Strategic planning in public R&D organizations for agribusiness: Brazil and the United States of America

There is increasing evidence that public organizations dedicated exclusively to research and development (R&D) in agribusiness need systematic management tools to incorporate the uncertainties and complexities of technological and nontechnological factors of external environments in its long-term strategic plans. The major issues are: “What will be the agribusiness science and technology (S&T) needs be in the future?” “How to prepare in order to meet these needs?” Both Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, Embrapa), attached to the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) have developed a comprehensive strategic and operational planning process in order to answer these key questions in the 1990s. The main objective of this article is to present a comparative and preliminary analysis of concepts, methodologies, and processes utilized, and some results obtained by these public organizations.     

Models for innovation diffusion: Vijay Mahajan and Robert A. Peterson; A Sage University Series on “Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences,” No. 07-048, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1985.

Developing countries wish to achieve in a few decades what the developed countries accomplished in many centuries under conditions of relatively lesser resource constraints. Therefore, the developing countries cannot emulate the evolutionary experiences of the developed countries; they need a revolutionary approach in their development strategies. One plausible option for this revolutionary orientation could be the utilization of a technology-based strategy for national development planning. This article proposes undertaking certain measurement activities with respect to the technological system of a country, which would enable national decision makers to use technology as a strategic variable for socioeconomic development. The article briefly describes the role of technology as the master key for sustainable development, discusses the current activities related to the measurement of technology, presents a few conceptual schemes, and a framework for the assessment of national technological capabilities and needs.     

Sources and directions of technological accumulation in France: a statistical comparison with FR Germany and the UK

Technological activities are an important determinant of national economic performance. Data on R&D and on the national origins of patenting in the USA show that, compared to those of FR Germany and the UK, French technological activities have the following characteristics: (1) a relatively high rate of growth over the past 20 years in aggregate activity; (2) concentration of technological strength in sectors dominated by state procurement and related R&D funding, rather than in “core” technologies; (3) stronger performance in fast-growing technologies in defence, electrical products and fine chemicals, than in electronics and motor vehicles; (4) a relatively stable and speialized sectoral pattern of technological strengths and weaknesses; and (5) sectoral patterns of trading strengths and weaknesses that broadly reflect those in technology. These characteristics of France's technological activities cannot be explained by their greater or lesser concentration, which is very similar to that found in both FR Germany and the UK, both in aggregate and in specific sectors. As in the other two countries, a few large firms have a major influence on national technological activities, especially in R&D-intensive sectors and automobiles. These results are on the whole consistent with the recent assessment by INSEE and CEPII of France's competitive position in international markets. However, they do show a strong Franch “niche” in technologies linked to state markets, and they do suggest certain advantages in long-term stability, rather than rapaid change, in technological priorities.     

Technology Foresight Activities in Korea and in Countries Closing the Technology Gap

This article discusses technology foresight in selected countries which were politically dependent (colonial) before World War II and considered as “under-developed” in the post-war period. Most of them show considerable economic dynamism in the 1990s, which is not always based on their own scientific and technological capability. For this group of countries, national exercises in technology foresight are likely to be an important tool in planning the strategic direction for science and technology development in order to catch up economically as well as socially. In Korea, which has recently become an OECD member, comparative advantage based on factors such as low wages and protected industries are no longer effective as the economy is now wide open to the world. Foresight is being used to look at comparative advantages based on Korea’s own knowledge-creating activities. In southeast Asian countries, foresight is still in an infant stage, but most of these have medium-term planning cycles and have undertaken longer-term vision studies. In South Africa, a national foresight project is running, as is an adapting foresight process to make the large national research organization fit. In Latin America, an agenda has been set up which indicates the desire of several countries to engage in foresight activities using different approaches.     

Universities and intellectual property rights in Southern European countries

This paper analyses and discusses the patenting activity of Public Research Organizations (PROs) in Southern European countries. Despite the importance of the topic, studies about the European experience are rare. By using an original database of “American” (USPTO) and “European” (EPO) patents held by PROs in Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece, we observe that the number of university patents in these countries has not increased dramatically during the last years, despite a growing interest at both European and national level during the same period. However, differences do exist among countries in terms of number of granted patents and regulative frameworks. With regard to PROs patenting strategies, we argue that PROs should be progressively able to adopt a “balanced” approach, in order to achieve co-existence between the traditional mechanisms of the so-called “open research system” and the more recent concerns about intellectual property protection, technology transfer and regional development.     

