Liquidation triggers and the valuation of equity and debt

Many bankruptcy codes implicitly or explicitly contain net-worth covenants, which provide the firm’s bondholders with the right to force reorganization or liquidation if the value of the firm falls below a certain threshold. In practice, however, default does not necessarily lead to immediate change of control or to liquidation of the firm’s assets by its debtholders. To consider the impact of this on the valuation of corporate securities, we develop a model in which liquidation is driven by a state variable that accumulates with time and severity of distress. We model a dynamic grace period for the liquidation event. Recent or severe distress events may have greater impact on the liquidation trigger. Our model can be applied to a wide array of bankruptcy codes and jurisdictions.     

Optimal capital structure: A multi-period programming model for use in financial planning

This paper describes a multi-period, chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period, the firm's optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt. The model assumes that the firm's objective is to maximize total value of the firm, and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty, with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs. Finally, the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model.     

Earnings Predictability,Bond Ratings,and Bond Yields

We examine the role that earnings predictability plays in establishing a firm’s cost of debt capital by measuring its influence on establishing a new issue’s bond rating. In addition, we also examine the effects of earnings predictability on the initial pricing of the firm’s debt. Using new corporate bond issues from the period 1990–2000, our results indicate that the degree of predictability of a firm’s earnings is positively associated with a firm’s bond rating. Moreover, earnings predictability is also documented to be negatively associated with the offering yield. Importantly, bond rating classification accuracy is improved when specific measures of a firm’s earnings predictability are added to a robust model.JEL Classification:     

Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America?

We examine how corporate culture influences firm behavior. Prior research suggests a link between individual religiosity and risk aversion. We find that this relationship also influences organizational behavior. Firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure, as measured by variances in equity returns or returns on assets. They exhibit a lower investment rate and less growth, but generate a more positive market reaction, when they announce new investments. Finally, chief executive officers are more likely to join a firm with a similar religious environment as in their previous firm when they switch employers.     

The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex,lies, and firm value

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.     

The impact of foreign board membership on firm value

This study examines the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin’s Q). Using a sample of firms with headquarters in Norway or Sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-American board member(s), after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for. We argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by “importing” an Anglo-American corporate governance system. Such an “import” signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market.     

Explaining the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle using Stochastic Discount Factors

I use Stochastic Discount Factors to examine the sources of the idiosyncratic volatility premium. I find that non-zero risk aversion and firms’ non-systematic coskewness determine the premium on idiosyncratic volatility risk. The firm’s non-systematic coskewness measures the comovement of the asset’s volatility with the market return. When I control for the non-systematic coskewness factor, I find no significant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock expected returns. My results are robust across different sample periods and firm characteristics.     

Hedging, hedge accounting, and speculation in a rational expectations equilibrium

This paper explains corporate hedging and speculation in a two period rational expectations model. A risk averse manager represents a firm that is priced in a risk neutral market. The manager enters into a cash flow hedge of a forecast transaction by taking a short position in the futures market. When the futures position is chosen, the manager possesses private information regarding the firm’s production capacity. Mandatory disclosure of the futures position in the financial statements allows the market to draw inferences over the manager’s information. These inferences affect the market’s pricing decision and in turn the manager’s hedging decision. The futures position taken is chosen not only to reduce price risk exposure but to signal some capacity level. In equilibrium, however, the market anticipates the manager’s strategy and is not fooled.Considering varying managerial preferences, we analyze three settings. In the basic setting speculation occurs whenever the manager prefers high market values in both periods. In the second setting we add transaction costs and find that speculation is less likely. Finally, we introduce uncertainty regarding the manager’s preferences. If the market needs to determine prices based on expected preferences, incentives to speculate are mitigated in equilibrium but still present.     

