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1.
In his 1987 Developing Countries in the GATT System, Robert Hudec concluded that the identity of developing countries in the GATT system was primarily a matter of their demanding non‐reciprocal and preferential treatment, developed countries responding grudgingly to those demands and that this situation had been unfruitful either to support developing country reforms or to discipline developed country restrictions aimed at developing countries. Hudec was pessimistic about the relationship becoming more productive, but his expression of despair offered a glimmer of hope: ‘There are those who believe that the GATT has become so committed to the current policy that the only way to change it would be to start a new organization’. A new organisation was started, the World Trade Organization, but has the WTO achieved what Hudec hoped a new organisation might? At the 1987–95 Uruguay Round, developing country leaders acted as Hudec had hoped. They used international rules and bindings as leverage to support their own internally‐driven reforms; to overcome generations of accumulated protection, to lock in reforms against the backsliding that had undone previous reforms. Dealing with the Uruguay Round's ‘unbalanced outcome’ and the overlapping ‘implementation problem’ have shaped the Doha Round, but the negotiations have misconceived and mismanaged both issues. Rather than seeking to identify their real economics, the negotiations have gone back to the traditional idea of special and differential treatment. Perhaps the largest cost of this mismanagement is that in many developing countries the unilateral momentum for liberalisation has waned. To the extent that the Doha negotiations have drawn attention away from the domestic issues that were the basis of developing country liberalisation – and enhanced the status of negotiators relative to the leaders who fought at home for reform – they have contributed to that waning.  相似文献   

2.
The recovery of world trade in the last few years has not led to an improvement in the situation of the developing countries. Many commodity prices are currently at their lowest level since the 1930s, and protectionism is on the increase. Are the Uruguay Round negotiations likely to bring positive results for the developing countries?  相似文献   

3.
This paper offers a political economy analysis of the Doha Ministerial Conference with special reference to developing countries. One of my key objectives is to understand the politics underlying the negotiations with a view to assessing the influence developing countries exerted on the outcome and the success they achieved in relation to the Uruguay Round Agreement, which is widely perceived as favouring mainly if not exclusively the developed countries. The main conclusions of the paper may be summarised as follows. First, with trade liberalisation as its central focus, the Doha negotiating agenda is to be welcomed from the viewpoint of developing countries. Second, the opposition by developing countries to the inclusion of at least some of the Singapore issues at Doha is defensible. Among other things, the countries lack the necessary negotiating and implementation capacity. Third, while the UR Agreement benefited both developing and developed countries, on balance, it benefited the latter more. The Doha outcome offers a better balance when taken by itself but does not go so far as to significantly correct the imbalance in the UR Agreement. Fourth, despite this better balance, the Doha negotiations offer little evidence of a shift in the relative bargaining powers of developing and developed countries. Nor can the superficially development friendly language of the Doha Declaration be viewed as signalling the softening of the tough negotiating stance developed countries took during the UR Round. Fifth, much of the negotiating power continues to reside with developed countries. Relatively equal levels of incomes gives greater coherence to interests of developed countries on issues that divide along North–South lines. Moreover, the presence of three large players – the USA, EU and Japan – allows them to exploit their bargaining power more effectively. Finally, to negotiate more effectively in the future, developing countries must improve their research capacity, think strategically and forge coalitions with other influential WTO members – whether developed or developing.  相似文献   

4.
This paper develops a methodology to estimate the environmental impact of the Uruguay Round trade agreement. The impact is estimated in terms of five air pollutants for both developed and developing countries/regions. The methodology estimates environmental Kuznets curves and uses these in conjunction with FranÇois et al.'s (1995) estimates of Uruguay Round income gains and sectoral production changes, together with sectoral pollution intensities from Hettige et al. (1994). In this manner, composition, scale and technique effects of the Uruguay Round on air pollution are estimated. The monetary cost/benefit associated with the pollution changes is also estimated. Results indicate that emissions of all five pollutants are predicted to increase in developing and transition regions as a result of the Uruguay Round, whilst in developed regions emissions of three pollutants decrease and two increase. The results also suggest that the environmental impact will be considerably greater if the Uruguay Round affects the rate of economic growth.  相似文献   