Government funding strategy in technology programs

Industrial R&D in a market economy is mainly implemented in the private sector, therefore public funding is a very important tool of government to guide private R&D activities. This paper investigates the experience of funding national programs in a number of industrialized countries, and reaches some preliminary conclusions: (a) To reduce opportunistic behavior and ingrain intrinsic incentive in firms, both competition and cost-sharing principles should be used concurrently in underwriting firms' R&D projects. (b) Competition principles can be applied across many candidate projects around the same time or a series of one-of-a-kind projects over a longer time horizon. (c) The major threat to application of competition principles is that there is no “real competition” due to few qualified candidates in specific technological fields or in some, especially small, countries. (d) In practice, the appropriate cost-sharing level is difficult to determine. Fifty-fifty is used as a rule of thumb in many countries to simplify the decision making and circumvent “bounded rationality.” (e) Full cost endorsement may be another “quantum” alternative for projects urged by government but not felt to be very relevant by firms.     

A model of “coupled” technology transfer : A logistic curve approach

This article presents a mathematical model relating to the technology transfer problem. The origin of the problem stems from the existing trade-offs between the strategies of “technological progressiveness” and “static efficiency” employed by firms or countries defined as “leaders” and “followers,” respectively. The formulation of the model is based on the assumption that the technological development of a firm or a country follows a logistic growth curve when related to a specific technology. During the process of a “coupled” technology transfer, the development of the follower changes and its behavior is described by a first order nonhomogenous deferential equation. Different scenarios of the “coupled” technology transfer between the leader and the follower are being discussed.     

Tolerance for uncertainty and the growth of informationally opaque industries

Hofstede's [Hofstede, Geert H. 1980. Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.] cross-country psychological survey of IBM employees finds that some countries (societies) are systematically less tolerant of uncertainty, while uncertainty-tolerance is shown by some theoretic models to be essential to the growth of emerging sectors about which less is known. This paper first uses Durnev, Morck, and Yeung's [Durnev, Art, Morck, Randall, and Yeung, Bernard. 2004. Value-enhancing capital budgeting and firm-specific stock return variation. The Journal of Finance. 59(1): 65–105.] methodology to identify these informationally opaque industries. The hypothesis is then made that countries characterized by high uncertainty aversion (measured by Hofstede's indicator, and two other alternative indicators) will grow disproportionately slower in industrial sectors where information is less available. Using the Rajan and Zingales [Rajan, Raghuram G. and Zingales, Luigi. 1998. Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review. Vol. 88(3): 559–586.] “difference-in-differences” methodology, which is relatively free from the endogeneity problem, the study provides robust evidence of such an industrial growth pattern in 34 countries and 36 manufacturing industries. It also shows that national uncertainty aversion is not driven by underdevelopment of financial sector, inadaptability of civil law systems, lower level of economic or human capital development, labor market inflexibility, or any of many other institutional factors. The results remain robust when religious (Catholic vs. Protestant) composition is used as an instrumental variable for national uncertainty aversion. The international evidence presented helps explain why some countries are slower in embracing “new” (vs. traditional) industries.     

Scenarios and the growth of knowledge: Notes on the epistemic element in scenario building

Scenarios raise a very remarkable challenge. They are a special category of thought experiments and as such they deal with the domain of the “possible” and “probable”, i.e. with the world of speculation. Nevertheless they are of a crucial practical importance for public policy, management and strategic thinking in general: any premeditated significant action has to be preceded by such a thought experiment that anticipates the possibility of its outcomes and its implications. The question is then, how could speculation have such a crucial epistemic role? What kind of knowledge, if any, do scenarios produce? What is the epistemic role of scenarios? The objective of this article is to discuss the controversial but crucial issue of the epistemic functions of scenarios and to outline several possible approaches to it. The article explores the relevance in this respect of the research that has been already done on thought experiments, de-biasing, deductive arguments and uncertainty—and complexity—coping cognitive devices while indicating the potential contribution of that literature to the further development of the scenario building practice and of the futures methodology.     

