Lenders on the storm of wholesale funding shocks: saved by the central bank?

We provide empirical evidence on banks’ responses to shocks in the wholesale funding market, using data of 181 euro area banks over the period from August 2007 to June 2013. Responses to funding liquidity shocks for both banks’ lending volumes and loan rates, to households and corporates, are analysed in a panel VAR framework. We thereby distinguish banks by country, extent of Eurosystem borrowing, bank size and capitalization. The results show that shocks in the securities and interbank markets have significant effects on loan rates and credit supply, particularly of banks in stressed countries of the periphery. The results also suggest that central bank liquidity has mitigated this effect on lending volumes. Lending to nonfinancial corporations is more sensitive to wholesale funding shocks than lending to households. Lending volumes of large banks that are typically more dependent on wholesale funding and banks with large exposure to sovereign bonds show stronger responses to wholesale funding shocks.     

What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy,Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?

This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour.     

Central Bank and Commercial Banks' Liquidity Management – What is the Relationship?

The paper explores the relation between individual banks' liquidity management in the euro area and the ECB's management of the aggregate current accounts held by banks with the Eurosystem. It is argued that, in the case of the euro area with its large, remunerated reserve requirements that have to be fulfilled only on average over a one-month period, the banks' demand for working balances to serve as a buffer against market imperfections is always below reserve requirements. It is therefore normally sufficient for the ECB when steering short-term interest rates to control aggregate liquidity in a way that the aggregate banking system is in a position to fulfil adequately its reserve requirements. In particular, the ECB normally does not need to take care of any factors that affect temporarily the demand for working balances, such as the level and uncertainties of interbank payment flows. However, two exceptions are noteworthy and are discussed in the paper: the banks' balance sheet management activities implying a regular end of month peak of the EONIA rate; and the liquidity situation in the case of substantive market tensions as in the days following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The need of the ECB's liquidity management to address the associated deviations from a model of perfect markets is discussed.     

Identifying a Liquidity Effect in the Japanese Interbank Market

This article examines whether there was a liquidity effect in the Japanese interbank market for reserves during the period from January 4, 1996, to February 12, 1999. According to the standard martingale model, the only determinant of the overnight rate during the reserve maintenance period is the rate that is expected to prevail on the settlement day (the last day of the period), but this model ignores the fact that reserves are used for interbank payments. If overdraft costs are introduced into banks' reserve management problem, the overnight rate will also depend on what this paper calls the reserve surplus, which captures the liquidity effect of reserves. We identify the liquidity effect by exploiting two institutional features. First, the overnight rates observed in the morning are forward rates for a contract to be settled later in the day. Second, changes in reserves that are due to factors other than open market operations are rendered temporary through defensive operations by the Open Market Desk. We show that the liquidity effect can be identified from the regression of the spot-forward differential on these temporary liquidity shocks. Our estimates indicate that there was a liquidity effect, at least before the Yamaichi debacle of November 1997.     

An empirical analysis of excess interbank liquidity: a case study of Pakistan

We investigate the drivers of excess interbank liquidity in Pakistan, using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag approach on weekly data for December 2005 to July 2011. We find that the financing of the government budget deficit by the central bank and nonbanks leads to persistence in excess liquidity. Moreover, we identify a structural shift in the interbank market in June 2008. Before June 2008, low credit demand was driving the excess liquidity holdings by banks. After June 2008, banks’ precautionary investments in risk-free securities drive excess liquidity holdings. Monetary policy is less effective if banks hold excess liquidity for precautionary reasons.     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.     

POLONIA dynamics during the years 2006–2012 and the effectiveness of the monetary Policy of the National Bank of Poland

In the study we investigate the effectiveness of the National Bank of Poland in counteracting the negative results of the financial crisis in the Polish interbank market. The situation was exceptional in a sense, that during the period of the financial crisis the Polish interbank market experienced liquidity surplus, and the main problem of the central bank was to regain confidence among commercial banks and stimulate interbank transactions. We concentrate on the spread between the rate of overnight interbank loans and the reference rate and based upon its dynamics we assess the monetary policy of the Polish central bank. Using econometric techniques we study how the central bank influenced the spread, when its control over it weakened and when was it strengthened. The study is supported by the results of the survey directed to the headquarters of commercial banks. We conclude that the ability of the central bank to control overnight rate was temporarily lost during the first phases of the financial crisis, but gradually regained after implementation of the confidence pact.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

The interbank market during a crisis

The autumn of 1998 provides a setting in which to test the performance of the interbank market during a potential financial crisis. This period witnessed Russia's effective default on its sovereign bonds and the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. Despite these negative shocks to bank capital and increased uncertainty in financial markets, the federal funds market still effectively channeled liquidity to those institutions in need at rates consistent with Federal Reserve intentions. Further, risk premiums on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased, suggesting that the federal funds market performed well during this period.     

我国市场利率功能的实证研究

利率市场化是我国利率管理体制改革的重要内容,我国银行间同业拆借市场已经于1996年开始实行市场利率。各项存款、货币供应量、股票成交金额与企业商品价格同比指数是我国金融体系中重要的金融变量。因而,选取并利用全国银行间同业拆借市场加权平均利率代表我国市场利率,借助格兰杰关系检验、向量自回归模型的脉冲响应函数等计量经济学方法,可以研究市场利率与重要金融变量间的相互关系,进一步分析市场利率对金融体系的微观调节功能。     

What broad banks do, and markets don’t: Cross-subsidization

We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for “broad” banks that operate across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity efficiently, but fail to respond efficiently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both shocks and, hence, achieve an efficient internal allocation of capital. This allocation involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less fluctuations within regions. However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits.
(J.E.L.: E52, G21).     

