The effects of credit default swaps on corporate investment

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how credit default swaps (CDS) affect the corporate investment of the referenced entities. We document a significant reduction in corporate investment after CDS trading, a result that is robust to alternative model specifications and a set of endogeneity tests. Our findings of the increased firm risk and cost of capital support the costly external capital channel. The cross-sectional variations in CDS effects demonstrate that both reduced monitoring and the empty creditor problem might be the underlying forces driving the costly external capital channel. Our additional analysis implies that CDS trading is associated with an enhancement in investment efficiency for firms that are prone to overinvestment.     

Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

Exploring the components of credit risk in credit default swaps

In this paper, we test the influence of various fundamental variables on the pricing of credit default swaps. The theoretical determinants that are important for pricing credit default swaps include the risk-free rate, industry sector, credit rating, and liquidity factors. We suggest a linear regression model containing these different variables, especially focusing on liquidity factors. Unlike bond spreads which have been shown to be inversely related to liquidity (i.e., the greater the liquidity, the lower the spread), there is no a priori reason that the credit default swap spread should exhibit the same relationship. This is due to the economic characteristics of a credit default swap compared to a bond. Our empirical result shows that all the fundamental variables investigated have a significant effect on the credit default swap spread. Moreover, our findings suggest that credit default swaps that trade with greater liquidity have a wider credit default swap spread.     

Modelling bonds and credit default swaps using a structural model with contagion

This paper develops a two-dimensional structural framework for valuing credit default swaps and corporate bonds in the presence of default contagion. Modelling the values of related firms as correlated geometric Brownian motions with exponential default barriers, analytical formulae are obtained for both credit default swap spreads and corporate bond yields. The credit dependence structure is influenced by both a longer-term correlation structure as well as by the possibility of default contagion. In this way, the model is able to generate a diverse range of shapes for the term structure of credit spreads using realistic values for input parameters.     

The use of credit default swaps by bond mutual funds: Liquidity provision and counterparty risk

Corporate bond mutual funds increased their selling of credit protection in the credit default swaps (CDS) market during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This trading activity was primarily in multi-name CDS, greater among larger and established funds, and directed toward counterparty dealers in financial distress. Funds that sold credit protection during the crisis experienced greater credit market risk and superior post-crisis performance, consistent with higher expected returns from liquidity provision. Funds using Lehman Brothers as a counterparty experienced abnormal outflows and returns of –2% immediately following Lehman's bankruptcy, suggesting that funds’ opportunistic trading in CDS exposed investors to counterparty risk.     

Risk management of deposit insurance corporations with risk-based premiums and credit default swaps

In this paper, we propose a risk-based model for deposit insurance premiums and provide the closed-form formula for premiums, including early closure, capital forbearance, interest rate risk, and moral hazard. Our numerical analysis confirms the proposed pricing formula and the relative impact of the provisions for deposit insurance premiums. We illustrate how to use credit default swaps (CDSs) to manage the bank’s asset risk corresponding to the deposit insurance model. A failed bank, Washington Mutual, is used to demonstrate how to calibrate the model’s parameters and calculate fair premiums that are consistent with market risks on the basis of our proposed model and credit derivatives. Finally, a numerical experiment is designed to determine the optimal hedge ratio, which can minimise the variance of cash-flow of the deposit insurance corporations.     

Counterparty credit risk and the credit default swap market

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.     

Pricing default swaps: Empirical evidence

In this paper we compare market prices of credit default swaps with model prices. We show that a simple reduced form model outperforms directly comparing bonds' credit spreads to default swap premiums. We find that the model yields unbiased premium estimates for default swaps on investment grade issuers, but only if we use swap or repo rates as proxy for default-free interest rates. This indicates that the government curve is no longer seen as the reference default-free curve. We also show that the model is relatively insensitive to the value of the assumed recovery rate.     

Credit default swaps and the market for sovereign debt

In this paper, we analyze the determinants and effects of credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation in the sovereign bond market. CDS trading initiation is associated with a 30–150 basis point reduction in sovereign bond yields, with greater yield reductions accruing to higher default risk economies. For countries with high default risk, rated B or lower by Standard and Poor’s, CDS initiation is also associated with significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying market. CDS trading initiation is more likely following increases in local equity index volatility, index spreads for regional and global CDS markets, or depreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar, and decreases in a country’s ability to service foreign debt. Our results are robust to selection bias controls based on these factors.     

Good and bad credit contagion: Evidence from credit default swaps

This study examines the intra-industry information transfer effect of credit events, as captured in the credit default swaps (CDS) and stock markets. Positive correlations across CDS spreads imply that contagion effects dominate, whereas negative correlations indicate competition effects. We find strong evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies and competition effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies. We also introduce a purely unanticipated event, in the form of a large jump in a company's CDS spread, and find that this leads to the strongest evidence of credit contagion across the industry. These results have important implications for the construction of portfolios with credit-sensitive instruments.     