The impact of liberalization on bureaucratic corruption

Liberalization increases the number of goods available for consumption within a country. Since bureaucrats value variety, this raises the marginal utility of accepting a bribe. This “benefit effect” is counteracted by an increasing “cost effect” from corruption deterrence activities that arise due to greater international pressure to curb corruption. The interaction of these two effects can lead to a non-monotonic relation between liberalization and corruption. Moreover, pre-commitment to deterrence activities is shown to be more effective in controlling corruption. Empirical evidence supports the existence of a non-monotonic relation between economic openness and corruption among developing countries.     

Technological generalizations and leitbilder—the anticipation of technological opportunities

Recent national technology foresight studies as well as the Millennium Project of the American Council for the United Nations University are very much based on “nodes of discussion.” These short statements are called, e.g., topics, issues, or developments. This article provides a framework for the classification and analysis of nodes related to future technological development. Key concepts of the article are “technological generalization” and “leitbild.” The topics in the technology foresight Delphi studies can be seen as different kinds of generalizations from already realized technological developments. Leitbild is a German word. Its most general meaning is a guiding image. Like a common vision, a leitbild creates a shared overall goal, offers orientation toward one long-term overall goal, and provides a basis for different professions and disciplines to work in the same direction. The analysis of leitbilder and emerging technological paradigms might contribute to the construction of topics and issues and to the argumentation processes related to them.     

Adaptive Foresight: Navigating the complex landscape of policy strategies

Adaptive Foresight has been developed at the crossroads of foresight and adaptive strategic planning. Innovation is seen as increasingly complex, interdependent and uncertain and therefore in need of broad and multi-disciplinary exploration and participation. The adaptive planning paradigm provides a natural guide for navigation of this complex landscape: one should consider whether strategic decisions should be deferred until more information is available and simultaneously whether to invest in (real) options which would facilitate the implementation of such decisions if taken some future time. This does not mean that all strategic decisions should be deferred. Rather it is the careful combining of commitment and opportunism that best enables actors to pursue their super-ordinate values and objectives. Compared to conventional foresight, Adaptive Foresight thus favours a more modest interpretation of the collective ability to “shape the future” and stresses the need to adapt to actions by others. Here it is equally important to be able to exploit the upside of uncertainty as to abate its downside. The purpose of this paper is to achieve a conceptual consolidation of Adaptive Foresight, to review in a fairly hands-on way methodological experience thus far, and to outline the substantial methodological challenges ahead.     

An introduction to nanotechnology policy: Opportunities and constraints for emerging and established economies

Nanotechnology has captured wide attention all over the world and excited the imagination of young and old alike. Interest in the subject has increased remarkably during the last few years because of potential technological applications, and commercial interest has skyrocketed. The promise of nanotechnology as an economic engine that can redefine the wellbeing of regions and nations is pervasive; yet the imprecise language, and overuse of the term nanotechnology, has made that term fuzzier, broader, and trendier than many imagined possible. This is especially evident in nanotechnology market projections, which rose dramatically over the past five years as more traditional “product families” were engulfed by the expanding use of the term. Government policy regarding nanotechnology has often resembled an embrace of imagination rather than a systematic use of what Sun Tzu and others have taught about strategic decision making. Further, if nanotechnology is truly the next wave of technology product paradigms, how will we provide an educated workforce to support it? Moreover, in company with these societal benefits come increased societal risks. This paper is intended to provide policy makers and strategists with observations that might limit actions such as those that led to the “over-hype” of nanotechnology and to the fear (or discounting) of societal risks. In the latter case we might learn from the experiences of policy makers connected with other emerging enabling-technology bases, such as nuclear energy and, to a lesser extent, the “dot-com” boom.     

Home country effects of foreign direct investment: From a small economy to a large economy

Previous studies on home country effects mainly focused on FDI from large developed economies to other countries. But today's super recipient is a relatively larger economy than its investors and many of these investors are not classified as “developed economies.” A simple Ak type model implies that a small and more developed country investing in a large and less developed country will experience decreases in both employment and income disparity (compared to the recipient country) as the less-developed recipient country gains the higher technology of production through FDI inflows. The empirical results for the Four Tigers (source countries) and China (recipient country) are consistent with our theoretical model of FDI outflows. We also find that FDI outflows to China decrease the ratio of exports to GDP only for small source countries, even though a higher investment in China raises the share of these countries' exports-to-China to China's total imports.     