Default Risk, Asset Pricing, and Debt Control

The pricing and control of firms’ debt has become a majorissue since Merton’s (1974) seminal article. Yet Mertonas well as other recent theories presume that the asset valueof the firm is independent of the debt of the firm. However,when using debt finance, firms may have to pay a premium foran idiosyncratic default risk and may face debt constraints.We demonstrate that firm-specific debt constraints and endogenousrisk premia, based on collateralized borrowing, affect the assetvalue of the firm and, in turn, the collateral value of thefirm. In order to explore the interdependence of debt financeand asset pricing of firms, we endogenize default premia andborrowing constraints in a production-based asset pricing model.In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizingthe present value of the firm faces an additional constraintgiving rise to the debt-dependent firm value. We solve for theasset value of the firm with debt finance by the use of numericaldynamic programming. This allows us to solve the debt controlproblem and to compute sustainable debt as well as the firm’sdebt value.     

Bond indenture provisions and the risk of corporate debt

This paper examines the effect of alternative bond indenture provisions on the allocation of risk among the firm's claimants. The approach taken here differs from that of earlier studies in that risk allocation is examined while the firm's leverage (in market value terms) is held constant. In this context, four indenture provisions are examined: (1) the time to maturity, (2) the promised payment schedule, (3) financing restrictions and (4) priority rules. It is concluded that risk is transferred from stockholders to bondholders as the time to maturity and promised payment increase appropriately. Furthermore substitution of longer-term debt for an equal amount of shorter-term debt also increases the risk to bondholders while decreasing the risk to stockholders. The analysis shows that a coupon bond can be represented by a unique discount bond with the same risk and value. This permits the characterization of the effective maturity of a risky debt issue, a concept analogous to the stochastic duration of a default-free coupon bond. These results are shown to be independent of the means used to finance the debt issue. Finally, it is concluded that the relative risk associated with different bonds issued by the same firm cannot be determined by the structure of priority rules alone. It is also necessary to consider the timing of the promised payments compared to that of the other debt issues in the firm's capital structure.     

Management quality and the cost of debt: Does management matter to lenders?

This paper investigates the effect of organizational capital, typified by various management practices within a firm, on the cost of external debt financing. Using a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in the US, we find that better management practices enhance a firm’s external financing capacity by lowering the firm’s cost of bank loans. We do not find any evidence that the lower loan cost of a high-quality-management firm is associated with more restrictive non-price contract terms such as greater collateral requirements and stricter covenants. These results suggest that banks explicitly take into account the risk arising from poor management practices when pricing and designing debt contracts.     

Adopting better corporate governance: Evidence from cross-border mergers

Cross-border mergers allow firms to alter the level of protection they provide to their investors, because target firms usually import the corporate governance system of the acquiring company by law. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes in corporate governance on firm value, and on an industry as a whole. We construct measures of the change in investor protection induced by cross-border mergers in a sample of 7330 ‘national industry years’ (spanning 39 industries in 41 countries in the period 1990–2001. We find that the Tobin's Q of an industry — including its unmerged firms — increases when firms within that industry are acquired by foreign firms coming from countries with better shareholder protection and better accounting standards. We present evidence that the transfer of corporate governance practices through cross-border mergers is Pareto improving. Firms that can adopt better practices willingly do so, and the market assigns more value to better protection.     

‘Managerialism’, ‘ownerism’ and risk

This paper proposes that managers, having the value of their human capital dependent on the performance of the firm they manage, and being unable to diversify away this risk, are expected to attempt to reduce their employment risk internally by project selection or by income smoothing, intended to stabilize the firm's income stream. An empirical investigation shows that manager-controlled firms exercise ‘income smoothing’ to a greater extent than owner-controlled firms, have relatively lower unsystematic risk and perhaps lower systematic risk.     

