The Owner–Manager Conflict in Insured Banks: Predetermined Salary versus Bonus Payments

This article examines the incentive of a bank's owners and manager to increase the level of assets risk if bank deposits are insured. The model consists of three players: a public insurer (e.g., the FDIC), the bank's owners, and its manager. Empirical evidence has shown that the management of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) and a low level of audit and control can be instrumental in causing banks to fail or get into financial difficulties. In the model, the form of compensation to the manager plays a crucial role in determining the level of asset risk. The article shows under which conditions and form of compensation bank's owners and manager have an incentive to raise the risk level. The model is run first under the assumption that the information between the bank and the insurer is symmetrical, and then under the assumption that it is asymmetrical for two forms of pay: a predetermined salary; and bonus payments whose value is not known at the time the contract between the owners and the manager is signed. The article also examines whether there is a Pareto-optimal contract between the owners and the manager as regards the risk level, given the two forms of pay. This question is important because the absence of such a contract could indicate the existence of a source of instability in the banking system.     

第三方支付对商业银行盈利水平影响的实证分析——基于系统GMM模型

基于2012~2017年41家商业银行相关数据构建动态面板系统GMM模型,从实证角度分析第三方支付对商业银行盈利水平的影响。结果表明:总体而言,第三方支付降低了商业银行盈利能力;分类来看,第三方支付对全国性商业银行有积极影响,但对地方性商业银行有较大的负面影响。     

第三方支付对我国商业银行盈利水平影响的实证研究

以15家上市商业银行为样本,以2009—2018年10年的面板数据为研究对象,将第三方支付对商业银行盈利水平的影响进行了实证研究。首先通过变量的选取建立面板数据方程,对商业银行的面板数据以及外部控制变量进行了描述性数据分析,通过F检验和Hausman检验确定各组样本所适用的最优回归模型,然后引入工具变量来缓解内生性,得到各组样本缓解内生性后的回归结果,结果发现第三方支付交易规模与商业银行整体盈利水平、商业银行利息净收入呈负相关关系,与商业银行中间业务盈利水平呈正相关关系。表明第三方支付虽对商业银行整体盈利能力产生抑制,但两者存在一定的作用空间来化解不利影响。     

Debt,Taxes, and Banks

Understanding the impact on banks’ capital structures of tax biases toward debt finance is critical to assessing policy responses to socially excessive bank leverage—but there is no empirical evidence of its extent. Guided by some simple theory, this paper explores this impact for a large panel of banks in 82 countries. On average, the tax sensitivity of banks’ leverage proves significant and about as large as for nonfinancial firms. Somewhat counterintuitively, but as the theory suggests, taxation has little impact on the use of hybrids. Banks holding smaller equity buffers and larger banks are noticeably less sensitive to tax.     

Banks, markets, and efficiency

A competitive financial system can help reduce banks’ monopoly power and the associated inefficiencies. However, according to Diamond (J Polit Econ 105: 928–956, 1997) and Fecht (J Eur Econ Assoc 6(2), 2004) competition with the financial sector may also constrain the amount of liquidity insurance that banks can provide to households affected by unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. To study this trade-off, we model competition between banks and between banks and financial markets. Our analysis shows that competition between banks and financial markets can constrain the risk-sharing offered by deposit contracts. This effect is the same if competition between banks mainly affects the reallocation of deposits. However, if banking competition primarily affects new deposits, then such competition only limits inefficient monopoly rents without restraining risk-sharing. We would like to thank Diemo Dietrich, Phil Dybvig, Hans Peter Grüner, Martin Hellwig, Elu von Thadden, Uwe Vollmer, Wolf Wagner as well as seminar participants at the Bundesbank, at the University of Mannheim, at the University of Tilburg, at the 3rd Workshop on Monetary and Financial Economics in Halle, at the University of Lausanne, at the First ProBanker Symposium in Maastricht, at the Global Finance Conference 2005 in Dublin, at the European Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Amsterdam, at the International Finance Conference 2005 in Copenhagen, and at the German Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Bonn. We thank Mike Demott for editorial assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System.     

对基层人行征信管理工作中协调障碍的思考

从边缘管理的新视角分析征信管理工作中交叉、衔接部位易出现的协调障碍问题：1．与社会各界的协调障碍问题;2与银监局的协调障碍问题;3．与金融系统的协调障碍问题;4．人民银行内部的协调障碍问题。     

国际收支失衡背景下人民币汇率与利率协调问题研究

我国的国际收支失衡问题从根本上说是经济结构不合理、投资消费关系不协调等内部问题引起的结构性失衡.从长远看,解决国际收支失衡问题须着力于经济结构的调整和经济发展方式的转变.从短期看,必须统筹兼顾汇率与利率政策,采取更加积极的政策措施,促进我国国际收支平衡目标的实现.     

钉住制度、国际收支失衡与比索危机

1994年12月,墨西哥金融危机爆发,并很快波及其他拉美国家,形成了一场震惊世界的拉美经济危机。比索钉住美元的汇率制度是此次危机的根源,国际收支失衡是此次危机的导火索。本文在宏观经济学的框架内,尝试分析钉住制度、国际收支失衡与比索危机之间的内在联系,并从钉住制度的退出时机和顺序的选择、货币政策与汇率政策的实施、钉住制度造成本币高估及其负面影响、经常项目逆差的潜在风险、过分依赖外国资本的弊端以及社会稳定的重要性等方面总结了墨西哥金融危机的启示。     

Payments systems and monetary policy

A dynamic spatial model is constructed where there is a role for money and for centralized payments arrangements, and where there are aggregate fluctuations driven by fluctuations in aggregate productivity. With decentralized monetary exchange and no centralized payments arrangements, there is price level indeterminacy, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. A private clearinghouse arrangement improves efficiency but produces a real indeterminacy. The pricing of daylight overdrafts is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation. Efficiency is achieved with a zero nominal interest rate on overnight central bank lending, or through private overnight interbank lending.     

