What drives financial crises in emerging markets?

The study examines the causes of financial crises in 31 emerging market countries during 1980–2001. It estimates a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial sector variables. Traditional variables such as unemployment and inflation, as well as several indicators of indebtedness such as private sector liabilities and the foreign liabilities of banks explain currency crises rather well, and it appears currency crises occur in tandem with banking crises. Indeed, in emerging market countries the vulnerability to crisis is exacerbated by situations involving large liabilities that permit sudden capital outflows. Increases in indebtedness followed the liberalization of capital flows and domestic financial sectors.     

金融危机理论演进与发展研究

随着我国金融开放的深度和广度的不断提高,旧有风险进一步暴露,新的风险进一步产生。我国经济受全球经济波动的影响越来越大,发生金融危机的可能性也在增大。由于金融危机的最大特征就是货币的急剧贬值,关于货币危机的研究也最为成熟,目前已形成四代理论模型。而银行业危机理论和外债危机理论的研究比较分散,还没有形成像货币危机理论那样完善的体系。     

Currency and Financial Crises in Turkey 2000 –2001: Bad Fundamentals or Bad Luck?

This paper attempts to explore the underlying causes of twin crises experienced by Turkey in November 2000 and February 2001. We study an extensive set of leading indicators of crises that are drawn from the existing literature. Our results identify three sets of vulnerabilities in the Turkish economy in triggering the financial crisis and bringing about the collapse of the Turkish lira. These are: first, the weak external position caused by excessive debt burden combined with the loss of competitiveness; second, the weak fiscal position resulting from the record levels of interest payments on domestic borrowing; and most importantly, third, weaknesses in the financial and banking sector. Given these observations, we argue that the success of financial sector reform is instrumental not only for putting the economy on a sustainable recovery path but also for reducing the likelihood of similar crises in the future. The general lesson to be drawn from this experience is that a sound financial system is a pre‐condition for the successful operation of a fixed exchange rate regime.     

Der deutsche Bankensektor

Although Germany’s banking sector has experienced a wave of consolidation, especially since the financial crisis, the country is still home to a high number of banking institutions. When domestic economic activity was sluggish in the mid-2000s, German banks searched for sources of income abroad; some of them have massively invested in structured products. As a consequence, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 has hit German banks harder than those from other eurozone countries. The European Commission has played a key role in restructuring the sector, asking in particular that banks which have received state aid strongly reduce their balance sheets — and ordering the liquidation of one of them. Since 2010 the German banking sector has returned to the profit zone and appears more robust thanks to an increase of equity and a reduction of balance sheets. The leverage ratio remains nevertheless significant, profitability remains low in a context of strong competition on the domestic market, and some banks find themselves deeply affected by the crisis of the shipping sector.     

Bank Performance and Credit Availability in the Bulgarian Banking Sector, 1997-2001

Abstract

The 1997 financial crisis wiped out 30% of the Bulgarian banking sector and created severe strains on corporations. With the establishment of the currency board in 1997 and the new Banking Law, which set the legal framework for proper bank supervision, major Bulgarian banks were rapidly privatized through sales to foreigners, now controlling around 80% of bank assets. Since 1997, the Bulgarian banking sector has recovered from the crisis by improving its profitability and efficiency and adopted a legal framework compatible with the European Union standards. Based on a regression analysis of bank balance sheets and income statements, this paper shows that low level of credit volume during 1997-1999 derived from banks' cautious stance towards credit making reflecting both the ongoing risks in the real sector, and the stringent new banking regulations. Large banks, however, benefited from scale economies in improving profitability in the same period.     

Nationale Geldsch?pfung zersetzt den Euroraum

The Eurosystem has been operating in crisis mode for more than four years now. Massive quantitative and qualitative easing in its monetary policy stance are the visible marks of its response to the turbulence in the financial sector. This policy aims primarily at maintaining financial stability in the euro area by providing vast liquidity support to commercial banks that are operating in nationally segmented banking systems. The sovereign debt crises in some member countries further exacerbate the segmentation problem along country borders. As a side effect, cross-border capital flows are substituted by money market operations by the national central banks. The latter are engaging more and more often in substantial balance-of-payments financing, and financial risks are shifted from investors to European taxpayers via the Eurosystem. Symptomatically, this shows up in exploding TARGET2 positions in the national central banks’ balance sheets. The longer this process continues, the stronger the centrifugal forces become that ultimately might burst the single currency. A solution requires a euro area-wide regulatory approach for the financial sector. Next to a uniform scheme for banking regulation, supervision and resolution, we recommend the comprehensive introduction of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) as a major refinancing source for the banking industry. As this proposal cannot be introduced overnight, national and European banking resolution funds are necessary in the short run. The latter do not rescue banks, but they kick in as soon as a bank’s equity is depleted in order to wind down failing banks in a systemically prudent way.     

