Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis

This paper analyses the agency explanation for the cross-sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK by looking at the managerial entrenchment hypothesis drawn from the agency literature. Consistent with predictions, a significant U-shaped relationship between dividend payout ratios and insider ownership is observed for a large (exceeding 600 firms) sample of UK companies and two distinct periods. These results strongly suggest the possibility of managerial entrenchment when insider ownership reaches a threshold of around 30%. Evidence is also presented that non-beneficial holdings by insiders can lead to entrenchment in conjunction with shares held beneficially.     

公司治理与会计稳健性——基于上市公司的实证研究

会计稳健性是财务报告的一个重要特征和惯例，已成为会计盈余的重要质量特征之一。本文运用basu（1997）模型，将会计稳健性定义为会计报告对坏消息的确认比好消息更及时，探讨了有关公司治理的几个重要因素对会计稳健性的影响。研究发现：在影响会计稳健性的治理因素中，银行借款比例与会计稳健性正相关，国家股比例与会计稳健性负相关，在国家股比例低的分组，会计稳健性较高。发行有B股的企业，会计稳健性与只有A股的企业没有显著差异。研究表明，会计稳健性作为会计报告质量的一种量度，随着会计制度和准则的国际接轨与完善，证券市场监管的加强，取得了一定成效，但是会计准则和会计制度不能保证会计报告的质量，尚需改革国内相关的制度背景，如公司治理、法律实施环境等。     

Financial Systems, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance

Financial systems of industrialised countries are usually classified as being either capital market- or bank-dominated. This paper tries to shed some light on the validity of this distinction. In order to do this, it analyses two specific roles of the financial sector vis-à-vis the enterprise sector: the role of financing or funding business and the role of capital markets and banks, respectively, in the context of corporate governance. Our analysis of the relevant findings in the literature shows that financing patterns are quite similar between countries, while corporate governance systems are quite dissimilar. The paper discusses how these divergent findings could be made compatible with existing theories and what implications they may have for the question of whether there is a tendency for corporate governance systems in different countries to become as similar as corporate financing patterns seem to be.     

控制权机制对公司治理的影响研究

公司控制权是公司治理中的核心问题。近几年，国内关于公司治理的实证研究文献越来越多，但是讨论公司控制权与公司治理之间关系的实证研究文献却并不多，这是我国公司治理研究领域比较薄弱的一个环节。本文从我国证券市场的实际情况出发，以公司控制权机制对公司治理的影响为研究主题，通过实证分析，讨论了公司控制权机制对公司治理绩效的影响，并提出了一些建议。     

Corporate Raiders,Performance and Governance in Europe

I analyse 136 block purchases made by corporate raiders in Europe between 1990 and 2001. Contrary to the hypothesis that these investors expropriate the target companies, there is a positive market reaction to the first public announcement of these purchases. In the long‐run, raiders earn an abnormal profit when they sell their stakes. When they still held their positions at the end of the sample period, abnormal returns were insignificant. Raiders' activities do not improve operating performance. The findings are consistent with superior stock picking ability among these investors, but do not support the hypothesis that raiders are governance champions.     

交叉上市、风险分散与溢出效应

本文从非交叉上市公司对交叉上市的市场反应入手，利用对比公司法（MatchedFirmApproach）和事件研究法，实证分析了交叉上市对国内非交叉上市公司带来的影响。分析表明，我国的交叉上市政策增强了国内股票市场的风险分散功能，给国内上市公司带来了正的净溢出效应。     

利益相关者理论与国有商业银行公司治理

从利益相关者理论出发,结合我国国有商业银行改革与发展的特殊性,提出构建和完善我国国有商业银行公司治理结构应充分考虑各利益相关群体的利益,实施利益相关者治理。同时,应当在考虑我国经济条件、法律制度、文化传统等方面特点的情况下,充分借鉴发达国家公司治理模式,以促进我国国有商业银行国际竞争力和资源配置效率的提高。     

长安银行公司治理的实践与探索

公司治理是现代企业制度的核心,公司治理的效果决定公司的发展速度和质量,积极探索和改进公司治理方式是银行持续健康发展的永恒主题。本文从合理的股权结构、有效的工作机制、优良的高管团队、监管机构有力指导等方面,就如何构建具有中国特色的金融企业公司治理进行了阐释。     

关于公司治理结构趋同问题的讨论综述

全球化竞争使国家公司治理结构成为与企业竞争适应度相关的因素。一些学者认为，各国公司治理结构模式将向某一种最优模式趋同；另一些学者则认为，不会发生快速和完全的趋同，一些重要的差异将持续存在。但如果趋同，意味着对有效的公司治理基本要素的全球共同理解和接受的不断增长，那就毫无疑问，它确实正在发生，并有利于各国公司治理结构的不断改善。     

我国券商治理风险及对策

我国证券公司经营户中存在多种委托-代理关系。在现行的治理框架下，股东相容性风险、股东-经营层代理风险和客户-经营层代理风险均居高不下，使得治理风险成为我国券行业的最大风险。以国有产权为主导的产权结构和激励不相容的外部治理机制是滋生治理风险的源头，也是解决问题的切入点。     

Related Party Transactions,Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation

Examining the years 2001–2012, we document a decrease in reported CEO related party transactions (RPTs) and an increase in reported outside director RPTs, with the largest change occurring around the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) RPT disclosure changes. Our analysis of the determinants of RPTs and their association with CEO compensation also shows an impact of the SEC disclosure change, as we find support for the weak governance hypothesis in the pre‐2006 period and some support for the efficient contracting hypothesis post‐2005. While our results vary by model, pre‐2006, consistent with weak governance we find that outside director RPTs are positively associated with CEO compensation, with our estimates of the impact ranging from 8 to 18% depending on the model. In the post‐2005 period, this result dissipates, and we find some evidence consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis. Overall we find that the SEC RPT disclosure change appears to have had a significant impact on reported RPTs, the determinants of those RPTs, and the impact of those RPTs on CEO compensation.     

Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value

This study examines the relationship between board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. Board diversity is defined as the percentage of women, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics on the board of directors. This research is important because it presents the first empirical evidence examining whether board diversity is associated with improved financial value. After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, we find significant positive relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the board and firm value. We also find that the proportion of women and minorities on boards increases with firm size and board size, but decreases as the number of insiders increases.     

Corporate Governance,Social Responsibility,and Data Breaches

We study whether corporate governance and social responsibility are related to data breaches. We find that socially responsible companies with smaller boards and greater financial expertise are less likely to be breached. The financial impact of a breach is visible in the long term. Specifically, data‐breach firms have –3.5% one‐year buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns. Additionally, banks with breaches have significant declines in deposits and nonbanks have significant declines in sales in the long run. Finally, we find that following a data breach, companies are more likely to replace their chief executive officer and chief technology officer as well as improve their governance and social responsibility.     

公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有“兜底”效应,降低了董事高管的执业风险.选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响,进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异.研究结果表明:董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为;随着公司治理水平提高,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱.     

公司治理对上市公司估值的影响分析

本文在分析公司治理机制的基础上,将影响公司治理的各个因素进行量化,通过构建上市公司估值模型,对公司治理影响估值进行实证分析.本文的结论是,公司治理对上市公司估值的影响很大;治理结构完善的公司,其估值水平相对较高,反之亦反之.     

公司治理、管理者动机与衍生金融工具使用

基于中国上市公司2007~2013年财务数据,研究公司治理对管理者使用衍生金融工具的影响,并结合中国制度背景,深入分析和检验企业产权、政策监管对公司治理效应的影响。实证结果表明,公司治理对管理者使用衍生金融工具的动机存在重要影响,公司治理水平越高,管理者越倾向于利用衍生金融工具避免财务困境风险;相反,管理者越倾向于利用衍生金融工具规避薪酬风险。研究还发现,公司治理的作用机制会受到所有权性质的影响,国有控制属性会弱化公司治理效应,对衍生金融工具交易的政策监管差异是重要原因。     

反思与重构--我国中小商业银行公司治理机制再研究

目前我国中小商业银行普遍建立了以“三会一层”为主体的公司治理架构和运行机制,对促进经营管理水平的提升发挥了积极作用。但受多方因素影响,公司治理有形无实、难以发挥实质性作用等问题仍然突出。本文对我国中小商业银行公司治理现状进行了总结、反思和研究,既借鉴国外银行公司治理成功经验,又充分考虑了我国中小商业银行的特殊性,按照体制基础与制度设计兼顾、体制基础优先的原则,提出了相应的对策和建议。     

公司治理、融资效率与经济增长

由于不良的公司治理使更多的劳动和资本资源配置到经理的私人收益上，只要劳动所创造的边际私人收益为正，经理人就会减少公司红利或利息，对公司股权融资或债权融资造成不利影响，从而降低融资效率，减少产出，影响经济增长。提高经理人市场和资本市场的完全竞争性，可以有效地降低因公司治理结构的不完善而带来的资源效率的损失，提高融资效率，促进经济增长。     

论投票制度与我国上市公司治理的改进

现代企业理论认为，一个关于解决企业所有权安排问题的基本框架（原则）就是让企业剩余索取权与控制权的分享相对应（对称）。然而，在目前普遍实行的投票制度下，这一目标无法实现，引发了投票制度与治理原则之间的矛盾，本文对其根源进行了分析。在我国上市公司中这一矛盾尤为突出，为此，我国新修订的公司法引入了累计投票制以改善上市公司内部治理结构。本文分析了累计投票制所面临的重重障碍，并对如何改进投票制度提出了建议。     

Social Networks and Corporate Governance

We analyse frameworks that link corporate governance and firm values to governing boards' social networks and innovations in technology. Because agents create social networks with individuals with whom they share commonalities along the dimensions of social status and income, among other attributes, CEOs may participate in board members' social networks, which interferes with the quality of governance. At the same time, social connections with members of a board can allow for better evaluation of the members' abilities. Thus, in choosing whether to have board members with social ties to management, one must trade off the benefit of members successfully identifying high ability CEOs against the cost of inadequate monitoring due to social connections. Further, technologies like the Internet and electronic mail that reduce the extent of face‐to‐face networking cause agents to seek satisfaction of their social needs at the workplace, which exacerbates the impact of social networks on governance. The predictions of our model are consistent with recent episodes that appear to signify inadequate monitoring of corporate disclosures as well as with high levels of executive compensation. Additionally, empirical tests support the model's key implication that there is better governance and lower executive compensation in firms where networks are less likely to form.