Inefficiency of bilateral bargaining in interbank markets

Many countries have interbank markets that are over the counter (OTC) instead of exchange mediated. In OTC systems, bilateral bargaining takes place over the rate of interest on the (interbank) loan. This article characterizes such bilateral bargaining for loans between banks under asymmetric information and shows that bargaining outcomes maybe inefficient. The article suggests two sources of inefficiency. In a one-period model, bargaining between two banks may fail due to incomplete information even if gains to trade exist. Intertemporal issues examined in this article reveal that repeated interaction could create distorting effects through reciprocal contracts. Both cases are shown to require active liquidity management by the regulatory authority to restore the first best allocation.     

Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: Diminishing effectiveness?

This paper analyses the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending in a low interest rate environment. Based on a sample of 108 large international banks, our empirical analysis suggests that monetary policy is less effective in stimulating bank lending growth when interest rates reach a very low level. This result holds after controlling for business and financial cycle conditions and different bank-specific characteristics such as liquidity, capitalisation, funding costs, bank risk and income diversification. We find that the impact of low rates on the profitability of banks’ traditional intermediation activity helps explain the subdued evolution of lending in the period 2010–14.     

Regional Liquidity Risk and Covered Interest Parity During the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Tokyo,London, and New York*

ABSTRACT

During the global financial crisis, there were substantial deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) condition. In particular, in the post-Lehman period, the US dollar interest rate became very low on the forward market. However, the deviations from the CIP condition varied across markets. After presenting a simple model, the following analysis examines how the CIP condition between the Japanese yen and the US dollar was violated in Tokyo, London, and New York markets. We show that the CIP deviations became largest in the New York market soon after the Lehman shock but were largest in the Tokyo market in the rest of the turmoil period. The regressions suggest that market-specific credit risks and central banks’ liquidity provisions explained the difference across the markets. In particular, they indicate that larger dollar-specific risk and smaller yen-specific risk caused larger deviations in the Tokyo market.     

The Choice Among Interbank Settlement Systems: The European Experience

This paper addresses the choice of banks between alternative channels for interbank payments. The conventional view assumes a tradeoff between the safety of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) and the liquidity savings of multilateral netting. Moreover, correspondent banking is believed to be inefficient, both in terms of liquidity and of administrative costs. In the last decade, however, the impulse of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, technological changes and the management of RTGS systems by central banks have reduced the difference between the various systems. This is especially true for risk, whereas liquidity cost crucially depends on the refinancing policy adopted by the central bank and the co-ordination among the participants. On the basis of the recent evolution of payment systems in Europe, we verify the importance of liquidity, as well as other variables like transaction costs, for the choice of banks among different settlement systems. Cost factors imply that the nature of payments flows (value, commercial versus financial) and some structural features of the banking systems (dimension of the intermediaries, concentration of the banking sector) become important. The analysis is carried out both through a theoretical model and a cross-country comparison based on three data sources: ECB (European Central Bank, EBA (Euro Banking Association) and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).     

The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering money market rates during the financial crisis

The financial crisis has deeply affected money markets and thus, potentially, the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering euro area money market rates by looking at (i) the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations and (ii) the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. We find that during the crisis money market rates up to 12 months still respond to revisions in the expected path of future rates, even though to a lesser extent than before August 2007. We attribute part of the loss in monetary policy effectiveness to money market rates being driven by higher liquidity premia and increased uncertainty about future interest rates. Our results also indicate that the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures as of October 2008 were effective in addressing the disruptions in the euro area money market. In fact, our estimates suggest that non-standard monetary policy measures helped to lower Euribor rates by more than 80 basis points. These findings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary policy in times of crises.     

Network efficiency and the banking system

Inspired by the Coasean “market versus firm” dichotomy, we offer a new definition of efficiency by applying the notions of network cost and network efficiency as developed in complex network theory. Network analysis is relevant for every system of interconnected exchanging agents. One such system is the banking sector. It is showed that the notions hereby presented may improve upon the results of Allen and Gale’s standard model of the interbank market, where banks exchange liquidity and where troubles in a region of the market may lead to systemic collapse.     

Central Banking and Post-Keynesian Economics

Abstract

The Post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money has given much attention to the role of the central bank in the money creation process. Circuit theory has neglected this role, in so far as it has focused on the relationship between banks and firms within a monetary production economy. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it intends to fill this gap in circuit theory, by providing a role for the central bank in settlement of interbank debts. Secondly, it aims at reinforcing the Post-Keynesian analysis of central bank money by considering both the money-purveying and the credit-purveying roles of the settlement institution in the interbank market. The result of this analysis is a more comprehensive theory of endogenous money, where the lender-of-last-resort facilities of a central bank are viewed as an endogenous phenomenon involving both a money creation and a credit operation between the central bank and the domestic banking system. In such a framework, monetary policy consists of setting the base rate of interest at a level that enables banks to limit their bilateral debt position in the interbank market, so as not to disrupt the workings of the payment system by either an illiquidity or an insolvency crisis.