The unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank: Effectiveness and transmission analysis

Since the beginning of the financial crisis in summer 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) has redirected traditional monetary policy, based on interest rates, to an unconventional monetary policy focused on the quantitative expansion of its balance sheet. In this context, the present paper aims to assess the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy instruments with regard to inflation and economic growth. To this end, the methodology is based on the estimation of a structural vector autoregressive model for the period 2007:Q1–2018:Q4, using four variables: EONIA, the total amount of assets on the ECB's balance sheet, the Eurozone inflation rate and the Eurozone economic growth rate. The results show a slight impact of the different balance sheet policies on inflation and economic activity behaviour, especially during the last year of the financial crisis. The robustness of these results is supported by the estimation of the same model replacing EONIA rates with shadow rates. Therefore, the results support the existence of monetary transmission for the period during which the unconventional monetary policy was developed as well as the effectiveness of the monetary policy adopted by the ECB in its commitment to price stability.     

What does the Bank of Japan do to East Asia?

In recent policy debates some have argued that expansionary monetary policy in Japan can increase real output in Japan and in Japan's neighbors, while others have warned that it is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. In this paper we estimate structural vector autoregressions to assess the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks. We find that the effects of Japanese monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variation in East Asia have been modest and difficult to reconcile with the beggar-thy-neighbor view. We estimate that the Asian crisis was preceded by expansionary monetary policy shocks in Japan, but we fail to find support for the view that these shocks contributed to the crisis.     

Thailand: Opportunities and risks in a fast‐changing business environment

Thailand's business environment is changing dramatically in the wake of the worst financial crisis and economic recession in the country's recent history. Some of these changes may be ephemeral, and Thailand will return to old business practices once the crisis eases, but many of the economic and political reforms now being implemented can make trade and investment in Thailand easier, more transparent, and less affected by corruption. Some of the reforms will not deliver the expected results. Others may increase uncertainty that will be counterproductive in the short run. But some of the constitutional changes—the restructuring of family controlled conglomerates, better regulation of the financial sector, demands for stronger corporate governance, and new incentives for private investment—can have profound impacts on the country's business climate and the way American companies do business in Thailand. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The Foreign Exchange Origins of Japan's Economic Slump and Low Interest Liquidity Trap

Japan's macroeconomic problem has yet to be properly diagnosed. Throughout the 1990s, policy makers could not decide on the proper macro economic measures to combat the country's severe economic slump. We propose a unified explanation, with deep historical roots, of why aggregate private demand failed to recover after Japan's stock and real estate bubbles burst in 1991 and deflationary pressure continues. The problem is not purely ‘made in Japan’. It arises from Japan's unbalanced mercantile relationship with the United States. Starting in the early 1970s, numerous trade disputes between the two countries created tensions that were (temporarily) resolved by the yen going ever higher against the dollar up to 1995. In the last two decades, this persistent pressure for the yen to rise was further aggravated by Japan's large current‐account (saving) surpluses as the counterpart of America's large current account (saving) deficits. The legacy is the expectation that trade and financial tensions will recur so that the yen will be higher 10, 20, or 30 years from now –with Japan's (wholesale) price level forced correspondingly lower and nominal interest rates on yen assets remaining more than four percentage points less than those on dollar assets. This fear of yen appreciation, whose timing is erratic and unpredictable, now inhibits private domestic investment by both Japanese firms and households. Our theory also explains why, in the late 1990s, nominal interest rates on short‐term yen assets were compressed toward zero so as to destroy the normal profit margins of the banking system. In this liquidity trap, the Bank of Japan –whose monetary policy has been quite ‘expansionary’–is powerless to stimulate the flagging economy. To spring the liquidity trap, eliminate deflationary pressure, and restore macro economic balance in Japan, the American and Japanese governments must act jointly to quash the expectation that the yen will be higher in the future than it is today.     