Financial Liberalisation and the South Korean Financial Crisis: An Analysis of Expert Opinion

This paper provides a novel analysis of the South Korean financial crisis drawing on the findings of a unique survey of IMF/World Bank and South Korean experts. The survey reveals that over‐optimism and inadequate recognition of financial risks inadvertently led to excessive risk‐taking by Korean financial intermediaries. It also indicates that the sources of over‐optimistic assessments of East Asian economies were mainly to be found outside East Asia and included the Bretton Woods Institutions themselves, Western media and analysts. In Korea, weaknesses in risk management were the result of (i) lack of expertise in relation to handling the risks associated with capital flows, and (ii) disincentives to manage risks emanating from a relatively successful history of government‐provided safety nets for both industry and banking. Financial liberalisation widened risk‐taking opportunities, by allowing Korean financial institutions to both borrow from and lend to institutions outside Korea. It also created additional disincentives for managing risk by intensifying competition and eroding bank franchise values. Weaknesses in prudential regulation allowed bank portfolios to become riskier, especially in terms of increased liquidity risk as a result of maturity mismatches between dollar‐denominated assets and liabilities. The liquidity crisis, which followed the re‐assessment of the South Korean economy by international lenders in late 1997, triggered a full‐blown financial crisis because of the absence of an effective international lender of last resort.     

Financial liberalization,prudential supervision,and the onset of banking crises

We examine what is perceived as one of the main culprits in the occurrence of banking crises: financial liberalization. As is typically argued, if liberalization is accompanied by insufficient prudential supervision of the banking sector, it will result in excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries and a subsequent crisis. Having evaluated the empirical validity of this hypothesis, we conclude that such a development is, at worse, only a medium run threat to the health of the banking sector. We find that a more immediate danger is the loss of monopoly power that liberalization typically entails. We base our conclusions on an empirical investigation of a panel-probit model of the occurrence of banking crises using macro-economic, institutional and political data.     

Japan's Lost Decade and its Financial System

After briefly explaining the causes of the Japanese asset‐price bubble in the 1980s, this paper analyses why the bursting of the bubble developed into a full‐fledged financial crisis in the late 1990s. In order to cope with this crisis, the Government has injected capital directly into the banking sector and banks have written off enormous amounts of bad loans. However, the Japanese financial sector remains very weak and Japan still faces a number of problems in its financial system. Firstly, the profit margin of banks is too small to cover the increased default risk following the bursting of the bubble, and there are market distortions created by the government‐backed financial institutions and the requirements on new lending to small and medium sized companies. Secondly, banks still have excessive stock investment and crossholding of shares between banks and other companies has weakened the market discipline on entrenched management. Thirdly, the government guarantee of all banking‐sector liabilities should be removed. Once the financial system is stabilised, a risk‐adjusted deposit insurance premium should be introduced so as to strengthen market discipline on banks, and the huge postal saving system should be privatised to create a level‐playing field among deposit taking financial institutions. Besides the foregoing, the weak corporate governance structure of Japanese financial institutions has to be remodelled. The management of banks has shielded themselves by extensive cross‐shareholdings, especially with life insurance companies. There has been extensive mutual provision of capital, most large life insurance companies have weak corporate governance, and many of the large shareholders of banks are life insurance companies. This double gearing between banks and life insurance companies has therefore weakened the market control of Japanese financial institutions.     

Financial integration, productivity and capital accumulation

Understanding the mechanism through which financial globalization affects economic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of opening financial markets. This paper is a first attempt at disentangling the effects of financial integration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP) and investment. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 70 countries observed between 1975 and 1999. The results for both de jure and de facto indicators suggest that financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity, while it does not directly affect capital accumulation. I also control for indirect effects of financial globalization through financial development and banking and currency crises. While financial integration does not systematically increase domestic financial depth, it may raise the likelihood of banking crises, though only to a minor extent. Yet, the overall effect of financial liberalization remains positive for productivity and negligible for investment.     

强化银行财务风险管理 构建微观审慎指标体系

与世界其他地区的金融危机相比 ,亚洲金融危机清楚地表明银行业稳健性的重要。银行业风险预警和内部治理的缺陷增大了银行机构对外部威胁的暴露程度 ,审慎性规则的不健全使银行承担了过度风险。从而 ,强化银行财务风险管理 ,建立微观审慎指标体系应成为银行业内部治理结构调整重点之一。     

Impact of the Financial Crisis on Cross‐Border Mergers and Acquisitions and Concentration in the Global Banking Industry

The global banking industry has seen dramatic changes in the past 40 years. Most recently, the financial liberalization of emerging markets and the global financial crisis have significantly impacted the market share of banks worldwide. This article investigates the impact of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the banking sector and emphasizes the role of emerging‐market banks in the postcrisis consolidation trend. Using M&A data and concentration data over the period 2000–2013, our analysis indicates that the financial crisis had a significant impact on worldwide M&As, especially on the direction of the transactions. Emerging‐market banks appear to be major acquirers in the postcrisis period, targeting both neighboring countries and developed economies in Europe. We also observe an increase in bank concentration in developed markets most hit by the financial crisis, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, whereas bank concentration decreased in emerging markets. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Financial integration,productivity and capital accumulation

Understanding the mechanism through which financial globalization affects economic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of opening financial markets. This paper is a first attempt at disentangling the effects of financial integration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP) and investment. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 70 countries observed between 1975 and 1999. The results for both de jure and de facto indicators suggest that financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity, while it does not directly affect capital accumulation. I also control for indirect effects of financial globalization through financial development and banking and currency crises. While financial integration does not systematically increase domestic financial depth, it may raise the likelihood of banking crises, though only to a minor extent. Yet, the overall effect of financial liberalization remains positive for productivity and negligible for investment.     