Future information systems for road transport: A Delphi panel-derived scenario

Modern information and microelectronic technology can be used to improve road traffic. The aim of this study is to create scenarios on how new information systems for improved road traffic can evolve. What are the driving forces? Who can act? Who can benefit? What are the social impacts?Through the use of a Delphi panel of professionals, researchers, and informed generalists, we have gathered impulses for the scenarios on how information technology, communication means, and control systems can reshape future road traffic. The issue studied is how this “Road Transport Informatics” (RTI) will evolve.     

A Brief Methodological Guide to Scenario Building

This brief guide reviews the philosophical underpinnings of the prospective procedure then strives to explain the concepts and characteristics of this “intellectual undiscipline” which aims not to predict but rather to help shape the future. La prospective contributes to our efforts to gain foresight, an indispensable quality for anyone who wants to be an actor in a future yet to be created. The various stages of the procedure are presented, in particular the scenario method as applied by the author in local, national, and international futures projects for subjects as varied as aging populations, retirement in industrialized countries, and the impact of new technology on production.     

A re-examination of the technological catching-up hypothesis across OECD industries

This study re-examines the catching-up hypothesis at the industry level across the main OECD countries, using panel data econometric models involving technological gap indicators calculated with a nonparametric distance function suggested by Färe et al. [Färe, R.S., Grosskopf, M.N., Norris, M., Xhang, Z., 1994. Productivity growth, technical progress, and efficiency change in industrialized countries. American Economic Review 84, 66–83]. The results show that there is statistical evidence of a catching-up process at the industry level. Moreover, both tradables and nontradables sectors exhibit catching-up effects and technology adoption from abroad. This result complements the findings by Bernard and Jones [Bernard, A.B., Jones, C.I., 1996a. Comparing apples to oranges: productivity convergence and measurement across industries and countries. American Economic Review 86(5), 1216–1238., Bernard, A.B., Jones, C.I., 1996b. Productivity across industries and countries: Time series theory and evidence. Review Of Economics and Statistics 78, 135–146], Gouyette and Perelman [Gouyette, C., Perelman, S., 1997. Productivity convergence in OECD services industries. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 8, 279–295] and Hansson and Henrekson [Hansson, P., Henrekson, M., 1997. Catching up, social capability, government size and economic growth, in V. Bergström, eds, Government and Growth, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 61–126] that there is no (or even a slow) catching-up effect in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, social capability indicators evaluated for each country show that “Non-European” and “Central European” tradables sectors have a rather similar degree of inefficiency while “North European” countries are less efficient for both tradables and non-tradables. Lastly, both the cross country and the cross sectors dispersions of inefficiency levels are smaller for tradables sectors than for non-tradables.     

Technology, productivity, and organization

The on-coming age of changing technology and knowledge intensification, and its interactions with human values are expected to bring forth fundamental shifts in socioeconomic environment. The paper presents an overview of the dynamics of technological change, a hypothesis on productivity dynamics, and likely shifts in organizational structure. To cope with changes, organizational productivity has to be increasingly governed by human creativity and managerial effectiveness. The structure will be flatter, action-oriented, entrepreneurial, and, above all, flexible. By being organically alive, it will be different from conventional mechanical setups. The future will witness more of flexible manufacturing and flexible management systems and a change of emphasis from “management of technology” to “management of change”, governed by a multiperspective vision. The paper also analyzes major problems likely to be faced by developing countries in getting prepared for the future. In addition to their current focus on technological aspects, the Third World countries have to be seriously concerned about people and organizational issues.     

Technology Forecasting Activities in Japan

Japan started its development in science and technology later than other countries but was nevertheless quite successful. Many factors contributed to this success—and one of them was the adaptation of large foresight studies at the end of the 1960s. In Japan, the Science and Technology Agency (STA), among others, in 1971 started to conduct a large study on the future of science and technology. The Delphi method was one technique used for foresight activities. This was not considered a tool of prediction but an instrument to systematically look into the long-term future. Among the aims of this type of national activity is the identification of areas of strategic research and of generic technologies most likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits. Although many countries stopped their national foresight activities in the 1970s, the Japanese Delphi process continued and was applied every five years. In 1997, the sixth study was finished. Yet, Japanese technology policies are less consistent than is commonly believed and involve an assortment of policy measures and actors/agencies pragmatically devised to address diverse, ever-changing, and sometimes conflicting needs embedded in a broad range of issues. Forecasting results provide the “language” to communicate among Japanese actors in science, technology, and society.