor has a negative (positive) impact on ERCs for firms with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. These results suggest that large auditing firms (Top 10) in China are perceived as more effective for curbing income-increased earnings management, which leads to higher (lower) ERCs for clients with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. Firms' switching to a larger auditor may signal high-quality earnings. Therefore, investors more often increase stock prices when firms have positive abnormal earnings and less often depreciate prices for negative abnormal earnings. Similarly, switching to a smaller auditor may signal lower earning quality, resulting in opposite market responses. In general, the empirical evidence suggests that audit information is valued by the capital market in China. Large auditing firms have been able to product-differentiate themselves within the Chinese stock market.     

证券监管的选择性执行:以IPO核准为例

在证券法律体系已经相对比较完备的情况下,执行问题成了学者们关注的焦点。现实中的证券法律执行,经常是执法者在不同时期、针对具体情形有选择性地采取不同的执行强度,即选择性执行。基于IPO核准的经验研究发现,市场低迷阶段的IPO核准速度较慢,这对来自所在辖区政治地位较高地区的公司更为明显;进一步引入发行市盈率后研究发现,市场低迷、所在辖区政治地位较低、发行核准越慢的公司,其发行市盈率越低,但所在辖区政治地位较高地区的公司发行市盈率没有显著更低,在市场繁荣时期却表现出相反的结果。研究结论为理解转型经济中政府管制选择性执行的状况、路径和经济后果提供了一个有益的视角。     

媒体监督影响审计师的审计意见决策吗？——来自中国证券市场的实证证据

媒体监督在公司治理中的作用已引起了广泛的关注,然而关于媒体监督对审计师行为的影响这一论题的研究还不多见。以2001年到2009年中国A股上市公司为样本,首次对媒体监督是否影响以及如何影响审计师的意见决策进行实证考察。结果发现,媒体对上市公司负面报道越多,审计师对其发表非标准审计意见的概率越大;国际"四大"会计师事务所的声誉机制并不能加强这一结论;当年财经媒体对上市公司负面报道越多,审计师改善次年审计意见类型的概率越高。这说明媒体监督起到了审计治理的作用。     

Taking Away the Voting Powers from Controlling Shareholders: Evidence from the Chinese Securities Market

The main agency problem in the Chinese economy comes from a conflict between strong controlling shareholders and weak minority shareholders. In such economy, seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) are used as a means to exploit minority shareholders. This paper examines the effects of a regulation (the classified voting system [CVS]) that attempts to protect the interests of minority shareholders by excluding controlling shareholders from the voting process of SEOs. This results show that the rejection rate significantly increases after the CVS comes into effect. SEOs proposals are more likely to be rejected when perceived private benefits are high and security benefits are low, and when minority shareholders have higher bargaining power. Further, investors receive significantly higher post‐SEO stock returns for SEOs approved under the CVS than for those approved before the CVS.     

所有权结构与年报披露的及时性

采用2001年-2004年上市公司的数据,从年报披露的及时性角度系统地检验了所有权结构对上市公司会计信息披露政策的影响.通过控制上市公司所处行业、公司成长性、公司规模、财务风险、审计意见、公司类型以及交易所变量对上市公司会计信息披露政策的影响,发现上市公司所有权集中程度越高,上市公司年报信息披露就越及时.再从股权制衡程度方面进行替代性检验也印证了这一发现.这对上市公司会计信息披露政策的选择具有一定的启示意义.     

分析师盈利预测压力与企业投资效率——来自中国A股市场的证据

证券分析师盈利预测是市场预期的一个典型替代变量,其超出企业内部经营预期的部分会对企业产生压力,从而干扰经理人的决策和行为。通过构建盈利预测压力测算模型研究证券分析师盈利预测压力对企业投资决策的影响,并进一步考察分析师跟踪和企业政治联系对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现,分析师盈利预测压力与投资不足正相关,与过度投资不相关。这表明企业在面临分析师盈利预测压力时更倾向于减少投资,而不是冒险将资金用于高风险项目。进一步研究发现,分析师跟踪以及企业政治关联会负向调节盈利预测压力对投资不足行为的影响,外部监督的增强以及资源获取渠道的拓宽能够纠正企业在盈利预测压力下的非效率投资行为。     