Valuation of credit default swaps and swaptions

This paper presents a conceptual and general framework for valuation of single-name credit derivatives. The general subfiltration approach of [J-R] to modelling default risk, which includes the Cox-process setting of [L], is integrated with a numeraire invariant approach. Several known results are reformulated and extended in this framework. New concepts and results are presented for change of numeraire in presence of default and valuation of credit swaptions. A new formula on fractional recovery of pre-default value is derived, generalizing that of [D-S]. A Black-Scholes formula for credit default swaptions due to [S] is shown to serve as a least-squares approximation to the general case.Received: 1 November 2003, Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B28, 60G44, 60G40JEL Classification: E43, G13I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

The delivery option in credit default swaps

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity.     

The sensitivity of the credit default swap market to financial analysts’ forecast revisions

We examine the impact of analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) and cash flow per share (CPS) forecast revisions on the market for credit default swaps. We find that while the issuance of both EPS and CPS forecast revisions are inversely associated with changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads, cash flow forecast revisions have a larger effect. We demonstrate that the relationship between CPS forecast revisions and CDS spreads tends to be stronger in cases of financial distress. We provide evidence that cash flow forecasts dominate earnings forecasts in some situations and that participants in the CDS market discriminate between analysts' forecast revisions and recommendation changes.     

Tournament incentives and firm credit risk: Evidence from credit default swap referenced firms

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of managerial tournament incentives on firm credit risk in credit default swap (CDS) referenced firms. We find that intra‐firm tournament incentives are negatively related to credit risk. Our results suggest that tournament incentives reduce credit risk by alleviating the potential for underinvestment when managers are concerned about exacting empty creditors. Further, we find that tournament incentives decrease credit risk when internal governance is strong or product market competition is intense. Taken together, our results suggest that creditors perceive senior manager tournament incentives (SMTI) as a critical determinant of a firm's credit risk, particularly in settings where managerial risk aversion is high.     

Theory and evidence on the dynamic interactions between sovereign credit default swaps and currency options

Using sovereign CDS spreads and currency option data for Mexico and Brazil, we document that CDS spreads covary with both the currency option implied volatility and the slope of the implied volatility curve in moneyness. We propose a joint valuation framework, in which currency return variance and sovereign default intensity follow a bivariate diffusion with contemporaneous correlation. Estimation shows that default intensity is much more persistent than currency return variance. The market price estimates on the two risk factors also explain the well-documented evidence that historical average default probabilities are lower than those implied from credit spreads.     

Credit default swap prices as risk indicators of listed German banks

This paper explores empirically the usefulness of credit default swap (CDS) prices as market indicators. The sample of reference entities consists of large, internationally active German banks and the observation period covers 3 years. By analysing the explanatory power of three risk sources: idiosyncratic credit risk, systematic credit risk and liquidity risk, we gain important insights into modeling the dynamics of CDS spreads. The impact of systematic risk, for example, has three components; one is related to the overall state of the economy, another related to the risk of the internationally active banking sector, and the third is an unobservable systematic factor. Default probabilities, inferred from a tractable reduced form model for CDS spreads, are compared with expected default frequencies from the Moody’s KMV model. The results lend empirical support to the hypothesis that structural models can be less informative than reduced-form models of CDS spreads in the case of banks with major investment banking activities as the leverage loses explanatory power. Although the CDS market appears to have matured over the observation period, during certain periods premiums for liquidity risk can increase substantially thus limiting the value of CDS spreads as market indicators. We conclude that equity prices and CDS premia should be considered together to fully exploit the information content of both market indicators and to mitigate their respective drawbacks.

Pricing of swaps with default risk

In this paper, I study the valuation of interest rate and currency swaps with default risk under the contingent claim analysis framework. I demonstrate that the traditional approach of pricing swap contracts as exchanges of loans underestimates the value of such contracts to the counterparty with higher credit rating and exaggerates the credit spread required to guard against default risk. Numerical simulations show that the swap rate is not sensitive to counterparty credit rating: for a ten year interest rate swap, a one hundred basis point increase in counterparty bond yield spread results in only about one basis point increase in the swap rate. (JEL G10, G12, G13)This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Ph.D. dissertation at Yale University. I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Kenneth French, Roger Ibbotson, and Jonathan Ingersoll, Jr. (chairman), for helpful advice and guidance. I would also like to thank Keny Back, Richard Lindsey, N. R. Prabhala, Ming Huang, Marti Subrahmanyam, three anonymous referees and especially Bob Jarrow, the editor, for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are solely mine. This paper won the 1996 Trefftzs Award for best student paper from the Western Finance Association.     

Arbitrage-free credit pricing using default probabilities and risk sensitivities

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities are obtainable for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices can be backed out from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, single-obligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.     

The impact of European bank mergers on bidder default risk

We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However, for relatively safe banks, mergers generate a significant increase in default risk. This result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a risk-reducing and stabilizing effect on the European banking industry.     

Recovery rates,default probabilities,and the credit cycle

In recessions, the number of defaulting firms rises. On top of this, the average amount recovered on the bonds of defaulting firms tends to decrease. This paper proposes an econometric model in which this joint time-variation in default rates and recovery rate distributions is driven by an unobserved Markov chain, which we interpret as the “credit cycle”. This model is shown to fit better than models in which this joint time-variation is driven by observed macroeconomic variables. We use the model to quantitatively assess the importance of allowing for systematic time-variation in recovery rates, which is often ignored in risk management and pricing models.