Financial integration,specialization, and systemic risk

This paper studies the implications of cross-border financial integration for financial stability when banks' loan portfolios adjust endogenously. Banks can be subject to sectoral and aggregate domestic shocks. After integration they can share these risks in a complete interbank market. When banks have a comparative advantage in providing credit to certain industries, financial integration may induce banks to specialize in lending. An enhanced concentration in lending does not necessarily increase risk, because a well-functioning interbank market allows to achieve the necessary diversification. This greater need for risk sharing, though, increases the risk of cross-border contagion and the likelihood of widespread banking crises. However, even though integration increases the risk of contagion it improves welfare if it permits banks to realize specialization benefits.     

The influence of bank ownership on credit supply: Evidence from the recent financial crisis

This study examines how bank ownership influenced the credit supply during the recent financial crisis in Russia, where the banking sector consists of a mix of state-controlled banks, foreign-owned banks, and domestic private banks. To estimate credit supply changes, we apply an original approach based on stochastic frontier analysis. We use quarterly data for Russian banks covering the period from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009. Our findings suggest that bank ownership affected credit supply during the financial crisis and that the crisis led to an overall decrease in the credit supply. Relative to domestic private banks foreign-owned banks reduced their credit supply more and state-controlled banks less. This supports the hypothesis that foreign banks have a “lack of loyalty” to domestic actors during a crisis, as well as the view that an objective function of state-controlled banks leads them to support the economy during economic downturns.     

Why do currency crises arise and how could they be avoided?

In the 1990s currency crises arose in different regions, e.g. in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil and Ecuador, to mention only the most important ones. What are the main factors which may trigger such events? How does globalisation and deregulation of financial markets influence the emergence of a currency crisis? What forms of crises exist? Are they driven by fundamental imbalances in a country or are they caused by self-fulfilling mechanisms involving herd behaviour and destabilising speculation? To what extent do such crises reflect implicit governmental and international guarantees which may cause moral hazard and adverse selection, thereby increasing the risk behaviour of enterprises and banks?     

中国金融体系的脆弱性与道德风险

道德风险行为就是当签约一方不完全承担风险后果时所采取的自身效用最大化的自私行为.中国金融体系存在严重的脆弱性,根本原因也在于道德风险.政府不仅对银行提供了担保,也认为证券市场"太大而不能失败".证券市场危机往往是金融危机的先行指标,随之而来的银行危机和货币危机将决定金融危机的深度和广度.中国金融体系的道德风险已经深入到最基层的代理人,其代价将是非常惨重的.     

民营化、国有化与中国国有银行改革

国有银行自上世纪70年代中期以来出现了民营化的国际趋势,一些国家因此发生了银行危机.而此前全球曾有过国有化浪潮.虽然国有银行效率比民营银行低,但经验研究却表明,国有银行与银行危机之间没有或很少有因果关系;而且由于有政府信誉担保不易发生挤兑.中国国有银行改革过程实际上是政府逐步放弃控制权的过程,但切不可因效率而忽视金融稳定;简单地依靠所有权变更无法解决国有银行脆弱性问题;而且,与境外战略投资者合作时要谨防金融主权失控风险.     

China's Investment in Africa's Banking Sector

1 Introduction The global financial crisis, whose effects have been most severe on the world's largest banks, has created a vacuum in banking sector in Africa by stalling investment from the traditional investor. The world's largest banks, brought to their knees by the crisis, and having had to be bailed out, are in no position to continue investing in the banking sector in Africa.     

Banking Soundness Indicators and Sovereign Risk in Time of Crisis: The Case of the European Union

This study examines the impact of the soundness of the banking sector on sovereign risk of EU member countries during the financial crisis using a selection of financial soundness indicators (FSIs) and the sovereign ratings of the three main rating agencies. Unlike previous literature that typically focuses on the ability of FSIs to foresee banking crises, we estimate ordered response models to assess the power of these indicators to explain sovereign risk. Our results show that evaluations made by the rating agencies are related to the lagged values of core FSIs such that an improvement in these indicators leads to improvements in upcoming sovereign ratings. Hence, reinforced banking soundness would reduce the sovereign risk. Accordingly, governments, supervisors and central banks should pay close attention to the evolution of certain FSIs related to the banking sector, in addition to other variables that have traditionally been taken into account in analysing sovereign risk.