The Brazilian Economy in 1994–1999: From the Real Plan to Inflation Targets

This paper investigates the three main events that shook the Brazilian economy in 1994‐‐1999, a period that represented a turning point in the country's economic history. These events were the implementation of the Real Plan in 1994, the devaluation crisis in 1999, and the subsequent adoption of inflation targets. The principal contributions of this period were the drastic reduction of high inflation rates – the biggest problem in Brazil since the 1970s – and the reorientation towards economic growth, which were also supported by a privatisation programme, the openness of the economy to foreign capital, a trade liberalisation process, and the ongoing fiscal adjustments. Nevertheless, the period also left its scars, such as high budget and current account deficits, accompanied by a policy of elevated interest rates and, until 1999, a highly appreciated exchange rate. The paper concludes with a cautiously optimistic evaluation of the country's economic future based on the accomplishments of the 1990s and the possibility of a long‐term commitment to low inflation targets.     

The Federal Reserve's Mandate: Long Run

Given the slow recovery of the U.S. economy, quantitative easing of monetary policy in the form of U.S. Federal Reserve asset purchases has been attractive. However, it is not clear that the current and likely future economic environment warrants this policy, given its long-term risks. This paper outlines these risks and makes the case for a return to conventional policy by allowing currently held assets to roll off the Federal Reserve's balance sheet as they reach maturity and by resuming more conventional monetary policy. This is not a quick fix, but it is less risky than current policy in achieving the Federal Reserve's long-run dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment.     

日德本币升值下的政策得失及对我国的启示

在本币升值背景下,日本与德国采取了不同的应对政策。德国首先着眼于国内宏观经济的稳定,放开汇率的波动,从而更好地保持了国民经济的稳定与增长;而日本试图阻止和缓解日元升值压力,其结果却是日元持续急剧升值,并造成了日本高通货膨胀和泡沫经济。综观日本、德国汇率波动的历史可以得到以下启示：人民币汇率升值是必然趋势;坚持货币政策的独立性十分重要;在坚持货币政策的独立性的同时,实现缓慢渐进式汇率改革;区域货币合作有利于区域内强国减少投机资本冲击,减少汇率升值对贸易品部门的负面影响;加快经济发展战略的转型,促使内外经济均衡发展。     

后危机时代中国在世界经济中的作用

2008年以来,美国经济放缓,欧洲债务危机严重,全球经济明显衰退。在后危机时代,美国、欧盟、中国、日本等主要经济体应进一步调节其货币政策及经济政策。当前,世界经济需要中国在连续二十多年的快速增长之后作出更大贡献,如进一步在国际货币体系中发挥更为重要的作用,进一步减少对进口的控制,增加对其他国家商品的进口。中国仍然是发展中国家,会越来越多地出现发达国家在发展过程中的一些特点。要在人民币和美元汇率之间保持稳定性,需要制定更加扩张的货币政策,进一步提高消费水平,有效拉动内需。     

China and Global Macroeconomic Interdependence

China is transitioning towards more inward‐focussed growth, causing adverse changes in the product and financial terms of trade in the advanced economies. At the same time, international financial markets tussle between tightening forces associated with the US recovery on the one hand and unconventional monetary expansion in Europe and Japan on the other. The way these shocks interact is examined in this paper using a global macromodel with national portfolio rebalancing and asset differentiation and a representation of unconventional monetary policy. Results are found to be sensitive to the contributions of productivity and capital accumulation to China's growth. When these are offered in realistic combination, the effects are deflationary in the United States and China, militating against contractionary US monetary policy. Monetary responses in the United States and China then combine with price targeting regimes in the EU and Japan to expand liquidity globally, amplifying impacts on financial markets and the global distribution of real investment.     

International briefing 34: training and development in Spain

This article locates training and development in Spain within the country's socio‐economic context. It maps the major changes which have been introduced into the training and development system since the briefing by Escardíbul and Llinas‐Audet published in this journal in 2010. It relates those changes to the ongoing economic crisis which began in 2009 and the growing emphasis on employers’ demands in the design of the training system. Finally, it identifies the challenges presented to Spanish policy‐makers by a number of weaknesses in the current system. The Spanish experience is particularly relevant for countries in which social partner involvement and a significant small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) presence are important issues in the development of their training system. It is also particularly useful for those countries in Latin America whose training systems have been influenced by the Spanish model.     