5.
Abstract

Although the Doha Development Round was launched with much promise for developing countries in 2001, the global trade negotiations have collapsed. One of the reasons for the lack of progress in the negotiation is the developed countries' unwillingness to reduce their enormous farm domestic subsidies and massive agricultural trade distortions. The developing countries' economies are characterized by heavy dependence on farm sector, labor-intensive agriculture, and persistent unemployment. Consequently, rich nations' unfair agricultural policies are detrimental to the well-being of poor exporting countries. This study develops a model incorporating developed countries' domestic and trade policies and developing countries' economic characteristics to illustrate the adverse effects of rich countries' policies on poor countries. We show that elimination of developed countries' policies will increase the world prices of agricultural commodities, which will benefit the farm-dependent developing countries.  相似文献   

6.
Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non‐traditional protection such as anti‐dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti‐dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti‐dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti‐dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti‐dumping protection but also the total number of anti‐dumping petitions filed by countries.  相似文献   

7.
The success of the entire Uruguay Round of the GATT depends considerably upon the success of the negotiations on the liberalization of world trade in textiles and clothing, since a number of developing countries have made their support for progress in the negotiations on services or safeguards contingent upon progress in this field. What are the present controversies? And what are the chances of resolving them in time?  相似文献   

8.
张暤 《国际经贸探索》2006,22(2):60-63,81
国内支持是WTO<农业协定>中的"三大支柱"(市场准入、出口补贴和国内支持)之一,是发达国家对农业进行保护和支持重点使用的手段,压低了世界市场的农产品价格,恶化了农产品出口国的贸易条件,造成了农产品贸易环境的扭曲.虽然乌拉圭回合达成了趋向自由贸易的<农业协定>,对国内支持也形成了一定的约束,但国内支持政策的庞杂、各个利益集团立场的分歧等诸多原因使其在多边贸易谈判中依然是命运堪忧.文章从欧盟、美国等代表性国家和利益集团在多哈回合农业谈判中"国内支持"政策上的立场和分歧,揭示了其立场背后的根本原因,预言农业谈判在该项议题上的可能进展.  相似文献   

9.
During the 1950s and 1960s, most developing nations, particularly the larger ones, strongly opted for a policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI). This was based on heavy protection and generally led to very inefficient industries. Since the early 1970s, an increasing number of developing countries deregulated their economies and liberalized trade, and this stimulated efficiency and growth. Some developing nations also tried strategic trade policies and to endogenize growth (as postulated by endogenous growth theory), but with only limited success. It seems impossible and inconsistent under the new international trade rules, however, for other developing countries to duplicate the East Asia “miracle,” which was based on strong government support for domestic industry while stimulating competition and efficiency among domestic firms. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round is expected to greatly benefit developing countries through continued deregulation and increased access to developed-country markets.  相似文献   

10.
We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post‐Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with gains of $164.0 billion for the United States, $132.6 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post‐Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by $2.1 trillion, with gains of $497.0 billion (5.5 per cent of GNP) for the United States and $401.9 billion (6.2 per cent of GNP) for Japan. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the Doha multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Korea, and the United States with Chile, Singapore and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non‐member countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analysed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.  相似文献   

11.
Radha Sinha 《Intereconomics》1990,25(5):229-237
The Uruguay Round negotiations are currently passing through a critical phase after four years of strenuous bargaining. The ultimate success of the negotiations largely depends on the attitudes of the USA, the EC and Japan. What are the main contentious issues between these three and how are their trade relations likely to develop in future?  相似文献   

12.
This study assesses the changing policy and regulatory context for telecommunications services and their provision and use in Canada. A number of recent developments, including a I987 Department of Communications policy statement, recent CRTC regulatory decisions, changes in the role of Telesat Canada and Teleglobe Canada, as well as implementation of the Canada-US FXA, are treated. Prospective developments in several other areas such as another attempt to introduce longdistance competition in Canada and the implications of the Uruguay Round services trade negotiations are also examined. The theme throughout is that telecommunications services, both domestic and international, are being provided and used within an increasingly open and competitive environment.  相似文献   

13.
多哈回合中以G20为代表的发展中国家间更密切的协商沟通体系的建立,推动了多哈回合各项谈判议题的开展。本文就G20集团中各国农业发展相似度和产品贸易竞争力进行了比较,分析了成员方组成谈判集团参与农业相关问题谈判的动机,得出结论基于相近的农业产业发展层次,集团成员对扩大农产品贸易的相似诉求是集团组建的基础,同时分析了G20未来所面临的挑战,提出了应对问题的解决方案。  相似文献   