Government Regulation,Corporate Board,and Firm Value: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of board composition and its consequences on firm value in China by focusing on the impact of ultimate owner type and financial needs under the institution environment with government intervention and weak investor protection. We find that State‐Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to choose politically connected directors without professional backgrounds, but non‐SOEs are more likely to have independent directors, or politically connected directors with professional business backgrounds. Appointment of independent directors has no effect on firm value. Due to weak legal investor protection in China, a dominant shareholder can easily remove independent directors, as there is no mature market for directors. Politically connected directors without professional business backgrounds are negatively associated with a firm's value. Although such directors can help a company establish relationships with the government, their firms may suffer due to inferior professionalism.     

基于投资者保护的证券市场规管

在以保护投资者利益为目标而对证券市场实施规管的前提下,本文结合有关证券市场过度规管的理论,阐述证券市场规管中存在过度规管的可能性,并对当前中国证券市场中的一些过度规管现象进行了讨论,包括对证券交易所的规管、证券市场开放的规管中存在的过度规管倾向,从而为对证券市场的规管者实施规管提供一定的理论基础。     

市场势力对银行效率影响分析——来自我国商业银行的经验数据

运用我国14家上市和50家未上市商业银行2000~2009年的数据探讨商业银行市场势力对效率的影响。分别测量我国商业银行的市场势力、成本效率以及利润效率,结果发现与未上市商业银行相比,上市商业银行具有较高的市场势力和利润效率以及较低的成本效率。同时分别建立线性模型和非线性模型分析市场势力对效率的影响,结果发现在我国特殊金融环境下,商业银行市场势力与成本效率或利润效率之间均为线性关系;提高商业银行的市场势力,会导致其成本效率显著下降和利润效率显著提升;在所有显著的变量中,信用风险对成本效率和利润效率的影响都是最大的。     

市场摩擦理论及其在我国证券市场的应用

本文系统地介绍了市场摩擦理论的基本框架：摩擦的概念、起因、类型、度量方法和不同的度量方法之间的关系，并根据其要旨探讨如何将市场摩擦理论应用到我国证券市场，就完善我国证券市场的微观结构、减少市场摩擦和提高市场效率提出了一些看法。     

股市周期、投资者情绪与盈余管理——来自中国A股市场的证据

将中国大陆1394家上市公司2004年至2007年期间5576份年报,分为熊市悲观样本组与牛市乐观样本组,用Givoly&Hayn(2000)的应计项目模型和Ball&Shiva-kumar(2005)的应计项/现金流模型进行实证检验。研究发现:熊市悲观样本组的应计利润以及非经营性应计利润较低,会计盈余下降周期与熊市悲观周期吻合;牛市乐观样本组的应计利润以及非经营性应计利润较高,会计盈余上升周期与牛市乐观周期一致。上市公司经营者(代理人)操纵应计项目以及刻意安排应计项目在牛市与熊市之间回转,使得熊市悲观周期会计盈余被低估而牛市乐观周期会计盈余被高估,以迎合投资者(委托人)牛市过度乐观而熊市过度悲观的情绪和盈余预期。     

Order Imbalance,Liquidity, and Market Efficiency: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market

We used data from the Chinese stock market to quantify the amount of time for the market to converge to efficiency. Order imbalance may predict returns when there is no designated market maker. In spite of availability of the direction of trade information in the Chinese stock market, it takes longer for information regarding order imbalance to be incorporated into stock prices in China than in the USA. With information on past returns and order imbalance, it takes between 15 and 30 min to converge to efficiency in the Chinese stock market. The process of converging to efficiency depends highly on liquidity. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Timeliness of Annual Report Releases and Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in an Emerging Capital Market: The Case of China

This paper examines the relation between firm performance and the timing of annual report releases in an emerging capital market. Based on the population of listed Chinese firms with A-shares for 1994-1997, we find that good news firms release their annual reports earlier than bad news firms, and loss firms release their annual reports the latest. Moreover, consistent with Chambers and Penman (1984) and Begley and Fischer (1998), these firms unexpectedly accelerate the release of good news and delay the disclosure of bad news relative to their previous reporting pattern. We also observe a significant price reaction to the annual earnings announcements for both early (good news) and late (bad news) reporting firms. Similar results are found for those A-share firms which have also issued B- or H-shares to foreign investors. Our study documents a systematic timing pattern of annual report disclosures, which is useful for investors to predict future earnings, especially in anticipating bad news in China's emerging market where information about future earnings is very limited.     