Misalignment of the Baht and its Trade Balance Consequences for Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s

This paper examines Thailand's pre‐crisis exchange rate policy, focusing on the degree of the country's real exchange rate misalignment pre‐crisis and its consequent effects on Thailand's trade balance with its two large trading partners, the US and Japan, in the 1980s and 1990s. Defining misalignment as the difference between actual and ‘equilibrium’ exchange rates, we estimate three key ‘equilibrium’ exchange rates of the Thai baht: (a) the real effective equilibrium exchange rate of the Thai baht against its twenty‐two major trading partners; (b) the bilateral real equilibrium exchange rates of the baht against the US dollar; and (c) the bilateral real equilibrium exchange rate of the baht against the Japanese yen.     

Indonesia – Trade Policy Review 2007

This paper examines the 2007 WTO review of Indonesian trade policy. Indonesia undertook a major policy liberalisation in the late 1960s. Serious protectionist pressures emerged in the 1970s but for most of this period, and especially since the mid‐1980s, the economy has remained broadly open. We summarise the WTO report, update some of its analysis, highlight its key findings, and point to some trade policy issues that in our opinion warranted greater attention. The main theme of the paper is that Indonesia is a largely open economy, but that this openness on occasion remains precarious. There are both political economy, rent‐seeking forces opposed to the current openness and, perhaps more importantly, much of the country's influential public opinion is sceptical of the merits of an open economy and deeper global commercial integration. Nor is there a deeply institutionalised support for openness in the country's bureaucracy and polity. Seen from this perspective, a key question to answer is why the country has remained open, particularly since the deep economic and political crises of 1997–98.     

Restructuring FDI policy in emerging economies: The republic of Korea case

This article presents several frameworks for examining the effect of a national financial crisis as a stimulus for economic reform and applies them to the Korean case 1997–2001. The author lists significant dimensions of reform and restructuring, presents a schema showing macro reform measures and some possible micro ramifications regarding a country's policies toward incoming foreign direct investment, and extends the schema to the concept of a trade‐off between macro and micro determinants of a country's attractiveness to foreign direct investment. There is also a chart highlighting the extent of government allowance of foreign equity participation. The author uses all these concepts to analyze the Republic of Korea's response to the financial crisis of 1997–1999. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Using the Capital Assets Pricing Model for risk management—A tool for multinational corporation managers

In this article, using a theoretical model and empirical analysis, we show how multinational corporations (MNCs) can utilize the fundamentals of the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) to formulate a strategic risk management in a global economy. We show that MNCs with branches all over the world, specifically those that specialize in nontradable goods (e.g., McDonald's), should consider each country's beta as the appropriate measure of the relevant risk attached to the location in the country. Finally, using data from the most recent world economic crisis (the subprime crisis), we show that during a world economic crisis the loss of growth will be significantly higher in countries with higher betas, and lower in those with lower betas. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Bubble and the Lost Decade

In this overview of the Symposium papers, we note that the bubble that occurred in Japan's asset markets in the late 1980s came at a time when the conventional indicators of Japan's economic performance were relatively stable. Following the collapse of the bubble, neither the Bank of Japan (BOJ) nor the Ministry of Finance (MOF) took timely and effective measures to deal with the recession that followed. While the evidence suggests that looser fiscal policy would have been ineffective, monetary policy measures might have worked. However, the BOJ followed a relatively tight monetary policy in 1991–93. In the face of the liquidity trap that ensued in the last of the 1990s, the conventional tools of stabilisation policy appeared to be of limited use. To help the Japanese economy to recover from the ‘lost decade,’ we thus discuss a number of unconventional and bold measures that the BOJ and MOF could pursue. It appears, however, that the political will is absent to undertake such measures. So long as this is the case, the effects of the lost decade will continue to act as a drag on the economy.     

