Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation

This paper investigates the effectiveness of using securities class action lawsuits in monitoring defendant firms by institutional lead plaintiffs from two aspects: (1) immediate litigation outcomes, including the probability of surviving the motion to dismiss and the settlement amount, and (2) subsequent governance improvement such as changes in board independence. Using a large sample of securities lawsuits from 1996 to 2005, we show that institutional investors are more likely to serve as the lead plaintiff for lawsuits with certain characteristics. After controlling for these determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff, we show that securities class actions with institutional owners as lead plaintiffs are less likely to be dismissed and have larger monetary settlements than securities class actions with individual lead plaintiffs. This effect exists for various types of institutions including public pension funds. We also find that, after the lawsuit filings, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs experience greater improvement in their board independence than defendant firms with individual lead plaintiffs. Our study suggests that securities litigation is an effective disciplining tool for institutional owners.     

Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus short-termism?

This study tests two opposing views of institutional investors—monitoring versus short-termism. We present evidence that institutional investor stability is negatively associated with 1-year-ahead stock price crash risk, consistent with the monitoring theory of institutional investors but not the short-termism theory. Our findings are shown to be robust to alternative empirical specifications, estimation methods and endogeneity concerns. In addition, we find that institutional ownership by public pension funds (bank trusts, investment companies, and independent investment advisors) is significantly negatively (positively) associated with future crash risk, consistent with findings that pension funds more actively monitor management than other types of institutions.     

Institutional Ownership and the Dynamics of Trading Volume around FFO Announcements

We examine the effect of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume around the announcement of funds from operations (FFO) by real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our central thesis is that abnormal trading volume is lower for the more informed institutions vis a vis non-sophisticated retail investors/institutions. We find a negative relationship between ownership by pension funds and abnormal trading volume around quarterly FFO announcements. However, ownership by the other types of institutions is unrelated to abnormal trading volume. Consistent with the view that some institutional investors are more informed than individual investors and therefore respond less to end of year announcements, we find that higher ownership by investment advisors is associated with lower levels of trading volume around end of year FFO announcements. Lastly, we find no evidence of institutional sell-offs associated with announcements of less than expected FFO.     

Investor monitoring and differences in mutual fund performance

A number of mutual funds cater exclusively to institutional investors. Although institutional funds might be a natural place to look for “smart money”, agency costs associated with delegated monitoring may lead to less monitoring and worse overall performance. We split institutional funds based on proxies for the degree of investor oversight, and we find that institutional funds with low initial investment requirements and funds with retail mates perform significantly worse than other institutional funds both before and after adjusting for risk and expenses. Tracking error is especially important in the flow-performance relationship of institutional funds with high minimum investment requirements.     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.     

REIT Institutional Ownership Dynamics and the Financial Crisis

Collectively, institutional investors hold large ownership stakes in REITs. The traditional view is that institutions are both long-term and passive investors. The financial crisis beginning in 2007 provides an opportunity to analyze the investment choices of institutional investors before, during, and after the crisis. Our results indicate that institutional ownership increased prior to the financial crisis, declined significantly during the period of market stress, but rebounded after. These results hold for four institutional investor subtypes: mutual funds/investment advisors, bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions, with mutual funds/investment advisors and bank trusts most clearly exhibiting this pattern. We also find evidence that institutions actively manage their REIT portfolios, displaying a “flight to quality” after the market downturn by reducing beta and individual risk exposure, and by increasing ownership in larger REITs.     

Non-audit fees, institutional monitoring, and audit quality

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with high institutional ownership. Our results are robust after controlling for auditor industry specialization, firms’ operating volatility, size effect, and potential endogeneity between institutional ownership and audit quality.     

Institutional monitoring and litigation risk: Evidence from employee disputes

In this article, we investigate how institutional investors help mitigate business‐related risks in a corporate environment. Using a large sample of employment disputes, litigations, and court cases, we find that institutional investors play a significant role in reducing employment litigation. We observe that firms with larger shares of institutional ownership have a lower incidence of employment lawsuits and that long‐term institutional investors are more effective at decreasing employee mistreatment. Our results suggest that institutional investors can improve the employee work environment and help mitigate future employee litigation. The improvement in employee work conditions has been shown to increase a firm's value through increased employee output, reduced litigation, and direct and indirect costs. Our results shed light on the effectiveness of institutional monitoring on a firm's litigation risk.     