Unusual operating cash flows and stock returns

The current financial reporting of cash flows from operations does not present individual sources of these cash flows, making it difficult for investors to assess a firm’s future performance. I hand-collect individual cash flows from unusual operations and examine their characteristics for predicting future cash flows. The results show that the unusual individual cash flow items contain a significant incremental predictive ability for future cash flows. Additional return tests show that stock prices fail to fully reflect their predictive value, suggesting that the current reporting practice may mislead investor perceptions of a firm’s cash generating ability and investors could benefit from a more explicit presentation of cash flows from operations.     

Managerial responses to incentives: Control of firm risk, derivative pricing implications, and outside wealth management

We model a firm’s value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options. The manager also controls allocation of his outside wealth, which allows partially hedging of his exposure to firm risk. Managerial control increases the expected time to exercise for his employee stock options. It also reduces the gap between his certainty equivalent and the firm’s Fair Value for his compensation, but that gap remains substantial. Managerial control also causes traded options to exhibit an implied volatility smile. With costly control the same basic patterns remain, but the manager’s risk-taking is dampened.     

Operational risk

This paper provides an economic and mathematical characterization of operational risk useful for clarifying the issues related to estimation and the determination of economic capital. The insights for this characterization originate in the corporate finance literature. Operational risk is subdivided into two types, either: (i) the risk of a loss due to the firm’s operating technology, or (ii) the risk of a loss due to agency costs. These two types of operational risks generate loss processes with different economic characteristics. We argue that the current methodology for the determination of economic capital for operational risk is overstated. It is biased high because the computation omits the bank’s net present value (NPV) generating process. We also show that although it is conceptually possible to estimate the operational risk processes’ parameters using only market prices, the non-observability of the firm’s value makes this an unlikely possibility, except in rare cases. Instead, we argue that data internal to the firm, in conjunction with standard hazard rate estimation procedures, provides a more fruitful alternative.     

Short and long translations: Management accounting calculations and innovation management

Management accounting calculations relate innovation to the firm through translations where both can change. Based on examples of the management of innovation from three firms the study shows how management accounting calculations rather than describe the properties of innovation add perspective to them mediating between innovation concerns and firm-wide concerns. This mediation happens through short and long translations. In short translations, management accounting calculations extend or reduce innovation activities via a single calculation. In long translations innovation activities are problematised via multiple calculations. When calculations challenge each other in long translations they problematise not only what innovation should be, but also where it should be located in time and space. In the three examples, calculations mobilised alternative propositions about the relevance of technical artefacts and linked this to innovation strategy and sourcing strategy in the firm’s inter-organisational relations. Tensions between calculations associated with technological, organisational and environmental entities framed considerations about the value of innovation to the firm strategically differently. All this happens because management accounting calculations are partial rather than total calculations of firms’ affairs and value.     

Executive compensation and non-financial risk: An empirical examination

Executives face potentially severe (non-financial) personal risks if firm environmental performance is below industry best practice. We examine the relation between CEO compensation and the non-financial risk associated with environmental exposure, and how use of environmental performance as an explicit determinant of compensation affects this relation. We find evidence that CEOs are compensated for exposure to environmental risk, even after controlling for financial risk. We also find that this premium is reduced when the CEO has greater opportunities to improve the firm’s environmental performance.     

Enterprise risk management and firm performance: A contingency perspective

In recent years, a paradigm shift has occurred regarding the way organizations view risk management. Instead of looking at risk management from a silo-based perspective, the trend is to take a holistic view of risk management. This holistic approach toward managing an organization’s risk is commonly referred to as enterprise risk management (ERM). Indeed, there is growing support for the general argument that organizations will improve their performance by employing the ERM concept. The basic argument presented in this paper is that the relation between ERM and firm performance is contingent upon the appropriate match between ERM and the following five factors affecting a firm: environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, firm complexity, and board of directors’ monitoring. Based on a sample of 112 US firms that disclose the implementation of their ERM activities within their 10Ks and 10Qs filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, empirical evidence confirms the above basic argument. The implication of these findings is that firms should consider the implementation of an ERM system in conjunction with contextual variables surrounding the firm.