新形势下推进河北对外贸易的思考

在本轮经济危机中,主要依靠宽松货币政策和财政政策的刺激而启动的全球经济复苏,态势缓慢乏力,欧美国家更是将世界经济失衡的原因归咎于新兴经济体的快速发展及全球经济一体化带来的负面影响,致使经济发达国家放任本币贬值,更加注重通过增加出口来提振本国经济,加大对中国等发展中国家进口产品的限制,无端制造贸易摩擦,出台层出不穷的贸易保护措施,各国在争夺整体需求增长乏力的国际市场上的竞争更加激烈,致使我们面临的国际贸易环境更趋复杂。     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan</Emphasis> by Sebastian Mallaby

I agree that Sebastian Mallaby’s detailed and well-sourced The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan, will be essential for every future economic historian studying the Greenspan era. That said, Mallaby does not convey to his readers a sound understanding of monetary policy. I disagree with Mallaby’s claim that Greenspan could and should have done something about the housing and subprime mortgage bubbles. Peter Wallison makes a strong case that the affordable housing quotas did not just “encourage” but forced the GSEs to buy subprime mortgages. Information available in real time on aggregate subprime mortgage issuance was seriously flawed because the GSEs did not report accurately. Greenspan cannot be held responsible for the GSEs hiding the subprime debt on their balance sheets. These mortgages were central to the crisis. It seems improbable that any monetary policy mistake of 2001–05 was large enough to create the crisis. Mallaby could have written a final chapter emphasizing the Maestro resisting the power of a malign and evil pair of GSEs and the power of the President and Congress of the United States pursuing a disastrous housing policy. Despite the Maestro’s best efforts, Leviathan triumphed and brought ruin upon the Nation.     

关于财政货币政策调整的争论与分析

本文认为,在全球经济复苏特别是澳大利亚、挪威政府开启加息程序的背景下,考虑财政货币政策的调整问题是很有必要的.国内生产总值增长速度、居民消费价格指数同比增速、投资与进出口增速、国内政策之间的配合程度、国际之间政策的协调程度等可以作为对财政货币政策调整与退出作出判断的重要指标.文章提出,中国积极的财政政策应该在2011年下半年或2012年开始逐渐淡出直至退出,货币政策应该继续维持"适度宽松"的基调,真正向"适度宽松"回归,并注意把握好政策的重点、力度和节奏,从而更好地发挥货币政策支持经济增长、保持物价稳定的作用,同时还应密切关注美国货币政策的动向.     

Principles for Economic Recovery and Renewal

Over the past year, substantial progress has been made on the path to economic recovery. Yet, as true with most recessions induced by a financial crisis, recovery is going to be long and slow. This is particularly true for employment. Moreover, there is evidence that indicates there are structural as well as cyclical concerns about this recovery's slow employment growth. The personal as well as macroeconomic costs of this slow growth mean that there is no higher public policy priority than economic recovery and job creation. This address presents and discusses three guiding principles for economic policy: restoring confidence, increasing aggregate demand, and achieving broader and deeper education.     

Risky business: Financial‐sector liberalization and China

China's dramatic growth in exports, its rising conflict with its trade partners over the perceived undervaluation of the renminbi, and the snail's pace of financial liberalization is pushing its bilateral trade and monetary relations to a boil. Discontent in the United States, Japan, Southeast Asia, and, most recently, Brazil, has led popular pundits and even country finance ministers to speak publicly of a “currency war” with many calling for the de‐pegging of the renminbi to the dollar and an immediate appreciation of China's currency. However, China's history of liberalization, beginning with the opening to the West in 1978, is well known as one of gradualism in trade and the financial spheres. Economic history is replete with economic crises brought on by too rapid or premature liberalization of countries' capital flows. This article presents the case both for and against capital account liberalization and highlights the risks that China in particular confronts in responding to external demands for greater openness and an appreciation of the renminbi. It clearly captures the tightrope that China must walk between responding to the demands of its trade partners and maintaining economic growth and political stability at home. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.