14.
自乌拉圭回合以来,全球农产品贸易开放程度逐步加深。然而在这一共同背景下,不同发展中国家的农业绩效出现显著差异。除了扩大农业贸易开放这一因素外,由发展中国家的文化、制度、经济环境等因素决定的国际竞争力高低等非贸易因素对农业绩效可能产生了重要影响。本文利用世界银行和FAO等国际机构发布的多国统计资料建立面板数据模型,检验影响发展中国家农业生产力的重要因素。结果表明,发展中国家的农业生产力由生产投入的数量和结构所决定,扩大贸易开放对农业生产力的影响方向主要取决于贸易格局的变化,而提高本国的竞争力和全球化水平有利于在开放的市场环境下提高农业生产力。  相似文献   

15.
多哈回合的谈判结果对于多边贸易体制的稳定、经济全球化的进程、贸易自由化给各成员国带来的福利增进而言,具有极其重要的意义。世贸组织承诺,多哈回合要给发展中国家带来真正的好处。作为世界上最大的发展中国家,中国所受到的影响更是引人注目。  相似文献   

16.
积极应对国外“反倾销”   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
刘红燕 《商业研究》2002,(10):122-124
制定明确的反倾销规则是乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判的热点问题之一。反倾销法本来是用于防范外国公司以掠夺性价格进行倾销 ,但却日益成为贸易保护主义的工具 ,被许多国家滥用。中国是世界上反倾销指控的最大受害国 ,越来越多的反倾销诉讼 ,严重影响到我国对外贸易的发展。  相似文献   

17.
Agriculture looms large on the WTO's agenda. It was the first substantive item listed in the work programme of the Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha Round, and it was arguably at the centre of the failure at Cancun. Developing countries made it clear both before and during the Cancun meeting that progress on agriculture was their primary objective. Negotiations in other areas have received less attention and progressed more slowly. This paper considers that prioritisation, and suggests that the interests of developing countries in the current round of trade negotiations are much broader than is suggested by the narrow range of agricultural issues that have dominated negotiations. A true development round would require a significant reprioritisation of many areas of the WTO's current agenda.  相似文献   

18.
Within the Uruguay Round, the “Group of Negotiations on Trade in Services” deals with the formation of a multilateral framework of principles and rules for the “progressive liberalization” of trade in services. Telecommunications is of high priority in the framework preparations, both as a delivery vehicle for information-intensive services and as a service industry itself. This article attempts to clarify possible economic and developmental opportunities for LDCs which could emerge from the Uruguay negotiations regarding telecommunications and information-intensive services. It contains an up-to-date analysis of the present results of the Uruguay Round and offers an outlook on the consequences of the negotiations.  相似文献   

19.
In the post–Uruguay Round World Trading System and with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a new set of agendas on the governance of the world economy has emerged. Among them are the relationship between trade and social policy, trade and the environment, and trade and competition policy. These issues are new in the sense that policymakers have, until now, avoided drawing direct‐policy linkages between them. The main reason for this is that traditionally social and competition policies have been domestic policy domains that international policymakers were prevented from influencing. While environmental policy has been subject to several international negotiations, the link between trade and the environment has been relatively under‐discussed in the GATT. Moreover, there have been few international agreements that have drawn a direct link between trade and the environment.1 The focus of this paper is the relationship between trade and competition policy. In particular, this paper seeks to address the issues related to international competition policy and the concerns and problems faced by international business in this context. 1 An exception being the agreement on trade in endangered species (CITES). © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  相似文献   

20.
This paper takes stock of trade policies in Southeast Asia after the Asian crisis and in the wake of the current global economic crisis. It compares trade policies in individual Southeast Asian countries; places them in the context of regional and global economic integration; and particularly draws implications for the region from the rise of China and India. The first section looks at recent trade and FDI patterns in Southeast Asia. Then follows an overview of key trade‐policy trends, in the region overall and in individual countries. The next sections examine ASEAN countries in international trade negotiations and agreements: first in the WTO, especially in the Doha Round; then within ASEAN; and finally on cross‐regional FTAs. The paper concludes that ASEAN countries cannot rely on external tracks ‘from above’ for meaningful trade policy reform. Since the Asian crisis there has been a slowdown of reform momentum, and too much reliance on trade negotiations – especially FTAs. Rather, countries in the region have to rely on themselves –‘from below’ as it were. The engine of liberalisation and regulatory reform has to be home‐driven – as it was before the Asian crisis – with governments taking unilateral measures in response to internal and external conditions.  相似文献   

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