Institutional investors' holdings surrounding equity rights offerings

We examine shareholding surrounding Swedish rights offerings using detailed information on the ownership in firms. We analyze shareholding levels and their changes for domestic and foreign institutional investors. As institutional holdings change, domestic institutions increase their holdings more than foreign institutions. Our examination of low and high buying activities by institutional investors surrounding rights offerings shows no stock picking ability, thus not supporting the “smart-money hypothesis” (Gibson et al., 2004). We also find that investor domicile influences firm value following the offering. Overall, foreign investors exhibit a strong and opposite directional reaction to adverse selection costs than domestic investors.     

How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records

The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.     

Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion

We examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting discretion, focusing on whether the impact varies with institutions' cost of acquiring monitoring information. Using geographic distance between the firm and the institutional investor as a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information, we find that corporate managers are less likely to use financial reporting discretion in the presence of local monitoring institutions than distant monitoring institutions. We also find that the impact of monitoring institutions on financial reporting discretion varies with the costs and benefits of financial reporting discretion.     

Determinants of cost efficiencies in the mutual fund industry

We evaluate determinants of cost efficiencies in the U.S. mutual fund industry for 1998-2003. Our empirical results show that cost increases in this industry have been less than proportional to increases in assets. We find that funds without a 12b-1 plan show larger economies of scale than funds with a 12b-1 plan; institutional funds show greater economies of scale than do retail funds; and that fund families that are more focused in their investment objectives reap benefits of lower fund management costs than do fund families that are more diversified in their investment objectives.     

Fund flows and performance: New evidence from retail and institutional SRI mutual funds

In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of the performance of US SRI mutual funds as well as its relation to the flow of new money that those funds experience in the context of investors sophistication. In particular, we compare the performance of SRI funds with their conventional peers, matched by both managers and characteristics criteria, using several performance measures. We investigate the role of investors sophistication and its influence on the flow-performance and performance-flow relations within the retail and institutional SRI fund shareclasses. For the analysis of the flow-performance relation we use portfolio approach along with monotonic relation test, while the shape of the flow-performance relation is studied using piecewise linear panel regressions. For the performance-flow relation, the flow and unexpected flow portfolios are formed and their risk-adjusted performance is evaluated. We find that SRI mutual fund sector earns positive abnormal returns before expenses and retail SRI funds outperform their institutional peers both, before and after fees. No differences in performance when we consider SRI and conventional funds run by the same management companies. Moreover, we find a positive flow-performance relation which is convex for retail SRI funds but no convexity is found for the institutional ones. We cannot confirm the smart money effect for retail SRI funds, instead we find a dumb money effect for SRI institutional funds. Our paper provides new insights into the role of the investors sophistication for those relations in the presence of sustainability preferences.     

Did institutions herd during the internet bubble?

We examine the trading behavior of institutional investors during the internet bubble and crash of 1998–2001, and its impact on stock prices. Similar to some recent findings concerning the trading behavior of hedge funds and NASDAQ 100 stocks, we find that during the bubble all types of institutions herded with great intensity into internet stocks for a comprehensive sample of institutional investors and internet stocks. In addition to this, we present three entirely new results. First, institutional herding was much greater than what can be explained by momentum trading. Second, institutions as a group continued to increase their holdings of internet stocks for two quarters past the market peak during the first quarter of 2000, and three quarters past the peak for individual stock prices, suggesting that institutions were unable to time the price peaks. Finally and most importantly, we find positive abnormal returns contemporaneous with institutional herding and negative abnormal returns (reversals) at the point that herding ceased. This finding suggests that institutions’ trading created temporary price pressures, and may have contributed to the bubble.     