企业收购兼并的长期超额收益研究与实证

本文选取1998年发生兼并收购的公司作为样本，主并公司和目标公司都是上市公司。研究发现，公司收购兼并后对主并企业的长期超额收益为负。对公司并购后( 1， 12)，( 13， 24)和( 25， 36)时间段的CAARs和BHAR进行实证研究。研究表明，三年的长期超额收益在5％的水平下显著为负。     

上市公司违规及证券市场监管的研究综述

介绍了国内外关于上市公司违规以及证券市场监管的研究进展,揭示了建立包含有效的监管手段的外部监管机制以及建立以合理的公司治理结构为基础的内部公司约束机制的重要性,为规范上市公司行为提供了思路。     

独立董事独立性、关联交易与公司价值——基于沪深两市上市公司的经验证据

要求独立董事对关联交易进行监管政策的出台,创造了基于关联交易研究独立董事监督职能的机会.基于此,在研究独立董事独立性对公司异常关联销售和公司价值的影响后发现,独立董事独立性的提高有助于抑制异常关联销售的发生.<关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见>颁布以后,异常关联销售的比率降低,且更为"干净".独立董事独立性对异常关联销售的抑制不仅是政策作用的直接结果,而且确实有助于提高经济效益.     

上市公司内部控制审计与年报及时性——基于OLS与分位数回归的证据

及时性是会计信息质量的重要特征之一,内部控制审计通过提高内控质量与审计效率来促进年报披露的及时性。以2010—2012年沪深主板A股3894家上市公司为样本,运用OLS与分位数回归对内部控制审计与年报及时性进行了理论分析与实证研究。研究发现:虽然内部控制非标审计意见、内部控制缺陷以及内控缺陷整改会导致年报时滞延长,但在总体上内部控制审计促进了上市公司年报及时披露。分位数回归结果还表明,在不同的年报披露时滞水平下,各影响因素对年报延迟的影响效果不同。     

经营风险、劳动力市场与外聘高管规模——基于中国民营上市公司的证据

以2008-2012年中国民营上市公司为样本,研究发现:经营风险较高的民营企业对管理才能的需求较大,更愿意从外部聘用高管以补充管理才能;内部管理才能供给越丰富,民营企业越不愿意从外部聘用高管;经理人市场发育程度与外聘高管比例显著正相关,与外聘CEO比例弱正相关,而与外聘董事比例的正相关关系不显著。进一步研究发现,在经理人市场发育程度较低的地区,经营风险、内部管理才能供给对外聘高管规模的影响更加显著;经理人市场发育程度对民营企业外聘高管规模的显著正向影响仅在经理人市场发育程度较高的地区发挥作用。     

法律风险、政治联系与风险导向审计定价——基于中国证券审计市场的经验证据

中国转型期的公司法律风险和政治联系对于新兴的审计市场均衡定价至关重要。以2007年、2009年和2010年三年间96家上市公司作为样本,采用多元线性回归的分析方法,对上市公司法律风险、政治联系与审计收费的关系进行实证研究,结果显示:现代风险导向审计模式下,上市公司法律风险越高则审计收费越高,上市公司政治联系越强则审计收费越低,而且国内"十大"事务所对政治联系较弱的上市公司收取了更高的风险溢价。这一结果表明现代风险导向审计定价具有风险含量。     

美国市政债券市场概况及其对我国的借鉴

在美国,市政债券是指州和地方政府及其授权机构发行的有价证券,目的是一般支出或特定项目融资.一般划分为一般责任债券和收益债券.自20世纪70年代末以来,美国的市政债券市场发生了较大的变化,这些变化值得我们关注;同时,美国市政债券的规模可以为我国发行市政债券提供一定的借鉴,值得我们分析.