Banks,bankruptcy, and public regulation

In a simple state-preference model with a complete capital market, some surprising implications of equilibrium in the banking industry are derived. For example, to limit a bank's probability of bankruptcy, it is sufficient for public regulators to control the composition and relative size of its portfolio or marketable securities. Generally, its loans need not be restricted. Also, under most publicly subsidized deposit insurance, bankers select very risky portfolios of bonds and loans with or without any risk adjustment in the insurance premium. In fact, with many types of subsidized insurance, public monitoring of bank loans is essential.     

汇率变动、经济转型与国际收支平衡

中国汇率制度改革以来,人民币汇率水平稳步上升,但国际收支顺差不仅没有减少,反而呈现持续增长的态势。由于受政策导向和增长方式的影响,特别是出口企业产品的"超低"成本优势,更使汇率升值的效果被淡化于"无形"。在推进经济转型过程中,应采取推进外贸增长方式由粗放型向集约型的转变,推进资源要素价格从管制型向市场型转变;还可以通过提高劳动力工资成本,改变对外贸易的国际竞争力和产业结构,进而改变经常项目收支状况。     

Returns to Retail Banking and Payments

The present paper examines the fundamental relationship between the country-level infrastructure of the retail payment market and overall bank performance. Using data from across 27 European markets over the period 2000–07, the results confirm that the performance of banks in countries with more developed retail payment service markets is better. This relationship is stronger in countries with a relatively high adoption of retail payment transaction technologies. Retail payment transaction technology itself can also improve bank performance, and evidence shows that heterogeneity in retail payment instruments is associated with enhanced bank performance. Similarly, higher usage of electronic retail payment instruments seems to stimulate banking business. We also show that retail payment services have a more significant impact on savings and cooperative bank performance, although they have a positive influence on the performance of commercial banks as well. Additionally, the findings reveal that the impact of retail services on bank performance is more pronounced through fee income, although their impact through interest income is also positive. Finally, an effective payment service market is found to be associated with higher bank stability. Our findings are robust to different regression specifications.     

Payments and liquidity under adverse selection

Informational asymmetries regarding the future value of assets affect their role in exchange. I construct a random-matching economy composed of two assets: a risk-free bond and a Lucas tree whose terminal value is privately known to its holder. No restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. The main finding supports a pecking-order theory of payments: Agents use their risk-free bonds first in order to finance their spending shocks, and they use their information-sensitive assets only if their holdings of bonds are depleted. The theory has implications for the optimal provision of risk-free bonds, the structure of asset returns, and liquidity.     

Banks,maturity transformation,and monetary policy

Banks engage in maturity transformation and the term premium compensates them for bearing the associated interest rate risk. Consistent with this view, I show that banks’ net interest margins and term premia have comoved in the United States over the last decades. On monetary policy announcement days, bank equity falls more sharply than nonbank equity following an increase in expected future short-term rates, but also responds more positively if term premia increase. These effects are reflected in bank cash-flows and amplified for banks with a larger maturity mismatch. The results reveal that banks are not immune to interest rate risk.     

Banks,financial markets,and social welfare

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model of banking and financial markets. The model allows to compare financial systems in which banks have access to financial markets with financial systems in which banks do not have access to financial markets. Allen and Gale [A welfare comparison of intermediaries and financial markets in Germany and the US. European Economic Review 39 (1995) 179–209] find that the Anglo-Saxon model of financial intermediation in which financial markets play a dominant role does not necessarily improve social welfare in comparison with the German model in which banks dominate. Our model provides a theoretical foundation for this view.     

Banks, private money, and government regulation

We study competition between inside and outside money in economies with trading frictions and financial intermediation. Claims on banks circulate if the redemption rate is low. When the quantity of fiat money is scarce, coexistence of inside and outside money dominates equilibria with a unique medium of exchange. If outside money is ample, banks choose to redeem claims in outside money, which increases welfare. Under binding reserve requirements, tightening monetary policy leads to credit rationing. Our results support recent trends toward lower reserve requirements. However, we also identify situations where restrictions on note issue are beneficial.     

Banks, Bears, and the Financial Crisis

We test whether short selling is destabilizing comparing distressed financial firms to other firms using NYSE transactions records covering 4 years including the recent financial crisis. Aggressive short-selling is sometimes destabilizing by some measures, but its impact is small, vanishes quickly, is not necessarily larger for distressed firms or during the crisis, and is accompanied by other stabilizing effects. The evidence does not validate theoretical predictions from models of destabilizing speculative or predatory trading. Aggregate short-selling is largely unrelated to market-wide investor sentiment, credit risk, and ex ante volatility. Aggressive liquidation of long positions typically has more impact than short selling. Thus, the data cannot justify the restrictions on short sales of financial stocks imposed in September 2008.     

战略管理、银行成长与商业银行战略转型

银行战略是银行发展的长期性和全局性的谋划,是构成商业银行成长的关键要素之一。银行战略管理的机制流程包括战略制定、战略实施与战略控制。中国的商业银行战略管理总体水平不高,且面临着战略转型,而战略转型构成中国的商业银行目前阶段的战略管理的矛盾的主要方面。本文提出的商业银行战略管理的“十大转变”对于中国的商业银行的战略管理而言,具有实践价值。     

银根紧缩 银企合作

如果不能适时地进行产业结构调整和价值链升级,实现经济发展方式的顺利转型,增强企业的核心竞争能力,中国的产业和企业将无力应对新一轮的经济复苏和市场竞争。     

Sovereign Default,Domestic Banks,and Financial Institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.