Institutional trading in firms rumored to be takeover targets

In this paper we examine institutional trading in proximity to takeover rumors by combining the ANcerno dataset of transaction-level institutional trades with a unique sample of takeover rumor ‘scoops’. We find that institutions are net buyers in firms which subsequently become subject to takeover speculation and that institutional trading predicts which rumored firms will eventually receive takeover bids. Segregating funds according to their propensity to trade, we show that those less likely to purchase rumored targets by chance over the pre-rumor period are more likely to identify firms which will receive bid proposals and that they trade more profitably over both the pre- and post-rumor periods. We test for the presence of informed trading in a variety of ways and conclude that institutional investors appear to trade on material private information which identifies the firms soon to be the target of takeover speculation.     

Institutional Investor Ownership and Corporate Pension Transparency

We examine the association between institutional ownership and defined benefit (DB) pension decisions. We find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with pension underfunding, opportunistic increases in the expected rate of return assumption in the presence of underfunding, and significant ownership of the firm's own stock in the DB plan portfolio. Furthermore, these relations are stronger when institutional ownership is concentrated, when institutions are nontransient investors, or when institutions are relatively large. These results suggest that institutional investors are monitoring firm pension decisions, particularly those institutions with stronger monitoring incentives or resources.     

Litigation and mutual-fund runs

We investigate whether anticipation of adverse events (litigation about market timing and late trading) may trigger mutual-fund runs. We find that runs start as early as three months prior to litigation announcements. Pre-litigation runs accumulate to 31 basis points of the total net assets over a three-month window; post-litigation runs may last more than six months and accumulate to 1.25 percent over the first three-month window. Additionally, investors who run before litigation announcements earn significantly higher risk-adjusted and peer-adjusted returns than those who run after litigation. The difference in returns is particularly pronounced for funds holding illiquid assets. Finally, securities held by litigated fund families significantly underperform vis-á-vis other securities in terms of lower abnormal returns and liquidity. Our analysis suggests that a pro-rata ownership design is insufficient to prevent mutual-fund runs.     

The role of institutional investors in seasoned equity offerings

Do institutional investors possess private information about seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)? If so, do they use this private information to trade in a direction opposite to this information (a manipulative trading role) or in the same direction (an information production role)? We use a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to distinguish between these two roles of institutional investors. We explicitly identify institutional SEO allocations for the first time in the literature. We analyze the consequences of the private information possessed by institutional investors for SEO share allocation, institutional trading before and after the SEO and realized trading profitability, and the SEO discount. We find that institutions are able to identify and obtain more allocations in SEOs with better long-run stock returns, they trade in the same direction as their private information, and their post-SEO trading significantly outperforms a naive buy-and-hold trading strategy. Further, more pre-offer institutional net buying and larger institutional SEO allocations are associated with a smaller SEO discount. Overall, our results are consistent with institutions possessing private information about SEOs and with an information production instead of a manipulative trading role for institutional investors in SEOs.     

THE ROLES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE FAILURE OF NEWLY PUBLIC STOCKS

In this article, we study two negative events that can happen to newly public stocks: (1) the price drops at least 50% from the closing price on the first trading date within one year after the initial public offering (IPO) (initial failure) and (2) the firm is delisted for negative reasons within three years after the IPO (final failure). We find that high investor sentiment at the time of IPO can lead to both initial failure and final failure of IPO firms, whereas monitoring by external professionals plays a more important role in averting final failure than initial failure. Exploring the roles of different types of institutional investors, we find that transient (i.e., short‐term trading) institutions sell before initial failure. In contrast, dedicated (i.e., monitoring) institutions focus on long‐term performance and may stay with stocks suffering temporary initial failure, but their selling typically signals the imminent final failure of newly public firms.     

Who Blinks in Volatile Markets,Individuals or Institutions?

We investigate the relationship between the ownership structure and returns of firms on days when the absolute value of the market's return is two percent or more. We find that a firm's abnormal return on these days is related to the percentage of institutional ownership, that there is abnormally high turnover in the firm's shares on these days, and that this abnormal turnover is significantly related to the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm. Taken together, these results are consistent with positive feedback herding behavior on the part of some institutions, particularly mutual and pension funds.